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Alan  James  Horn.  31.01.03. Abstract: 
The  thesis  is  a  contribution  to  the  understanding  of  the  relationship  of  the  dialectical 
thought  and  method  of  G.  W.  F.  Hegel  and  K.  Marx.  The  aim  of  the  thesis  is  to  ascertain 
what  the  relation  and  the  difference  between  the  two  contrary  forms,  of  the  idealist  and  the 
materialist  dialectic,  actually  is.  The  thesis  consequently  attempts  to  make  sense  of  Marx's 
view  that  his  application  of  the  dialectical  method  was  not  only  different  from,  but  also  the 
"direct  opposite"  of  his  idealist  predecessor.  This  theme,  itself  the  source  for  the  enigmatic 
nature  of  the  inversion,  is  developed  by  ascertaining  some  of  the  core  elements  that  lie 
behind  and  underpin  Marx's  own  comment;  that  the  rational  kernel  of  Hegel's  mystical 
form  of  dialectic  could  be  discovered  if  it  was  "turned  right  side  up  again.  " 
The  thesis  also  explores  the  relationship  between  the  early  Marx's  critique  of  Hegel, 
contained  in  the  1844  Paris  Manuscripts,  with  the  later  Marx's  comments  on  his  view  of 
the  relation  of  his  dialectic  to  Hegel's.  As  such,  the  thesis  argues  that  there  is  both  a 
continuity  and  a  development  in  Marx's  critical  attitude  to  Hegel's  dialectical  thought. 
The  core  elements  of  the  rational  kernel  of  Hegel's  dialectic  for  Marx  lies,  as  the  thesis 
will  argue,  in  the  Hegelian  account  of  the  general  form  of  working  of  the  dialectic,  and  in 
Hegel's  explication  of  the  laws  of  dialectics.  The  thesis  thus  explores  the  intimate  relation 
of  these  two  interconnected  themes  from  the  point  of  view  of  Hegel's  systematic  idealism, 
and  in  Marx's  materialist  application  of  these  rational  elements  to  his  critique  of  political 
economy. 
This  involves  endeavouring  to  elucidate,  both  the  nature  of  a  dialectical  account  of 
contradiction,  and  the  related  explanation  of  nomological  activity  or  law  from  a  dialectical 
perspective.  The  thesis  also  attempts  to  explore  the  fundamental  contrast  of  the  materialist 
from  the  idealist  elucidation  of  these  core  elements.  The  focus  for  the  summation  of  this 
difference  is  discussed  in  the  final  chapter,  by  developing  the  materialist  view  of  the 
fundamental  contradiction  contained  in  Hegel's  idealist  account,  that  of  the  open-ended 
nature  of  the  dialectical  method  and  Hegel's  philosophical  system. TABLE  OF  CONTENTS: 
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PART  ONE: 
THE  CRITIQUE  OF  DIALECTICAL  MYSTIFICATION. 
CHAPTER  ONE. 
THE  DIALECTIC  DE-MYSTIFIED. 
1.  Introduction:  The  Enigma  Outlined. 
"Aphorism:  It  is  impossible  completely  to  understand  Marx's  Capital,  and  especially 
the  first  chapter,  without  having  thoroughly  studied  and  understood  the  whole  of 
Hegel's  Logic.  Consequently,  half  a  century  later  none  of  the  Marxists  understood 
Marx!!  "  ' 
The  general  aim  of  the  present  thesis  is  to  contribute  to  an  understanding  of  the  intellectual 
relationship  of  Marx  to  Hegel;  a  relation  that,  as  Lenin  noted,  had  still  to  be  fully  understood 
in  all  of  its  complexity.  Failure  to  adequately  grasp  this  relation  has,  moreover,  had 
deleterious  theoretical  consequences  for  the  understanding  of  the  nature  of  dialectics  itself. 
Marx,  more  than  once,  pointed  out  the  need  to  "divest"  or  "strip  away"  the  mystical  veil  that 
surrounds  the  rational  element  contained  in  Hegel's  philosophical  thought.  His  suggested 
1 method,  by  which  that  rational  kernel  could  be  discovered  from  within  the  idealist  mystical 
shell,  was  by  turning  it  right  side  up  again. 
This  problem,  which  I  call  the  enigma  of  the  inversion,  has  though  to  be  seriously  and 
critically  addressed  if  any  real  progress  is  to  be  made  in  deepening  our  understanding  of 
what,  precisely,  is  the  nature  of  a  dialectical  method.  If  the  relation  of  Hegel  and  Marx's 
dialectic  is  poorly  appreciated,  then  consequently  a  fuller  comprehension  of  the  nature  of 
dialectics  is  too. 
That  there  are  problematics  involved  in  understanding  the  relation  of  Hegel  to  Marx  is 
generally  accepted  by  a  wide  spectrum  of  opinion.  Yet  this  theoretical  question  still  remains 
of  fundamental  importance,  for  if  analysed  correctly,  it  should  take  us  to  the  heart  of  what  a 
dialectical  account  is.  Why  though  is  it  problematic? 
Firstly,  Marx  himself  never  fully  settled  his  accounts  with  Hegel  in  writing,  though  his 
intention  to  do  so,  as  we  shall  see,  was  one  that  remained  with  him  for  a  number  of  years. 
Secondly,  an  adequate  explanation  of  what  the  specific  nature  of  this  inversion  actually 
entails  is  also  seen  to  face  great  difficulties  in  being  gleaned  from  Marx's  scanty  comments 
on  this  issue.  Marx's  suggestion,  or  clue,  has  been  viewed  as  not  containing  either  sufficient 
explanatory  power,  or  content,  to  afford  a  coherent  strategy  for  developing  a  rational 
account  of  a  dialectical  methodology. 
Indeed,  many  commentators  hasten  to  point  out  the  very  problematical  nature  of  Marx's 
suggestion  that  the  dialectic  should  be  "turned  right  side  up  again"  in  order  to  discover  the 
rational  kernel  contained  in  Hegel's  dialectical  thought. 
For  example,  in  the  work  of  L.  Althusser,  there  is  no  rational  kernel  to  be  extracted  from  the 
mystical  shell;  the  Hegelian  kernel  itself  is  infected  with  idealist  and  ideological 
mystifications.  Turning  it  upside  down  does  not  extract  any  rational  content  from  this 
I  V.  I.  Lenin.  Collected  Works.  Progress  Publishers  (1972.  )  Volume  38.  P-180. 
2 process,  as  there  is  no  fundamental  relation  between  the  process  of  inverting  and  the  process 
of  extracting.  "How  can  an  inversion  be  an  extraction"  as  Althusser  puts  it? 
In  his  account,  there  is  no  working  concept  behind  Marx's  idea  of  inverting  Hegel's 
dialectic;  the  thought  of  it  being  turned  right  side  up  again  being  "merely  gestural,  even 
metaphorical".  That  there  is  a  working  concept  behind  the  inversion  is,  I  believe,  the  case. 
That  concept  is  the  dialectic  itself,  what  other  concept  could  be  informing  Marx's 
observations?  ' 
This  critical  interpretation  of  Marx's  comments  has  also  been  viewed  as  being  the  case  by 
those  on  the  opposite  end  of  the  scale  from  Althusser;  that  is,  by  those  more  sympathetic  to 
a  Hegelian  interpretation  of  Marx.  Here,  C.  Arthur  raises  the  following  question  that 
challenges  Marx's  own  clarity  on  this  issue. 
"The  question  of  how  Marx's  critique  of  political  economy  benefited,  in  its 
presentation  at  least,  from  his  appropriation  of  Hegel's  logic.  It  is  my  belief  that 
Marx  himself  was  not  clear  about  the  answer  to  this  question;  the  relatively  sketchy 
and  enigmatic  remarks  in  his  prefaces  may  be  a  sign  of  this.  Although  Marx 
acknowledged  the  influence  of  Hegel's  dialectic  on  his  Capital,  he  failed  to  explain 
how  an  idealist  logic  could  assist  a  materialist  science.  He  left  the  impression  that 
one  could  preserve  a  logic  while  inverting  its  ontological  presuppositions.  This 
introduces  a  dichotomy  of  form  and  content  that  is  itself  undialectical.  "3 
C.  Arthur's  "belief"  that  Marx  himself  was  not  clear  how  his  critique  of  political  economy 
benefited  from  his  appropriation  of  Hegel's  Logic  seems  to  me  a  highly  implausible  solution 
'  Louis  Althusser.  For  Marx.  Penguin  Press.  (1969.  ).  Althusser's  work  is  a  semi-systematic  attempt  to 
rid  Marx  of  any  Hegelian  influence.  As  a  result,  there  has  to  be  a  widespread  revision  of  the  centrality  of 
dialectical  contradiction  as  a  form  of  polarity  that  is  contained  in  the  work  of  Hegel,  Marx,  Engels,  Lenin, 
Trotsky,  etc.  In  a  nutshell,  the  classical  approach  to  dialectics,  defended  in  the  present  thesis,  was  thrown 
overboard  to  meet  the  requirements  of  what  he  regarded  as  uniting  theory  with  practice.  The  question  is 
though,  which  practice  did  Althusser  wish  to  theoretically  underpin? 
3 or,  more  correctly,  explanation  to  the  problem.  Similarly,  that  Marx  "failed"  to  explain  how 
an  idealist  logic  could  assist  a  materialist  science  is  problematic,  only  if  you  posit  the  view 
that  he  left  the  "impression"  that  this  entails  that  the  idealist  logical  form  is  preserved  while 
its  ontological  assumptions  are  inverted:  I 
In  my  view,  it  is  not  just  Marx's  "presentation"  of  his  critique  of  political  economy  that-  is 
influenced  by  his  appropriation  of  Hegelian  logic.  His  employment  of  a  dialectical  method 
of  treatment  of  the  nature  of  the  substance  and  form  of  value  is  the  primary  source  of  his 
critique  of  political  economy.  A  method  of  treatment  that  is,  moreover,  the  result  of  his  own 
materialist  appropriation  and  critique  of  Hegel's  dialectic. 
The  ontological  inversion  of  *Hegel  by  Marx  does,  and  has  to,  alter  Marx's  view  of  the 
Hegelian  logical  form.  The  de-mystification  of  the  dialectic  by  Marx  also  applies  to  Hegel's 
logical  thought  content;  the  critique  of  Hegel's  logic  by  Marx  will  also  be  exhibited  as 
having  a  twofold  form  and  content,  being  both  rational  and  mystical  in  its  nature. 
Marx's  failure  to  fully  settle  his  accounts  with  Hegel's  dialectic  is  more  plausibly  explained 
by  lack  of  time  and  pressure  of  work,  rather  than  lack  of  clarity  in  Marx's  thought  process. 
All  the  evidence  from  Marx's  comments  on  this  subject  points  in  this  direction.  Marx 
expressed,  on  more  than  one  occasion  and  spanning  a  number  of'years,  his  desire  and 
intention  to  settle  those  accounts  if  circumstances  permitted.  Marx  did  not  so  much  fail;  it 
was  more  a  question  that  he  did  not  have  the  time  to  devote  to  it,  hence  the  resultant  esoteric 
nature  of  his  comments. 
That  Marx's  methodological  remarks  are  "relatively  sketchy  and  enigmatic"  is  undoubtedly 
the  case.  However,  it  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  warrant  the  inference  that  Marx  "himself" 
lacked  clarity  in  understanding  his  relation  to  Hegel's  dialectic.  That  there  are  genuine 
problems  inherent  in  Marx's  inversion  of  Hegel,  and  that  those  problems  are  fraught  with 
3  C.  J.  Arthur.  Hegel's  Logic  and  Marx's  Capital.  Contained  in  Marx's  Method  in  Capital.  A  Re- 
Examination.  Edited  by  F.  Moseley.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  63-  64. 
4 theoretical  and  intellectual  difficulties  for  a  coherent  understanding,  does  not  negate  the 
need  for  both  clarity  and  explanation. 
The  necessity  to  do  so  remains  an  important  and  fundamental  question  that  has  far  reaching 
theoretical  and  practical  consequences.  It  is  not  a  luxury  of  theory,  it  has  never  been  so;  it  is, 
on  the  contrary,  a  theoretical  imperative.  Any  argument,  from  whatever  quarter,  that  points 
in  the  direction  of  closing  the  door  on  any  possible  fruitful  outcome  of  investigation  should 
therefore  be  rejected. 
C.  Arthur,  unlike  Althusser,  does  offer  a  positive  and  partial  resolution  to  the  problem  of  the 
enigmatic  relation  of  Hegel  and  Marx's  dialectic  in  the  following  form.  That  the  relation  of 
Hegel's  logic  to  value  theory  centres  on  Hegel's  concept  of  a  systematic  totality,  a 
systematic  totality  that  Marx  employs  in  his  critique  of  capital.  That  the  Hegelian  view  of 
this  is  an  important  and  central  influence  on  Marx's  account  of  capital  as  a  systematic  whole 
is,  in  my  view,  undoubtedly  correct.  4 
The  question  still  remains  though,  in  what  way  does  Hegel's  account  of  this  systematic 
totality  relate  to  the  wider  point  of  Marx,  that  of  inverting  the  mystical  form  of  Hegel's 
dialectic  in  order  to  extract  the  rational  kernel?  Moreover,  how  does  that,  in  turn,  relate  to 
the  question  of  the  apparent  undialectical.  dichotomy  of  an  idealist  logical  form  and  a 
materialist  ontological  content?  Alternatively  posed,  in  what  way  does  the  materialist 
critique  of  Marx  impact  on  Hegel's  account  of  a  logical  system  itself? 
What  is  central  to  a  fuller  answer  to  this  question  is  Marx's  critique,  and  application  of 
Hegel's  account  of  the  laws  of  motion  of  dialectical  contradiction,  the  motor  force  of  the 
development  that  coheres  both  Hegel's  and  Marx's  view  of  a  systematic  totality.  This 
4  The  work  of  both  C.  Arthur  and  T.  Smith  in  this  very  area,  that  of  the  relation  between  Hegel's  logical 
system  and  Marx's  critique  of  capital,  must  be  given  due  credit.  Whilst  their  work  is  not  the  last  word  on  the 
subject,  they  have  both  made  valuable  contributions  to  our  understanding  of  many  of  the  issues  that  result 
from  this  fundamental  relationship.  C.  J.  Arthur.  (op.  cited.  )  T.  Smith.  The  Logic  of  Marx's  Capital.  S.  U.  N.  Y. 
Press.  (1990.  ) 
5 primary  and  essential  problematic  of  dialectics,  its  account  of  systematic  nomological 
activity,  in  both  or  either  of  its  idealist  and  materialist  forms  and  content,  as  well  as  their 
relationship,  has,  so  far,  not  been  fully,  and  hence  successfully  extracted  by  commentators 
on  the  relation  of  Hegel  and  Marx's  dialectic. 
The  central  question  that  continues  to  beset  the  development  of  a  clear  and  lucid  account  of 
scientific  dialectics,  and  which  has  therefore  been  a  theoretical  problem  of  human  thought 
that  is  getting  on  now  for  nearly  a  hundred  and  fifty  years,  is  the  following  one.  How  does 
one  go  about  successfully  divesting  or  stripping  away  the  mystical  form  in  which  Hegel  had 
enveloped  the  dialectic?  Lack  of  clarity  on  this  central  question  of  the  evolution  of 
dialectical  method  and  thought  entails  the  continuation  of  the  enigmatic  nature  of  the 
dialectical  relation  and  difference  of  Hegel  and  Marx. 
Consequently,  the  nature  of  dialectics  itself  as  a  rational  and  scientific  method,  remains,  like 
Hegel's  own  idealist  variation,  still  largely  shrouded  in  mystery.  The  key  here  to  untangling 
this  dilemma,  is  to  view  Hegel  and  Marx's  relation  as  itself  a  dialectical  one,  as  the 
expression  of  the  movement  of  a  contradiction.  This  is  to  formulate  the  relational  problem 
within  the  classical  Hegelian  sense  of  aufheben,  where  the  question  becomes  not  only  what 
is  cancelled,  but  also  what  is  preserved  or  retained  in  the  process  of  supersession. 
Indeed,  the  solution  to  the  enigma  of  the  inversion  hinges,  by  and  large,  on  developing  the 
analysis  and  argument  along  this  very  conceptual  framework  of  development.  This  is  the 
essence  of  the  dynamic  contained  in  Marx's  supersession  of  Hegel's  thought.  The  difficulty 
of  the  analysis  is  to  work  your  way  through  the  logic  of  the  relations  contained  in  this 
process  of  supersession. 
The  aim  of  the  thesis  is  to  provide  a  contribution  to  what  the  possible  foundations  and 
beginnings  of  an  answer  to  this  problematic  of  the  nature  of  the  inversion  of  Hegel, 
contained  within  Marx's  dialectic,  actually  is.  Given  that  none  other  than  Marx  himself 
6 bequeathed  this  theoretical  quandary  to  us,  it  cannot  be  ignored,  wished  away,  or  treated  as 
either  a  non-question  or,  for  that  matter,  an  unanswerable  one. 
The  inversion  that  Marx  suggests  applies,  in  my  view,  not  only  to  the  idealist  foundations 
but  also  the  idealist  subject  matter  of  Hegel;  a  materialist  method  requires  a  materialist 
subject  matter  as  its  presupposition.  It  is  necessary  to  invert  not  only  the  ontological 
presupposition  of  Hegelian  logic,  but  also  its  idealist  ontological  form  and  content;  as  the 
alienated  expression  of  "pure  thought"  in  the  guise  of  a  mystical  supersensible  subject,  the 
absolute. 
This  was,  in  my  view,  the  route  and  journey  that  was  taken  by  Marx.  All  the  evidence, 
which  will  be  cited  in  the  present  argument,  points  in  this  direction.  Moreover,  this  entails 
that  Marx  had  already  traversed  his  own  suggested  path  of  turning  Hegel's  idealist  method 
and  dialectic  upside  down.  That  journey,  ftom  the  early  criticism  of  Hegel's  speculative 
dialectic  to  the  later  criticism  of  capital,  is  a  long  road.  At  the  same  time  it  is  also  an 
interconnected  journey  that  spans  the  intellectual  movement  of  a  single  subject,  namely 
Marx  himself. 
For  a  full  and  comprehensive  understanding  of  Marx's  dialectical  method  can  only  be 
generated  by  working  through  both  his  early  materialist  criticisms  of  Hegel's  mystical  form 
of  dialectic,  and  his  own  later  critical  application  to  political  economy  of  the  materialised 
form  of  dialectic.  The  question  is  what  rational  elements  of  Hegelian  dialectics  are  retained 
in  this  process,  given  that  Marx's  characterisation  of  Hegel's  dialectic  itself  takes  a  twofold 
expression,  as  itself  having  both  a  mystical  and  a  rational  form  and  content? 
By  understanding  the  nature  of  the  tensions  and  contradictions  in  the  relationship  between 
Hegel's  idealist  form  of  dialectic  and  the  dialectic  in  the  real  world,  in  real  nature  and  in  real 
society,  is  the  key  to  understanding  how  the  inversion  of  Hegel  was  initially  developed  by 
Marx  himself.  When  this  earlier  critique  of  Marx  is,  as  it  should  be,  combined  with  Marx's 
7 later  application  of  the  dialectic  to  political  economy,  then  the  fuller  content  of  the  rational 
form  of  dialectics  itself  can  begin  to  emerge. 
At  the  same  time,  what  still  remains  of  rational  use  and  value  in  Hegel's  method  should  then 
be  more  able  to  be  definitively  extracted.  This  orientation  would  also  avoid  or  circumvent 
the  "impression"  of  an  undialectical  dichotomy  of  an  idealist  logical  form  and  a  materialist 
content  that  Arthur  alludes  to  in  Marx. 
2.  Rational  Kernel  and  Mystical  Shell. 
The  starting  point  of  the  present  study  will  aim  to  show,  through  analysing  Marx's  own 
correspondence  and  writings,  that  contrary  to  some  widespread  misconceptions,  Marx  did  in 
fact  have  a  consistent  thread  to  his  view  of  Hegel  that  spanned  his  early,  mature,  and  later 
years.  Despite  the  changes  in  tone,  emphasis,  and  subject  matter  of  Marx's  criticisms  and, 
for  that  matter,  the  changes  of  emphasis  and  weight  of  his  overall  appraisal  of  Hegel's 
philosophy,  there  still  remains,  in  my  view,  a  thread  of  continuity  in  his  assessment. 
The  guiding  thread  of  this  continuity  in  Marx's  thought  is  contained  in  his  assessment  that 
there  was  a  fundamentally  contradictory  element  and  dynamic  contained  in  Hegel's  own 
account  of  dialectic.  Its  twofold  form  and  nature  was,  paradoxically,  both  mystical  and 
rational.  Firstly,  what  evidence  is  there  in  Marx  that  would  lend  aid  and  support  to  this 
viewpoint? 
Secondly,  what  other  reflections  are  there  on  Hegel,  that  Marx  makes  over  the  years,  that 
could  give  some  more  clues  and  insights  into,  not  only  Marx's  critical  assessment  of  Hegel, 
but  also  what  still  remains  in  his  thought  that  could  be  considered  of  rational  scientific  use? 
Let  us  investigate  the  second  question  first,  before  seeing  what  evidence  there  might  be  for 
the  idea  of  a  thread  of  continuity  in  Marx's  critical  assessment  of  Hegel. 
8 Despite  their  sketchy  nature,  the  methodological  remarks  in  the  afterwords  and  prefaces 
written  by  Marx,  supplemented  by  some  letters  of  correspondence,  can,  in  my  view,  yield 
some  interesting  and  fruitful  lines  of  investigation.  The  only  available  empirical  data  for 
analysing  the  relation  of  Hegel  to  Marx  are  the  above,  and  the  primary  texts  of  Hegel  and 
Marx.  We  have  no  other  substantial  material  at  our  disposal  to  work  with.  It  therefore 
requires  thoroughgoing  analysis  to  see  what  they  can  yield.  This  is  the  strategy  adopted  in 
5  the  present  work. 
The  correspondence  cited  here  dates  from  the  period  when  Marx  was  compiling  his 
Grundrisse  notebooks  to  a  few  years  after  the  publication  of  Capital  volume  1.  Roughly,  the 
years  from  1857  to  1873.  The  correspondence  analysed  here  broadly  highlight  areas  why 
Marx  may  have,  not  only  benefited  as  he  put  it  "by  mere  accident"  from  re-acquainting 
himself  with  Hegel's  Logic,  but  also  why  he  thought  it  necessary  to  endeavour  to  ascertain 
the  rational  core  of  Hegel's  work. 
The  following  letter  to  Engels  is  dated  16'  Jan.  1858,  when  Marx  was  busily  working  on  the 
Grundrisse. 
"I  am,  by  the  way,  discovering  some  nice  arguments.  E.  G.  I  have  completely 
demolished  the  theory  of  profit  as  hitherto  propounded.  What  was  of  great  use  to  me 
as  regards  method  of  treatment  was  Hegel's  Logic  at  which  I  had  another  look  BY 
MERE  ACCIDENT.  .. 
If  ever  the  time  comes  when  such  work  is  again  possible,  I 
should  very  much  like  to  write  two  or  three  sheets  making  accessible  to  the  common 
reader  the  rational  aspect  of  the  method  which  Hegel  not  only  discovered  but  also 
mystified.  " 
I  This  is  not  entirely  true,  we  also  have  the  work  of  F.  Engels,  which,  despite  whatever  misgivings 
some  people  may  have,  are  a  highly  valuable  resource  on  both  dialectics  and  Marx's  thought.  I  am,  here,  also 
making  a  distinction  between  what  I  would  call  the  primary  material  of  Hegel  and  Marx  that  is  the  necessary 
core  of  the  research,  from  the  secondary  material  and  literature  on  the  subject. 
I  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  40.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1983.  )  P.  249. 
9 Four  months  later  in  a  letter  to  Lassalle  dated  31"  May  1858,  Marx  writes  on  a  similar 
theme: 
"This  dialectic  is,  to  be  sure,  the  ultimate  word  in  philosophy  and  hence  there  is  all 
the  more  need  to  divest  it  of  the  mystical  aura  given  it  by  Hegel.  "' 
Some  ten  years  later,  in  a  letter  to  J.  Dietzgen  dated  9'  May  1868  he  writes: 
"When  I  have  cast  off  the  burden  of  political  economy,  I  shall  write  a  'Dialectic'. 
The  true  laws  of  dialectics  are  already  contained  in  Hegel,  though  in  a  mystical  form. 
What  is  needed  is  to  strip  away  this  form.  "' 
Finally,  for  the  present,  the  above  remarks  should  be  combined  with  the  following 
(in)famous  passage  from  the  Afterword  to  the  second  German  edition  of  Capital,  which  was 
written  five  years  later  in  1873: 
"The  mystification  which  dialectic  suffers  in  Hegel's  hands,  by  no  means  prevents 
him  from  being  the  first  to  present  its  general  form  of  working  in  a  comprehensive 
and  conscious  manner.  With  him  it  is  standing  on  its  head.  It  must  be  turned  right 
side  up  again,  if  you  would  discover  the  rational  kernel  in  the  mystical  shell.  "' 
We  can  now  pose  another  question  for  the  present  investigation.  How  do  these  remarks  in 
the  Afterword  relate  to  the  other  comments  of  Marx  that  are  cited  here,  and  which  are  spread 
over  a  period  of  some  fifteen  years?  What  results  from  analysing  the  above  comments  of 
Marx,  in  my  view,  are  the  following  points. 
Firstly,  due  to  the  significance  of  Hegel's  dialectical  method,  Marx  put  settling  his  accounts 
with  Hegel  second  only  in  importance  to  his  work  on  political  economy;  at  least  as  far  as  his 
'Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  40.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1983.  )  P.  316. 
8  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  43.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1988.  )  P.  31. 
10 theoretical  and  methodological  output  was  concerned.  Marx,  unfortunately,  never  gained  the 
time  to  fully  "cast  off  the  burden  of  political  economy"  in  order  to  write  his  dialectic. 
Secondly,  and  most  importantly  for  the  present  investigation,  is  that  according  to  Marx, 
already  contained  within  Hegel's  work  and  thought  is  the  "rational  aspect"  of  the  method 
that  Hegel,  not  only  "discovered"  in  dialectics,  but  at  the  same  time  formulated  and 
interpreted  in  a  mystical  form.  This  rational  aspect  of  the  dialectical  method  is  the  core  of 
what  still  remains  of  lasting  value  in  it;  what  are  we  though,  to  make  of  this  discovery  of 
Hegel's  that  Marx  attributes  to  him? 
To  discover  something  is  to  unearth  and  to  bring  into  view  or  ascertain,  a  truth  that  was 
already  in  existence,  but  hidden  from  perception  and/or  cognition.  In  the  case  of  Hegel's 
dialectic,  the  discovery  itself  has  to  be  critically  analysed,  in  order  to  divest  and  strip  away 
its  mystical  aura,  and  reveal  the  rational  kernel  in  the  mystical  shell.  The  inversion  of  Hegel 
itself  being  described  as  a  method  of  discovery  by  Marx,  and  the  product  or  result  of  this 
activity,  what  is  to  be  discovered,  or  more  accurately  re-discovered,  is  the  rational  kernel 
contained  within  Hegelian  dialectics. 
In  my  analysis  the  usage  here  by  Marx  of  "rational  kernel"  is  a  reference  back  to  the 
previous  point  in  the  1873  Afterword;  namely  that  of  Hegel  being  the  first  to  present,  in  a 
comprehensive  and  conscious  manner,  the  general  form  of  working  of  the  dialectic.  The 
point  being  made  by  Marx,  and  this  is  largely  missed,  is  that  it  is  the  general  form  of 
working  of  dialectic  that  is  standing  on  its  head.  It  is  then,  according  to  my  analysis,  the 
general  form  of  working  of  dialectic  that  Hegel  not  only  discovered,  but  also  mystified. 
The  rational  kernel  to  be  discovered  by  inverting  Hegel  is  then  this  generalform  of  working 
of  the  dialectic.  This  is  the  core  of  the  rational  aspect  of  Hegel's  dialectical  method  for 
Marx.  This  still  leaves  open,  of  course,  what  the  nature  of  this  general  fonn  of  working  of 
'  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  29. 
11 the  dialectic  could  be,  and,  moreover,  what  employment  Marx  utilises  of  it  in  his  analysis  of 
political  economy. 
In  turn,  and  given  the  intimacy  of  their  relation,  the  question  also  becomes  in  what  way  is 
this  rational,  general  form  of  working  of  the  dialectic,  linked  and  related  to  the  comments  in 
the  correspondence  that  the  "true  laws  of  dialectics  are  already  contained  in  Hegel"?  In  both 
cases,  as  Marx's  writings  and  correspondence  tells  us,  these  rational  core  aspects  of  Hegel's 
dialectic  are  enveloped  in  a  mystical  form  that  needs  to  be  stripped  of  this  same  form.  It  is 
by  inverting  that  mystical  form,  that  we  can,  at  the  same  time,  divest  or  strip  away  that 
idealist  veil. 
To  answer  the  question  of  their  relation  more  directly,  then  it  would  appear  that  they  are  a 
reference  to  the  same  thing,  or  to  be  more  precise,  the  same  process.  For  the  laws  of 
dialectics  cannot,  in  my  view,  be  logically  separated  off  from  its  general  form  of  working.  In 
turn,  the  general  form  itself  has  to  be  the  basic  and  primary  ontological  categories  and  laws 
governing  both  being  and  thought,  as  well  as  the  relationship  of  being  and  thought. 
These  are  the  rational  aspects  gleaned  from  Marx's  own  correspondence  and  writings,  which 
I  will  argue,  remain  of  Hegel's  dialectic.  The  related  question  that  arises  from  this  is  what 
rational  form  do  these  elements  take  in  its  inverted  materialised  form  of  Marx's  dialectic? 
These  are  the  central  themes  and  topics  of  the  thesis  as  a  whole. 
It  is  by  attempting  to  make  some  headway  in  this  task  that  we  can  begin  to  more  fully 
answer  C.  Arthur's  pertinent  question  of  how  an  idealist  logic  can  assist  a  materialist 
science.  The  ascertaining  of  the  nature  of  the  laws  of  dialectics,  and  its  general  form  of 
working,  being  key  elements,  I  would  argue,  in  answering  that  very  question. 
The  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics  find  their  meeting  point,  in  my  view, 
in  the  analysis  of  a  dialectical  account  of  systematic  nomological  behaviour.  Hegel 
predicates  this  systematic  nomological  activity  within  an  idealist  foundation  and  framework 
12 that  sublates  the  object  as  the  product  of  a  mystical  subject;  through  analysing  the  generic 
ontological  concepts,  categories,  and  predications  contained  in  substance,  as  the  idealist 
movement  of  the  categories  that  generate  real,  material,  and  objective  substantial  activity. 
These  laws  and  their  general  form  of  expression  are  the  foundational  principles  and  primary 
ontological  categories  that  are  involved  in  the  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  necessary  activity 
of  a  systematic  and  substantial  subject.  They  are  the  core  principles  and  categories  for 
understanding  the  nomological  basis  for  the  phenomenal  form  of  appearance  of  that 
substantial  subject.  What  though  is  the  dynamic  motor  source  of  this  nomological  motion  of 
the  idealist  categories  and  concepts  inherent  within  manifested  substantial  being? 
The  principle  of  change  and  alteration  inherent  to  a  dialectical  account  of  nomological 
activity  is  based  on  an  architectonic  of  posited  and  resolved  contradiction;  this  process  of 
the  systematic  movement  of  a  substantial  contradiction  is  the  core  dynamic  behind  the 
general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics.  As  such,  it  is  an  essential  feature  of 
dialectics  in  both  its  mystical  and  rational  forms;  this  is  their  commonality  of  source  and 
meeting  point.  10 
What  my  analysis  in  the  thesis  will  aim  to  show  is  the  interrelation  between  these  three 
aspects  of  Hegel's  idealist  account  of  dialectic.  The  nature  of  the  general  form  of  working  of 
dialectic,  its  laws  of  motion,  and  their  essential  correlation  and  expression  in  the  dynamic 
principle  of  change  and  alteration  contained  in  the  systematic  movement  of  the  ontological 
categories  and  predications  of  a  substantial  subject. 
Dialectics  is  about  the  movement  and  development  of  the  contradiction  of  an  interconnected 
whole,  expressed  by  Engels,  as  the  "science  of  universal  interconnection.  "  Its  aim  is  to 
demonstrate  the  necessary  nexus  or  inner  connection  that  is  the  mediation  between  the  polar 
extremes  that  contain  the  parameters  of  the  process  of  movement  and  change  of  a  substantial 
13 subject.  Marx  and  Hegel's  distinction  between  the  essence  of  the  substantial  activity 
expressed  in  that  inner  connection,  -and  its  phenomenal  form  of  appearance  lies  precisely  in 
this  area. 
The  question,  and  inherent  difficulty  in  any  attempt  to  understand  what  exactly  is  entailed 
by  inverting  Hegel,  is  to  separate  out  and  not  conflate,  the  rational  and  mystical  sides  of  his 
dialectical  method  from  Marx's  materialist  perspective.  The  other  central  question  and 
problem  generated  by  this  activity  is  to  ascertain  what  is  left  of  this  Hegelian  method, 
stripped  of  its  idealism,  that  continues  to  remain  rational? 
In  order  to  retrieve  that  rational  element  of  the  Hegelian  method  it  had  to  be  not  only 
critically  examined,  but  also  at  the  same  time  put  on  a  material  foundation  and  basis.  Marx 
himself  had  to'go  through  this  very  process  when  de-mystifying  the  Hegelian  dialectic.  ý 
Marx's  foundation  for  the  dialectic  lies  in  the  material  changes  and  motions  in  nature  not 
spirit.  In  particular,  the  major  emphasis  of  Marx  is  on  the  human  expression  of  its 
relationship  with  nature,  namely  labour.  Labour,  moreover,  that  is  in  an  oppressed, 
exploited,  and  alienated  condition. 
This  process  finds,  as  we  shall  shortly  investigate,  its  first  concrete  expression  in  the  Paris 
Manuscripts  of  1844.  This  inversion  of  dialectical  subject  was  necessary,  for  both  Marx's 
own  theoretical  self-clarification,  and  for  developing  the  grounds  for  a  materialist  form  of 
dialectical  method  to  begin  to  emerge  in  his  work. 
The  inversion  of  Hegel  and  the  application  of  the  dialectical  method  to  political  economy 
are  intrinsically  bound  together.  Even  if  for  no  other  reason  than  the  simple  one  that,  a 
materialist  ontological  presupposition  and  foundation  needs  and  requires  a  materialist 
ontological  subject  matter  and  content  for  dialectical  investigation.  It  is  then,  a  fundamental 
component  of  the  materialist  inversion  of  Hegel's  dialectic  by  Marx. 
"  This  commonality  of  the  systematic  movement  of  a  contradiction  should  also  not  blind  us  to  the 
differences  that  pertain  to  an  idealist  and  materialist  analysis  of  the  ontological  nature  of  both  contradiction 
14 The  scientific  importance  and  contribution  of  Hegel's  dialectic  is  not  what  Marx  is  calling 
into  question.  Marx  is,  in  fact,  stating  the  opposite  in  quite  unambiguous  terms;  though  what 
the  rational  content  of  the  idealist  form  of  dialectic  that  remains  of  scientific  value  does 
remain  ambiguous,  and  hence  needs  to  be  theoretically  clarified. 
What  is  puzzling  is  Marx's  suggestion  of  inverting  it.  It  is  a  mistake  however  to  infer  from 
this  position  that  though  turning  it  right  side  up  again,  in  order  to  discover  the  rational 
kernel  is  itself  posed  by  Marx  in  a  form  that  is  problematical  and  enigmatic,  then  the 
importance  of  Hegel's  dialectical  method  for  Marx  is  so  also.  The  conclusion  does  not  flow 
from  the  premise. 
Nor  does  it  flow  from  any  of  the  available  evidence  in  Marx.  What  is  unclear  and 
problematic  is  only  our  understanding  of  the  relation  of  Marx  to  Hegel  and,  even  more 
importantly  as  it  is  the  crucial  result  of  this  relation,  the  nature  of  a  rational  form  of 
dialectics  itself. 
One  can  be  critical  of  the  means  suggested  by  Marx,  but  what  is  relatively  clear  is  the  end 
aim  of  the  activity,  to  extract  the  rational  kernel  from  the  mystical  shell.  It  would  appear 
then,  from  all  the  available  evidence,  that  Marx  would  have  rejected  Althusser's  assertion 
that  the  kernel  itself  is  infected  with  mysticism  and  ideology;  that  it  is  in  fact  rotten  to  its 
idealist  core  and  fit  only  for  the  dustbin  of  history. 
It  is  no  accident  that  Marx  kept  on  returning  to  this  common  theme  of  his  relation  to  Hegel; 
as  we  shall  see,  it  is  a  theme  that  generated  its  own  variations  over  a  number  of  years.  When 
this  commonality  of  theme  is  combined  with  both  his  felt  desire  to,  and  the  theoretical  need 
for,  clarifying  what  was  still  rational  in  Hegel,  then  this  would  seem  to  indicate  that  Marx 
did  have  a  relatively  clear  conception  of  his  own  relation  to  Hegel's  dialectic. 
and  system. 
15 3.  In  Defence  of  the  "Dead  Dog". 
The  viewpoint  that  attempts  to  deny  or  neuter  the  influence  of  Hegel  on  Marx,  for  example, 
the  Althusserian  position  that  the  mature  Marx's  thought  owes  virtually  next  to  nothing  to 
Hegel's  dialectical  method,  is,  for  its  adherents,  unfortunately  contradicted  by  the  mature 
Marx  himself. 
We  have  already  seen  some  evidence  for  this  position,  but  there  is  still  more  contained  in 
the  mature  Marx's  writings,  to  confirm  that,  if  anything  was  the  case,  Marx  had  reassessed 
his  relation  to  Hegel  more  positively  than  in  his  younger  days.  Here  is  some  more  of  the  oft- 
quoted  view  of  the  1873  Afterword. 
"The  mystifying  side  of  Hegelian  dialectic  I  criticised  nearly  thirty  years  ago,  at  a 
time  when  it  was  still  the  fashion.  But  just  as  I  was  working  at  the  first  volume  of 
"Das  Kapital",  it  was  the  good  pleasure  of  the  peevish,  arrogant,  mediocre  Epigones 
who  now  talk  large  in  cultured  Germany,  to  treat  Hegel  in  the  same  way  as  the  brave 
Moses  Mendelssohn  in  Lessing's  time  treated  Spinoza,  i.  e.  as  a  "dead  dog".  I 
therefore  openly  avowed  myself  the  pupil  of  that  mighty  thinker,  and  even  here  and 
there,  in  the  chapter  on  value,  coquetted  with  the  modes  of  expression  peculiar  to 
him.  "" 
Marx  is  here  referring  to  a  trip  he  made  to  Germany  in  April  and  May  of  1867,  to  oversee 
the  publication  of  the  first  edition  of  Capital.  The  analogy  he  uses  with  Spinoza's  treatment 
is  not  an  isolated  one.  There  is  a  further  reference  to  this  dismissive  treatment  of  Hegel 
contained  in  a  letter  to  Kugelmann  dated  27"  June  1870. 
"And  what  this  Lange  has  to  say  about  the  Hegelian  method  and  my  application  of 
the  same  is  simply  childish.  First,  he  understands  rien  about  Hegel's  method  and, 
therefore,  second,  still  less  about  my  critical  manner  of  applying  it.  In  one  respect  he 
16 reminds  me  of  Moses  Mendelssohn.  That  prototype  of  a  windbag  once  wrote  to 
Lessing  asking  how  he  could  possibly  take  that  "dead  dog  Spinoza"  seriously!  In  the 
same  way,  Mr.  Lange  expresses  surprise  that  Engels,  I,  etc.  take  seriously  the  dead 
dog  Hegel,  after  Buchner,  Lange,  Dr.  During,  Fechner,  etc.,  had  long  agreed  that 
they  -  poor  dear  -  had  long  since  buried  him.  Lange  is  naive  enough  to  say  that  I 
"move  with  rare  freedom"  in  empirical  matter.  He  has  not  the  slightest  idea  that  this 
"free  movement  in  matter"  is  nothing  but  a  paraphrase  for  the  method  of  dealing 
with  matter  -  that  is,  the  dialectical  method.  "12 
What  is  of  interest  here  is  not  only  that  Marx  takes  the  dead  dog  Hegel  seriously,  but  that 
entailed  in  doing  this  is  both  his  critical  adoption  and  his  critical  manner  of  applying 
Hegel's  dialectical  method.  Marx  also  appears  to  be  suggesting  here  that  one  has  to  have 
some  real  knowledge  of  Hegel's  dialectical  method  before  an  understanding  of  his  own 
critical  application  of  it  can  be  fully  grasped.  This  could  also  be  interpreted  as  a  point  that 
apparently  confirms  Lenin's  famous  aphorism  cited  earlier,  on  the  relation  of  Hegel's  Logic 
to  Marx's  Capital. 
It  is  precisely  due  to  Hegel's  discovery  of  the  comprehensive  operation  of  the  general  form 
of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics  that  Marx  ranks  Hegel's  thought  as  being  the  "ultimate 
word"  in  philosophy.  It  is  by  attempting  to  analyse  and  understand  how  that  general  form 
and  the  laws  of  dialectics  operate  in  Hegel  and  Marx's  work,  that  we  can  build  up  a  clearer 
picture  of  their  relation,  and  begin  to  further  ascertain  the  rational  kernel  in  the  Hegelian 
mystical  shell. 
Going  in  reverse  chronological  order,  there  is  yet  a  third  reference  by  Marx,  on  Hegel  and 
his  dialectic  being  treated  as  a  "dead  dog".  In  a  letter  to  Engels,  written  on  the  11'  Jan.  1868 
he  also  states  the  following: 
K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  I.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  29. 
Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  43.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1988.  )  P.  528. 
17 "The  gentlemen  in  Germany  (with  the  exception  of  theological  reactionaries)  believe 
Hegel's  dialectic  to  be  a  "dead  dog".  Feuerbach  has  much  on  his  conscience  in  this 
respec  . 
9913 
From  the  above  letter  it  is  clear  that  not  only  is  Marx  prepared  to  defend  Hegel,  with  only 
the  dubious  company  of  "theological  reactionaries",  he  seemingly  blames  Feuerbach  for 
being  a  central  contributor  to  this  sorry  state  of  affairs. 
A  position  that  is  apparently  radically  different  from  his  early  writings.  In  particular,  and  as 
we  shall  shortly  see,  one  can  cite  evidence  ftom  the  Economic  and  Philosophic  Manuscripts 
of  1844  (E.  P.  M.  or  Paris  Manuscripts  or  Manuscripts)  for  proof  of  this. 
In  that  work,  Feuerbach  was  viewed  as  providing  the  materialist  critique  of  Hegel's  idealist 
dialectic  of  systematic  thought.  He  is  heralded  as  the  person  who  "has  in  principle 
overthrown  the  old  dialectic  and  philosophy"  and  is  "in  fact  the  true  conqueror  of  the  old 
philosophy". 
Why  then,  a  quarter  of  a  century  later,  is  Marx  going  out  of  his  road  to  defend  Hegel  from 
what  he  regards  as  unjustified  and  philistine  attacks  and,  at  the  same  time,  implicating 
Feuerbach  as  a  pivotal  source  behind  this  sorry  state  of  affairs? 
The  question  generated  by  this  apparent  paradox  of  young  versus  old  is  the  following  one, 
why  is  there  an  ostensible  and  radical  about  turn  in  Marx's  view  of  Hegel?  This  volte-face 
of  Marx,  however,  also  appears  to  raise  some  problems  for  the  proposition  I  posed  earlier. 
That  of  the  idea,  defended  in  the  present  thesis,  that  there  is,  at  the  same  time,  a  thread  of 
continuity  from  the  early  to  the  late  Marx  in  his  characterisation  of  the  twofold  rational  and 
mystical  elements  contained  in  Hegel's  dialectic  method? 
11  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  42.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1987.  )  P.  520. 
18 What  Marx's  object  of  criticism  of  Hegel  was  directed  towards  all  those  years  ago,  as  he 
tells  us  in  the  1873  Afterword,  was  the'"mystifying  side"  of  the  Hegelian  dialectic.  The 
implication  of  this  being  that  there  is  another  side  to  Hegel's  thought,  a  rational  side.  It  is,  of 
course,  precisely  because  of  this  rational  element  contained  in  Hegel's  dialectic  that  he 
cannot  simply  written  off  as  a  "dead  dog"  for  Marx. 
However,  this  twofold  nature  of  Marx's  analysis  does  not  appear  to  be  driving  his  earlier 
1844  explication  and  analysis  of  Hegel's  philosophy;  this  takes  the  form  of  a  critique  that  is 
dominated  by  the  impact  of  Feuerbach's  demolition  of  speculative  idealism. 
The  question  is,  does  the  appearance  of  the  earlier  critique  contradict  the  essence  of  the  later 
criticism  here,  or  does  the  appearance  also  belie  some  other  form  of  movement,  closer  to  the 
later  twofold  rational  and  mystical  analysis  and  characterisation  of  Hegel  by  Marx? 
4.  Marx's  Apparent  Volte-Face. 
This  conspicuously  apparent  volte-face  in  Marx's  view  of  Hegel,  here  expressed  through  a 
radical  change  in  his  attitude  to  Feuerbach  has,  like  the  enigma  of  the  inversion,  never  been 
adequately  or  fully  explained.  The  two  questions  being  merely  different  facets  of  the  same 
problem. 
The'question  is,  how  do  we  understand  and  interpret  the  dynamics  of  Marx's  own 
intellectual  development  in  order  to  explain  these  two  viewpoints,  expressed  nearly  thirty 
years  apart,  and  which  if  viewed  solely  on  the  surface  or  factually  reductive  level,  are 
apparently  in  contradiction  with  each  other?  Let  us  start  the  analysis  with  his  earlier 
viewpoint,  expressed  in  the  Paris  Manuscripts,  one  that  is  still  clearly  reverberating  under 
the  bombastic  impact  of  Feuerbach's  explosion  of  Hegel's  systematic  idealism. 
In  the  E.  P.  M.,  Feuerbach's  "great  achievement"  for  Marx  was  contained  in  the  following 
gains  that  he  contributed  to  the  critical  development  of  thought.  Firstly,  he  proved  that 
19 philosophy  is  an  estranged  and  alienated  condition  that  is  nothing  else  but  religion  rendered 
into  thought  and  is  the  divine  expounded  by  thought.  In  other  words,  Feuerbach  exposes 
philosophical  thought  in  its  apposite  condition,  as  an  alienated  and  estranged  expression  of 
the  essence  of  man. 
Secondly,  by  making  the  social  relation  of  "man  to  man"  the  basic  principle  of  the  theory, 
he  establishes  "true  materialism"  and  "real  science"  for  Marx.  Finally,  Feuerbach's 
"opposing  to  the  negation  of  the  negation,  which  claims  to  be  the  absolute  positive,  the  self- 
supporting  positive,  positively  based  on  itself.  "14 
Feuerbach,  according  to  Marx,  highlights  Hegel's  failure  to  resolve  the  alienation  inherent 
in  his  idealist  dialectic;  furthermore,  he  also  shows  that  Hegel  ultimately  affirms  that 
alienation  after  having  rejected  it.  Philosophy  itself,  at  least  in  this  its  idealist  form  is  shown 
to  be  riddled  with  theological  thought  and  presuppositions. 
Consequently,  and  this  is  no  small  or  mean  achievement,  it  was  by  showing  that  alienation 
is  inherently  expressed  and  manifested,  in  an  alienated  way  in  the  idealist  view,  that  gives 
value  to  Feuerbach's  critique  of  Hegel's  philosophical  negating  and  then  reaffirming  of 
religion.  Hegel's  philosophical  system  is  shown  to  be  the  product  of  an  alienated 
philosophical  mind  that  affirms  theology  after  having  negated  it. 
By  doing  so,  Feuerbach  had  laid  bare  the  material,  natural,  and  social  basis  for  religious 
thought  and  belief  as  an  expression  and  product  of  alienated  humanity  itself.  By  inverting 
the  ontological  foundation  of  that  speculative  system,  he  was  thus  able  to  show  the  resultant 
descent  of  spirit  from  the  heavens,  to  its  more  mundane  origin  in  the  human  condition; 
whose  alienated  conditions  of  existence  are  seen  as  ultimately  residing  in  nature  and  society, 
its  true,  objective  and  material  foundations. 
11  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  328. 
20 Here,  idealist  thought  finds  its  inverted  and  naturalised  rooting  of  the  prime  relation  and 
subject  matter  of  investigation  to  that  of  the  relation  of  man  to  man,  which  itself  is  reflected 
in  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  civil  society.  The  importance  of  the  Feuerbachean  critique 
lies  in  the  inversion  of  the  foundations  of  absolute  idealism,  and  in  the  replacement  of  those 
idealist  foundations  in  real,  natural,  material  and  social  relations,  their  true  source. 
By  doing  so  the  speculative  system  of  Hegel  is  blown  apart  and  philosophy,  rescued  from 
the  realms  of  the  absolute,  is  now  given  a  fundamentally  natural,  anthropological,  and 
psychological  foundation  for  the  analysis  of  the  human  condition.  However,  Feuerbach's 
immediate  impact  on  Marx,  and  his  intellectual  development,  was,  despite  the  earth- 
shattering  nature  and  extent  of  it  at  this  point,  still  relatively  transitory  and  short-lived.  How 
are  we  to  explain  this? 
Furthermore,  is  there  any  indication,  within  the  E.  P.  M.,  that  Marx  already  appears,  at  least 
in  any  embryonic  form,  to  be  in  the  process  of  distancing  himself  from,  or  at  the  very  least 
qualifying,  his  positive  view  of  Feuerbach's  outstanding  achievements?  If  so,  where  does 
this  difference  or  qualification  begin  to  emerge?  The  question  is  can  a  critical  analysis  of  the 
Manuscripts  reveal  the  sources  for  those  soon  to  be  emerging  differences?  " 
The  primary  reason  for  this  fundamentally  important  but  transitory  impact  of  Feuerbach's 
naturalism  and  materialism  on  Marx,  in  my  view,  was  that  Marx  had  a  grasp  of  dialectics 
that  was  ultimately  superior  in  knowledge  and  scale  to  Feuerbach's.  Marx  does  not  follow 
Feuerbach's  rejection  of  Hegel's  speculative  dialectic  as  a  rejection  of  the  application  of 
dialectics  per  se.  This  difference,  as  we  shall  see,  is  already  evident  in  Marx's  own  critique 
of  Hegel's  speculative  form  of  dialectic  in  the  1844  text. 
11  Feuerbach's  work  was  both  a  revelation  and  a  liberation  from  the  shackles  of  idealism.  Hegel's 
system  was  at  last  exploded  and  cast  aside.  "Enthusiasm  was  general;  we  all  became  at  once  Feuerbachians. 
How  enthusiastically  Marx  greeted  the  new  conception  and  how  much  -  in  spite  of  all  critical  reservations  - 
he  was  influenced  by  it,  one  may  read  in  77ze  Holy  Family.  "  F.  Engels.  Marx-Engels.  Selected  Works.  Volume 
2.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  )  P.  333.  As  Engels  then  goes  on  to  point  out,  to  discard  a  system  does  not 
mean  that  that  system  has  been  disposed  of  by  the  mere  assertion  that  it  is  either  false,  or  by  it  being  ignored. 
This  important  theoretical  omission  is  one  of  the  central  limitations  of  Feuerbach's  critique  of  Hegel. 
21 Marx's  Strategy. 
"The  time  was  ripe  for  a  critical  settling  of  accounts  with  the  mother  of  Young 
Hegelianism  -  the  Hegelian  dialectic.  "" 
Marx  himself  expresses  the  overall  need  of  the  philosophical  criticism,  contained  in  the 
Manuscripts,  in  the  above  manner.  What  Marx  intends  to  do  in  order  to  settle  those 
accounts,  as  he  also  tells  us  in  his  prefatory  remarks  of  the  analysis,  is  to  engage  in  "a 
critical  discussion  of  Hegelian  dialectic  and  philosophy  as  a  whole".  This  critical  form  of 
analysis  he  considers  not  only  "to  be  absolutely  necessary",  but  more  importantly  for  the 
present  line  of  investigation,  he  also  regards  it  as  "a  task  not  yet  performed.  "" 
This  necessary  critical  settling  of  accounts  is  still  posited  though,  within  the  parameters  and 
gains  of  Feuerbach's  own  "theoretical  revolution";  the  only  genuine  advance  in  philosophy 
since  Hegel  according  to  Marx.  However,  what  the  above  also  tells  us  is  that  Marx  saw  the 
need  for  Hegel's  philosophy  to  be  criticised  in  a  more  generalised  fashion,  as  a  systematic 
whole;  secondly,  that  the  humanistic  and  naturalistic  criticism  by  Feuerbach  of  Hegel  still 
required  further  proof.  As  Marx  himself  expresses  it: 
"How  far,  on  the  other  hand,  Feuerbach's  discoveries  about  the  nature  of  philosophy 
still,  for  their  proof  at  least,  called  for  a  critical  discussion  of  philosophical  dialectic 
will  be  seen  from  my  exposition  itseIL"" 
The  question  raised  here  is  what  is  the  relation  between  these  twin  tasks,  that  of  the 
generalised  critique  of  Hegel's  dialectic  and  philosophy  as  a  whole,  and  Marx's  attempt  to 
provide  the  proof  of  Feuerbach's  discoveries  through  this  critical  vehicle?  Feuerbach's  . 
11  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  328. 
"Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  232. 
11  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  234. 
22 critique  then,  though  philosophically  liberating,  still  lacked  a  sufficient  generalised  form  of 
proof  for  Marx. 
This  lacuna  is  not,  however,  posed  in  the  form  of  a  criticism  of  Feuerbach;  indeed,  Marx 
himself  sought  to  furnish  the  necessary  proof  that  would  confirm  the  Feuerbachian  account. 
The  intriguing  question  that  this  generates  is  what  impact  did  the  attempted  providing  of  this 
proof  have  on  the  intellectual  development  of  Marx  himselp.  Indeed,  what  form  and  content 
does  this  proof  take  in  order  to  underpin  the  naturalised  and  materialised  foundation  for  the 
criticism  of  idealist  and  speculative  thought? 
Marx  aims  to  outline  and  highlight,  in  the  course  of  his  general  analysis  and  exposition,  the 
difference  between  what  could  be  described  as  the  abstract  idealist  and  critical  materialist 
form  of  dialectic.  He  expresses  this  inverse  dialectical  relation  in  the  form  of  a  contradiction 
that  is  latent  within  the  idealist  view;  a  contradiction  that  is  brought  out  in  this  its  critical- 
materialist  form. 
This  inverse  relation  of  the  contradiction  between  the  abstract  philosophical  and  the  critical 
materialist  form  of  dialectic  is  characterised  in  the  Paris  Manuscripts  by  Marx  in  the 
following  terms,  as  "the  critical  form  of  this  in  Hegel  still  uncritical  process.  "" 
Marx,  through  this  formulation,  not  only  wishes  then,  to  confirm  and  provide  the  proof  of 
the  Feuerbachian  critique,  via  this  approach,  he  also  aims  to  generalise  the  criticism  of 
Hegel  in  this  form.  The  interpretation  and  logical  development  of  this  self-characterisation 
of  his  overall  strategy,  if  adequately  unpacked,  is  the  key  to  a  more  comprehensive 
understanding  of  both  Marx's  own  positive  account  of  the  dialectic  in  the  Paris  Manuscripts, 
and  his  own  intellectual  development. 
How  are  we  to  interpret  this  overall  approach  to  the  problem  and  Marx's  own  self- 
characterisation  of  it  as  "the  critical  form  of  this  in  Hegel  uncritical  process"?  What  is  also 
23 important  to  ascertain  is  if  this  critical  form  of  Marx's  analysis  of  Hegel,  contained  in  the 
Manuscripts,  relates  to  the  more  general  question  of  the  thesis,  what  the  nature  of  the 
materialist  inversion  of  Hegel's  dialectic  entails. 
If  this  indeed  turns  out  to  be  the  case,  and  there  is  a  relationship  between  the  earlier  and  later 
forms  of  Marx's  criticism,  then  in  what  manner  can  it  aid  our  understanding  of  Marx's  own 
intellectual  development,  and  his  later  correlated  strategy  of  inverting  Hegel's  dialectic? 
What  does  Marx  mean  and  intend  by  posing  the  problem  in  this  form?  Furthermore,  is  this 
formulation  merely  an  earlier  variation  on  the  later  theme,  of  there  being  a  rational  kernel 
contained  within  the  mystical  shell  of  Hegel's  dialectic?  If  so,  then  what  would  the  nature  of 
that  connection  be? 
Does  this  "critical  form  of  an  uncritical  process"  foreshadow  later  writings  on  the  subject; 
do  they  represent  the  first  formulations  of  a  common  theme  that  straddles  Marx's  later 
pronouncements  on  his  relation  to  Hegel's  dialectic?  Is  this  proposition  then  merely  an 
earlier  variation  of  how  the  dialectic  in  Hegel  glorifies  and  mystifies  existing  states  of 
affairs,  whilst  the  dialectic  is,  in  its  essence,  critical  and  revolutionary? 
If  this  is  indeed  the  case  it  may  also  be  the  key  then  to  ascertaining  the  bedrock  that  forms 
the  continuity  of  the  dialectic  on  which  the  development  of  the  mature  Marx's  thought  is 
based.  If  so,  then  an  important,  not  to  say  foundational,  link  will  have  been  made  with 
regards  to  the  question  of  the  relation  of  the  early  to  the  later  Marx.  Is  there  then  such  a  link 
in  these  Paris  writings  that  would  indicate  real  continuity  in  the  critical  development  of  both 
his  later  dialectical  thought,  and  in  his  critique  of  Hegel's  idealist  and  speculative  variation 
of  the  dialectic? 
To  pose  the  question  more  starkly,  is  Marx,  here  in  the  Manuscripts,  stating  that  the  critique 
of  Hegel  that  he  attempts  will  also  bring  out  important  elements  of  the  critical  and  rational 
form  of  dialectic  that  is  contained  within  Hegel,  but  posed  by  him  in  an  uncritical  and 
11  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  329. 
24 mystical  fashion?  Is  this  the  same  process  as  turning  Hegel  right  side  up  again  in  order  to 
discover  the  rational  kernel  that  is  contained  within  the  mystical  shell?  Is  there  any  further 
evidence,  contained  in  the  Paris  writings,  which  would  allow  this  interpretation  to  be 
legitimated  as  a  valid  proposition? 
It  is  now  time  to  analyse  this  criticism  of  Marx,  contained  in  the  1844  Manuscripts,  of 
Hegel's  account  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  as  a  fundamental  principle  involved  in 
dialectics,  in  order  to  see  what  it  can  reveal  for  the  present  discussion  and  subject  matter  of 
investigation. 
25 CHAPTER  TWO. 
THE  DIALECTIC  OF  NEGATIVITY. 
"All  social  life  is  essentially  practical.  All  mysteries  which  lead  theory  to  mysticism 
find  their  rational  solution  in  human  practice  and  in  the  comprehension  of  this 
practice.  "  K.  Marx.  Thesis  8  'On  Feuerbach'.  " 
1.  The  Dialectic  of  Negativity. 
Marx's  analysis  of  Hegel  in  this  early  work  is,  in  my  analysis,  like  his  later  pronouncements 
on  the  subject  of  Hegel's  dialectic,  twofold  and  contradictory.  His  dialectical  critique  is, 
however,  undoubtedly  and  asymmetrically  weighted  in  the  E.  P.  M.  to  exposing  the  mystical 
idealism  and  foundation  of  Hegel's  thought.  That  the  emphasis  in  the  work  is  primarily 
directed  against  the  mystical  and  alienated  form  that  Hegel's  dialectic  takes,  is  not 
unsurprising;  as  it  is  a  critical  settling  of  accounts  with  Hegelianism  and  the  Hegelian 
dialectic  that  is  Marx's  aim  in  that  work. 
What  Marx  attempts  to  ascertain,  through  his  analysis,  is  a  generalised  form  of  criticism  of 
Hegel's  dialectical  thought;  this  is  achieved  via  the  development  of  a  critical  form  that 
converges  on  Hegel's  analysis  of  a  central  principle  and  law  of  the  general  form  of  working 
of  the  dialectic.  As  such,  Marx's  critical  analysis  of  this  dialectic  of  negativity  focuses  on 
the  discussion  of  the  role  that  negation  of  the  negation  plays  in  Hegel.  This  discussion  being 
central  for  Marx  to  achieve  his  desired  aim,  that  of  a  "critical  settling  of  accounts"  with  the 
Hegelian  dialectic. 
"  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  5.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1976.  )  P.  5. 
26 Nevertheless,  the  criticism  also  contains  within  it  some  positive  affirmations  of  certain 
aspects  of  Hegel's  dialectical  method.  Whilst  the  emphasis,  necessarily  at  this  time  and 
stage  of  Marx's  own  intellectual  development,  is  on  the  critique  of  the  mystical  form  of 
Hegel's  dialectic,  there  are  also  some  allusions,  as  we  shall  shortly  see,  to  the  rational  and 
positive  form  that  is  inherently  contained  in  the  Hegelian  dialectic. 
This  generalised  critique,  as  we  shall  see,  not  only  "at  least"  provides  the  proof  of 
Feuerbach's  discoveries;  it  will  also  point  beyond  them,  through  the  positing  of  the  real  and 
concrete  material  source  and  content  that  is  lurking  behind  Hegel's  form  of  mystical 
dialectic.  What  Marx  actually  does  then,  in  my  analysis,  is  to  not  only  provide  the  necessary 
proof  of  Feuerbach's  discoveries,  but  by  doing  so  he  is  also  in  the  process  of  going  well 
beyond  Feuerbach's  parameters  and  viewpoint. 
What  will  also  be  argued  for  then  is  that  Marx,  not  only  criticises  Hegel's  mystical  idealism, 
but  at  the  same  time  he  also  highlights  some  fundamentally  important  elements  of 
dialectical  reasoning  and  analysis  contained  in  Hegel,  that  are  both  retained,  and  critically 
applied  by  Marx  to  a  new  subject  matter.  There  is,  even  within  this  early  work,  an 
expression  of  both  the  twofold  rational  and  mystical  sides  of  the  operation  of  Hegel's 
dialectic  that  are  exposed  and  expressed  in  Marx's  generalised  form  of  critique. 
At  the  same  time,  Marx  is  also  developing  his  own  materialist  foundation  for  the  dialectic  to 
be  applied  in  a  critical  manner,  and  to  a  materialist  subject  matter.  In  the  1844  Manuscripts, 
Marx  is  already  then,  inverting  the  dialectic  from  Hegel's  philosophical  head  and  standing  it 
on  terra  firma.  His  criticism  remains,  despite  the  open  and  welcoming  embracement  of 
Feuerbach's  gains,  one  that  still  remains  rooted  in  a  dialectical  foundation. 
This  distinction  itself  separates  off  Marx  from  Feuerbach;  this  differentiation,  whilst  not 
expressed  as  either  a  conscious  criticism  or  difference  with  Feuerbach,  is  already  in 
operation  within  the  Manuscripts.  That  these  differences  are  either  latent  within  the 
Economic  and  Philosophical  Manuscripts,  or  largely  remain  below  the  surface  level  as 
27 unresolved  tensions  and  antinornies,  does  not  mean  that  there  is  no  tentative  expression  of 
them. 
Marx's  glowing  advocacy  for  Feuerbach  will,  in  my  analysis,  ultimately  prove  to  be  unsure 
of  its  footing;  this  being  due  to  the  inherent  dynamics  of  the  dialectics  that  are  involved  in 
the  positive  and  negative  aspects  of  Hegel's  thought  that  are  both  outlined,  and  critically 
analysed  by  Marx. 
That  Marx  wholeheartedly  accepts  the  core  of  Feuerbach's  critique  is  not  the  issue,  he 
clearly  does.  The  problem  is  in  explaining  how  that  Feuerbachian  critique  is  interpreted  by 
Marx  in  conjunction  with,  for  example,  his  apparent  retention  of  what  he  considers  to  be  the 
core  rational  element  that  remains  of  the  Hegelian  dialectic  of  negativity.  " 
The  further  question  generated  by  this  is  the  following  one,  are  these  rational  elements  the 
source  of  the  critical  form  of  dialectic  that  is  contained,  within  this  Hegelian  mystical  guise, 
as  an  uncritical  process?  If  so,  what  is  their  positive  nature?  The  dialectical  nature  of  the 
critique,  contained  in  this  process  is  already  embryonically  reflected  and  contained,  as  the 
analysis  will  attempt  to  show,  within  Marx's  discussion  of  Hegel's  dialectic  of  negativity 
and  negation  of  the  negation  in  the  Manuscripts. 
In  order  to  answer  the  above  questions  more  fully  then  the  following  strategy  has  to  be 
employed;  it  is  necessary  to  separate  out  Marx's  twofold  analysis  of  the  abstract  idealist  and 
the  critical  materialist  form  of  dialectic  contained  in  his  criticism.  At  the  same  time  both 
have  to  be  related  and  integrated  into  the  investigation  of  the  core  elements  of  his  argument. 
11  Whilst  Feuerbach  signals  a  huge  leap  forward  for  critical  thought,  his  naturalism  and  materialism  is 
not  dialectical  and  active,  but  contemplative  and  passive.  The  critical  explosion  of  Hegel's  idealist  foundation 
for  thought,  contained  in  Feuerbach's  theoretical  advance,  and  its  replacement  with  a  material  and  natural 
foundation  as  the  source  for  a  naturalised  ontology  and  epistemology  is,  however,  not  the  same  thing  as  an 
inverted  material,  natural,  and  social  form  of  dialectic.  This  difference  in  the  philosophical  basis  for  Marx's 
critique,  though  not  yet  consciously  expressed  here  by  Marx,  will  shortly  manifest  itself  in  the  theses  on 
Feuerbach. 
28 Otherwise,  it  would  be  impossible  to  expound  what  Marx  characterises  as  "the  critical  form 
of  this  in  Hegel,  uncritical  process.  " 
This  dialectical  form  and  exposition  of  the  critique  is  necessary,  in  order  to  show  how  Marx 
reveals  both  the  mystical  and  rational  elements  contained  in  Hegel's  method.  The  dialectical 
character  of  the  critique  should  also  exhibit  how  Marx's  own  critical  form  of  dialectic  is, 
paradoxically,  both  contained  in,  and  the  inverse  of,  the  abstract  idealist  form;  this  can  only 
be  achieved  by  demonstrating  how  it  emerges  out  of  his  general  criticism  of  Hegel's  idealist 
dialectic. 
Failure  to  do  so  would  raise  serious  doubts  as  to  the  validity  of  trying  to  make  sense  of 
Marx's  suggestion,  here  contained  in  its  earliest  form  of  expression,  of  the  need  to  invert  the 
Hegelian  form  of  dialectic.  This  primary  dialectical  principle  of  change  and  alteration 
contained  in  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  should,  therefore,  -logically  take  both  a 
critical  and  uncritical  form  in  Marx's  exposition,  if  the  above  interpretation  contains  any 
efficacy. 
As  we  shall  see,  this  dialectical  principle  and  law  of  motion  does  take  a  contradictory  form 
in  Marx's  analysis  of  Hegel's  exposition.  It  contains  both  genuine  and  important  theoretical 
insight,  and  an  alienated  and  mystified  form  of  expression  that  is  grounded  in  an  absolute 
form  of  idealist  ontology.  Herein  lies  the  real  difficulty  for  the  analysis  of  the  rational  form 
contained  in  Hegel;  it  lies  in  unearthing  this  critical  form,  which  in  Hegel  is  still  left  at  the 
level  of  an  uncritical  process;  a  process  that  is  subsumed  and  blunted  by  his  idealism. 
This  twofold  character  of  Marx's  analysis  of  this  fundamental  principle  of  the  negation  of 
the  negation,  as  a  principle  that  pertains  to  all  forms  of  being,  is  now,  due  to  its  centrality  for 
explaining  and  resolving  the  above  problem,  now  posited  as  the  subject  matter  for  our 
investigation. 
29 2.  Negation  of  the  Negation. 
First  of  all  for  the  investigation,  just  what  role  does  the  negation  of  the  negation  play  in 
Hegel's  philosophical  analysis?  In  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  for  example,  it  takes  the 
following  form  for  Marx.  The  negation  of  the  negation  is  the  process  of  the  coming  to  be  of 
self-consciousness  and  self-affirmation  through  the  supersession  of  its  own  form  of 
alienation  and  estrangement;  a  form  that  is  itself  expressed  in  the  relation  of  consciousness 
to  objectivity.  This  process,  in  turn,  becomes  expressed  in  Hegel's  idealism,  as  a  dialectic 
between  consciousness  and  self-consciousness;  that  is,  as  a  dialectic  within  consciousness 
itself. 
Alternatively  expressed,  it  is  the  act  of  self-reference  in  alienation  by  the  supersession  of 
that  alienation.  It  is  the  superseding  of  alienation  by  the  active  negation,  by  the  subject,  of 
its  own  alienated  condition;  a  condition  that  takes  the  form  of  its  relation  to  its  direct 
opposite,  its  dialectical  pole,  its  own  other  as  Hegel  expresses  it.  It  is  the  active  subject 
resolving  its  contradiction  by  negating  and  incorporating  that  opposite  pole  as  a  moment  or 
determination  of  its  own  activity;  by  doing  so  it  affirms  itself  as  the  subject  of  the  process. 
As  such,  it  is  a  core  element  in  Hegel's  account  of  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws 
of  dialectics.  The  concept  is  here  at  the  level  of  abstract  definition;  the  aim  is  that  this  will 
be  investigated  and  teased  out  in  a  variety  of  fashions,  and  in  more  concrete  detail,  as  the 
thesis  develops.  22 
11  This  key  concept  of  Hegel's  dialectic  has,  in  my  analysis,  more  than  one  logical  and  ontological 
application  and  usage.  It  applies  to  both  the  operation  of  a  systematic  subject  in  its  dialectical  activity  of 
positing  and  resolving  the  primary  contradiction  in  its  nature,  and,  in  the  more  traditional  and  "orthodox" 
Marxist  sense  and  usage;  that  of  a  subject  superseding  itself  and  positing  a  new  specific  form  of  systematic 
activity.  Capital,  as  the  systematic  exploitation  of  commodified  labour  power,  would  be  an  example  of  the 
former.  Labour,  in  its  evolving  social  forms,  with  its  dialectical  transformation  and  supersession  into  higher 
historical  social  forms  of  development  as  an  example  of  the  latter. 
Hegel  also  applies  this  key  concept  to  the  analysis  of  substance,  as  the  fundamental  ontological 
category  of  being;  indeed  the  logical,  historical,  and  objective  elements  in  Hegel's  thought  are  united  in  the 
idea  of  the  process  of  how  substance  becomes  subject.  This  application  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  to 
substantial  activity  will  have  its  resonance  in  Marx's  dialectic  of  labour  and  value.  It  is  an  important  and 
fundamental  relation  that  cannot  be  stressed  highly  enough,  and  will  be  the  subject  of  investigation  as  the 
thesis  develops. 
30 Hegel  views  this  alienated  form  of  speculative  dialectic  as  being  ultimately  the  expression 
and  product  of  the  movement  contained  within  pure  logical  thought  itself.  The  absolute 
nature  of  thought  is  revealed  in  the  process  of  conceptual  development;  as  a  universal 
interconnection  of  the  categories  of  thought  that  are  conceptually  integrated  by  Hegel  into  a 
cohesive  and  self-moving  logical  totality. 
A  self-moving  logical  and  systematic  totality  that  objectifies  itself  in  manifest  nature,  and 
subjectifies  itself  in  society  as  human  spirit  or  mind;  this  latter  shape  is  itself  expressed  in  its 
highest  form  by  pure,  logical,  speculative,  philosophical  thought. 
We  shall  start  off  the  analysis  with  the  central  points  of  the  criticism,  contained  in  the 
E.  P.  M.,  of  Feuerbach's  view  of  Hegel's  the  negation  of  the  negation.  The  criticism  takes  the 
following  forms  in  Marx's  exposition;  forms  that  are  derived  from  and  summarise 
Feuerbach's  from  Marx's  perspective. 
Feuerbach's  Critique. 
Feuerbach's  importance  for  Marx  is  that  he  represents  both  genuine  insight  and  a  real  gain 
for  critical  thought  in  his  explication  of  the  contradiction  contained  in  this  core  principle  of 
Hegel's  speculative  idealism.  In  the  Feuerbachean  critique,  it  is  posed  as  a  contradiction 
within  Hegel's  philosophy  that  it  affirms  theology  after  having  denied  it,  and  which  it 
therefore  affirms  in  opposition  to  itself. 
In  broad  terms,  the  negation  of  the  negation  in  Hegel  is  the  self-confirmation  of  alienated 
consciousness  in  its  own  alienation.  The  positive  side  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  in 
Hegel,  the  self-affirmation  contained  in  it,  is  viewed,  by  Feuerbach,  as  a  position  that  still 
has  not  overcome  its  opposition. 
31 The  "positive  position"  of  the  self-affirmation  and  self-confirmation  that  is  contained  in  the 
negation  of  the  negation  is  therefore  not  proven  in  Hegel.  It  is  still  "burdened"  with  its 
opposite,  nature.  Hegel's  view  thus  does  not  demonstrate  itself  by  its  existence.  As  the 
speculative  idealist  account  does  not  prove  itself  objectively  in  existence,  it  is,  therefore,  for 
Feuerbach's  naturalism,  "confronted  by  the  position  of  sense-certainty  based  on  itself.  "" 
The  General  Form  of  Marx's  Critique. 
Marx  is  in  broad  agreement  with  the  above  criticisms  of  Feuerbach.  At  the  same  time  there 
is  the  need  to  generalise  the  critique  of  Hegel's  dialectic  and  this  fundamental  principle  of 
all  activity  pertaining  to  it,  to  widen  and  extend  its  nature.  Due  to  this  very  need  for  a  more 
generalised  settling  of  accounts  with  Hegel's  dialectic,  there  is  inevitably  a  difference 
expressed  by  Marx  between  the  scope  and  range  contained  in  Feuerbach's,  and  his  own 
form  of  criticism  and  investigation.  This  is  so  for  the  following  reasons. 
Firstly,  whilst  Marx  accepts  the  Feuerbachian  analysis,  it  is  a  specific  critique  of  Hegel's 
idealist  and  theosophical  viewpoint.  One  that  is  still  contained,  by  and  large,  within 
traditional  philosophical  boundaries  and  parameters.  Feuerbach  limits  his  critique  of  Hegel's 
application  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  to  Hegel's  theosophical  and  philosophical 
relation,  expressed  as  a  contradiction  of  philosophy  with  itself. 
"  Feuerbach  thus  conceives  the  negation  of  the  negation  only  as  a  contradiction  of 
philosophy  with  itself  -  as  philosophy  which  affirms  theology  (the  transcendent  etc.  ) 
after  having  denied  it,  and  which  it  therefore  affirms  in  opposition  to  itself.  9924 
23  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  329.  In  a  note  in  the 
text  here  by  Marx,  he  also  expresses  this  in  the  following  manner.  "Feuerbach  also  defines  the  negation  of  the 
negation,  the  definite  concept,  as  thinking  surpassing  itself  in  thinking  and  as  thinking  wanting  to  be  directly 
awareness,  nature,  reality.  " 
24  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  329. 
32 Feuerbach,  according  to  Marx,  does  not  see  the  positive  side  of  the  negation  of  negation  as 
self-affirmation  and  self-confirmation,  because  Hegel's  absolute  idealism  fails  to 
demonstrate  its  existence  in  the  real  world.  The  world  remains  unaltered  by  the  activity  of 
speculative  idealist  thought  for  it  has  only  overcome  that  world  in  thought,  and  posited  that 
world  as  the  product  of  thought. 
By  implication,  Marx  sees  the  critique,  inherent  the  negation  of  the  negation,  in  a  wider 
sense  than  the  expression  of  an  alienated  movement  that  entails  the  negation  of  religion  and 
its  subsequent  reaffirmation  in  the  guise  of  the  philosophy  of  religion.  The  negation  of  the 
negation  has  a  universal  application  and  usage  in  Hegel's  philosophy;  the  materialist 
criticism  of  Marx  reflects  this  more  universal  application  of  this  dialectical  principle  of  all 
movement  and  generation. 
The  failure  of  Hegel's  idealist  account  of  self-affirmation  contained  in  Feuerbach's  critique 
does  not  mean  that  the  negation  of  the  negation  cannot  be  applied  to  other  active  subjects, 
subjects  where  it  is  objectively  self-affirmed.  By  contrast,  Marx,  as  we  shall  see,  is 
attempting  to  generate  just  this  form  of  dialectic  This  generalised  form  of  criticism  is 
reflected  by  Marx  in  his  discussion  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  as  applying  to,  not  only 
the  negating  and  affirming  of  alienated  religion  as  philosophy,  a  la  Feuerbach;  but  also  to 
another  subject. 
This  subject,  the  inverted  materialist  form  of  Hegel's  mystical  one  is  nature;  this  natural 
subject  also  further  includes  within  it,  the  essential  human  activity  that  is  bound  up  with 
external  nature.  Dialectics,  as  the  movement  of  an  ontological  contradiction,  is  expressed  as 
a  necessary  relation  of  the  subject  to  sublate  the  opposite  determination  in  its  own  specific 
nature.  For  Marx  this  dialectic  is  expressed  through  the  human  activity  of  labour. 
Paradoxically  though,  both  the  positive  as  well  as  the  negative  aspects  of  Hegel's  mystical 
application  of  this  dialectical  principle  will  be  brought  out  in  Marx's  critical  analysis  'of  the 
33 more  generalised  form  of  estrangement  and  alienation  that  negation  of  the  negation  takes  in 
Hegel. 
That  is,  both  the  rational  and  the  mystical  elements  will  be  represented  in  his  critical 
analysis  of  this  pivotal  Hegelian  concept  and  dialectical  categoryAt  is  by  counterpoising 
Hegel's  idealist  account  of  spirit's  relation  to  nature  with  labour's  relation  to  nature  that 
Marx  generates  this  dialectical  paradox.  It  is  this  inversion  of  the  dialectic  within  all  activity 
that  will  fundamentally  separate  Marx's  critique  from  that  of  Feuerbach's. 
There  is,  for  Marx,  still  a  positive  aspect  to  this,  failed  idealist  dialectic;  this  is  implicitly 
revealed  in  the  following  usage  by  Marx  of  a  qualifying  "but".  Marx  himself  proceeds  to  tell 
us  what  the  nature  of  that  qualifying  "but"  actually  is. 
"But  because  Hegel  has  conceived  the  negation  of  the  negation,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  positive  relation  inherent  in  it,  as  the  true  and  only  positive,  and  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  negative  relation  inherent  in  it  as  the  only  true  act  and 
spontaneous  activity  of  all  being,  he  has  found  only  the  abstract,  logical,  speculative 
expression  for  the  movement  of  history,  which  is  not  yet  the  real  history  of  man  as  a 
given  subject,  but  only  the  act  of  creation,  the  history  of  the  origin  of  man.  "' 
Secondly,  and  directly  related  to  the  view  that  Feuerbach's  criticism  of  Hegel's  philosophy, 
whilst  undoubtedly  correct  for  Marx,  has  to  be  expanded  in  its  range  and  scope.  There  is  yet 
another  qualifying  "but"  to  Feuerbach's  argument  that  is  pregnantly  inserted  into  Marx's 
account  in  the  Manuscripts.  This  qualification  reinforces  the  earlier  need  to  generalise  the 
criticism  of  Hegel  through  this  his  core  principle. 
"Here  is  the  root  of  Hegel's  false  positivism,  or  of  his  merely  apparent  criticism:  this 
is  what  Feuerbach  designated  as  the  positing,  negating  and  then  the  re-affirming  and 
25  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  329. 
34 re-establishing  of  religion  or  theology  -  but  it  has  to  be  expressed  in  more  general 
terms.  Thus  reason  is  at  home  in  unreason  as  unreason.  "" 
This  aspect  of  my  analysis  is  in  disagreement  with  C.  Arthur's  view,  which  attaches  no 
significance  to  the  earlier  point  made  by  Marx.  That  of  how  Feuerbach  criticised  the 
negation  of  the  negation  in  a  specific  form,  that  is,  only  as  a  contradiction  of  philosophy 
with  itself.  This  formulation,  according  to  Arthur,  cannot  be  taken  as  indicating  any  real 
criticism  of  Feuerbach's  analysis  by  Marx;  this  is  due  to  the  following  reason. 
To  interpret  Marx's  comment  here  as  being  more  negative  than  "either  an  endorsement"  or  a 
"neutral  report"  with  regards  Feuerbach,  is  to  "read  too  much  into  the  text".  The  reason  for 
this,  according  to  Arthur,  is  that  "no  other  remark  in  the  1844  Manuscripts  can  be  said  to  be 
critical  of  Feuerbach,  so  the  balance  of  probability  is  that  this  is  not  either.  "2' 
It  seems  clear  though,  that  there  is  a  form  of  relation  between  the  above  quoted  two  forms  of 
employment,  by  Marx,  of  the  qualifying  use  of  "but",  and  how  Hegel's  negation  of  the 
negation  is  interpreted  by  Feuerbach  only  as  a  contradiction  of  philosophy  with  itself.  " 
Firstly,  because  Hegel  has  encapsulated  the  dialectical  polarity  of  the  principle  of  negativity 
as  "the  only  true  act  and  spontaneous  activity  of  all  being"  and  the  "abstract,  logical, 
speculative  expression  for  the  movement  of  history"  entails  that  its  application  is  wider  than 
Hegel's  theosophical  contradiction.  It  is  by  showing  how  Hegel's  thought,  is  not  only  in 
contradiction  in  its  philosophical  expression  of  its  relation  to  religion,  that  it  precisely 
requires  to  be  widened  in  its  scope. 
11  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  339. 
11  C.  Arthur.  Dialectics  of  Labour.  Blackwell.  (1986.  )  P.  122. 
28  G.  Lukacs.  The  Young  Hegel.  Merlin  Press.  (1975.  )  Pages  547-561.  G.  Lukacs  takes  a  similar  view 
to  the  position  outlined  in  this  section  of  the  thesis.  See  P.  559-560.  However,  he  does  not  link  the  second 
qualifying  "but"  to  the  first,  to  produce  the  critique  inherent  in  Marx  vis  a  vis  Feuerbach.  In  my  view,  to  do  so 
adds  further  strength  to  the  viewpoint  that  does  see  that,  even  within  the  E.  P.  M.,  there  are  some  implicit  if  not 
explicit  criticisms  of  Feuerbach's  analysis  of  Hegel's  negation  of  negation  at  work.  The  real  question,  and 
problem,  is  to  understand  the  fluidity  and  dynamics  involved  that  are  forming  Marx's  intellectual  development 
at  this  particular  period. 
35 This  naturally  leads  on  to  the  second  qualifying  but  of  Marx,  one  that  does  clearly  connect 
with  the  need  for  a  wider  critique  than  Feuerbach's  view  that  the  negation  of  the  negation 
expresses  only  a  contradiction  of  philosophy  with  itself.  It  is  also  because  it  is  a  generalised 
philosophical  principle  with  a  wider  application  to  all  being  that  it  is  characterised,  by  Marx, 
as  an  alienated  philosophical  form  that  expresses  a  more  generalised  condition. 
For  example,  Hegel's  thought  contains  an  inverted  and  mysticised  account  of  human 
rationality  that  is  also  in  contradiction  with  both  its  relation  to  nature,  and  its  alienated 
social  condition.  This  is  also  why  it  is  generalised,  by  Marx,  in  the  form  of  how  "reason  is  at 
home  in  unreason  as  unreason.  "  This  is  why  his  alienated  form  of  reason,  and  his 
application  of  his  dialectical  principle,  as  Marx  puts  it,  "has  to  be  expressed  in  more  general 
terms.  " 
In  my  perspective,  both  the  above  remarks,  combined  with  Marx's  expression  that  the 
critique  of  Hegel  has  to  be  generalised  and  aimed  at  Hegel's  dialectic  and  philosophy  as  a 
whole,  entails  that  if  taken  together,  and  viewed  as  being  in  some  form  of  intellectual  and 
theoretical  relation,  amount  to  more  than  just  "an  endorsement"  or  a  "neutral  report"  on 
Feuerbach.  As  such,  they  indicate,  at  the  least,  an  immanent  criticism,  or  an  underlying 
tension. 
The  situation  can  also  be  posed,  perhaps  more  accurately,  in  the  following  fashion,  as  being 
both  an  endorsement  and  as  a  going  beyond  the  parameters  of  Feuerbach's  critique,  to  a 
wider  and  fuller  form.  Marx's  attempted  proof  of  Feuerbach's  achievements  would  though, 
take  his  general  form  of  criticism  into  uncharted  regions,  well  beyond  the  topography  of 
Feuerbach. 
This,  I  believe,  captures  the  dynamics  of  the  relation  more  accurately.  To  see  the 
interconnection  between  these  two  qualifying  statements  by  Marx  is  to  trace  out,  what  was 
already  in  the  embryonic  process  of  becoming  a  significant  difference  between  Feuerbach 
36 and  Marx.  The  two  remarks  are,  in  my  view,  related  and  have  a  widespread  significance  and 
implication  for  understanding  Marx's  own  critique  of  Hegel.  The  question  is  what  are  the 
implications  of  the  dynamic  inherent  in  this  more  generalised  form  of  critique  of  Marx? 
Marx's  critique  of  Hegel's  idealism  is  posited  by  him  in  a  more  generalised  form  whose 
specific  aim  is  not  just  to  show  Hegel's  philosophical  thought  as  expressing  an  alienated 
philosophical  and  theosophical  form;  a  form  which  has  its  roots  in  nature  and  civil  society. 
There  would  be  no  point,  that  specific  criticism  of  Hegel  had  already  been  achieved  by 
Feuerbach  and  accepted  wholeheartedly  by  Marx. 
The  materialist  critique  of  Marx  aims  to  demonstrate  that  the  negation  of  the  negation,  when 
critically  applied,  for  example,  to  Hegel's  alienated  expression  of  social  thought,  reveals 
that  "this  lie  is  the  lie  of  his  principle.  "  The  problem  with  Hegel's  account  is  that  it 
rationalises  that  alienated  condition  in  its  alienated  fashion,  and  cognises  it  as  the  product  of 
abstract  philosophical  mind. 
"The  man  who  has  recognised  that  he  is  leading  an  alienated  life  in  law,  politics, 
etc.,  is  leading  his  true  human  life  in  this  alienated  life  as  such.  Self-affirmation,  self- 
confirmation  in  contradiction  with  itself  -  in  contradiction  with  both  the  knowledge 
and  the  essential  being  of  the  object  -  is  thus  true  knowledge  and  life.  "" 
What  Marx  seeks  to  add  to  the  Feuerbachian  account  is  a  generalised  form  of  criticism,  and 
a  generalised  proof  of  this  criticism.  This  generalised  disapprobation  would,  if  successful, 
seem  to  be  a  more  damning  criticism  than  Feuerbach's,  and  in  many  ways  it  certainly  is. 
However,  and  paradoxically,  this  generalised  form  of  criticism  also  allows  for  the  positive 
and  rational  element,  contained  within  the  idealist  conception  of  the  dialectic  of  negativity, 
to  begin  to  emerge  more  clearly. 
37 Marx's  incisive  analysis  is  of  a  central  concept  and  fundamental  principle  in  Hegel's 
philosophy.  By  honing  in  on  the  dynamic  contradiction  that  is  expressed  within  it,  the 
criticism  can  then  be  applied  to  the  "the  entire  compass  of  abstraction"  contained  in  Hegel's 
thought.  This  will,  paradoxically,  both  deepen  and  comprehensively  extend  the  materialist 
critique  of  Hegel,  and  at  the  same  time  draw  out  the  positive  aspects  of  the  principle  of  the 
negation  of  the  negation  contained  in  Hegel's  work.  This  is  brought  out  precisely  by 
showing  how  "reason  is  at  home  in  unreason  as  unreason.  "'o 
Marx's  critique  is  a  critique  that  posits  that  the  totality  of  Hegel's  view  of  activity,  including 
the  objective  world  and  nature,  is  itself  posited  in  an  idealist  and  alienated  fashion  as 
ultimately  the  work  of  thought.  It  is  this  very  objectivity  itself  that  Hegel  has  to  annul  by  the 
movement  of  self-consciousness,  by  idealist  philosophical  thought.  The  critique  inherent  in 
Marx  then,  is  not  only  limited  to  the  inversion  of  ontological  primacy,  but  also  of  an  idealist 
subject  of  dialectical  activity  and  its  replacement  with  a  materialist  subject  of  dialectical 
activity. 
The  emphasis  Marx  places  on  the  positive  form  of  the  Hegelian  dialectic  of  negativity  as  the 
self-movement  of  a  contradiction,  the  essence  of  the  dialectical  method,  marks  him  out  from 
the  Feuerbach  critique.  What  separates  Marx  from  Feuerbach  in  the  Manuscripts,  and  this  is 
of  vital  importance  for  understanding  the  nature  of  Marx's  inversion,  is  the  attempt  to 
11  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  339.  Marx  then  goes 
on  to  say  the  following.  "There  can  therefore  no  longer  be  any  question  about  an  act  of  accommodation  on 
Hegel's  part  vis-A-vis  religion,  the  state,  etc.,  since  this  lie  is  the  lie  of  his  principle.  " 
11  This  leaves  us  with  a  problem  that  requires  some  explanation,  one  whose  answer  will  challenge  the 
view  that  Hegel's  dialectic  is  rotten  to  its  idealist  core;  how,  for  the  critical  materialist,  can  reason  be  at  home 
in  unreason  as  unreason?  Before  we  can  even  begin  to  answer  this  question  we  will  have  to  introduce  yet 
another  element  into  the  argument.  In  my  analysis,  this  further  element  has  not  been  sufficiently  integrated 
into  the  analysis  by  commentators  in  this  area  of  historical  research.  This  element  being  Marx's  designation  of 
Hegel's  philosophy,  and  his  view  of  the  essence  of  it,  as  a  form  of  "alienated  science  thinking  itself".  This 
unusual  formulation  of  Marx  can  also  be,  in  my  account,  interpreted  as  an  alternative  way  of  expressing  his 
generalised  criticism  that  in  Hegel's  thought,  "reason  is  at  home  in  unreason  as  unreason.  " 
The  discussion  of  this  relation  between  reason  being  at  home  in  unreason  as  unreason,  and  its  relation 
to  Marx's  designation  of  Hegel's  Logic  as  a  form  of  alienated  science,  will  be  discussed  later  in  the  thesis. 
(See  chapter  four.  )  Before  we  can  do  so,  it  requires  yet  further  analysis  of  Marx's  critique  of  Hegel's  idealist 
dialectic  to  prepare  some  more  groundwork  for  a  more  fruitful  discussion  to  take  place. 
38 disengage  Hegel's  methodological  insights  from  his  idealist  system.  This  strategy  is  not  part 
of  Feuerbach's  philosophical  criticism.  " 
It  is  time  now  to  begin  to  take  a  more  in  depth  look  at  the  core  elements  of  Hegel's  account 
of  the  dynamics  of  the  process  and  movement  of  dialectical  thought,  and  the  areas  where 
Marx  develops  his  generalised  form  of  criticism  of  Hegel's  alienated  form  of  expression  of 
dialectic.  Hegel's  application  of  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  inherent  to  the 
dialectic  of  negativity  is  to  the  development  of  mind  as  self-consciousness;  in  a  process  of 
sublating  its  opposite,  nature,  in  order  to  affirm  itself  as  logical  speculative  mind. 
The  objectivity  of  external  being  is  cognised  as  merely  the  alienated  form  and  manifestation 
of  the  activity  of  absolute  thought,  manifested  and  expressed  in  that  thought's  own 
estranged  form  of  existence,  the  objective  natural  totality.  ý  The  result  of  this  mystified 
dialectical  process  and  supersession  of  Hegel  is  the  creation  of  a  totality  of  logical 
abstraction.  This  is  expressed  by  Marx  as  the  "dialectic  of  pure  thought"  that  revolves 
within  its  own  circle,  in  its  own  peculiar,  speculative,  and  alienated  form  as  philosophical 
logic,  and  containing  its  twin  dialectical  poles  of  abstract  nature  and  abstract  mind. 
How  does  Hegel  end  up  with  an  idealist  account  of  the  dialectic  that  mystifies  rather  than 
clarifies  that  real  relation?  How  does  Hegel  arrive  at  this  peculiar  position  of  abstract 
thought  being  its  own  subject  and  object,  its  own  self-contained  totality  according  to  Marx? 
3.  Hegel's  Double  Error. 
The  explanation  of  the  sources  of  Hegel's  speculative  leaps  and  somersaults  involves  what 
Marx  calls  Hegel's  "double  error";  the  critical  analysis  of  this  twofold  error  by  Marx  attacks 
11  This  separation  of  method  from  system  will  prove  to  be  fundamentally  important  for  the 
development  of  Marx's  critical  thought.  The  contradiction  in  Hegel  between  method  and  system,  later 
highlighted  by  Engels,  is  already  in  operation  here.  These  differences,  of  a  materialist  subject  of  the  dialectic, 
and  the  separation  of  the  dialectical  method  from  an  idealist  system,  constitute  what  would  become  a 
fundamental  separation  of  Marx  from  Feuerbach.  The  full  ramifications  of  which,  Marx  had  yet  to  develop, 
never  mind  fully  think  through. 
39 the  philosophical  foundation  for  Hegel's  idealist  illusions.  What  Hegel  takes  to  be  the 
criterion  of  the  estranged  world,  is,  in  fact,  itself  an  alienated  expression  of  that 
estrangement  for  Marx.  This  is  Hegel's  first  error.  What  are  posed,  as  the  criterion  of  the 
estranged  world,  are  the  philosopher  and  the  activity  of  philosophical  thought. 
"The  whole  history  of  the  alienation  process  and  the  whole  process  of  the  retraction 
of  the  alienation  is  therefore  nothing  but  the  history  of  the  production  of  abstract  (i.  e. 
absolute)  thought  -  of  logical  speculative  thought.  "" 
Objectivity  becomes  interpreted  as  an  abstract  objectivity,  with  the  ongoing  and  developing 
forms  of  consciousness  viewed  in  an  unfolding  dialectical  and  historical  relation;  a  relation 
that  results  in  the  realisation  of  its  true  nature,  as  self-conscious  mind  that  contains 
knowledge  of  the  absolute.  The  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  as  the  historical  result  of  this 
development  of  abstract  philosophical  thought,  has  realised  its  teleological  goal,  as  absolute 
knowledge. 
The  core  of  the  alienation  process  is  contained  within  the  parameters  of  the  dialectic  of 
subject  and  object;  with  the  object  cast  as  the  idea  in  itseýf,  as  nature,  and  the  subject  cast  as 
the  ideafor  itseýf,  as  mind.  Estrangement,  is  the  direct  oppositional  form  of  this  objective 
dialectical  relation  between  nature  and  man  that  is  contained  in  this  contrariety  of  in  itself 
and  for  itself.  The  opposition  is  also  manifested,  according  to  Marx,  as  that  between  abstract 
thinking  and  sensuous  reality  "or  real  sensuousness  within  thought  itself.  " 
The  objective  relation  is  itself  subjectivised  and  sublated  in  thought  by  Hegel's  idealism;  the 
objective  relation  is  internalised  within  the  subject,  and  is  now  expressed  in  the  form  of  the 
dialectic  of  consciousness  and  self-consciousness.  As  the  object  now  appears  as  a  form  of 
consciousness,  it  is  in  the  process  of  being  superseded  by  the  realm  of  thought. 
32  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  331. 
40 The  object  then  appears  only  as  an  external  manifestation  of  abstract  consciousness,  as  an 
externalised  thought-entity  or  concept;  this  is  its  idealised  form  of  being.  The  subject,  as 
man,  appears  only  as  self-consciousness;  the  dialectic  of  self  and  other,  of  subject  and 
object,  is  now  integrated  within  the  process  of  thought  itself.  This  relation  being  the  posited 
essence  and  source  of  the  objective  estrangement  that  is  to  be  superseded  in  thought  and  by 
thought. 
This  process,  of  estrangement  and  its  supersession,  is  all  the  entire  work  of  the  movement  of 
the  categories  of  thought.  Estrangement  lies  in  the  form  of  the  opposition  of  the 
objectification  of  natural  man,  in  contrast  to  his  truer  and  higher  nature,  as  abstract  thinker. 
The  appropriation  of  objectivity  and  the  annulling  of  the  estrangement  occur  in  the  realm  of 
thought,  as  a  movement  and  process  belonging  only  to  pure  thought. 
The  second  error  that  flows  from  this  is  that  mind  is  posited  as  the  essence  of  man.  As  the 
philosopher,  the  abstract  form  of  estranged  man,  is  the  criterion  of  the  estranged  world,  then 
mind,  whose  essence  is  alienated  abstract  thinking,  appropriates  the  estranged  world  in  an 
estranged  way;  in  the  active  form  and  mode  of  abstract  philosophical  thought. 
As  the  external  objects,  both  natural  and  social,  are  ultimately  seen  as  thought- 
determinations,  as  conceptual  thought-entities,  then  the  idealist  dialectical  paradox  that 
ensues  is  that  they  are  then  both  objectively  estranged  from,  and  at  the  same  time  contained 
within,  abstract  philosophical  thought.  As  the  product  of  abstract  mind,  and  as  the 
phenomenal  form  of  the  movement  of  the  categories  of  thought,  they  are  phases  of  mind  or 
conceptual  thought-entities.  The  true  appropriation  of  objectivity  occurs  then,  only  in  the 
form  of  abstract  thought,  that  is,  in  the  estranged  form  of  abstract  philosophical  man. 
Consciousness,  in  this  its  dynamic  dialectical  movement,  becomes  self-consciousness.  The 
process  and  the  result  of  this  idealist  dialectic  is  absolute  mind,  which  is  thinking  returning 
home  to  its  point  of  origin.  The  historical  result  of  this  process  being  the  dialectic  of  pure 
thought,  with  the  true  form  of  mind  as  logical,  speculative  mind. 
41 As  such,  the  dialectic  of  consciousness  and  self-consciousness  becomes  generalised  in  an 
alienated  philosophical  form,  as  pure  logical  thought.  Alternatively  expressed,  it  is  alienated 
thinking  contemplating  itself  in  an  alienated  fashion,  and,  moreover,  taking  that  alienated 
expression  as  its  true  and  real  expression.  As  this  is  abstract  thought  that  abstracts  from  real 
nature  and  from  real  man,  it  is  an  abstract  totality  of  thought  that  becomes  indifferent  to  all 
real  determinateness. 
In  Marx's  view  the  activity  of  the  philosophical  mind,  the  essence  and  criterion  of  all  reality 
for  Hegel,  is  "nothing  but  the  estranged  mind  of  the  world  thinking  within  its  self- 
estrangement  -  i.  e.,  comprehending  itself  abstractly.  "33 
This  view  is,  in  itself,  a  more  generalised  criticism  of  Hegel's  philosophy  than  that  of  the 
negating  of  religion  and  its  philosophical  reaffirmation  through  the  negating  of  that 
negation.  This  "double  error"  in  Hegel  gives  rise  to  the  speculative  illusions  that  are 
expressed  in  his  inverted  and  mystical  form  of  dialectic;  a  dialectic  that  contains  its  own 
specific  form  of  idealist  presuppositions  as  its  foundation. 
Speculative  Illusions. 
"The  issue,  therefore  is  to  surmount  the  object  of  consciousness.  Objectivity,  as  such 
is  regarded  as  an  estranged  human  relationship  which  does  not  correspond  to  the 
essence  of  man,  to  self-consciousness.  The  reappropriation  of  the  objective  essence 
of  man,  produced  within  the  orbit  of  estrangement  as  something  alien,  therefore 
denotes  not  only  the  annulment  of  estrangement,  but  of  objectivity  as  well.  Man,  that 
is  to  say,  is  regarded  as  a  non-objective  spiritual  being.  "" 
33  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  330. 
34  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  333-334. 
42 The  movement  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  in  Hegel  is  characterised  here  by  Marx  as 
"the  movement  of  surmounting  the  object  of  consciousness.  "  The  exposition  of  Hegel's 
account  of  this  process,  contained  in  Marx's  criticism,  and  outlined  here,  will  concentrate  on 
the  mystical  and  uncritical  form  of  the  idealist  dialectic  before  drawing  out,  later  in  the 
thesis,  some  of  the  more  positive  or  critical  aspects  that  are  entailed  in  this  Hegelian 
principle  of  the  dialectic. 
First  of  all,  it  is  important  to  be  clear  what  Marx  means  here  by  his  use  of  the  phrase  "the 
movement  of  surmounting  the  object  of  consciousness.  "  What  is  referred  to  and  entailed  in 
the  use  of  this  phrase  by  Marx?  Hegel,  for  Marx,  regards  the  externalised  and  alienated 
objectivity  of  nature  as  an  estranged  relationship  that  does  not  correspond  to  the  essence  of 
man,  that  is,  to  man  in  his  apposite  form  as  rational  and  speculative  mind.  What  though  is 
the  ontological  status  of  the  object  of  consciousness  here? 
The  object  of  consciousness  is,  for  abstract  philosophical  man,  nothing  but  self- 
consciousness;  or  alternatively,  the  object  is  itself  only  a  form  of  objectified  and  alienated 
self-consciousness.  Self-consciousness,  in  fact,  presents  itself  to  itself,  in  the  form  of  an 
object;  an  object  that  is  destined  to  be,  in  this  its  alien-objective  and  estranged  form,  negated 
by  the  process  and  movement  of  self-consciousness  itself.  The  movement  of  surmounting 
the  object  of  consciousness  is  then  the  process  of  the  return  of  the  object  into  the  self,  in  the 
form  of  conceptual  thought,  its  true  essence  and  ontological  root. 
The  movement  behind  this  process  takes  the  form  of  the  negation  of  the  negation,  as  the 
dialectic  inherent  in  the  active  thought  process.  Consciousness,  first  of  all,  negates  itself  by 
alienating  itself  in  the  estranged  form  of  the  object;  this  it  does  in  order  to  then  negate  the 
estranged  nature  of  the  object  and  return  to  itself  as  self-conscious  conceptual  thought.  The 
means  by  which  this  process  is  realised  is  through  the  sublation  of  the  alienation  of  self- 
consciousness  through  the  movement  of  surmounting  that  estranged  object  of 
consciousness,  namely  objective  nature. 
43 Self-consciousness  posits  objectivity  itself  as  a  thing  whose  essentiality  lies  outside  its  own 
materialised  form;  its  essence  lies  in  the  form  of  abstract  thought.  The  objectivity  of 
material  being,  as  estrangement  and  alienation,  exists  then  only  as  a  result  of  the  self- 
estrangement  and  self-alienation  of  absolute  thought.  As  conceptual  thought  is  regarded  as 
the  very  essence  of  that  estranged  and  alien  objectivity,  then  by  conceptually  surmounting 
the  object  of  consciousness,  consciousness  will,  at  the  same  time,  realises  itself  in  its  higher 
form,  as  self-consciousness. 
What  constitutes  estrangement  for  Hegel's  idealism  is  not  the  determinate  character  of  the 
object  but  its  very  objectivity  itself.  Self-consciousness  "takes  offence"  not  at  estranged 
objectivity,  but  at  objectivity  per  se.  It  is  objectivity  itself  that  is  to  be  annulled  in  thought 
and  as  thought.  This  entails  that  in  the  supersession,  it  is  not  only  the  annulment  of 
estrangement  that  takes  place,  but  also  the  annulment  of  objectivity  itself.  This  is  why,  the 
essence  of  man,  as  Marx  characterises  Hegel's  view,  is  ultimately  regarded  as  being  that  of  a 
"non-objective  spiritual  being.  " 
This  re-appropriation  of  man's  estranged  objective  essence  is  effected  through  the  dialectic 
contained  in  the  alienated  form  of  the  natural  object  outside  him,  as  an  object  that  is 
inherently  fated  to  be  subsumed  in  the  process  of  the  production  of  speculative  and  logical 
thought.  This  consciousness  realises  by  replacing  the  "offensive"  objectivity,  the 
externalised  form  of  the  estranged  essence,  with  a  new  object  that  reflects  its  true  essential 
activity;  namely,  conceptual  thought. 
The  result  of  this  process  of  surmounting  the  object  of  consciousness  is  that  the  object  itself 
becomes  a  moment,  a  determination  of  thought;  as  essentially  the  product  of  a  conceptual 
entity.  This  conceptuality  is  then,  both  the  very  essence  and  the  source  of  the  substantial 
being  of  the  object;  as  a  conceptual  essence  that  can  only  be  grasped  in  and  by  rational 
thought,  its  true  source  and  substantial  foundation. 
44 Speculative  thought  becomes,  through  this  idealist  dialectic  of  consciousness  with  self- 
consciousness,  its  own  subject  and  object;  one  that  merely  has  an  estranged  external  and 
natural  form,  but  whose  true  essence  lies  in  the  domain  of  conceptual  thought.  Nature  and 
objectivity  are  then  viewed  as  being  essentially  conceptual  entities,  as  the  externalised 
material  form  of  the  expression  of  self-consciousness.  It  is  the  process  where  objectivity 
itself  is  sublated  in  thought  and  expressed  in  its  universal  form  as  pure,  logical,  speculative 
thought. 
Through  this  dialectical  activity  of  mind,  self-critical  thought  becomes  a  systematic,  rational 
and  logical  self-consciousness.  At  the  same  time,  nature  is  shown  to  be  the  product  of 
conceptual  thought,  as  its  mere  phenomenal  appearance  and  manifestation.  The  real 
alienation,  of  active  objective  humanity  in  relation  to  active  objective  nature,  is  inverted  and 
regarded  as  the  form  of  appearance  of  the  estrangement  of  self-consciousness. 
The  object  turns  out  to  be,  in  this  inverted  idealist  process,  the  self-estrangement  and 
externalisation  of  thought  that  is  retracted  back  to  its  truer  and  higher  form,  as  rational 
conceptual  thought,  as  knowledge,  but  in  an  alienated  and  estranged  fashion  that,  in  Marx's 
critique,  only  confirms  its  own  alienated  and  abstract  philosophical  activity. 
How  does  this  process  and  movement  unfold  that  would  underpin  and  confirm  the  idealist 
viewpoint  for  Hegel?  The  answer  to  this  idealist  process  ties  in  with  the  previous  criticism 
of  Marx,  the  "double  error"  in  Hegel  discussed  in  the  last  section. 
As  mind  is  the  true  human  essence  for  Hegel,  then  the  development  of  mind  is  in  the 
overcoming  of  this  its  alienated  condition.  As  abstract  philosophical  man,  the  criterion  of  all 
knowledge,  is  in  this  view  self-consciousness,  then  the  objective  estrangement  is  the 
estrangement  of  self-consciousness  from  realising  itself  in  its  true  nature,  as  logical, 
speculative  mind.  Alienated  self-consciousness  posits  that  estranged  objective  essence  as  an 
abstraction,  as  an  abstract  object;  the  result  of  this  positing  is  that  external  being  is  itself 
reduced  to  a  conceptual  abstraction,  namely  "thinghood". 
45 Thinghood,  as  the  abstract  form  of  external  nature,  is  the  estranged  form  of  that  objective 
essence;  as  the  dialectical  opposite  and  negative  identity  of  alienated  self-consciousness 
itself.  In  this  alienated  form,  self-consciousness  posits  itself  as  object,  and  the  object  as 
itself.  This  it  can  do  only  through  the  positing  of  thinghood  as  the  reduction  of  the  objective 
concrete  determination  to  an  abstract  thought  determination. 
"And  what  is  posited,  instead  of  confirming  itself,  is  but  confirmation  of  the  act  of 
positing  which  for  a  moment  fixes  its  energy  as  the  product,  and  gives  it  the 
semblance  -  but  only  for  a  moment  -  of  an  independent,  real  substance.  "" 
This  idealist  abstraction,  posited  by  the  alienation  of  self-consciousness,  entails  that 
objectivity  and  thus  thinghood  is  inherently  non-independent;  what  it  is  dependent  on  is  the 
activity  of  conceptual  thought.  The  determinate  character  of  the  object  and  its  very 
objectivity  are  negated  and  cancelled  by  this  process  and  act  of  abstraction;  this  only  serves 
to  confirm  objectivity  as  both  the  self-alienation  and  dialectical  return  of  abstract 
speculative  thought  to  itself. 
Thinghood  is  thus  both  a  product  of,  and  posited  by,  abstract  thought  itself;  it  is,  in  turn, 
dependent  upon  abstract  thought  for  its  very  existence.  This  positing  of  thinghood  "is  itself 
an  illusion  of  speculation"  for  this  abstract  objectification  of  externality  is  itself  "an  act  of 
contradicting  the  nature  of  pure  activity,  it  has  to  be  cancelled  again  and  thinghood  denied.  " 
Thinghood  does  not  then  confirm  itself  in  its  activity;  instead  it  merely  confirms  the  activity 
of  abstract  thought. 
The  object,  as  it  becomes  sublated  in  the  form  of  conceptual  thought,  is  shown  to  be  both 
dependent  and  self-annulling.  The  nullity  of  the  estranged  object  is  "precisely  the  self- 
confirmation  of  the  non-objectivity  of  the  abstraction  itself.  "  Here  the  nullity  of  the  object 
lies  in  the  non-existence  of  the  distinction  between  the  object  of  conceptual  consciousness 
46 and  self-consciousness  itself,  it  lies  in  their  direct  identity  as  essentially  the  product  of 
speculative  thought. 
At  the  same  time  as  speculative  idealism  is  showing  the  essential  "nullity"  of  an  external 
object,  as  an  object  that  is  itself  dependent  on  conceptual  and  abstract  thought  as  its  very 
essence,  self-consciousness,  through  the  process  of  re-absorbing  that  objectivity,  realises 
that  it  is,  in  fact,  at  home  in  its  other  being  as  such.  Estranged  objectivity  is  thus  dependent 
upon  abstract  thought  for  its  estranged  form  of  existence. 
Knowing  has  confronted  itself  with  itself,  that  which  appears  to  it  as  an  object  is  only  itself. 
The  outcome  of  the  process  is  that  self-consciousness  "knows  knowing"  as  an  object,  as  an 
object  that  is  merely  the  alienated  form  of  self-conscious  mind.  Knowing  has  confronted 
itself  with  itself,  the  object  is its  own  estranged  and  external  form. 
The  "in  itself"  of  consciousness  in  its  dialectical  relation  to  objective  nature  becomes  the 
"for  itself"  of  self-consciousness  as  mind  or  spirit.  Mind  is  thus  self-confirmed  as  the  true 
essence  of  man,  and  thinking,  logical,  speculative  mind  is  the  true  character  and  the  realised 
essence  of  mind.  This  is  the  illusion  of  thought  in  its  mystical  and  idealist  form,  and  how  the 
principle  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  becomes,  in  Hegel's  analysis,  the  inverted 
confirmation  of  the  pseudo-essence,  as  abstract,  speculative  thought. 
The  entity  that  is  superseded  is  the  entity  as  an  object  of  knowledge;  what  is  ultimately 
transcended  is  a  conceptual  entity.  In  turn,  as  the  object  is  transformed  into  a  moment  or 
determination  of  thought,  it  merely  confirms  the  abstractions  of  self-consciousness.  The 
result  of  this  idealist  movement  is  the  identity  of  consciousness  with  self-consciousness  in 
the  form  of  absolute  knowledge. 
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47 "[T]he  movement  of  abstract  thought  no  longer  directed  outwards  but  proceeding 
now  only  within  its  own  self:  that  is  to  say,  the  dialectic  of  pure  thought  is  the 
resu  t. 
"36 
In  the  dialectical  movement  for  surmounting  the  object  of  consciousness  what  is  cancelled  is 
estranged  objectivity,  what  is  retained  is  that  estranged  objectivity  as  a  moment  and 
determination  of  thought,  as  the  alienated  and  inverted  contrary  form  of  the  dialectic 
contained  in  conceptual  thought.  Nature  is,  by  its  very  externality,  absolute  thought's  own 
estranged  form  of  negative  existence. 
Self-consciousness  thus  realises  and  affirms  itself  in  its  highest  form,  as  a  logical, 
systematic,  and  speculative  totality  of  pure  thought.  The  conceptual  identity  of  object  and 
subject  is  underpinned  and  hypostasised  as  the  product  of  pure  logical  thought,  their 
common  foundation,  one  that  is  conferred  with  an  absolute  status.  The  potentiality  of 
consciousness  as  mind  or  spirit  is  actualised  in  this  its  divine  element  and  source,  as  the 
absolute  idea. 
This  is  why  self-consciousness  can  believe  itself  to  be  directly  the  other  of  itself.  Hegel's 
speculative  illusions  reside  in  his  view  that  consciousness,  as  self-consciousness,  as  it  is 
both  in  direct  identity  to  and  the  source  of  that  very  estranged  objectivity,  thinks  that  it  is  at 
home  in  its  other-being  as  such.  As  speculative  thought  imagines  itself  to  be  the  other  of 
itself,  as  the  essence  of  the  object;  then  the  action  of  thought  is  taken  to  be  the  essential 
source  of  the  action  behind  the  object. 
As  Hegel's  illusion  posits  that  self-consciousness  is  at  home  in  its  alienated  and  estranged 
other,  then  its  materialist  critique  posits  its  direct  opposite;  that  knowing  pretends  to  be 
directly  that  other,  the  real  world,  life.  As  Feuerbach  expressed  it,  thought  surpasses  itself  in 
thought,  it  does  not,  however,  prove  itself  in  its  existence.  Externality  remains  unaffected  by 
the  activity  of  abstract  speculative  thought.  This  is  why  Feuerbach  posits  that,  for  his 
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48 materialist  critique,  Hegel's  idealism  is  "confronted  by  the  position  of  sense-certainty  based 
on  itself.  " 
This  supersession  in  thought  then,  both  leaves  the  object  intact,  and  at  the  same  time 
believes  that  it  has  now  subsumed  the  object  in  its  essential  form,  as  a  product  of  conceptual 
abstraction.  This  abolition  of  the  estrangement  is  in  fact  a  confirmation  of  the  estrangement 
in  the  materialist  critique.  The  estrangement  inherent  to  this  idealist  dialectic  of  object  and 
subject  remains  in  the  sense  that  the  object,  nature,  is  ontologically  posited  as  the  idea  in  its 
alienated  and  external  other-being,  its  unconscious  or  non-rational  form. 
Estrangement  is  its  very  ontological  condition;  its  real  essential  activity  therefore  lies 
outside  itself,  in  the  subjectivity  of  self-consciousness,  in  active  mind.  This  implies  that 
when  consciousness  attains  to  adequate  self-consciousness,  when  the  alienation  posited  by 
consciousness  is  superseded  as  self-consciousness,  it  nevertheless  posits  that  alien  and 
estranged  objectivity  as  the  product  of  thought  itself.  Estrangement  is  thus  a  condition  that  is 
ultimately  posited  by  abstract  thought  itself.  Estrangement  is  the  inherent  condition  of 
external  nature  for  the  absolute  idealist. 
Estrangement,  like  alienation  and  religion  in  the  materialist  critique,  is  both  negated  and 
then  reaffirmed;  estrangement  is  then  not  overcome,  but  is  regarded  as  a  necessary  product 
of  the  dialectical  diremption  of  subjectivity  and  objectivity;  a  dialectic  whose  foundation  is 
based  on  the  ontology  of  absolute  idealism.  It  is  absolute  thought  that  estranges  itself  in  the 
form  of  the  alienated  object  of  thought,  as  its  own  alienated  essence  in  an  estranged 
objective  form. 
Objectivity  is  confirmed  as  an  alien  and  estranged  objectivity  that  does  not  correspond  to  the 
real  essence  of  nature.  More  importantly,  it  does  not  correspond  to  the  real  essence  of  man, 
to  self-consciousness;  that  is,  to  thought  elevated  from  the  animal  to  its  higher  form,  as 
absolute  spirit  or  mind,  as  the  divine  and  rational  element  in  man.  The  result  of  Hegel's 
Logic  is  the  process  then  whereby  systematic  abstract  thought  confirms  itself;  it  confirms 
49 itself  in  its  own  alienated  activity  for  it  has  absorbed  nature  as  an  abstract  systematic  totality 
that  now  proceeds  within  its  own  self,  as  the  dialectic  of  pure  thought. 
Marx's  argument  finds  its  inspiration  and  parallel  with  Feuerbach's  critique  of  Hegel's 
negating  and  reaffirming  of  religion.  Marx's  critique  of  Hegel's  dialectic  though  is  of  a 
more  generalised  form,  impacting  on  the  very  core  of  the  dialectical  principles  and 
foundations  of  Hegel's  speculative  and  logical  system  of  thought  in  its  relation  to  objective 
nature.  The  reason  this  is  so,  is  that  Marx  does  not  simply  counterpose  to  Hegel's 
speculative  thought,  Feuerbach's  view  that  it  is  "confronted  by  the  position  of  sense- 
certainty  based  on  itself.  " 
What  Marx  inverts  and  counterposes  to  Hegel's  idealist  activity  of  thought,  as  we  shall  see, 
is  what  he  regards  as  the  real  essential  activity  of  humanity.  This  estranged  and  alienated 
form  of  the  dialectic  of  negativity  of  Hegel  will  be  inverted  by  Marx  and  put  to  use  in 
understanding  real,  objective  activity.  This  is  one  explanation  why  Marx,  in  distinction  from 
Feuerbach,  expresses  this  inverted  and  mystified  idealist  dialectic  of  subject  and  object  in 
Hegel  as  the  condition  where  "reason  is  at  home  in  unreason  as  unreason.  " 
5.  Supersensible  Subject. 
Hegel's  critique  of  nature  as  being  estranged  from  consciousness  of  itself,  its  own 
conceptual  essence,  also  applies  to  man's  alienated  relation  to  his  real  essence,  the  divine. 
Hegel's  absolute  idealism  posits  thought  as  its  own  autonomous  subject  that  realises  itself 
through  this  dialectic  of  object  and  subject,  of  nature  and  spirit.  Philosophical  estrangement 
and  religious  alienation  are  thus  inherent  to  the  human  condition.  It  is  the  philosophical 
expression  of  "the  alienation  of  man  who  knows  himself"  in  his  alienated  being,  and  thus 
posits  a  subject  higher  and  distinct  from  himself. 
"This  movement,  in  its  abstract  form  as  dialectic,  is  therefore  regarded  as  truly 
human  life  and  because  it  is  nevertheless  an  abstraction  -  an  estrangement  of  human 
50 life  -  it  is  regarded  as  a  divine  process,  but  as  the  divine  process  of  man,  a  process 
traversed  by  man's  abstract,  pure,  absolute  essence  that  is  distinct  from  himself.  "37 
The  result  of  this  process  being  "the  self-knowing  and  self-manifesting  idea.  "  This  is 
expressed  in  pure  thought  in  the  universal  and  systematic  logical  categories  that  are  posited 
as  the  higher  form-of  both  nature  and  spirit,  as  their  common  content  and  divine  source. 
Logical  and  systematic  thought  is  hypostasised  and  conferred  with  the  status  of  the 
autonomous  subject. 
"This  process  must  have  a  bearer,  a  subject.  But  the  subject  only  comes  into  being  as 
a  result.  This  result  -  the  subject  knowing  itself  as  absolute  self-consciousness  -  is 
therefore  God,  absolute  Spirit,  the  seýf-knowing  and  sey-manifesting  idea.  Real  man 
and  real  nature  become  mere  predicates  -  symbols  of  this  hidden,  unreal  man  and  of 
this  unreal  nature.  Subject  and  predicate  are  therefore  related  to  each  other  in 
absolute  reversal  -a  mystical  subject-object  or  a  subjectivity  reaching  beyond  the 
object  -  absolute  subject  as  a  process,  as  subject  alienating  itself  and  returning  from 
alienation  into  itself,  but  at  the  same  time  retracting  this  alienation  into  itself,  and  the 
subject  as  this  process,  a  pure,  incessant  revolving  within  itself.  "" 
The  idealist  and  mystified  dialectic  requires,  in  my  reading,  an  idealist  and  mystified 
subject,  a  supersensible  subject.  In  that  sense  Marx  is  entirely  correct  to  draw  attention  to 
this  expression  of  Hegel's  -idealist  subject.  Those  of  a  Marxist  persuasion  have  not 
necessarily  followed  him  on  this  theme  of  Hegel's  idealist  subject.  For  example,  T.  Smith 
denies  that  there  is  such  a  supersensible  subject  in  Hegel.  The  dialectic,  even  in  its  Hegelian 
mystified  form,  is  interpreted  by  him  as  being  fundamentally  that  of  a  dialectic  between 
humans  and  nature.  39 
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51 Posed  in  the  more  traditional  and  abstractly  philosophical  terms,  as  subject  and  object,  there 
are,  for  the  materialist,  no  rational  and  divine  source  for  either  the  subject  or  the  object.  This 
is  only  the  case  when  that  Hegelian  dialectic  is  viewed  on  one  level.  In  the  materialist 
critique  of  Hegel's  idealism,  it  is  true,  there  is  the  understanding  of  the  dialectic  as  being 
contained  within  the  parameters  of  human  labouring  activity  and  nature.  Marx  clearly 
reflects  this  in  the  Manuscripts;  he  does  not  however  leave  his  critique  of  Hegel  solely  at 
this  level. 
In  order  to  criticise  this  speculative  and  systematic  account;  a  speculative  subject  has  to  be 
understood  as  underpinning  Hegel's  idealist  and  'absolute  form  of  dialectic.  Hegel's 
objective  idealism,  in  opposition  to  materialist  realism,  views  that  inherently  rational  form 
a:  nd  basis,  contained  in  the  dialectic  of  the  objectivity  of  being  and  human  subjectivity,  as 
the  product  of  not  just  human  mind,  but  that  of  an  absolute  mind.  Nature  and  man  are  seen 
as  the  product  of  divine,  rational,  and  speculative  thought. 
Moreover,  the  objective  and  subjective  idea  has  to  have  an  absolute  subject,  as  their 
common  identity,,  in  order  for  thought  to  take  these  twofold  objective  and  subjective  forms, 
in  order  for  thought  to  become  its  own  subject  and  object.  In  order  for  there  to  be  ultimately 
a  direct  identity  between  thought  and  being.  The  product  and  result  of  Hegel's  dialectic  of 
subject  and  object  is  the  higher  form  and  unity  of  the  two,  the  Notion  or  Logical  Idea.  This 
is  clearly  reflected  in  Marx's  critique  where  real  nature  and  real  man  become  mere 
predicates  of  this  unreal  and  abstract  subject. 
That  there  is  an  alienated  and  pseudo-subject,  a  product  of  human  thought  with  no  other 
existence  except  as  the  systematic  expression  of  alienated  thought,  does  not  downplay  either 
Hegel's  dialectical  achievements  nor  the  significance  this  absolute  foundation  has  for 
Hegel's  idealism.  To  recognise  this  to  be  the  case  leads  to  not  only  a  fuller  understanding  of 
the  Hegelian  variation  of  idealism,  but  also  the  dialectical  critique  and  materialist  inversion 
of  Hegel. 
52 It  also,  and  this  is  of  central  importance  for  the  materialist  analysis,  tellingly  impacts  in  the 
critique  of  Hegel's  idealist  and  absolute  foundations  for  a  closed  philosophical  system.  The 
Logical  Idea  is,  as  I  will  later  argue  later  in  the  thesis,  an  alienated  and  abstract  account  of 
both  scientific  method  and  substantial  objectivity;  in  order  to  posit  their  ultimate  identity  as 
a  result  of  a  systematic.  philosophical  process,  Hegel  has  to  promote  this  outcome  to  a  more 
elevated  and  Olympean  plateau. 
To  put  it  another  way,  it  is  logic  and  science  seen  as  the  expression  of  a  divine  subject,  the 
product  of  alienated  and  estranged  thought  itself,  pure  thought,  but  raised  to  a  divine  state 
that  is  autonomous  from  its  own  creations  in  nature  and  humanity. 
The  architectonic  inherent  in  Hegel's  idealism  posits  a  telos  or  final  cause  that  can  only  be 
seen  as  being  ultimately  divine.  It  may,  in  the  materialist  critique,  be  a  piece  of  speculative 
idealist  fantasy,  but  it  is  necessary  for  the  source  of  the  final  cause;  a  final  cause  that  gives 
the  coherence  and  binding  totality  to  Hegel's  system,  and  at  the  same  time  confirms  its 
idealist  ontological  foundation.  It  also  represents  the  closure  principle  for  the  whole  system 
where  the  "divine  dialectic"  revolves  within  its  own  circular,  self-contained,  and 
hermetically  sealed  abstract  totality. 
To  reject  that  Hegel  has  a  supersensible  subject  would  be  analogous  to  Marx  analysing  that 
commodity  production  and  its  realisation  in  circulation,  through  the  exchange  of 
commodities  andponey,  did  not  produce  capital  as  a  subject,  but  merely  the  polarity  of 
production  and  circulation  and  the  exchange  between  commodity  and  money. 
53 CHAPTER  THREK. 
BEGEL'S  PARADOX. 
1.  Pseudo-Essence  and  Real  Essence. 
A  central  issue  in  Marx's  critique  of  Hegel's  idealism  in  the  Paris  Manuscripts  is  the 
counterposition'of  what  he  calls  real  objectivity  in  opposition  to  the  abstract  and  idealist 
account  of  objectivity  in  Hegel.  Marx's  materialist  inversion  of  Hegel  then  has  to 
counterpose  what  that  real  objective  activity,  the  real  essence  that  affnimis  itself  by 
superseding  its  objective  relation,  actually  is,  in  contrast  to  the  activity  of  speculative  mind. 
Marx  does  not  reduce  that  objectivity,  through  the  philosophical  abstraction  inherent  in  the 
Hegelian  concept  of  "thinghood",  to  an  entity  that  is  destined  to  find  its  essence  outside 
itself,  in  conceptual  thought.  Nor  does  he  counterpose  to  this  idealist  sublation,  in  the 
manner  of  Feuerbých,  nature  in  the  form  of  immediate  sense-certainty  as  the  source  for  true 
contemplative  philosophical  thought.  By  contrast,  Marx  counterposes  to  all  forms  of 
abstract  philosophical  activity,  the  active  objectification  in  nature  and  society,  of  the 
subjectivity  of  concrete  labour. 
"Whenever  real,  corporeal  man,  man  with  his  feet  firmly  in  the  solid  ground,  man 
exhaling  and  inhaling  all  the  forces  of  nature,  posits  his  real,  objective  essential 
powe.  rs  as  alien  objects  by  his  externalisation,  it  is  not  the  act  of  positing  which  is 
the  subject  in  this  process:  it  is  the  subjectivity  of  objective  essential  powers,  whose 
action,  therefore,  must  also  be  something  objective.  An  objective  being  acts 
objectively,  and  he  would  not  act  objectively  if  the  objective  did  not  reside  in  the. 
very  nature  of  his  being.  He  only  creates  or  posits  objects,  because  he  is  posited  by 
objects  -  because  at  bottom  he  is  nature.  In  the  act  of  positing,  therefore,  this 
54 objective  behig  Ooes  not  fall  from  his  state  of  "pure  activity"  into  a  creating  of  the 
object;  on  the  contrary,  his  objective  product  only  confirms  his  objective  activity,  his 
activity  as  the  activity  of  an  objective,  natural  being.  "' 
Marx  expresses  this  essence  of  human  species-being,  contained  in  the  Manuscripts,  via  the 
critical  analysis  of  alienated  wage-labour;  a  process  that  is  itself  reflected  in  its  own  alien 
social  product.  The  productive  process,  and  the  alienated  form  that  labouring  activity  takes, 
is  the  external  result  and  the  real  outcome  generated  by  that  objective  dialectic  of  humans 
and  nature,  a  predicament  that  is  socially  reflected  in  the  conditions  of  alienated  labour  in  its 
oppressed  relationship  to  the  power  of  money. 
This  important  distinction  and  difference  between  Feuerbach  and  Marx's  criticism  of  Hegel 
is  already  being  expressed  in  the  Manuscripts.  The  full  consequences  of  this  distinction  of 
the  inversion  in  the  subject  matter,  generated  through  this  form  of  criticism,  have  only 
begun  to  reveal  their  consequences  for  Marx;  the  impact  this  will  have  for  his  relation  to 
Feuerbach  has  still  to  play  itself  through. 
This  inversion  of  the  active  subject  of  the  process  becomes  the  materialist  source  for  Marx's 
generalised  form  of  criticism  of  Hegel.  Marx  both  counterposes  and  replaces  the  activity  of 
speculative  and  logical  thought,  as  a  process  of  divine  creation  and  the  essence  of  man,  with 
alienated  labour;  labour  that  is  an  evolving,  objective  activity,  one  that  is  fundamentally 
dialectical  and  material  by  nature.  For  Marx,  objectivity  and  activity  necessarily  resides  in 
the  very  nature  of  essential  being. 
'Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  336.  This  highlights 
the  fundamental  and  central  importance  of  activity  in  Marx's  thought.  "Here  we  see  how  consistent  naturalism 
or  humanism  is distinct  from  both  idealism  and  materialism,  and  constitutes  at  ;  he  same  time  the  unifying  truth 
of  both.  We  see  also  how  only  naturalism  is  capable  of  comprehending  the  action  of  world  history.  " 
Naturalism,  in  Marx's  "consistent"  form,  becomes  active  materialism  based  on  a  dialectic  of  negativity.  The 
importance  of  this  stress  on  real  objectivity  and  real  activity  is  further  developed,  under  the  rubric  of 
theoretical  praxis,  in  the  Theses  on  Feuerbach.  The  primacy  of  activity  as  the  mediating  relation  between 
humans  and  nature,  and  the  critique  of  an  idealist  view  of  it,  is  the  core  of  Marx's  solution  to  the  defects  of  all 
preceding  materialism. 
55 "A  being  which  does  not  have  its  nature  outside  itself  is  not  a  natural  being,  and 
plays  no  part  in  the  system  of  nature.  A  being  which  has  no  object  outside  itself  is 
not  an  objective  being.  A  being  which  is  not  itself  an  object  for  some  third  being  has 
no  being  for  its  object;  i.  e.,  it  is  not  objectively  related.  Its  being  is  not  objective. 
A  non-objective.  being  is  a  non-being.  "" 
Marx  here,  is  both.  exposing  the  mystical  form  of  Hegel's  negation  of  the  negation,  and  also 
positing  the  rational  form  that  it  objectively  takes.  What  is  to  be  in  Hegel's  view  annulled,  is 
the  objectivity  that  is  the  condition  of  mind's  self-estrangement;  this  annulment  takes  place 
in  the  realm  of  thought.  Objectivity  is  negated  in  order  to  affirm  it  as  the  active  product  of 
speculative  thought;  at  the  same  time,  by  thought  subsuming  objectivity  it  turns  it  into  the 
product  of  a  systematic  self-generating  thought  whole. 
By  doing  so,  thought  confirms  itself  in  thought,  and  by  the  activity  of  thought  it  produces 
itself.  It  is  then  a  product  of  a  systematic  abstraction  and  totality  of  thought,  a  non-being, 
whose  essence  lies,  not  in  objectivity,  but  solely  in  the  realm  of  pure  thought,  the  alienated 
and  estranged  form  of  itself.  This  is  the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  mystified  form  of 
expression  of  the  dialectic  in  Hegel;  it  is  the  dynamic  whereby  the  pseudo-essence  is 
confirmed  as  the  real  essence. 
"In  Hegel,  therefore,  the  negation  of  the  negation  is  not  the  confirmation  of  the  true 
essence,  effected  precisely  through  the  negation  of  the  pseudo-essence.  With  him  the 
negation  of  the  negation  is  the  confirmation  of  the  pseudo-essence,  or  of  the  self- 
estranged  essence  in  its  denial;  or  it  is  the  denial  of  this  pseudo-essence  as  an 
objective  being  dwelling  outside  man  and  independent  of  him,  and  its  transformation 
into  the  subject.  ""2 
Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  337. 
Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  339  -  340. 
56 As  a  result,  it  takes  its  alienated  philosophical  form  of  expression  as  being  its  real  and  true 
expression.  Here,  the  negation  of  the  negation,  if  you  will  excuse  the  inference  from  the 
above  of  Marx,  is  the  confirmation  of  the  pseudo-essence,  precisely  through  the  negation  of 
the  real  essence.  By  confirming  the  estranged  form,  in  this  its  alienated  thinking,  the  act  of 
self-reference  is  validated  in  its  mystical  and  fetishised  form.  Hence,  Marx's 
characterisation  of  Hegel's  dialectic  in  this  its  general  form  of  criticism  shows  how,  as  a 
result  of  Hegel's  own  mystical  inversion  of  the  dialectic,  "reason  is  at  home  in  unreason  as 
unreason.  " 
What  is  also  missing  for  Marx,  in  Hegel's  dialectic  of  negativity,  is  what  he  terms  the  last 
act  of  self-reference  in  alienation.  What  does  he  mean  by  this  phrase?  The  process  of  self- 
reference  in  alienation  and  its  supersession,  viewed  in  Feuerbach's  critique  of  Hegel's 
idealism,  as  speculative  thought  still  being  burdened  with  its  opposite,  the  sensory  world,  is 
generalised  here  in  its  criticism  by  Marx,  as  the  stopping  at  the  last  act,  the  act  of  self- 
reference  in  real  objective  activity. 
Feuerbach's  critique  propounds,  in  opposition  to  Hegel's  mystical  and  speculative  subject, 
the  self-supporting  positive  based  on  itself.  For  Feuerbach,  the  philosophical  solution  to 
speculative  idealism  is  posited  in  the  contemplation  of  immediate  sense-certainty  based  on 
itself,  through  the  analysis  of  the  relation  between  consciousness  and  the  external  nature  that 
generates  it. 
For  Marx,  it  is  "the  subjectivity  of  objective  essential  powers,  whose  action,  therefore,  must 
be  something  objective"  that  is  the  solution  to  speculative  idealism.  The  real  activity  is 
externalised  in  opposition  to  itself,  in  the  form  of  the  product  of  labour.  The  objective 
product  of  that  social  labour  only  proves  or  confirms  that  objective  activity  in  the  external 
and  alien  product  of  that  activity.  Marx's  dialectic  in  contrast  to  Hegel's  is  concretely 
annulled  objectively,  only  in  and  through  labouring  activity  superseding  both  its  alienated 
condition  and  its  alienated  product,  as  the  last  act  of  self-reference  in  alienation. 
57 This  concrete  objectification  is  in  stark  contrast  to  the  non-objective  proof  of  Hegel's 
subsumption  of  nature  as  the  product  of  the  "pure  activity"  of  logical  thought;  with  the 
"entire  compass  of  abstraction"  locked  up  in  an  estranged  and  alienated  form;  as  the  product 
of  the  systematic  totality  of  mind.  Alternatively  posed,  it  lies  in  the  distinction  between  the 
real  essence  of  labour  and  the  pseudo-essence  of  alienated  philosophical  mind. 
The  application  by  Marx  of  the  dialectical  method,  itself  a  not  unimportant  differentiation 
from  Feuerbach's  critique,  is  already  being  applied  to  labouring  activity  and  the  product  of 
that  activity;  this  objective  relation  constitutes  the  real  social  essence  and  species-being  of 
man.  That  is,  it  is  already  posited  here  as  being  the  inverted  and  direct  opposite  of  the 
idealist  Hegelian  form.  The  real  critical  form  in  opposition  to  the  uncritical  process  of 
abstract  philosophical  activity  or  speculative  thought. 
Hegel  is  clearly  though,  a  contradictory  figure  for  Marx;  the  dialectic  expresses  itself  in  both 
a  positive  and  negative  fashion  in  his  work.  On  the  one  hand,  this  idealist  "philosophical 
dissolution"  of  the  existing  empirical  world,  seen  as  a  product  of  mind  in  its  realised  and 
essential  form  of  the  Logical  Idea,  is  the  source  of  both  Hegel's  justification  for,  and  the 
"uncritical  positivism"  of,  his  restoration  of  that  existing  empirical  world.  A  world  that  is 
both  sublated  and,  in  turn,  glorified  as  the  product  of  an  idealist  and  alienated  conceptual 
totality  of  thought. 
"Consequently,  despite  its  thoroughly  negative  and  critical  appearance  and  despite 
the  genuine  criticism  contained  in  it,  which  often  anticipates  far  later  development, 
there  is  already  latent  within  the  "Phenomenology"  as  a  germ,  a  potentiality,  a  secret, 
the  uncritical  positivism  and  the  equally  uncritical  idealism  of  Hegel's  later  works  - 
that  philosophical  dissolution  and  restoration  of  the  existing  empirical  world.  iý43 
That  reconciling  of  the  heart  and  mind  to  its  alienated  condition  by  the  activity  of 
speculative  thought;  as  a  mystified  form  of  thought  that  is  at  home  in  both  its  estranged 
58 natural  form  and  its  alienated  social  form.  By  doing  so,  Marx  shows  how,  in  Hegel,  the 
dialectic  of  negativity  and  the  negation  of  the  negation,  as  the  moving  and  generating 
principle,  becomes  the  "lie  of  his  principle".  It  thus  provides  a  philosophical  underpinning 
for  the  false  consciousness  of  both  bourgeois  ideology  and  divine  creation. 
On  the  other  hand,  his  thought  does  also  contain  far-sighted  and  genuine  criticism;  the 
motor  source  for  that  genuine  criticism  itself  lies  in  that  same  dynamic  form  of  the  dialectic 
of  negativity.  The  problem  is  to  unearth  the  rational  form  of  the  dialectic  from  the  mystical 
form  of  Hegel's  exposition.  The'emphasis,  necessarily  at  this  point  of  Marx's  intellectual 
development,  largely  resides  in  the  need  to  critically  settle  accounts  with  Hegel's'idealist 
mysticism. 
Marx's  analysis  in  the  E.  P.  M.  does  not,  however,  entirely  confine  itself  to  this  framework; 
he  also  draws  out  some  positive  aspects  contained  in  Hegel's  dialectic.  The  critical  elements 
contained  in  this  application  of  the  dialectic  of  negativity  nevertheless  "lie  concealed"  and 
hidden  within  this  mystical  form  of  expressing  it. 
"The  Phenomenology  is,  therefore,,  a  hidden,  mystifying  and  still  uncertain  criticism; 
but  inasmuch  as  it  depicts  man's  estrangement,  even  though  man  appears  only  as 
mind,  there  lie  concealed  in  it  all  the  elements  of  criticism,  already  prepared  and 
elaborated  in  a  manner  often  rising  far  above  the  Hegelian  standpoint.  "44 
Despite  the  mystifying  form,  Marx  also  draws  out  that  Hegel's  thought  does  contain,  even  if 
in  an  estranged  form,  critical-dialectical  analyses  of  whole  areas  and  spheres  like 
conventional  religion,  the  state,  civil  society,  and  natural  science.  The  entity  that  Hegel 
supersedes  though  is  not  the  real  thing,  but  the  concept  of  the  thing.  He  stands  in  opposition, 
according  to  Marx,  both  to  the  real  thing  and  to  the  conventional  concepts  of  those  real 
things;  this  latter  point  of  Marx  is  viewed  as  not  being  entirely  negative. 
43  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  331-2. 
"Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  332. 
59 The  point,  from  Marx's  1873  Afterword,  that  Hegel's  dialectic  appears  to  glorify  existing 
states  of  affairs  while  the  dialectic  is,  in  its  essence,  critical  and  revolutionary,  the  Hegelian 
paradox  and  its  negative  expression,  had  already  been  largely  made,  or  first  developed,  in 
the  Paris  Manuscripts. 
Hegel's  Paradox. 
Paradoxically  then,  contained  within  this  mystical  form  of  dialectic,  lie  all  the  elements  for 
its  critical  application.  These  dialectical  elements  frequently  go  well  beyond  the  Hegelian 
standpoint.  The  real  critical  application  of  those  elements  required  that  the  dialectic  of 
negativity,  and  the  process  of  supersession  entailed  by  that  activity,  in  order  to  take  a 
rational  form,  had  to  be  inverted  into  a  materialist  ontology;  that  is,  it  had  to  be  developed 
from  and  applied  to  real,  objective,  practical,  human  labouring  activity,  as  the  moving 
source  for  human  development. 
There  is  then,  a  twofold  mystical  and  rational  character  in  operation  in  Marx's  dialectical 
critique  of  Hegel.  It  is  now  time  to  further  develop  this  analysis  of  the  twofold  nature  of  the 
contradiction  contained  in  Hegel  by  further  examining  the  "critical  form  of  this  in  Hegel 
uncritical  process.  " 
Despite  Hegel's  failure  to  apply  that  dialectic  in  a  materialist  manner,  and  to  a  materialist 
subject  matter,  it  would  appear  from  Marx's  comments  in  the  Manuscripts  that  this  did  not 
preclude  him  from  outlining  the  dialectic  of  negativity  as  the  moving  and  generating 
principle  underlying  the  process  of  all  change.  That  is,  to  use  a  later  formulation,  it  by  no 
means  prevented  him  from  consciously  and  comprehensively  outlining  the  general  form  of 
working  of  dialectic  itself,  Marx  is  already  making,  more  or  less,  this  point  in  the  1844 
Manuscripts. 
60 Marx's  own  supersession,  through  this  critical  settling  of  accounts,  lies  in  precisely  applying 
"all  the  elements  of  the  criticism"  prepared  and  elaborated  by  Hegel,  but  now  applied  in  a 
materialist  manner,  and  to  a  materialised  subject  and  relation,  nature  and  alienated 
humanity.  By  doing  so,  Marx  now  has  the  foundations  for  developing  his  own  form  of 
dialectic,  in  a  manner  that  now  goes  well  beyond  Hegel's  idealist  confines  and  orientation, 
precisely  by  drawing  out  the  contradictions  that  lie  contained  within  Hegel's  account  of  the 
general  form  of  working  of  the  dialectic. 
According  to  Marx,  a  "peculiar  role,  therefore,  is  played  by  the  act  of  superseding  in  which 
denial  and  preservation,  i.  e.  affirmation,  are  bound  together.  "  The  "peculiar  role"  of 
supersession,  in  Hegel's  idealist  application  of  it,  as  we  have  seen,  is  to  mystify  and  invert 
the  real  process  and  relation  between  subject  and  object.  This  general  principle,  as  a  process 
applied  to  the  subject's  alienation  and  the  overcoming  of  it  through  the  dynamic  vehicle  of 
negation  of  the  negation,  clearly  still  has  some  positive  aspects  for  Marx,  even  in  this  its 
alienated  idealist  expression. 
"Supersession  as  an  objective  movement  of  retracting  the  alienation  into  seýr.  This  is 
the  insight,  expressed  within  the  estrangement,  concerning  the  appropriation  of  the 
objective  essence  through  the  supersession  of  its  estrangement;  it  is  the  estranged 
insight  into  the  real  objectification  of  man,  into  the  real  appropriation  of  his 
objective  essence  through  the  annihilation  of  the  estranged  character  of  the  objective 
world,  through  the  supersession  of  the  objective  world,  in  its  estranged  mode  of 
being.  " 
Marx  retains  the  essential  dynamics  of  the  analysis  of  the  process  of  alienation  and 
estrangement.  Where  Marx  differs  from  Hegel  is  that  the  estrangement  and  alienation  can  be 
overcome  subjectively  and  objectively  by  the  activity  of  labour  itself-,  there  is  no  necessary 
ontological  condition  of  nature  as  being  inherently  a  form  of  estrangement,  due  to  its  very 
externalised  and  non-conceptual  form  of  being.  The  act  of  supersession  is  achieved  for  Marx 
61 by  overcoming  the  negative  condition,  precisely  through  the  self-affirming  dialectical 
activity  of  self-reference  in  objectivity. 
There  is  also  then,  a  potentially  more  positive  form  for  this  "peculiar  role"  of  supersession 
contained  in  Marx's  comments.  The  reason  that  Marx  can  posit  that  this  is  the  case,  is  that 
the  very  essence  of  the  dialectic,  as  self-affirmation  through  negation;  is  due  to  the  analysis 
of  all  processes  of  change  as  being  the  expression  of  the  movement  of  a  contradiction. 
What  Hegel  does,  is  to  pose  in  an  abstract  and  idealist  fashion,  the  conceptualised  form  of 
the  social  relations  and/or  logical  categories  as  interconnected  "moments  of  motion".  The  act 
of  supersession  is  therefore  cognised  as  a  process  that  has  determinate  moments;  these 
moments  are  the  universally  interconnected  and  necessary  determinations  of  the  particular 
subject  in  process.  It  is  through  the  methodical  application  of  the  general  form  of  dialectic 
that  the  external  motions  can  be  conceptually  grasped.  "In  their  actual  existence  this  mobile 
nature  of  theirs  is  hidden.  It  appears  and  is  made  manifest  only  in  thought,  in  philosophy.  "" 
The  "moments"  are  expressed  through  the  conceptualisation  of  the  determinate  forms  and 
relations  of  the  substantial  subject,  with  a  moving  internal  principle  of  change  and 
alteration,  expressed  in  the  positing  and  resolving  of  the  contradiction  in  its  nature,  that 
links  all  these  conceptualised  determinate  moments  together.  That  contrariety  contained  in 
all  movement,  and  its  adequate  cognition,  requires  understanding  the  specific  form  of 
contradiction  that  drives  the  substantial  activity  as  a  form  of  determinate  negation.  This 
materialised  specification  of  the  dialectics  of  motion  provides  the  basis  for  the  development 
of  Marx's  own  critical  form  of  dialectic. 
This  general  critique  of  Marx,  and  the  paradoxes  in  Hegel  derived  from  it,  go  well  beyond 
the  criticisms  of  Feuerbach.  The  inherently  critical  form  of  Hegel's  dialectic  applies,  not 
only  to  specific  spheres  of  human  activity  and  their  conventional  conceptions,  but  also  to  the 
11  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  341. 
46  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  340. 
62 process  of  development  and  change  in  general;  as  the  source  for  their  general  laws  of  motion 
and  self-activity. 
The  essential  point  for  Marx  is  that  Hegel  has  captured  the  essence  of  movement  and  change 
as  the  dialectic  of  negativity,  as  the  movement  and  development  of  a  contradiction.  Even  in 
that  alienated  form,  it  is  the  explicit  view  of  being  for  self  or  affirmation  through  its 
negative  other,  its  own  alienated  form  of  being,  and,  in  turn,  the  negation  of  that  alienation 
as  the  process  of  self-determining  and  self-affirming  activity. 
This  critique  of  Hegelianism,  as  the  preceding  analysis  of  Marx's  view  attempted  to  show, 
had  to  be  generalised  to  develop  what  for  him  was  the  necessary  task  of  settling  accounts 
with  the  Hegelian  dialectic  and  philosophy  as  a  whole.  At  the  same  time,  this  generalised 
form  of  Marx  also  furnished  the  proof  that  would  underpin  Feuerbach's  criticism;  that  of 
Hegel's  positing,  negating,  and  then  re-affirming  of  religion  or  theology. 
The  criticism  had  to  be  generalised,  not  only  in  order  for  it  to  be  extended  to  cover  all  the 
areas  of  Hegel's  philosophical  subject  matter;  but  also  to  draw  out  the  full  implications  of 
Hegel's  dialectical  idealism  and  its  alienated  and  speculative  form.  Marx's  general  strategy 
was  to  dialectically  bring  out  and  highlight,  both  the  mystical  and  the  rational  forms  that  are 
inherent  in  Hegel's  dialectic;  even  within  the  mystical  guise  that  the  dialectic  has  in  its 
idealist  imposed  parameters  and  boundaries. 
Alternatively  expressed,  it  was  to  extract  the  critical  form  of  Hegel's  account  of  a  dialectical 
process.  In  order  to  do  so,  Marx  had  to  draw  out  the  logic  of  the  contradiction  that  is 
fundamentally  contained  within  Hegel's  thought.  By  drawing  out  the  inborn  contradictions 
in  Hegel's  dialectic,  Marx  is  able  show  how  there  is  an  inherently  critical  form  contained  in 
this  dialectic;  a  dialectic,  which  in  Hegel,  is  cognised  as  an  uncritical  process  of  affirming 
that  self-alienation  in  its  alienated  form. 
63 3.  Hegel's  Outstanding  Achievement. 
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Hegel's  concept  of  negation  of  negation,  despite  the  mystical  veil  that  he  envelopes  it 
within,  is  nevertheless  still  of  central  importance  in  understanding  Marx's  evolving 
materialism.  His  general  critique  of  this  fundamental  generating  principle  of  Hegel's 
dialectic,  with  its  consequential  inversion  of  ontological  presupposition  and  subject  matter 
of  investigation,  allowed  the  application  of  the  dialectic  to  be  turned  right  side  up  again.  - 
This  idealist  inversion  of  reality  in  Hegel  notwithstanding,  it  nevertheless  still  entailed  that 
he  had,  according  to  Marx,  discovered  in  this  principle,  the  abstract,  logical,  and  speculative 
expression  for  the  movement  of  history.  This  mystically  interpreted  by  Hegel  as  the  history 
of  spirit,  of  the  evolution  of  the  philosophical  idea,  that  is,  as  the  abstract  history  of 
intellectual  thought. 
That  historical  development  of  the  idealist  subject  shortly  becomes,  in  the  development  of 
Marx's  critique,  materialised  as  the  evolution  of  social  labouring  activity,  as  the  inverted 
and  real  objective  basis  for  the  species-being  of  man,  and  the  source  and  true  nature  of  man 
as  a  historical  subject. 
Even  within  Hegel's  idealist  expression  of  an  estranged  human  condition,  Hegel  still  grasps 
labour,  in  the  alienated  form  of  the  intellectual  labour  of  mind  or  spirit,  as  the  true  essence 
of  being  human.  The  only  labour  that  Hegel  truly  recognises  for  Marx  is  "abstractly  mental 
labour.  "  This  idealist  paradigm  of  Hegel's  is  cognised  as  the  very  species-being  and  activity 
that  marks  humanity  off  from  the  rest  of  nature.  Despite  entrapping  objectivity  within  the 
confines  of  an  idealist  view  of  estrangement  there  is,  however,  genuine  insight  into  the 
contradictory  nature  of  the  process  of  supersession. 
"Thus  by  grasping  the  positive  meaning  of  self-referred  negation  (although  again  in 
an  estranged  fashion)  Hegel  grasps  man's  self-estrangement,  the  alienation  of  man's 
essence,  man9s  loss  of  objectivity  and  his  loss  of  realness  as  self-discovery, 
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sphere  of  abstraction,  Hegel  conceives  labour  as  man's  act  of  seýF-genesis  - 
conceives  man's  relation  to  himself  as  an  alien  being  to  be  the  emergence  of  species- 
consciousness  and  species  life. 
>  "47 
Hegel,  for  Marx,  and  here  he  is  in  distinction  from  Feuerbach,  holds  to  the  view  that  despite 
his  idealism  Hegel  still  grasps  the  "positive  meaning  of  self-referred  negation".  The  central 
problem  lies  in  his  idealist  approach  to  the  question  of  self-referring  negativity,  not  to  the 
category  or  principle  behind  the  process  of  self-movement.  Accordingly  then,  for  Marx,  all 
this  mystical  inversion  of  reality  by  Hegel  does  not  negate  the  "outstanding  achievement" 
and  the  result  of  the  Phenomenology. 
This  achievement  is  attained  in  its  highest  form  precisely  through  the  conceptual  exposition 
and  employment  of  the  "dialectic  of  negativity  as  the  moving  and  generating  principle".  It  is 
through  this  "outstanding  achievement"  of  Hegel's  analysis  of  a  dialectical  process  that  the 
substantial  being  realises  its  essential  form  activity  as  subject,  and  therefore  receives  its 
adequate  conceptual  generalisation  and  expression. 
This  dialectical  principle  is  the  core  of  the  positive  aspect  of  the  critical  form,  a  form  that  is 
inherent  to  Hegel's  dialectic  for  Marx.  This  is  what  Marx's  critical  settling  of  accounts  with 
the  Hegelian  dialectic  also  seeks  to  extract.  That  extraction  of  the  rational  kernel  is  derived 
precisely  through  Marx's  materialist  inversion  of  this  Hegelian  principle. 
This  dialectic  of  negativity  or  self-referring  negation  is  then  a  key  element  in  the  analysis  of 
the  process  of  the  materialist  inversion  of  Hegel's  idealist  content  and  form.  It  appears,  from 
all  the  evidence  of  the  E.  P.  M.,  to  be  retained  as  an  essential  element  of  the  rational  kernel  in 
the  mystical  shell.  There  is  no  evidence  of  Marx  ever  having  changed  his  mind  on  the 
central  importance  of  the  dialectic  of  unfree  and  free  labour  in  his  work. 
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65 Marx's  early  emphasis  on  the  alienation  process  of  labouring  activity  had  still  though,  to  be 
underpinned  with  a  scientific  analysis  of  the  nature  of  value  itself.  To  be  more  accurate,  that 
understanding  of  the  alienation  process  of  labour  in  the  Manuscripts,  whilst  not  incorrect, 
had  yet  to  receive  its  concrete  scientific  foundation,  in  the  critical  analysis  of  value  as  a 
specific  form  of  alienated  social  productive  activity. 
The  "burden"  of  political  economy  had  only  just  begun.  What  has  been  developed  here  are 
some  of  the  major  philosophical  and  scientific  presuppositions  of  the  method  that  Marx  is 
going  to  employ  in  his  critique  of  political  economy.  The  negation  and  polarity  contained 
within  contradiction,  as  the  dynamic  source  of  the  movement  and  development  of  the 
opposition,  is  central  to  Hegel's  influence  on  Marx's  dialectic  of  labour. 
Even  within  Hegel's  idealist  analysis  of  estrangement,  the  emphasis  on  labour,  even  in  its 
abstract  philosophical  guise,  still  retain  some  positive  aspects  and  merits  for  Marx,  precisely 
as  it  is  based  on  the  abstract  form  of  negation  of  the  negation.  Hegel's  "outstanding 
achievement",  despite  his  mystifications,  lies  then  in  his  very  application  of  this  dialectical 
principle  of  negativity. 
"Hegel  conceives  the  self-creation  of  man  as  a  process,  conceives  objectification  as 
loss  of  the  object,  as  alienation  and  as  transcendence  of  this  alienation;  that  he  thus 
grasps  the  essence  of  labour  and  comprehends  objective  man  -  true,  because  real 
man  -  as  the  outcome  of  man's  own  labour.  "48 
If  Marx  does  not  retain  this  "outstanding  achievement"  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology,  then  he 
retains  virtually  nothing  of  Hegel's  work  that  could  be  described  as  a  rational  element,  as 
this  principle  is  at  the  very  heart  of  his  dialectical  view.  Even  if  labour  is  conceived  by 
Hegel,  either  as  an  abstract  logical  philosophical  activity,  as  the  labour  of  spirit,  or,  through 
"the  lie  of  his  principle"  in  its  alienated  social  form,  its  subsumption  under  value. 
66 "Let  us  provisionally  say  just  this  much  in  advance:  Hegel's  standpoint  is  that  of 
modern  political  economy.  He  grasps  labour  as  the  essence  of  man  -  as  man's 
essence  which  stands  the  test:  he  sees  only  the  positive  not  the  negative  side  of 
labour.  Labour  is  man's  coming-to-be  for  himseýf  within  alienation,  or  as  alienated 
man.  The  only  labour  which  Hegel  knows  and  recognises  is  abstractly  mental  labour. 
Therefore,  that  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  philosophy  -  the  alienation  of  man 
who  knows  himseýf,  or  alienated  science  thinking  itsetf  -  Hegel  grasps  as  its  essence; 
and  in  contradistinction  to  previous  philosophy  he  is  therefore  able  to  combine  its 
separate  aspects  and  to  present  his  philosophy  as  the  philosophy.  "49 
Marx's  critique  of  the  philosophical  essence  as  being  the  "alienation  of  man  who  knows 
himself,  or  alienated  science  thinking  itself"  also  demands  some  further  analysis.  The  earlier 
criticism  of  Hegel's  philosophical  illusions  was  expressed  in  its  generalised  form  by  Marx 
as  the  condition  where  "reason  is  at  home  in  unreason  as  unreason.  "  The  relationship  of  this 
earlier  formulation  to  "alienated  science  thinking  itself"  has  now  become  the  subject  matter 
of  investigation. 
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67 CHAPTER  FOUR. 
ALIENATED  SCIENCE. 
1.  Alienated  Science  Thinking  Itself. 
Marx's  description  of  the  essence  of  philosophy  in  general,  and  Hegel's  apotheosis  of 
philosophy  in  particular,  as  the  "alienation  of  man  who  knows  himself,  or  alienated  science 
thinking  itseýr'  raises  the  question  of  what  Marx  means  by  this  statement?  Furthermore,  how 
does  this  proposition  square  with  one  of  Feuerbach's  "great  achievements"  for  Marx,  where 
he  proved  that  "philosophy  is  nothing  else  but  religion  rendered  into  thought  and  expounded 
by  thought"? 
What  can  religious  mystification  and  human  estrangement  in  the  form  of  speculative 
philosophical  thought  contribute  to  science?  Moreover,  why  is  its  contribution,  if  it  is 
"nothing  else"  but  religion  rendered  into  thought,  also  describable  as  a  form  of  alienated 
science?  There  seems  to  be,  to  put  it  at  its  mildest,  a  tension  contained  here  in  Marx's 
analysis,  one  that  is  expressed  in  the  same  piece  of  work. 
This  tension  is,  in  my  view,  generated  by  the  difference  of  the  scope,  nature  and  content  that 
is  contained  in  Feuerbach  and  Marx's  criticisms  of  Hegel.  However,  this  solution  also  seems 
problematical,  given  that  Marx's  aim  in  the  Manuscripts  was  also  to  provide  the  proof  of  the 
Feuerbachian  critique,  that  Hegel's  philosophy  was  no  more  than  religion  rendered  into 
thought  and  expounded  by  thought. 
My  analysis  has,  nevertheless,  attempted  to  point  out  that  in  the  process  of  developing  his 
own  generalised  form  of  criticism,  Marx  not  only  proved  the  Feuerbachian  case,  he  travelled 
well  beyond  its  philosophical  parameters.  This  being  precisely  due  to  his  criticism  taking 
68 both  a  more  generalised,  and,  more  importantly,  a  dialectical  exposition  and  form.  In 
particular,  Marx's  strategy  and  analysis  consciously  attempted  to,  not  only  settle  accounts 
with  the  Hegelian  dialectic,  but  also  to  outline  the  critical  form  of  the  dialectic  that  in  Hegel 
was  cognised  as  an  uncritical  process. 
As  a  result  of  the  uniquely  dialectical  nature  of  his  criticism,  Hegel's  alienated  and 
estranged  form  of  the  dialectic  was  described  by  Marx  within  the  following  general 
proposition  and  framework;  as  that  of  reason  being  at  home  in  unreason  as  unreason.  Is  this 
position,  derived  from  my  analysis  of  the  text,  also  manifested  and  confirmed  in  a  further 
proposition  of  Marx,  that  the  essence  of  Hegel's  philosophy  is  also  describable  as  a  form  of 
"alienated  science  thinking  itself"? 
The  question  I  am  trying  to  provide  a  possible  foundation  for  answering  can  also  be 
formulated  in  another  fashion,  in  the  following  form.  How  can  that  alienated  science,  the 
product  of  an  idealist  mystical  inversion  of  thought,  in  turn  become  real  science?  Allowing, 
for  the  moment,  that  it  may  positively  contribute  towards  a  genuine  method  for  scientific 
inquiry;  then  the  question  becomes  if,  and  if  so  how,  can  it  then  provide,  given  that  it  is 
enveloped  within  a  mystified  and  alienated  form,  any  genuine  scientific  insights  and 
concepts? 
It  is  time  to  posit  some  initial  and  tentative  steps  towards  resolving  the  dilemma  of  what 
Hegel's  philosophy,  as  a  form  of  "alienated  science"  actually  is  or  could  be.  A  significant 
part  of  the  answer  to  this  question  has  in  fact  already  been  given;  in  the  form  of  Marx's 
generalised  form  of  criticism  of  Hegel's  dialectic  of  negativity.  To  explain  what  is  entailed 
in  Marx's  characterisation  of  alienated  science,  is  to  further  develop  and  expound  this  earlier 
generalised  form  of  criticism  of  Hegel's  thought,  of  how  reason  is  at  home  in  unreason  as 
unreason. 
First  of  all  then,  what  is  the  relation  between  Hegel's  alienated  form  of  reason  and  its 
alienated  view  of  science?  Furthermore,  what  is,  to  paraphrase  Marx's  strategy,  the  critical 
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is  the  dialectic  of  negativity  applied  to  in  this  account  of  alienated  science  by  Hegel? 
To  answer  the  above  questions,  is  to  further  extricate  what  Marx  considers  the  important 
and  fundamentally  rational  elements  that  still  remain  contained  within  Hegelian  dialectics, 
despite  its  mystical  form.  The  solution  to  the  above  problems  have  then  no  little  significance 
for  understanding  the  nature  and  process  of  Marx's  suggested  inversion  of  Hegel's  dialectic. 
A  fuller  answer  to  these  questions  can  be  procured,  if  this  generalised  form  of  criticism  is 
integrated  with  an  understanding  of  what  it  is,  according  to  Marx,  for  alienated  science  to 
think  itself. 
The  answers  to  these  questions  is  largely  comprehended  by  working  through  the 
consequences  of  what  the  nature  of  the  real  relationships  are  between  that  of  alienated 
abstract  thinking  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  real  dynamic  objectivity  of  nature  and  society  on 
the  other  hand,  actually  are.  What  is  this  theosophical  and  philosophical  mystification  of 
Hegel's  logical  thought,  as  a  form  of  alienated  science,  actually  thinking  about  other  than  its 
divine  and  alienated  subject?  Marx  has  his  own  views  on  the  answer  to  this  question. 
"The  rich,  living,  sensuous,  concrete  activity  of  self-objectification  is  therefore 
reduced  to  its  mere  abstraction,  absolute  negativity  -  an  abstraction  which  is  again 
fixed  as  such  and  considered  as  an  independent  activity  -  as  sheer  activity.  Because 
this  so-called  negativity  is  nothing  but  the  abstract,  empty  form  of  that  real  living 
act,  its  content  can  in  consequence  be  merely  a  formal  content  produced  by 
abstraction  from  all  content.  As  a  result  therefore  one  gets  general,  abstractforms  of 
abstraction  pertaining  to  every  content  and  on  that  account  indifferent  to,  and, 
consequently  valid  for,  all  content  -  the  thought  forms  or  logical  categories  torn  from 
real  mind  and  from  real  nature.  " 
"Hegel's  positive  achievement  here,  in  his  speculative  logic,  is  that  the  definite 
concepts,  the  universal  fixed  thought-forms  in  their  independence  vis  a  vis  nature  and 
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therefore  also  of  human  thought,  and  that  Hegel  has  therefore  brought  these  together 
and  presented  them  as  moments  of  the  abstraction  process  ... 
But  abstraction 
comprehending  itself  as  abstraction  knows  itself  to  be  nothing:  it  must  abandon  itself 
-  abandon  abstraction  -  and  so  it  arrives  at  an  entity  which  is  its  exact  opposite  -  at 
nature.  Thus,  the  entire  logic  is  the  demonstration  that  abstract  thought  is  nothing  in 
itself;  that  the  absolute  idea  is  nothing  for  itself;  that  only  nature  is  something.  "" 
There  is  again  here,  a  double-edged  sword  involved  in  Marx's  critical  appraisal  of  Hegel. 
This  alienation  of  systematic  thought  is  the  alienation  of,  not  only  the  thinker  estranged 
from  himself,  but  also  the  thinker  estranged  from  his  real  essence,  nature.  The  objective  act 
of  self-reference  in  alienation,  which  is  the  true  mode  of  being  of  these  abstract  forms, 
expressed  in  their  real  self-objectification  and  substantial  activity  in  nature,  are  sublated  as 
the  product  and  activity  of  abstract  thought;  as  the  outcome  of  the  movement  of  the 
categories  of  pure  thought. 
Instead  of  that  real  substantial  activity,  Hegel  reduces  objectivity  itself  to  a  thought  entity  or 
concept;  that  is,  he  views  them  as  abstract  nature  not  real  nature,  and  abstract  activity  not 
real  activity.  This  means  that  the  principle  of  the  negation  of  the  negation,  in  the  systematic 
form  of  the  Logic  is  the  restoring  of  that  objective  totality  as  a  thought  totality;  objectivity  is 
thus  systematically  subsumed  in  an  alienated  and  mystical  form,  as  "moments  of  the 
abstraction  process  -" 
That  is,  and  here  lies  a  potentially  more  positive  outcome,  the  essence  of  that  substantial, 
natural  objectivity  is  contained  in  the  generalised  logical  and  ontological  categories, 
predicates,  and  necessary  relations  that  are  the  conceptual  sources  for  understanding  the 
dynamic  activities  that  pertain  to  a  systematic  whole.  This  process  unfolds,  in  both  its 
relational  parts  and  as  a  totality,  into  a  universal  interconnection  of  the  categories. 
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idealism,  according  to  Marx,  is  that  the  logical  thoughts  "are  therefore  fixed  mental  forms 
dwelling  outside  nature  and  man.  "  What  Hegel  has  done  is  hypostasise  them,  for  he  has 
"locked  up"  these  fixed  mental  forms  together  and  created  a  totality  of  abstraction,  which 
means  that  the  fixed  abstractions  become  one  systematic  act  of  abstraction  revolving  in  its 
own  circle.  As  the  dialectical  movement  of  the  principle  of  negativity,  in  the  form  of  pure 
thought  that  is  now  systematically  outlined  as  the  logical  process  of  "absolute  negativity.  " 
These  "definite  concepts,  the  universal  fixed  thought-forms,  "  as  the  product  of  conceptual 
supersession,  are  the  basic  categories  inherent  in  all  substantial  being.  Hegel's  positive 
achievement  is  to  present  them  as  a  totality  of  interrelated  categorial  and  conceptual 
abstractions.  The  ontological  categories  concretely  inherent  in  substantial  nature  are  then 
subsumed  and  perceived  as  moments  and  determinations  of  the  absolute  negativity  of  the 
abstraction  process. 
Furthermore,  as  this  absolute  negativity  is  an  abstraction,  which  is  fixed,  and  considered  as 
an  independent  activity,  as  pure  activity,  it  can  only  have  a  content  which  is  the  abstract 
form  pertaining  to  every  content.  At  the  same  time,  this  entails  that  it  is  indifferent  to  every 
content,  and  thus  valid  for  all  content.  It  is  then  a  formal  and  abstract  appropriation  and 
conception  of  systematic  self-objectification,  where  the  real  concrete  natural  activity  is 
reduced  to  its  mere  abstraction,  as  the  systematic  movement  of  the  categories  of  "pure 
thought". 
This  has  to  be  the  central  implication  of  the  view  that  the  abstract  categories,  as  the  product 
of  alienated  thinking  that  abstracts  from  real  nature  and  real  man,  paradoxically  in  turn,  and 
by  dint  of  their  abstraction  and  generality,  in  fact  also  pertain  to  that  objective  material  and 
substantial  content.  As  that  objectivity  is  the  real  source  and  movement  for  the  dialectic  in 
abstract  thinking,  the  totality  of  abstractions,  as  Marx  points  out,  are  nothing  but  the 
conceptual  abstractions  that  are  "torn  from  real  mind  and  from  real  nature.  " 
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The  result  for  Marx,  though  this  is  far  from  being  entirely  negative  in  my  view,  is  a  content 
whose  thought-forms  or  logical  categories  are  both  indifferent  to  and  at  the  same  time 
pertain  to,  every  content.  This  elucidation  has  to  be  combined,  with  yet  another  viewpoint  of 
Marx;  that  Hegel  bequeathed  us  "the  entire  compass  of  abstraction"  as  now  being  the  object 
of  criticism,  to  more  fully  answer  the  question  of  how  "alienated  science  thinking  itself' 
could  become  real  science. 
Despite  Hegel's  mystifying  form  and  exposition,  his  logical  and  systematic  whole  of 
abstraction  has  to  be  seen  as  a  totality  that  includes  the  appropriation  and  criticism  of  all 
previous  philosophical  thought.  This,  in  turn,  made  the  criticism  of  Hegel's  philosophy  a 
criticism  of  philosophy  in  general. 
"This  means  that  what  Hegel  does  is  to  put  in  place  of  these  Rxed  abstractions  the 
act  of  abstraction  which  revolves  in  its  own  circle.  We  must  therefore  give  him  the 
credit  for  having  indicated  the  source  of  all  those  inappropriate  concepts  which 
originally  appertained  to  particular  philosophers;  for  having  brought  them  together; 
and  for  having  created  the  entire  compass  of  abstraction  as  the  object  of  criticism, 
instead  of  some  specific  abstraction.  "" 
The  above  passage  also  highlights  that  the  critique  of  Hegel  is  itself  not  just  a  specific 
critique  of  a  specific  abstraction,  but  the  "entire  compass"  of  Hegel's  summation  of 
philosophy  that  now  has  to  be  criticised.  This  further  reinforces  the  point  that  Marx's 
criticism  is,  and  has  to  be,  of  a  generalised  nature.  This  critique  of  Hegel's  systematic 
dialectic  entails  the  overthrow  of  philosophy  in  its  traditional  metaphysical  boundaries  and 
theoretical  presuppositions. 
Paradoxically,  not  only  then  does  this  prove  Feuerbach's  point  that  Hegel's  philosophy  as 
being  religion  merely  rendered  into  thought,  but  in  this,  its  highest  and  systematic  form  of 
51  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  344.  (Footnote  by 
Marx.  ) 
73 expression,  it  also  generates  a  form  of  alienated  science  thinking  itself  in  its  alienated 
condition. 
The  movement  of  the  real,  substantial,  objective  contradiction,  expressed  in  the  principle 
contained  in  the  dialectic  of  negativity,  is  reflected  in  this  systematic  totality  of  the  concepts 
and  categories  of  the  abstraction  process  itself.  The  movement  of  the  categories,  whose 
initial  starting  point  is  contained  in  its  elementary  abstract  simple  universal  forms,  are  then 
further  developed  through  their  own  specific  forms  of  determinate  negation  and  opposition, 
and  resolved  in  the  positing  of  more  complex  and  determinate  categories,  concepts,  and 
relations. 
The  result  is  the  evolution  of  a  conceptual  totality  of  relations,  with  the  positing  and 
resolving  of  contradiction  as  the  motor  force  of  the  whole  process.  Hegel  starts  with  abstract 
thought,  and  in  the  process  he  generates  a  systematic  whole  that  is  abstracted  from, 
indifferent  to,  and  valid  for,  all  content.  In  reality  that  totality  of  logical  thought  is  "nothing 
but  the  abstract  empty  form  of  that  real  living  act",  nothing  but  the  abstract  categories 
generated  from  real  nature,  real  mind,  and  real  social  being. 
Generated  though,  in  an  alienated  conceptual  form  and  idealist  foundation  that  is  indifferent 
to  the  real  determinations  and  substantial  referents,  preferring  instead  their  conceptual  and 
idealist  form  as  the  truth  behind,  and  the  origin  of,  that  objective,  material  reality. 
Thought,  alienated  from  its  natural  and  human  essence,  is  now  confined,  and  abstractly 
summated  within  an  alienated  philosophical  system  of  pure  logic.  The  movement  of  abstract 
thought  is  no  longer  directed  outwards  to  its  real  source  in  real  objectivity,  but  now  proceeds 
within  itself;  the  result  is  the  dialectic  of  pure  thought,  as  rational  self-consciousness  or 
philosophical  logic. 
As  the  supersession  contained  in  the  dialectic  of  negativity  in  its  general  form,  is  a  restoring 
of  these  categorial  forms  in  their  estrangement;  it  is  also  a  stopping  at  the  last  act,  the  act  of 
74 self-reference  in  real  alienation.  The  self-reference  takes  place  entirely  within  the  realm  of 
systematic  logical  thought.  It  is  also  then,  for  this  reason,  that  Marx  describes  Hegel's 
thought  as  a  form  of  alienated  science  thinking  itself. 
The  real  and  objectively  moving  contradiction  is  reduced  to  a  contradiction  in  the  process  of 
thought.  This  would  seem  to  point  to  a  not  insignificant  contribution  to  a  scientific  and 
nomological  account  that  is  already  contained,  albeit  in  an  estranged  and  mystical  form,  in 
Hegel's  thought.  Expressed  more  positively,  it  is  an  alienated  and  idealist  account  of 
scientific  method,  that  is,  alienated  in  the  sense  of  its  ontological  foundations  and  result, 
thought  of  as  proof  of  his  speculative  systematic  and  supersensible  subject,  but  nevertheless, 
still  a  contribution  to  a  scientific  methodology. 
That  abstract  and  empty  totality,  the  Logical  Idea,  as  the  autonomous  and  independent 
subject  is,  in  Hegel's  idealist  account,  also  the  highest  expression  and  the  logical  form  of 
scientific  method.  The  two  are  ftised  together  in  Hegel's  analysis.  What  is  necessary,  for  a 
materialist  and  dialectical  criticism  of  this  methodology,  to  follow  Marx's  example,  is  to 
separate  out  the  idealist  subject  and  ontology  of  the  content,  from  the  scientific  method  and 
the  objective,  real,  material  content  that  it  is  bound  up  with. 
That  the  logic  is  forced  to  end  by  positing  its  opposite,  nature,  means,  for  the  materialist 
critique,  that  it  has  in  fact  returned  to  its  real  and  true  point  of  departure.  The  idealist 
account  has  ultimately  nowhere  else  to  go  other  than  back  to  its  direct  polar  opposite  and 
material  source;  otherwise,  it  can  only  revolve  within  its  own  self-enclosed  conceptual 
totality  as  pure  thought.  This  is  why  the  system  of  logic  is,  for  Marx,  alienated  science 
thinking  itself,  precisely  because  it  is  conceived  as  a  totality  of  logical  abstract  thinking  that 
is  independent  of,  and  indifferent  to,  its  real  and  objective  source  and  substantiation.  52 
5'  For  Marx,  Hegel's  Logic  is  alienated  thinking.  Idealist  thought,  by  the  very  nature  of  its  emphasis 
on  mind  as  the  human  essence,  the  estranged  form  that  thought  takes  in  philosophical  speculation,  has  to  lay 
stress  on  the  ontological  primacy  of  the  concept  and  category.  "Logic  -  mind's  coin  of  the  realm,  the 
speculative  or  mental  value  of  man  and  nature  -  its  essence  which  has  grown  totally  indifferent  to  all  real 
determinateness,  and  hence  unreal  -  is  alienated  thinking  and  therefore  thinking  which  abstracts  from  nature 
and  from  real  man:  abstract  thinking.  "  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart. 
75 Conversely,  that  an  idealist  dialectic  is  ultimately  derived  from  this  real  nature  means,  to 
logically  invert  it  and  stand  it  on  its  feet,  that  it  reflects  and  pertains  to  that  very  same  real 
nature.  What  it  does  not  do  is  generate  that  external  nature  from  the  activity  of  the  categories 
of  thought;  to  speculate  in  this  manner,  is  to  posit  the  relation  and  the  explanation  in  a 
mystified  manner  that  itself  cannot  contain  its  own  contradictions. 
The  autonomous  subject,  the  Logical  Idea,  turns  out,  in  the  course  of  Marx's  critique,  not  to 
be  an  autonomous  being-for-self,  but  to  be  dependent  upon  its  dialectical  other,  nature,  as 
the  real  being-for-self.  As  the  totality  of  the  categories  of  abstraction  are,  in  fact,  "nothing 
else  but  abstractions  from  nature",  Hegel  is  driven  from  the  systematic  whole  of  his  logic  to 
the  direct  opposite  of  the  systematic  abstractions  and  categories;  that  is,  he  is  driven  by 
"boredom"  according  to  Marx,  back  to  nature. 
That  the  thought  totality  is  the  product  of  the  concrete  totality,  as  its  mystifying  inversion, 
by  no  means  prevents  Hegel,  to  paraphrase  Marx,  from  consciously  comprehending  and 
outlining  that  dialectical  thought  totality  in  its  general  form  of  working  and  operation.  The 
Logical  Idea  is  then,  a  form  of  alienated  science  thinking  itself,  and  pretending  to  be  at 
home  with  itself  in  that  alienated  condition.  It  is,  paradoxically,  the  "alienation  of  man  who 
knows  himself'. 
What  is  however  highlighted,  and  here  it  applies  to  the  Logic,  in  the  dialectical  critique  of 
Marx  is  not  only  the  negative,  but  also  the  positive  aspect  of  the  principle  of  the  negation  of 
the  negation  that  is  contained  in  Hegel.  The  application  of  the  principle  of  negativity  does 
not  appear  to  deter  him  from  making  some  genuine  insights  into  the  universal 
interconnection  of  the  categories  and  concepts  that  generate  and  explain  the  methodological 
and  scientific  basis  for  analysing  the  movement  and  development  of  a  systematic  totality. 
(1975.  )  P.  330.  The  Logic  is  then,  a  form  of  abstract  thought  thinking  about  itself,  or  as  alternatively  expressed 
by  Marx,  as  "the  alienation  of  man  who  knows  himself,  or  alienated  science  thinking  itself.  " 
76 A  totality  that  contains  a  universal  principle  of  change  and  alteration,  namely  the  movement 
of  a  contradiction  that  both  posits  and  resolves  itself,  and  that  characterises  the  specific 
contrariety  contained  in  each  of  its  categorial  forms  and  relations  in  their  ongoing  forms  of 
development  and  systematic  activity. 
The  dialectic  of  negativity  as  "the  moving  and  generating  principle  of  all  being"  has,  by  its 
very  defining  terms,  a  universal  application.  Once  the  divine  element  as  the  autonomous 
subject  is  removed,  what  we  have  is  an  abstract  and  idealist  account  of  how  a  systematic 
totality  and  its  fundamental  categories,  derived  from  nature,  universally  interconnect  and 
operate  in  a  systematic  fashion. 
Scientific  method  is  not  an  independent  subject  autonomous  from  nature  and  humanity;  it  is, 
in  fact,  one  of  the  central  and  hard-won  products  and  dialectical  results  of  that  real  relation, 
viewed  as  a  body  of  knowledge  and  procedure.  Furthermore,  this  systematic  totality  of 
thought,  viewed  as  independent  from  nature  and  mind,  are  both  the  product  and  the 
"necessary  result"  for  Marx  of  the  generalised  alienation  and  estrangement  of  the  human 
condition  in  its  fundamental  activity  and  thought. 
Alienated  social  activity  produces  alienated  forms  of  thought.  It  is  capable  though,  at  the 
same  time,  of  producing  some  rational  insight  into  that  alienated  condition.  The  rational  and 
the  mystical  can  be,  and  in  Hegel's  case  are,  bound  together.  This  binding  together  in  an 
uneasy  alliance  is  the  source  for  Hegel's  own  specific  form  of  contradiction,  a  contradiction 
that  points  well  beyond  his  own  self-imposed  idealist  boundaries. 
That  rational  insight  itself  takes  an  alienated  form,  an  alienated  form  that  can  paradoxically 
both  give  genuine  understanding  and  at  the  same  time  mystify  that  real  relation.  This 
alienated  expression  of  supersession  entails  that  what  Hegel  supersedes  is  not  the  real  thing 
but  the  concept  of  the  thing.  However,  due  to  the  critical  dialectical  form  that  is  nevertheless 
inherent  to  this  uncritical  process,  Hegel,  at  the  same  time,  stands  in  opposition  to  the 
following  for  Marx. 
77 "From  the  one  point  of  view,  therefore,  he  stands  in  opposition  both  to  the  real  thing 
and  to  the  immediate,  unphilosophic  science  or  the  unphilosophic  conceptions  of  this 
thing.  He  therefore  contradicts  their  conventional  conceptions.  "" 
The  enigma  surrounding  the  inversion  of  Hegel  is,  in  principle,  resolvable.  It  involves 
though  a  combination  of  different  strands  and  elements.  What  has  already  been  shown  to  be 
central  to  this  resolution  is  not  only  the  ontological  reversal  and  inversion  in  the  relation  of 
thought  to  being,  but  also  the  necessity  of  applying  that  dialectical  method  to  a  materialist 
subject  matter. 
That  Hegel's  idealism  inverts  the  categories  and  dialectical  concepts  of  his  analysis  does  not 
negate  the  fact  that  they  are  ultimately  derived  from  that  real  material  and  social  basis.  The 
question  is  to  separate  out  the  dialectics  involved  in  a  nomological  account  of  substantial 
activity  from  their  idealist  and  mystical  foundation,  not  to  mention  their  bogus,  autonomous, 
and  divine  subject.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  it  is  a  form  of  alienated  science  thinking  about 
itself. 
This  generalised  critique  of  Marx  showed  the  need  to,  not  only  condemn  abstract  thought 
for  not  basing  itself  ultimately  on  real,  material,  natural,  social  relations,  and  development, 
it  also  showed  the  need  to  base  dialectics  upon  just  such  a  critical  analysis  of  those  very 
same  natural,  material  and  social  foundations.  The  alienated  science  thinking  itself  is  de- 
mystified,  and  genuine  science  is  realised  and  materialised,  precisely  through  the  rational 
comprehension  and  practical  emancipation  of  the  human  condition. 
Despite  its  mystical  form,  Hegel's  dialectic  of  negativity  provides,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
grounds  and  conditions  necessary  for  that  materialist  succession;  with  those  grounds  being 
retained,  in  their  more  critical  process  and  form,  as  the  basis  for  future  development.  It  is  in 
this  sense  that  Marx's  dialectic  supersedes  Hegel's. 
78 It  is  also  in  this  sense,  to  answer  Althusser's  question,  that  we  can  show  how  an  inversion 
can  be  an  extraction;  indeed,  it  is  only  through  the  process  of  inverting  those  idealist 
presuppositions  and  subject  matter,  and  applying  them  to  a  materialist  content  and  process, 
that  the  rational  core  of  the  Hegelian  dialectic  of  negativity  can  itself  be  extracted. 
By  positing  the  source  of  the  development  of  the  contradiction  as  residing  in  those  same 
objective  processes  and  activities,  the  resultant  aim  of  conceptual  thought  is  to  then  reflect 
and  correspond  to  the  real  movement  of  the  material  contradictions  in  the  subject  matter.  It 
is,  furthermore,  to  derive  and  deduce  those  contradictions  from  the  objective  movement, 
instead  of  imposing  them  abstractly  and  systematically  as  the  movement  of  the  categories; 
as  a  conceptual  self-enclosed  whole  that  has  realised  its  teleological  nature. 
By  doing  so  Hegel  thus  has  to  attempt  a  dialectical  balancing  of  concepts  that  blunts,  both 
the  real,  material  contradictions  in  operation,  and  the  essentially  critical,  revolutionary 
content  that  is  inherent  to  a  dialectical  methodology;  a  methodology  that  itself  posits  all 
motions  and  processes  as  containing  constant  change  through  contradiction.  Both  errors 
have  to  be  committed  by  Hegel,  in  order  to  accommodate  and  confine  the  dialectic  within 
the  idealist  foundations  and  presuppositions  of  a  closed  philosophical  system,  as  the  final 
and  ultimate  form  of  that  dialectical  method. 
Even  in  such  an  early  work  that  is  still  under  the  spell  of  Feuerbach  as  the  Paris  Manuscripts 
are,  it  is  clear  that  Marx  applies  a  double-edged  sword  to  Hegel's  dialectical  thought.  The 
problematic  lies  in  explaining  how  there  can,  at  the  same  time,  be  both  positive-rational  and 
negative-mystical  elements  in  Hegel's  speculative  analysis. 
Marx's  analysis  and  critique  of  Hegel's  philosophy  has,  as  I  have  attempted  to  elucidate  and 
show,  itself  an  inherently  dialectical  flavour  and  character.  The  result  is  that  the  uncritical 
process  contained  in  Hegel's  dialectic  is  itself  superseded  by  Marx  through  the  catalyst  of 
11  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  341. 
79 Feuerbach's  materialism  and  naturalism.  What  is  cancelled  is  the  mystical-idealist 
foundation  and  explanation,  what  is  retained  is  the  rational  element  in  his  dialectical 
analysis  of  the  process  of  movement  and  change  through  the  developing  and  ongoing 
contradiction  of  a  systematic  subject. 
A  materialist  and  idealist  dialectic  are  not  polar  opposites  slugging  it  out  for  dominance; 
Marx's  materialist  dialectic  arises  out  of  and  goes  beyond  its  idealist  predecessor.  Hegel 
himself  has  been  subjected  to  his  own  concept  of  aufheben.  It  was  by  showing  how  the 
contradictions  inherent  within  Hegel's  dialectic,  which  itself  includes  laying  the  grounds 
and  foundations  through  that  critique  for  a  materialist  dialectic  and  subject  to  begin  to 
emerge  in  the  work  of  Marx,  that  is  reflected  in  the  analysis  proffered  here. 
Marx's  settling  of  his  accounts  with  Hegelianism  in  the  Paris  Manuscripts,  regardless  of 
whether  it  is  viewed  as  being  fully  comprehensive  or  otherwise,  is  nevertheless  primarily 
expressed  through  this  exposition  of  the  dialectic  of  negativity  in  its  twofold  character.  This 
is  itself  expressed  in  the  opposition  of  the  twofold  critical  and  uncritical  forms  of  the 
process  that  Marx's  analysis  develops. 
Marx  develops  this  resultant  critical  form  of  dialectic,  extracted  here  in  its  embryonic  form, 
through  his  generalised  inversion  of  Hegel's  own  mystical  application  of  the  negation  of  the 
negation.  One  might  almost  say  that  Marx  turns  a  fundamental  dialectical  principle  of 
Hegel's  right  side  up  again  in  order  to  discover  and  appropriate  the  rational  kernel  that  is 
contained  within  it. 
The  source  underpinning  Hegel's  illusions,  that  Marx  develops  and  generalises  from 
Feuerbach's  groundbreaking  innovations,  lays  the  material  foundations  for  that  dialectical 
process  to  be  analysed  in  its  more  critical  process  and  form  by  Marx.  His  treatment  of  Hegel 
in  the  E.  P.  M.  exemplifies  this  approach;  he  may,  over  the  course  of  time,  change  and  alter 
his  appreciation  of  Hegel,  and,  for  that  matter  Feuerbach,  but  he  does  not  deviate  from  this 
twofold  analysis  and  characterisation  of  Hegel's  dialectic. 
80 Marx,  unlike  Feuerbach,  never  gave  up  on  dialectics;  the  question  is  what  rational  form  his 
dialectic  takes  in  relation  to  Hegel's  mystical  variation.  Taken  together,  that  fusion  of  the 
dialectic  with  the  activity  of  labour  already  heralds  important  differences  that  are  emerging 
in  the  views  of  Marx  and  Feuerbach  vis  a  vis  Hegel;  not  to  mention  the  impact  they  will 
shortly  have  on  Marx's  own  attitude  to  Feuerbach. 
It  was  by  basing  it  on  the  practical,  objective  activity  of  labour  as  the  new  subject;  as  the 
substantial  and  essential  activity  that  expresses  both  man's  relation  to  man,  and  at  the  same 
time,  man's  relation  objectively  to  nature,  that  a  rational  form  of  dialectic  now  becomes 
possible  to  generate.  In  this  sense  Marx  was  wrong,  when  he  posed,  as  a  positive  outcome 
and  achievement  of  Feuerbach's  critique,  the  establishing  of  "true  materialism"  and  "real 
science";  this  now  becomes  possible  only  as  a  consequence  of  his  own  work. 
The  development  of  the  critique  of  socially  alienated  labour  in  both  its  social-material 
fetters  and  in  its  contradictory  conditions  of  existence,  is  the  core  subject  matter  of  the 
Manuscripts.  It  is  not  only  Prometheus  and  his  gift  of  labour,  but  also  the  dialectic  itself, 
that  is  now  potentially  unbound  and  set  free  from  its  idealist  fetters  and  chains  by  Marx's 
critique. 
This  not  only  marks  him  off  from  Feuerbach;  it  also  signals  the  clear  attempt  to  begin  to 
apply  the  dialectic,  in  a  rational  manner,  to  a  rational  subject.  This  new  subject  matter  of 
investigation,  in  combination  with  its  boundless  potentiality  for  free  activity,  is  now  posited 
as  the  focal  point  and  nexus  for  the  further  development  of  both  human  society  and  critical 
thought  itself. 
This  orientation  is  first  posited  as  the  foundation  central  to  Marx's  thought  in  the  Paris 
Manuscripts;  the  consequences  and  further  development  of  this  new  subject  matter  for 
investigation  are  nevertheless  still  embryonic  in  their  nature  at  this  point.  However,  the  ball 
has  already  been  sent  rolling;  the  only  question  is  in  ascertaining  the  nature  and  extent  of  its 
81 accelerating  and  gathering  momentum.  That  evaluation  has  to  be  viewed  though  as  an 
ongoing  dynamic  process,  with  the  rational  form  of  dialectic  itself  lying  behind  the  changes 
in  Marx's  viewpoint  and  perspective.  This  is  the  key  to  understanding  Marx's  rapidly 
evolving  world  outlook. 
The  earlier  critical  weighing  of  the  philosophical  scales  in  favour  of  Feuerbach,  due  to  the 
very  liberating  manner  of  Feuerbach's  explosive  demolition  of  Hegel's  systematic  idealism, 
has  its  own  internal  dynamic.  The  dynamics  of  this  process  is  largely  determined,  and 
ultimately  measured  by,  the  nature  of  Marx's  own  assimilation  and  further  development  of 
the  materialist  application  of  the  rational  form  of  dialectic  to  the  category  of  labour. 
This  asymmetrical  weighing  of  the  dialectical  scales  begins  to  inevitably  tip  back  in  favour 
of  Hegel,  as  Marx  evolves  his  own  independent  world  viewpoint  of  the  dialectics  of  social 
labour  and  the  critique  of  value. 
2.  Summary. 
It  is  the  view  of  the  thesis  that  the  early  and  incomplete  settling  of  accounts  with  Hegel  in 
the  Manuscripts  is  viewed  in  a  different  light  when  the  application  of  the  dialectic  to 
political  economy  has,  by  and  large,  been  completed  some  fifteen  years  later.  The  early 
critique  of  Hegel  was  centrally  aimed  towards  the  mystifying  side  of  his  dialectic.  Not  only, 
46all  those  years  ago"  though,  did  Marx  criticise  the  mystical  side  of  Hegel's  dialectic;  he 
also  outlined,  as  we  have  witnessed,  some  positive  aspects  pertaining  to  his  thought. 
Marx,  later  in  life,  clearly  felt  the  need  to  draw  a  balance  sheet  and  clarify  his  relation  to 
Hegel  by  writing  a  work  on  dialectics,  but  only  once  the  necessary  burden  of  political 
economy  had  been  put  on  a  scientific  foundation.  Marx's  debt  to  Hegel,  as  the  thesis  will 
82 later  attempt  to  show,  is,  if  anything,  greater  when  Marx  begins  to  apply  that  dialectic  to  the 
systematic  laws  of  motion  of  capital.  54 
Not  only  is  the  dialectic  of  negativity  as  the  moving  and  generating  principle,  expressed  in 
the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  retained  in  Marx's  later  work,  but  the  other  laws  of 
dialectics,  discovered  and  logically  systematised  by  Hegel,  are  also  applied  to  both  the 
understanding  and  the  critique  of  the  political  economy  of  value. 
In  order  to  arrive  at  this  point,  Marx  had  to,  not  only  accept  the  Feuerbachian  critique  of 
Hegel,  though,  as  I  have  argued,  heavily  qualified  by  Marx's  own  keen  sense  of  dialectic;  he 
also  had  to  develop  a  materialist  critique  of  Feuerbach's  inadequate  materialism.  The 
positive  contribution  of  Feuerbach  largely  lies  in  preparing  the  conditions  for  further 
intellectual  development  through  the  devastating  critique  of  Hegel's  idealist  foundation  for 
thought.  This  development  culminated  with  Marx's  own  critical  and  materialist  form  of 
dialectic  inherent  within  labouring  activity. 
This  was  achieved,  at  least  in  part,  by  drawing  upon  the  positive  elements  in  Hegel's 
dialectic  of  change  and  activity,  and  applying  them  to  the  study  of  alienated  labour  and  the 
power  of  money.  It  was  also  achieved  by  developing  a  generalised  materialist  form  of 
criticism  of  Hegel's  idealist  system;  a  system  that  is  ultimately  in  contradiction  with  both 
the  essence  and  the  subject  matter  of  the  dialectical  method. 
Feuerbach's  role  in  this  process  is  that  he  bridges  the  gap  in  this  transition  from  absolute 
idealism  to  the  critique  of  political  economy  and  a  materialist  conception  of  history.  This  he 
did  by  showing  that  nature  and  civil  society  were  the  true  sources  of  the  divine  and  the 
54  For  example,  could  Marx  really  have  known,  at  the  time  of  writing  the  E.  P.  M.  and  the  German 
Ideology,  that,  for  example,  Hegel's  dialectic  of  quality  and  quantity  and  their  transformation  into  the  category 
of  measure,  would  be  of  central  importance  in  analysing  both  the  substance  of  value,  and  the  money  form  of 
value?  Its  analysis  had  barely  been  put  on  the  agenda  at  this  time,  far  less  understood  in  a  thoroughly  scientific 
and  dialectical  manner  through  the  employment  and  analysis  of  these  very  categories. 
83 mystical,  and  the  real  foundation  by  which  human  understanding  and  knowledge  should  be 
55  interpreted,  developed  and  understood. 
Feuerbach's  liberating  influence,  despite  his  pivotal  role  for  this  further  development  of 
critical  thought  is,  however,  both  mediatory  and  transitory.  It  is  in  this  sense,  despite 
Hegel's  philosophical  superiority,  that  Feuerbach  was  "epoch  making  after  Hegel.  "  Marx,  in 
a  letter  to  Schweitzer  dated  Jan.  24th  1865,  where  he  writes  clarifying  his  relation  to 
Proudhon,  makes  the  following  interesting  comment  that  relates  to  the  present  discussion: 
"Proudhon's  relation  to  Saint-Simon  and  Fourier  is  about  the  same  as  that  of 
Feuerbach  to  Hegel.  Compared  with  Hegel,  Feuerbach  is  extremely  poor.  All  the 
same  he  was  epoch  making  after  Hegel  because  he  laid  stress  on  certain  points 
which  were  disagreeable  to  the  Christian  consciousness  but  important  for  the 
progress  of  criticism,  and  which  Hegel  had  left  in  mystic  semi-obscurity.  "" 
Philosophically  speaking  then,  Feuerbach  is  "extremely  poor"  in  comparison  with  Hegel  as 
a  philosopher  and  thinker.  Indeed,  Hegel  is  later  characterised  by  Marx  as  being  the 
"ultimate  word"  in  philosophy,  this  is  why  the  materialist  criticism  of  the  mystifying  form 
of  the  Hegelian  dialectic  was  all  the  more  necessary.  Feuerbach's  great  achievement  and 
merit  for  Marx  and  Engels,  was  to  produce  a  materialist  critique  of  that  speculative 
philosophical  form,  by  showing  that  the  mystical  form  of  idealism  has,  in  fact,  secular, 
material,  and  natural  roots. 
"  Engels  surnmarises  the  dissolution  of  the  Hegelian  school  of  philosophy  in  the  following  manner: 
"Feuerbach  alone  was  of  significance  as  a  philosopher.  But  not  only  did  philosophy  -  claimed  to  soar  above 
all  special  sciences  and  to  be  the  science  of  sciences  connecting  them  -  remain  to  him  an  impassable  barrier, 
an  inviolable  holy  thing,  but  as  a  philosopher  too  he  stopped  halfway,  was  a  materialist  below  and  an  idealist 
above.  He  was  incapable  of  disposing  of  Hegel  through  criticism;  he  simply  threw  him  aside  as  useless,  while 
he  himself  compared  with  the  encyclopaedic  wealth  of  the  Hegelian  system,  achieved  nothing  positive  beyond 
a  turgid  religion  of  love  and  a  meagre,  impotent  morality.  "  F.  Engels.  Ludwig  Feuerbach  and  the  end  of 
Classical  German  Philosophy.  Marx-Engels.  Selected  Works.  Volume  2.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  ) 
P.  349.  See  also  P.  345  for  more  on  Engels  view  of  Feuerbach's  "astonishing  poverty"  when  compared  with 
Hegel. 
"I  Marx-Engels.  Selected  Correspondence.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1956.  )  P.  185. 
84 The  central  importance,  the  historical  relevance,  and  the  "epoch  making"  aspect  of 
Feuerbach's  thought,  was  that  his  materialist  critique  of  religion  and  philosophical  idealism 
were  fundamentally  "important  for  the  progress  of  criticism".  That  is,  he  laid  the 
groundwork  for  the  further  development  of  critical  thought;  this  culminated  in  the  form  of  a 
dialectical  and  materialist  analysis  to  emerge  in  the  work  of  Marx  and  Engels.  This,  despite 
the  view  that  his  thought  is  deemed  philosophically  inferior  and  "extremely  poor"  in 
comparison  with  Hegel. 
However,  as  Marx  also  notes  in  the  correspondence,  the  "certain  points"  that  Feuerbach 
develops  and  lays  stress  on,  which  were  important  for  further  critical  development  and 
progress;  had  already  been  left,  by  Hegel,  in  "mystic  semi-obscurity".  That  is,  they  were 
already  contained,  at  least  in  the  germ  in  Hegel,  but  in  a  mystified  and  obscurantist  form. 
Marx's  positive  attitude  to  Feuerbach  had  though,  both  theoretical  and  practical  reasons  and 
causes.  The  major  theoretical  reason  is  Feuerbach's  critical  explosion  of  Hegel's  idealist 
system;  this  greatly  influenced  and  pushed  Marx  and  Engels  towards  developing  their  own 
materialist,  historical,  and  dialectical  viewpoint. 
The  practical  reason  was  that  in  their  early  adherence  to  communism,  Marx  and  Engels 
wanted  to  win  such  an  important  and  influential  figure  as  Feuerbach  to  the  communist 
cause.  However,  there  was,  after  a  brief  but  torrid  and  seminal  flirtation  with  Feuerbach,  a 
decisive  rejection  and  brake  with  him. 
That  Marx  grasped,  more  positively  than  Feuerbach,  the  rational  and  revolutionary  element 
in  Hegel's  dialectics  had  to  be  tempered,  however,  with  the  fact  that  it  had  yet  to  be  fully 
married  to  his  study  of  political  economy  in  order  to  generate  a  new  materialist  explanation 
of  social  being  that  was  fundamentally  dialectical. 
85 Feuerbach,  however,  has  very  little  to  offer  on  this  developing  front,  in  the  application  of  the 
dialectic  to  labour  and  political  economy;  Hegel,  by  contrast,  and  as  we  shall  see  in  some 
detail  later,  is  an  entirely  different  kettle  of  fish. 
86 CHAPTER  FIVE. 
HEGEL'S  ILLUSION  REVISITED. 
"My  dialectic  method  is  not  only  different  from  the  Hegelian,  but  is  its  direct 
opposite.  To  Hegel,  the  life-process  of  the  human  brain,  i.  e.,  the  process  of  thinking, 
which,  under  the  name  of  "the  Idea",  he  even  transforms  into  an  independent  subject, 
is  the  demiurgos  of  the  real  world,  and  the  real  world  is  only  the  external, 
phenomenal  form  of  "the  Idea".  With  me,  on  the  contrary,  the  ideal  is  nothing  else 
than  the  material  world  reflected  by  the  human  mind,  and  translated  into  forms  of 
thought.  "  57 
1.  Direct  Opposite. 
The  nature  of  Marx's  materialist  inversion  of  Hegel's  dialectic  entails  that  Marx's  method 
and  application  of  that  dialectic  is,  as  he  consciously  expressed  it,  the  "direct  opposite"  and 
not  merely  different  from  his  idealist  predecessor.  The  question  being,  and  remaining,  what 
is  the  exact  nature  of  this  inverted,  directly  opposite,  or  contrary  form  of  dialectic?  We  have 
already  gone  some  way  down  the  road  to  answering  this,  but  there  is  yet  further  progress  we 
can  make  that  will  both  back  up  the  route  taken  so  far,  and  lead  us  into  new  paths  for 
investigation. 
Hegel's  idealist  and  speculative  foundation  for  the  dialectic,  as  part  of  the  criticism 
contained  in  the  Paris  Manuscripts  showed,  is  also  the  source  of  his  idealist  illusions.  Marx, 
in  his  later  years,  also  made  some  comments  regarding  the  nature  of  the  speculative  illusions 
that  held  Hegel  in  their  sway.  It  is  to  these  comments  that  we  will  now  turn  our  analysis 
57  K.  Marx.  Afterword  to  the  Second  German  Edition  of  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart. 
(1974.  )  P.  29.  Jan.  24h  1873. 
87 towards,  with  a  backward  glance  seeing  how  they  relate  to  Marx's  earlier  attempted  general 
critique  in  the  Paris  Manuscripts,  and  a  forward  glance  that  relates  to  Marx's  mature  work, 
Capital. 
As  regards  the  question  of  the  continuity  in  Marx's  thought,  the  evidence  from  Marx's  early 
work  is,  in  many  ways,  both  reiterated  and  developed  within  his  more  mature  writings. 
Some  of  the  themes  of  his  later  criticisms  of  Hegelian  idealism  are,  as  we  shall  shortly 
witness,  the  same  as  the  earlier  targets.  The  vexed  question  of  the  continuity  or  otherwise  in 
Marx's  critical  account  of  Hegel  and  the  dialectic  can  now  be  put  under  the  spotlight  for 
further  investigation. 
Marx,  in  his  analysis  of  the  method  of  political  economy,  contained  in  the  introduction  to 
the  Grundrisse,  and  written  some  thirteen  years  after  the  Manuscripts,  returns  again  to  the 
sources  underpinning  Hegel's  illusion.  Marx's  frugal  observations  here  are  important,  not 
only  for  the  beginning  of  an  understanding  of  Marx's  view  of  a  scientific  method  of 
cognition,  itself  a  dialectical  one,  but  also  why  this  cognitive  dialectic  helped  to  both  delude 
and  confirm  Hegel  in  his  idealist  illusions. 
In  this  later  work,  Marx  offers  some  further  thoughts  on  Hegel's  analysis  of  a  systematic 
whole  that  brings  out  more  aspects  of  the  argument  for  the  ontological  priority  of  material 
being  over  consciousness,  an  early  but  constant  theme  of  Marx's  critique  of  Hegelian 
idealism. 
He  also  offers  a  partial  explanation  of  how  Hegel  came  to  have  a  mystified  account  of  the 
relation  in  the  introduction  to  the  Grundrisse.  The  source  of  why  this  systematic  totality  of 
thought  is  viewed  in  a  speculative  and  alienated  manner,  as  the  product  of  thought,  lies  in 
Hegel's  viewing  the  dialectical  method,  inherent  in  the  cognitive  process,  in  an  idealist 
fashion.  As  Marx  puts  it: 
88 "The  concrete  is  concrete  because  it  is  the  concentration  of  many  determinations, 
hence  unity  of  the  diverse.  It  appears  in  the  process  of  thinking,  therefore,  as  a  result, 
not  as  a  point  of  departure,  even  though  it  is  the  point  of  departure  in  reality  and 
hence  also  the  point  of  departure  for  observation  and  conception.  Along  the  first  path 
the  full  conception  was  evaporated  to  yield  an  abstract  determination;  along  the 
second,  the  abstract  determinations  lead  towards  a  reproduction  of  the  concrete  by 
way  of  thought.  In  this  way  Hegel  fell  into  the  illusion  of  conceiving  the  real  as  the 
product  of  thought  concentrating  itself,  probing  its  own  depths,  and  unfolding  itself 
out  of  itself,  by  itself,  whereas  the  method  of  rising  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete 
is  only  the  way  in  which  thought  appropriates  the  concrete,  reproduces  it  as  the 
concrete  in  the  mind.  But  this  is  by  no  means  the  process  by  which  the  concrete 
comes  into  being.  "" 
The  above  was  written  in  1857,  which,  if  taken  alongside  the  passage  quoted  at  the 
beginning  of  this  section  from  the  Afterword  written  in  1873,  still  echo  that  earlier  critique 
in  the  1844  Manuscripts.  A  time  period  of  nearly  thirty  years.  There  are  undoubted 
similarities  and  continuities  of  thought  contained  in  the  early  and  mature  Marx,  and  there 
are  also  nuances  within  the  broad  concepts  contained  in  that  materialist  critique,  which  point 
to  other  areas  of  inquiry. 
In  the  above  two  quotes,  written  sixteen  years  apart,  Marx  criticises  Hegel's  view  and 
interpretation  of  the  nature  of  the  "process  of  thinking.  "  What  are  the  core  elements  of  these 
two  criticisms  of  the  "life-process  of  the  human  brain",  that  is,  the  process  of  thinking? 
In  the  1873  Afterword  to  Capital,  the  "process  of  thinking"  is  seen  as,  and  transformed  into, 
an  independent  subject  that  is  the  creator  of  the  real  world.  The  world  is,  in  turn,  reduced  to 
the  status  of  the  external  phenomenal  form  of  "the  Idea".  In  the  Grundrisse  introduction  of 
1857,  the  criticism  of  the  "process  of  thinking"  is  that  concrete  reality  appears  as  the  result 
18K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  Introduction.  P.  101.  Aug-Sept.  1857. 
89 of  the  process  of  concentrated  thought  unfolding  itself  out  of  itself  and  by  itself,  in  the 
exterml  form  of  the  real  world. 
Here  we  have  a  common  perennial  theme  that  echoes  the  earlier  criticisms  in  the  Paris 
Manuscripts  of  1844  of  Hegel's  alienated  thought  sublating  not  only  nature,  but  the 
movement  of  thought  itself-,  by  the  positing  of  a  divine  subject  as  the  source  of  the  whole 
process;  where  nature  and  man  become  mere  predicates  of  this  unreal,  autonomous,  and 
mystical  subject. 
Hegel's  illusion  is  that  he  conceives  the  real  as  the  result  of  the  process  of  thinking 
constructed  into  a  totality  of  thought,  which  unfolds  and  objectifies  itself  as  nature  and 
human  spirit.  In  these  passages,  Marx  clearly  posits  the  ontological  primacy  of  the  material 
world  as  the  presupposition  and  real  starting  point  of  how  the  concrete  can  be  captured  in 
conceptual  thought.  The  1857  introduction  also  echoes  the  designation  of  Hegel's 
philosophy  in  the  Manuscripts,  as  being  a  form  of  "alienated  science  thinking  itself.  "  Here, 
again,  are  the  later  remarks  of  the  Grundrisse. 
"Therefore,  to  the  kind  of  consciousness  -  and  this  is  characteristic  of  the 
philosophical  consciousness  -  for  which  conceptual  thinking  is  the  real  human  being, 
and  for  which  the  conceptual  world  as  such  is  thus  the  only  reality,  the  movement  of 
the  categories  appears  as  the  real  act  of  production  -  which  only,  unfortunately, 
receives  a  jolt  from  outside  -  whose  product  is  the  world;  and  -  but  this  is  again  a 
tautology  -  this  is  correct  in  so  far  as  the  concrete  totality  is  a  totality  of  thoughts, 
concrete  in  thought,  in  fact  a  product  of  thinking  and  comprehending;  but  not  in  any 
way  a  product  of  the  concept  which  thinks  and  generates  itself  outside  or  above 
observation  and  conception;  a  product,  rather,  of  the  working  up  of  observation  and 
conception  into  concepts.  "" 
59  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  Introduction.  P.  10  1.  Aug-Sept.  1857. 
90 In  the  Manuscripts,  Marx  had  also  written  about  the  illusions  of  speculation.  The  question 
is,  does  the  earlier  critique  both  reflect  and  foreshadow  his  later  writings?  Hegel's  "double 
error"  in  the  Manuscripts  was  to  pose  the  philosopher  as  the  criterion  of  knowledge,  and 
mind  as  the  essence  of  man.  In  the  Grundrisse,  the  variation  on  the  common  theme  is  that 
conceptual  thinking  is  regarded  as  the  real  human  being  and  the  conceptual  world  as  the 
only  true  reality. 
Again,  the  problematic  criterion  of  philosophical  man  in  his  essential  speculative  activity  is 
seen  as  the  expression  of  the  real  human  being,  where  Hegel's  mystical  and  inverted 
speculative  idealism  confirms  itself  in  its  own  philosophical  alienation  as  an  alienated 
subject.  The  essence  of  Hegel's  illusion,  where  the  movement  of  the  categories  is  mystically 
interpreted  as  the  real  act  of  production,  is  also  reflected  in  the  following  remarks  from  the 
1844  text. 
"[T]he  abstract  thinker  learns  in  his  intuition  of  nature  that  the  entities  which  he 
thought  to  create  from  nothing,  from  pure  abstraction  -  the  entities  he  believed  he 
was  producing  in  the  divine  dialectic  as  pure  products  of  the  labour  of  thought,  for 
ever  shuttling  back  and  forth  in  itself  and  never  looking  outward  into  reality  are 
nothing  else  but  abstractions  from  characteristics  from  nature.  To  him,  therefore, 
the  whole  of  nature  merely  repeats  the  logical  abstractions  in  a  sensuous,  external 
form.  He  once  more  resolves  nature  into  these  abstractions.  Thus  his  intuition  of 
nature  is  only  the  act  of  confirming  his  abstraction  from  the  intuition  of  nature  -  is 
only  the  conscious  repetition  by  him  of  the  process  of  creating  his  abstraction.  ' 
2.  Movement  of  the  Categories. 
The  pieces  and  extracts,  quoted  from  three  different  works,  span  the  period  from  1844  - 
1873,  a  period  of  nearly  thirty  years.  There  is,  however,  a  definite  continuity  and 
consistency  in  Marx's  critique.  The  "divine  dialectic"  of  1844  is  "nothing  else  but 
91 abstractions  from  the  characteristics  of  nature.  "  The  Idea,  in  1873,  is  "nothing  else"  than  the 
"material  world  reflected  in  the  human  mind.  " 
The  1857  critique  posits  that  the  concept  does  not  generate  itself  "outside"  of  our 
observations  and  our  conceptions,  that  is,  the  Idea  does  not  take  an  external  material  form  in 
nature;  it  is  merely  the  product  of  our  reflection  of  nature  in  the  categories  of  thought.  Nor  is 
it  "above"  conception  and  observation,  that  is,  its  source  is  not  the  divine,  absolute  and 
autonomous  subject  of  the  Notion. 
Furthermore,  the  Logical  Idea  is  not,  as  in  1873,  the  "demiurgos  of  the  real  world.  "  The 
"movement  of  the  categories"  is  therefore  not  the  "real  act  of  production",  with  the  real 
being  merely  cognised  as  the  "external  phenomenal  form  of  the  Idea",  the  product  of 
thought  unfolding  itself  out  of  itself,  by  itself.  Nature,  as  it  is  not  the  product  of  autonomous 
idealist  thought,  cannot  then,  as  in  1844,  be  reduced  to  the  estranged  objective  form  that 
merely  "repeats  the  logical  abstractions",  the  pure  products  of  the  labour  of  thought,  in  "a 
sensuous,  external  form.  "  Marx's  criticisms,  spanning  over  three  decades,  hammer  away 
then  at  some  common  perennial  themes. 
Cognitive  Illusion. 
Hegel's  illusion  is  also  due  in  part,  and  here  we  have  another  positive  element  emerging 
from  the  idealist  philosophical  mist,  to  the  application  of  a  dialectical  method  of  cognition 
and  its  twofold  analytical  and  synthetic  paths.  The  movement  from  the  concrete  to  the 
abstract,  the  deriving  of  the  analytical,  abstract  universal  determinations  that,  as  Marx  puts 
it,  "evaporated"  the  concrete  whole  or  "full  conception",  is  the  abstract  starting  point  for  the 
appropriation  of  the  concrete  in  thought. 
The  idealist  ontological  illusion  of  Hegel,  that  it  is  the  result  of  the  categories  in  operation, 
is  then  confirmed,  for  Hegel,  by  the  second  opposite  path  of  the  cognitive  dialectic.  Here, 
60  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  3.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1975.  )  P.  345-346. 
92 "the  abstract  determinations  lead  towards  a  reproduction  of  the  concrete  by  way  of  thought.  " 
It  is  this  second  motion  of  the  synthetic  appropriation  of  that  concrete  totality  back  into  that 
full  conception,  the  movement  that  reproduces  the  concrete  as  the  concrete  in  thought,  that 
confirms  the  prior  motion  in  its  abstract  starting  point.  It  is  this  standing  reality  on  its  head 
that  supports  the  mystical  inversion  of  Hegel's  idealism  that  thought  does  not,  in  fact 
presuppose  external  nature  for  its  starting  point,  but  that  the  direct  opposite  is  in  fact  the 
case. 
It  is  then,  due  to  the  ability  of  the  twofold  contrary  motions,  the  move  from  the  concrete  to 
the  abstract  and  its  opposite  motion,  the  move  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete,  that  is 
contained  in  the  cognitive  dialectic,  that  not  only  allows  thought  to  reproduce  the  concrete 
in  thought,  but  also  aided  and  contributed  to  Hegel's  illusion  that  the  method  of  rising  from 
the  abstract  to  the  concrete  was,  in  fact,  the  way  the  concrete  was  itself  created. 
The  further  question  for  the  materialist  critique  of  this  idealist  form  of  the  cognitive  dialectic 
is  how  Hegel,  despite  these  speculative  mystifications  of  this  form  of  dialectic,  generated 
those  concepts  and  categories  into  a  systematic  whole,  and  how  that  entire  compass  of 
abstraction  relates  to  the  real  concrete  totality? 
In  order  to  cognitively  understand  the  nature  of  a  concrete  totality  in  its  dynamic  activity, 
then  the  major  categories  of  its  determinate  being  have  to  be  integrated  in  such  a  way  that 
the  totality  expresses  itself  in  the  evolving  dialectical  oppositions  and  relations  of  those 
categories.  This  evolution,  whilst  conceptual  in  its  form,  aims  through  its  categories  and 
concepts,  to  reflect  the  process  whereby  that  objective  totality  makes  itself  into  a  unity  of  a 
manifold  diversity. 
This  mirroring  of  the  real  by  cognition  is  achieved  by  developing  the  forms  of  dialectical 
activity  that  reflect  the  motions  that  manifest  themselves  in  the  subject's  general 
characteristics  of  being.  These  objective  ontological  forms  being  underpinned  by,  and 
understood  as,  the  nomological  basis  for  the  substantial  activity  that  is  expressed  in  the 
93 principles  of  change  and  alteration  inherent  in  those  developing  and  contradictory,  but 
reciprocal  ontological  poles.  As  the  source  of  the  motions  that  specifically  determine  and 
individuate  the  subject  into  a  unified  totality  embodying  its  own  internal  principle  of 
movement  and  self-activity. 
The  materialist  nature  of  the  dialectic,  and  its  subject  matter,  means  that  it  is  the  real 
material  contradiction  that  is  the  basis  for  the  movement,  change,  and  supersession  of  that 
subject  in  all  its  material  activities  and  contradictions,  not  its  abstract  thought  forms  or 
concepts.  The  dialectic  of  negativity  applies  primarily  to  the  ontology  of  objective  and 
substantial  activity. 
In  turn,  this  objective  contradiction  provides  the  basis  for  the  dialectic  of  negativity  in  the 
cognitive  form.  This  applies  in  a  twofold  sense,  firstly,  in  the  contrary  analytic  and  synthetic 
forms  of  motion  pertaining  to  the  cognitive  process.  Secondly,  as  a  conceptual  reflection, 
through  those  analytic  and  synthetic  forms  in  cognition  that  allows  thought  to  grasp  the 
evolving,  specific  and  determinate  forms  of  the  unfolding  of  the  contradiction  in  objective 
being. 
Those  specific  determinations  are  reflected  within  the  ontological  forms  of  the  categories 
that  are  generated  by  thought,  from  their  simple,  abstract  universal  forms  to  their  more 
developed  concrete  determinations  and  relations  that  allows  thought  to  appropriate  the 
ontological  relations  in  the  world.  This  cognitive  result  is  achieved  precisely  through  the 
contradictions  that  are  contained  in  the  categories  of  conceptual  cognition;  categories  that 
are  generated  by  and  the  reflections  of,  their  ontological  referents  in  that  substantial 
objectivity.  - 
In  general  terms,  the  analytic  form  of  cognition  produces  the  universal  form  of  abstraction 
pertinent  to  the  subject,  the  synthetic  form  of  cognition  specifies  and  concretises  that 
universal  form,  by  grasping  the  specific  difference  that  characterises  the  abstract  universal. 
By  dialectically  relating  these  two  forms  and  resolving  the  opposition  contained  in  them,  the 
94 universal  and  particular  are  individuated  in  the  concept  that  can  correspond  to  the  subject 
under  investigation. 
The  twofold  forms  of  the  cognitive  dialectic  are  united  into  a  systematic  whole,  with  a 
central,  dynamic  and  moving  principle  of  change,  the  positing  and  resolving  of 
contradiction,  that  unites  and  universally  interconnects  all  its  determinate  forms,  and  reveals 
the  systematic  activity  of  the  subject.  The  result  is  a  scientific  cognition  of  that  concrete 
totality,  not  the  concrete  totality  itself. 
The  dialectic  of  negativity  in  the  real  world  is  appropriated  through  this  cognitive  dialectic. 
Hegel  conflates  both  processes  and  posits  the  ontological  source  for  the  former  as  residing 
in  the  latter,  in  the  primacy  of  the  dialectic  of  negativity  contained  in  the  categories.  Marx 
retains  Hegel's  cognitive  dialectic  as  a  scientific  method  of  cognition,  what  he  negates  is 
that  the  real  is  the  product  or  result  of  the  movement  of  dialectical  thought.  The  result  is  the 
scientific  understanding  and  analysis  of  the  object  of  investigation,  not  the  proof  of  an 
idealist  ontological  basis  for  the  existence  of  the  object. 
The  method  of  rising  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete  is,  as  Marx  points  out,  only  the  way 
in  which  thought  appropriates  the  concrete  and  reproduces  it  as  the  concrete  in  the  mind.  it 
is  not  the  way  or  the  process  by  which  that  concrete  totality  comes  into  existence.  There  is 
both  a  mirroring,  one  is  tempted  to  say  an  extraction,  and  an  inverting  in  Marx's  critique  of 
Hegel's  idealist  form  of  cognitive  dialectic. 
it  would  appear  then,  paradoxically,  that  Hegel's  illusion  is  caused  by  an  incorrect  idealist 
foundation  and  ontology  combined  with  a  correct  dialectical  method  of  cognition.  A  method 
of  rising,  through  the  analytic  and  synthetic  forms  of  cognition,  from  the  abstract  to  the 
concrete,  that  allows  the  concrete  to  be  reproduced  in  thought.  It  is  again  difficult  to  draw 
out  any  other  contrary  conclusion  from  Marx's  comments.  This  does  not  entail  though,  that 
Marx  has  an  idealist  account  of  the  process  of  cognition. 
95 That  science  has  to  have  a  materialist  grounding  is  not  the  question  at  issue  here,  but  that 
materialist  grounding,  by  no  means  rules  out  the  point  that  idealist  thought  can,  and  has, 
made  important  contributions  to  scientific  thought.  Marx  is  merely  making  the  point  of  how 
a  correct  conceptual  method  of  appropriating  the  objective  can  strengthen  and  underpin  an 
idealist  view  of  them  as  being  the  product  and  result  of  the  subjective.  The  dialectic  between 
the  method  of  inquiry  and  the  method  of  presentation  can,  as  Marx  expresses  the  relation 
here,  also  help  to  further  confirm  those  idealist  illusions. 
"Of  course  the  method  of  presentation  must  differ  in  form  from  that  of  inquiry.  The 
latter  has  to  appropriate  the  material  in  detail,  to  analyse  its  different  forms  of 
development,  to  trace  out  their  inner  connexion.  Only  after  this  work  is  done,  can  the 
actual  movement  be  adequately  described.  If  this  is  done  successfully,  if  the  life  of 
the  subject-matter  is  ideally  reflected  as  in  a  mirror,  then  it  may appear  as  if  we  had 
before  us  a  mere  a  priori  construction.  "" 
The  real  and  objective  contradictions  necessarily  continue  to  play  themselves  out  to  a 
material  conclusion,  given  the  finite  nature  of  objective,  material  existence.  Moreover,  this 
produces  new  dialectical  forms  of  change  that  are  themselves  both  heedless  of,  and 
unenlightened  by,  the  illusions  of  speculative  thought  in  its  mystical  glorification,  and  in  its 
dialectical  balancing  of  the  concepts,  of  what  already  exists. 
The  dialectics  involved  in  the  cognitive  process  are  materialised  by  Marx  as  the  historical 
result  and  product  of,  not  only  the  dialectic  in  objectivity,  but  also  how  that  objective 
dialectic  between  humans  and  nature  is  cognitively  and  dialectically  reflected  in  human 
subjectivity.  As  the  result  of  the  social  evolution  of  the  brain,  itself  the  highest  product  and 
result  of  the  dialectic  of  human  labour  and  nature. 
"  K.  Marx.  Afterword  to  the  Second  German  Edition  of  Capital  Volume  I.  Lawrence  and  Wishart. 
(1974.  )  P.  28.  Written  on  Jan.  24'  1873. 
96 The  thinking  head,  in  order  to  think,  has  to  have  a  material  opposition  in  order  to  be  able  to 
develop  the  working  up  of  observation  and  conception  into  the  concepts  and  categories  of 
thought.  It  is  its  source,  its  cause,  and  its  ground,  and  the  categories  and  their  movement  are, 
in  the  final  analysis,  derived  from  and  presuppose  this  very  material  basis.  The  process  of 
thinking,  viewed  as  the  process  of  the  movement  of  the  categories,  thus  reflects 
idealistically  the  real  process  in  the  world  according  to  the  materialist  critique. 
This  is  why  Marx  necessarily  posits  that  Hegel's  idealism  "unfortunately"  has  to  receive  "a 
jolt  from  the  outside"  in  order  to  get  the  whole  idealist  process  of  thought  kick  started  and 
moving  in  the  direction  of  conceptual  appropriation  of  that  primary  objective  activity. 
Materialist  Subject. 
Simply  positing  the  inversion  of  the  primary  ontological  assumptions  of  idealism  does  not 
fully  exhaust  Marx's  materialist  inversion  of  Hegel.  Marx's  rejection  of  an  idealist  dialectic 
also  entails  the  rejection  of  an  idealist  subject,  the  Logical  Idea.  It  necessarily  in  my  view, 
and  there  is  more  evidence  than  we  have  already  witnessed  in  the  early  Marx  to  support  this, 
entails  that  the  inversion  also  posits  a  different  subject  matter  for  investigation.  The 
theoretical  method  too,  must  have  a  materialist  subject.  Marx  tells  us  what  it  is  in  the 
Grundrisse. 
"The  totality  as  it  appears  in  the  head,  as  a  totality  of  thoughts,  is  a  product  of  a 
thinking  head,  which  appropriates  the  world  in  the  only  way  it  can,  a  way  different 
from  the  artistic,  religious,  practical,  and  mental  appropriation  of  this  world.  The  real 
subject  retains  its  autonomous  existence  outside  the  head  just  as  before;  namely  as 
long  as  the  head's  conduct  is  merely  speculative,  merely  theoretical.  Hence,  in  the 
theoretical  method,  too,  the  subject,  society,  must  always  be  kept  in  mind  as  the 
presupposition.  "' 
97 That  subject  matter  and  presupposition  of  a  dialectical  method,  from  a  materialist 
perspective,  is  nature  and  man;  there  are  no  other  subjects,  supersensible  or  otherwise  for  a 
materialist  dialectic  to  investigate.  There  is,  though  in  a  sense,  only  one  science  for  Marx 
and  Engels,  that  science  is history;  that  history  itself  can  be  further  divided  in  the  form  of  a 
predominant  natural  history,  and  its  offspring,  human  history.  " 
What  I  have  been  arguing  for,  is  that  the  solution  to  the  enigma  of  the  inversion  remains 
problematic,  for  it  remains  incomplete  in  content,  if  the  inversion  is  left  solely  at  the 
reversal  of  ontological  presuppositions  without  working  through  the  further  consequences  of 
this. 
This  was  reflected  in  Marx's  inversion  of  the  Hegelian  dialectic  in  the  Manuscripts  was 
necessarily  combined  with  its  application  to  the  category  of  labour  in  its  dialectical  relation 
to  nature.  The  social  form  and  mode  of  production  of  human  evolution  being  viewed  as  a 
subject,  that  in  its  social  movement,  is  treated  as  a  derivative  process  of  natural  history. 
Marx,  in  the  Afterword  to  Capital,  quotes  from  a  Russian  reviewer  who  outlines  his  general, 
dialectical,  realist,  and  materialist  method  for  the  analysis  of  political  economy.  The  value 
of  analysing  this  review  of  Marx's  method  is  that  it  provides  a  rough  sketch  of  key  areas  of 
the  general  form  of  working  of  dialectic  from  his  own  materialist  and  historical  perspective. 
It  is  worth  extensively  quoting  to  provide  further  material  for  the  investigation  and 
discussion. 
"Marx  treats  the  social  movement  as  a  process  of  natural  history,  governed  by  laws 
not  only  independent  of  human  will,  consciousness  and  intelligence,  but  rather,  on 
the  contrary,  determining  that  will,  consciousness  and  intelligence 
.... 
If  in  the 
K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  Introduction.  P.  101-102.  Aug-Sept.  1857. 
In  the  first  section  of  the  German  Ideology,  in  a  passage  of  the  first  version  that  is  crossed  out,  the 
following  remarks  are  formulated.  "We  know  only  a  single  science,  the  science  of  history.  One  can  look  at 
history  from  two  sides  and  divide  it  into  the  history  of  nature  and  the  history  of  men.  The  two  sides  are, 
however,  inseparable;  the  history  of  nature  and  the  history  of  men  are  dependent  on  each  other  so  long  as  men 
exist.  "  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works  Volume  5.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1976.  )  P.  28. 
98 history  of  civilisation  the  conscious  element  plays  a  part  so  subordinate,  then  it  is 
self-evident  that  a  critical  inquiry  whose  subject  matter  is  civilisation,  can  less  than 
anything  else,  have  for  its  basis  any  form  or  result  of  consciousness.  That  is  to  say, 
that  not  the  idea,  but  the  material  phenomena  alone  can  serve  as  its  starting  point. 
Such  an  inquiry  will  confine  itself  to  the  confrontation  and  the  comparison  of  a  fact, 
not  with  ideas,  but  with  another  fact.  For  this  inquiry,  the  one  thing  of  moment  is, 
that  both  facts  be  investigated  as  accurately  as  possible,  and  that  they  actually  form, 
each  with  respect  to  the  other,  different  momenta  of  an  evolution;  but  most 
important  of  all  is  the  rigid  analysis  of  the  series  of  successions,  of  the  sequences  and 
concatenations  in  which  the  different  stages  of  such  an  evolution  present 
themselves.  " 
The  subject  matter  then  also  provides  a  materialist  grounding  of  the  dialectic.  What  Marx 
analyses  in  the  value  form  is  the  development  of  the  contradiction  of  two  facts,  use  value 
and  exchange  value,  that  run  all  the  way  through,  and  take  evolving  and  progressively  more 
concrete  forms  of  determinations  and  relations  in  the  course  of  the  analysis.  It  is  not  the  Idea 
that  is  in  the  driving  seat,  nor  is  the  understanding  of  that  objective  activity  based  on  an 
idealist  dialectic  of  thought  and  object. 
Marx's  materialism  and  realism  entails  that  the  economic  laws  of  motion  are  independent  of 
human  thought  and  volition.  The  movement  of  the  conceptual  categories,  portrayed  in  their 
evolving  dialectical  polarity,  only  provides  the  conceptual  framework  for  reflecting  and 
understanding  the  ý  real  material  basis  and  characteristic  forms  of  determinations  of  the 
objective  economic  laws  of  motion  of  the  operation  of  the  value  form  and  system.  - 
The  real  point  of  departure  for  Marx's  materialism  and  realism  is  the  objective  concrete 
totality  that  is  the  starting  point  for  the  head's  appropriation.  The  subject  of  Marx's 
"  K.  Marx.  Afterword  to  the  Second  German  Edition  of  Capital  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart. 
(1974.  )  P.  27-28.  (Jan.  24'  1873.  ) 
99 materialism  is  material  production,  but  material  production  in  its  historical  and  social 
specificity,  not  material  production  viewed  abstractly  and  ahistorically. 
Those  material  and  social  connections  are  rooted  in  the  concrete  historical  conditions  that 
generate  a  specific  form  of  material  production  and  its  social  relations.  Those  social 
connections  are  necessary  connections  for  the  working  of  the  economic  laws  of  motion  of 
the  specific  mode  of  social  production  under  investigation.  They  are  not  the  products  of 
accidental  relations,  but  of  the  historical  development  of  the  social  conditions  of  labour  in 
combination  with,  and  presupposing  as  their  foundation,  objective  natural  necessity. 
Production  is  not  only  the  result  of  specific  and  evolving  forms  of  production,  a  historical 
result,  but  it  also  generates  specific  forms  and  economic  categories  inherent  to  that  mode  of 
production.  A  definite  form  or  mode  of  production  "thus  determines  a  definite  consumption, 
distribution  and  exchange  as  well  as  definite  relations  between  these  different  moments.  "' 
A  definite  production  generates  then,  historically  specific  forms  that  are  systematically 
congealed  into  a  unity  of  the  diverse  moments  contained  in  that  organic  totality.  There  is  a 
systematic  and  reciprocal  relation  between  the  different  moments,  although  the  point  of 
departure  and  return  is  that  of  the  productive  mode.  Marx's  subject  matter  is  aimed  at  the 
analysis  of  the  specific  and  dominant  social  form  of  labour  that  determines  the  nature  of  the 
specific  historical  mode  of  material  production. 
"In  all  forms  of  society  there  is  one  specific  kind  of  production  which  predominates 
over  the  rest,  whose  relations  thus  assign  rank  and  influence  to  the  others.  It  is  a 
general  illumination  which  bathes  all  the  other  colours  and  modifies  their 
particularity.  It  is  a  particular  ether  which  determines  the  specific  gravity  of  every 
being  which  has  materialised  within  it.  "  66 
K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  Introduction.  P.  99. 
K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Introduction.  P.  106-107. 
100 The  general  form  of  working,  the  essence  of  the  dialectical  method,  is  now  applied  by  Marx 
to  the  study  of  the  social  form  of  labour,  in  order  to  analyse  the  historical  development  and 
laws  of  motion  of  the  historico-specific  forms  that  it  takes  in  its  productive  modes  of 
operation.  This  includes  the  arisal,  maturity,  decline,  and  transition,  to  higher  forms  of 
social  labour  contained  in  the  dialectic  of  those  specific  historical  forms. 
That  Marx  decisively  rejects  the  idealism  and  mystical  inversion  in  Hegel's  thought  is  a 
constant  from  his  early  writings  onwards.  What  is  variable  is  his  application  of  the  general 
form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectic.  It  is  not  until  Marx  clearly  defines  his  own 
subject  matter  and  parameters  of  investigation,  that  the  laws  of  dialectics  are  applied,  in  a 
systematic  manner,  to  a  systematic  materialist  subject. 
The  complexities  of  Hegel's  dialectical  analysis  of  nomological  activity  are  not  brought  out 
in  the  critical  discussion  of  Hegel  in  the  Manuscripts.  What  the  thesis  will  argue  is  that  what 
is  retained  and  applied,  in  a  materialist  manner  to  political  economy,  are  the  general  laws 
that  Hegel  outlines  as  pertaining  to  the  workings  of  a  systematic  whole  in  its  substantial 
process.  This  is  the  kernel  that  contains  the  rational  element  in  Hegel's  dialectic  as  applied 
to  a  system. 
Marx  does  not  give  up  on  the  laws  of  dialectics  formulated  and  discovered  by  Hegel.  These 
laws  being  at  the  heart  of  any  general  form  of  working  of  dialectic  itself,  including  Marx's 
own  application  of  the  dialectic.  Marx  does  not  abandon  these  at  any  time,  even  though  they 
may  have  to  be  altered  and  tailored  to  suit  a  materialist  foundation  of  the  dialectic.  This 
important  question  will  be  discussed  in  part  two  of  the  thesis. 
4.  Summary. 
Turning  Hegel's  dialectic  right  side  up  is,  as  is  generally  regarded,  a  reference  to  the 
contrary  ontological  presuppositions  of  both  thinkers.  The  critique  of  Hegel's  idealist 
totality  as  the  abstract,  philosophical  expression  of  the  real,  its  reconstitution  as  the  concrete 
101 in  thought,  is  returned  to  its  real  point  of  departure.  The  solution  to  the  enigma  of  the 
inversion  largely  lies  in  working  through  what  are  the  ontological  and  epistemological 
implications  of  this  materialist  grounding  of  the  dialectic. 
Not  only  is  there  an  ontological  inversion  in  the  primary  foundations,  with  material  and 
social  reality  replacing  thought  as  the  moving  force,  but  also  as  the  thesis  argues,  this 
necessitates  a  new  subject  matter  of  investigation.  It  also  necessitates  viewing  the  theoretical 
form  of  the  general  form  of  dialectic  as  itself  arising  out  of  the  movement  of  real  material, 
natural,  and  social  being. 
What  has  also  been  ascertained  by  the  method  of  investigation  employed,  is  that  implicit  in 
the  above  are  the  following  consequences  for  not  only  understanding  the  positive  and 
negative  sides  of  Hegel's  dialectical  thought,  but  also  its  ontological  inversion  in  the 
materialist  critique.  So  far,  the  following  consequences  have  been  gleaned  from  the 
materialist  inversion,  primarily  from  the  analysis  of  Marx's  early  work. 
1.  There  is  a  materialist  inversion  in  the  ontological  primacy  from  an  idealist  monism  to  a 
materialist  monism. 
2.  The  consequences  of  this  is  that  a  new,  primary,  materialist  subject  matter,  the  practical 
activity  and  historical  evolution  of  the  social  form  of  labour,  replaces  the  idealist  historical 
teleology  of  the  "Phenomenology  of  Spirit". 
3.  The  "Science  of  Logic"  gets  demoted  from  its  Pantheonic  and  Olympean  heights  to  its 
true  material  origin;  as  a  mystified  and  idealist  account  of  scientific  method  that  is  contained 
in  the  outlining  of  the  fundamentally  dialectical  nature  of  the  activity  of  the  ontological 
categories  and  laws  that  govern  the  interrelation  and  universal  interconnection  of  a 
systematic  organic  totality. 
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general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics. 
The  relation  between  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics  is  expressed  in 
the  laws  of  motion  of  a  systematic  and  substantial  subject,  as  a  process  and  movement 
containing  an  inherent  principle  of  change  and  alteration.  Dialectics  is  about  the  discovering 
of  the  laws  of  motion  and  the  driving  contradiction  that  expresses  those  laws  of  motion  of 
the  substantial  process.  This  being  the  core  content  of  the  laws  of  dialectics  themselves. 
What  Hegel  outlines  is  the  general  form  of  working  of  these  laws  of  dialectics. 
It  would  seem  unlikely,  and  it  appears  contrary  to  what  little  evidence  we  have,  that  Marx 
would  want  to  jettison  what  he  regarded  as  Hegel's  hard  won  positive  achievements  of  both 
consciously  and  comprehensively  outlining  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of 
dialectics,  even  if  they  are  not  ready  or  tailor  made  for  Marx,  but  have  to  be  modified  in  line 
with  his  materialism.  This  is  a  question  we  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to  give  a  more  full  and 
sufficient  answer  to. 
They  do  provide,  however,  and  this  was  gleaned  from  the  analysis  of  the  Paris  Manuscripts, 
the  basis  for  the  critical  form  of  dialectic  that  inherently  lies  in  Hegel's  thought.  The 
replacement  of  the  idealist  view  of  the  dialectical  abstractions  with  the  materialist  poles  of 
the  dialectic,  derived  from  the  subject  under  investigation,  are  combined  with  the  grounding 
of  their  activity  in  that  objectivity  rather  than  the  categories  of  thought.  This  has  the 
following  immediate  result  from  the  materialist  perspective. 
It  leads  to  a  contrary  understanding  of  the  movement  of  the  material  poles  of  the 
contradiction  in  their  development  and  supersession.  It  posits  an  open  ended  and  evolving 
materialist  view  of  the  interrelated  systems  of  nature  and  society,  and  the  dialectical 
contradictions  inherent  in  their  specific  motions  and  processes;  not  the  hermetically  sealed 
idealist  teleology  and  resolution  of  the  dialectical  contradictions  within  a  system  of  logical 
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between  the  dialectical  method  and  his  idealist  system. 
The  point  is  to  unearth  the  laws  of  motion  of  this  real  movement  in  its  specific 
contradictions,  that  is,  to  specify  the  general  form  itself  in  a  determinate  subject  in  its  own 
specific  expressions  of  those  laws.  Hegel  imposes  them  on  the  world,  as  laws  of  thought, 
not  laws  generated  from  real  nature,  their  true  source  of  origin.  It  does  not  stop  him  though, 
from  outlining  what  the  nature  of  those  general  laws  governing  the  dialectical  movement  of 
a  totality,  actually  are.  I 
To  apply  it  idealistically  is  to  apply  it  in  an  alienated  manner,  and  to  impose  that  logic  on 
the  world  as  the  laws  of  motion  of  thought,  instead  of  deriving  it  from  the  real  relations  and 
the  actual  facts,  is  to  invert  and  mystify  those  real  relations  and  actual  facts.  Marx  retains 
these  laws  of  dialectical  development;  they  are  the  key  to  understanding,  and  the  essence  of, 
the  rational  kernel  contained  in  Hegel's  mystical  inversion  of  dialectics. 
The  fundamental  contradiction  that  inherently  lies  in  Hegel's  work,  is  that  it  contains  both 
metaphysics  and  science  wrapped  together  in  an  idealist  account.  The  point  is  to  strip  it  of 
the  contradiction  between  the  metaphysical  content  and  form  that  Hegel  imposes  upon  the 
scientific  content  and  form.  It  is  by  doing  so  that  the  rational  kernel  can  be  revealed  and 
divorced  from  the  mystical  shell,  and  the  basis  for  understanding  how  that  idealist  and 
abstract  view  of  the  laws  of  motion  and  development  of  a  dialectical  totality  can  be  an  aid  to 
a  materialist  science,  finds  its  expression. 
This  is  the  core  content  of  the  rational  kernel  that  is  left  from  turning  Hegel's  dialectic 
upside  down;  the  systematic  materialist  result  of  this  inversion  was  the  application,  by 
Marx,  of  this  dialectical  method  to  the  political  economy  of  value.  What  the  relations  are 
between  these  two  processes  and  what  more  it  can  reveal  for  clarifying  the  dialectical 
enigma  of  the  relation  of  Hegel  and  Marx's  dialectic  is  now  the  subject  for  further 
investigation.  This  is  the  general  theme  of  part  two  of  the  thesis. 
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THE  GENERAL  FORM  OF  DIALECTIC. 
CHAPTER  SIX. 
OBJECTIVE  PROCESS  AND  THOUGHT. 
1.  Introduction. 
"Marx  was  and  is  the  only  one  who  could  undertake  the  work  of  extracting  from  the 
Hegelian  logic  the  nucleus  containing  Hegel's  real  discoveries  in  this  field,  and  of 
establishing  the  dialectical  method,  divested  of  its  idealist  wrappings,  in  the  simple 
form  in  which  it  becomes  the  only  correct  mode  of  conceptual  evolution.  The 
working  out  of  the  method  which  underlies  Marx's  critique  of  political  economy  is, 
we  think,  a  result  hardly  less  significant  than  the  basic  materialist  conception.  "" 
We  saw,  in  part  one  of  the  thesis,  that  Marx's  characterisation  of  Hegel's  logical  thought 
was  postulated  as  a  form  of  "alienated  science  thinking  itself.  "  A  central  thrust  of  the 
materialist  critique  of  this  estranged  and  alienated  account  of  scientific  method  by  Marx  was 
focussed  on  Hegel's  illusion  that  the  categories  were  the  source  of  the  movement  in  the  real 
world. 
That  the  movement  of  the  categories  is  not  the  real  act  of  production  does  not,  of  course, 
negate  that  the  categories  can  capture  that  real  movement  in  conceptual  thought;  all 
'  F.  Engels.  From  a  review  article  [Das  Volk,  no.  16,  August  20"  1859]  contained  in  K.  Marx.  A 
Contribution  to  the  Critique  of  Political  Economy.  Progress  Publishers.  (1977.  )  P.  224-225. 
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ontological  primacy  of  thought,  as  we  have  also  seen,  does  not,  for  Marx,  necessarily  entail 
the  rejection  of  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics,  only  their  speculative 
foundation  and  application. 
We  have  already  partially  addressed  the  nature  of  the  content  of  this  general  form  of  the 
Hegelian  dialectic;  this  we  elucidated  through  Marx's  critical  analysis,  and  inverted 
application,  of  the  Hegelian  principle  of  the  dialectic  of  negativity  to  the  category  of  labour. 
We  will,  though,  have  to  further  investigate  how  Hegel  mystifies  the  dialectical  method  that 
is  contained  in  his  account  of  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics. 
The  real  question,  for  an  understanding  of  the  materialist  critique  and  inversion,  is  what  are 
the  consequences  for  the  laws  of  dialectics,  the  core  elements  of  the  general  form  of 
working  of  the  Hegelian  dialectic,  when  they  are  grounded  in  social  and  natural  being,  as 
opposed  to  Hegel's  idealist  point  of  departure  and  systematic  logical  thought  totality?  Our 
spades  have,  then,  some  further  digging  to  do  in  order  to  provide  the  groundwork  for  the 
beginnings  of  a  fuller  answer  to  this  historical  legacy  and  problem  in  theoretical  thought. 
In  order  to  more  fully  comprehend  the  nature  of  Hegel's  logical  system,  then  the  following 
primary  constituents  have  to  be  viewed  as  being  of  paramount  importance  for  understanding 
the  dialectical  principles  underlying  the  analysis  of  the  Logic. 
The  relation  between  contradiction  as  the  primary  moving  principle  of  the  system,  the  meta- 
logical  principle  of  the  whole,  and  its  application  to  the  fundamental  characteristics, 
predications,  and  determinations  of  the  generic  analysis  of  substance.  These  interconnected 
constituents  provide  the  key  for  gaining  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  rational 
kernel  contained  in  the  general  form  of  working  of  the  dialectic. 
Both  are  fundamentally  interlinkcd  and  united  by  Hegel  in  the  process  whereby  substantial 
form  activity  is  interpreted,  in  its  universal  forras  of  predication,  as  the  product  of 
106 conceptual  and  logical  activity;  by  so  doing  it  becomes  a  logical  subject  and  the  product  of 
pure  thought. 
Substance  as  being-for-self,  as  subject,  is  what  ties  these  elements  of  the  Hegelian  analysis 
together  and  determines  the  self-reflexive  nature  and  reciprocal  relation  of  the  concepts  and 
categories  that  make  up  the  essential  elements  and  determinations  of  the  category  of 
substance.  This  ontological  category  is  the  product,  for  Hegel,  of  the  primacy  of  an  idealist 
logical  and  conceptual  ontology. 
2.  The  Logic  of  an  Idealist  Ontology. 
"The  tendency  of  all  man's  endeavours;  is  to  understand  the  world,  to  appropriate  and 
subdue  it  to  himself.  and  to  this  end  the  positive  reality  of  the  world  must  be  as  it 
were  crushed  and  pounded,  in  other  words,  idealised.  At  the  same  time  we  must  note 
that  it  is  not  the  mere  act  of  our  personal  self-consciousness  which  introduces  an 
absolute  unity  into  the  variety  of  sense.  Rather,  this  identity  is  itself  the  absolute.  "" 
philosophy,  for  Hegel,  is  a  "peculiar  mode  of  thinking.  "  It  is  a  mode  in  which  "thinking 
becomes  knowledge,  and  knowledge  through  notions.  "  The  rational  principle  behind  all 
substantial  being  is,  in  this  account,  conceptual  thought  as  the  sole  expression  of  the  essence 
of  the  universal  form.  Those  universal  forms  are  both  subjective  and  objective  in  their 
manifestation,  but  their  true  medium  lies  in  the  realm  of  mind,  where  they  find  their 
adequate  universal  expression  in  speculative  philosophical  thought. 
"It  will  be  shown  in  the  Logic  that  thought  (and  the  universal)  is  not  a  mere  opposite 
of  sense:  it  lets  nothing  escape  it,  but,  outflanking  its  other,  is  at  once  that  other  and 
itself.  "" 
68  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  Oxford  University  Press.  (O.  U.  P.  ).  (1975.  )  Paragraph  42.  z.  P.  69.  Here,  Hege 
is  reflecting  the  Aristotelian  position  expressed  in  the  opening  line  of  Aristotle's  Metaphysics.  "All  men  by 
nature  desire  to  know.  " 
61  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  20.  P.  31. 
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viewed  as  being  absolute  in  both  an  objective  and  subjective  sense.  Thought,  in  the  guise  of 
speculative  philosophical  logic,  then  becomes  its  own  form  and  content,  its  own  subject  and 
object,  whose  content  is  "the  entire  compass  of  abstraction",.  Hegel's  aim  is  to  consciously 
develop  and  systematise  this  idealist  form  of  "alienated  science"  contained  in  logical 
thought. 
Logic,  according  to  Hegel,  has,  since  Aristotle,  not  lost  any  ground.  However,  on  the  other 
hand  it  has  also  not  gained  any  ground  either.  The  conclusion  that  Hegel  draws  from  this  is 
that  it  is  surely  "all  the  more  in  need  of  a  total  reconstruction.  "  The  reason  for  this  necessity 
of  logical  rebuilding  is  that  the  evolution  of  philosophical  thought  has  itself  developed  as  an 
immanent  criticism  of  inherited  philosophical  and  logical  form. 
The  absolute  nature  of  logical  thought  has  now  revealed  and  manifested  itself,  for  Hegel,  as 
the  result  of  an  idealist  historical  process  of  spirit;  a  historical  process  that  is  in  fact  driven 
by  these  very  same  conceptual  and  logical  categories.  As  the  logical  and  systematic  totality 
of  the  speculative  notion,  in  the  form  of  universal  thought,  conceived  as  the  movement  of 
pure  reason.  The  product  and  result  of  which,  entails  that  the  universal  forms  of  the 
categories  of  thought  can  now  be  conceptually  articulated  and  universally  interconnected 
into  a  systematic  logical  whole. 
This  is  achieved  through  revealing  the  dynamic  manner  that  the  categories  both  particulatise 
and  individuate  themselves  into  a  systematic  logical  totality  covering  the  whole  realm  and 
content  of  philosophical  endeavour.  Hegel  expresses  this  historical  development  of  the 
philosophical  idea  in  the  following  form. 
108 "Spirit,  after  its  labours  over  two  thousand  years,  must  have  attained  to  a  higher 
consciousness  about  its  thinking  and  about  its  own  pure,  essential  nature.  "70 
The  problem  with  the  more  modern  accounts  of  philosophical  logic,  for  Hegel,  is  that,  not 
only  have  they  failed  to  theoretically  develop  the  fundamental  Aristotelian  heritage,  they 
have  also  been  infected  with  a  methodology  that  is  largely  borrowed  from  the  empirical 
sciences  and  mathematics.  However,  these  methodological  forms  are  in  large  part 
responsible  for  what  Hegel  calls  the  "abstract  identity"  that  marks  these  conceptually  fixed, 
and  at  the  same  time,  contingently  and  externally  related  categories  of  logic. 
The  solution  to  these  ossified  logical  forms  lies  in  a  method  that  can  breathe  life  back  into 
the  petrified  categories.  What  the  logical  science  aims  to  capture  is  the  systematic 
integration,  development,  and  interconnections  of  the  categories  and  universal  forms  of 
logical  thought. 
"Before  these  dead  bones  of  logic  can  be  quickened  by  spirit,  and  so  become 
possessed  of  a  substantial,  significant  content,  its  method  must  be  that  which  alone 
can  enable  it  to  be  a  pure  science.  "" 
Logic  had  become  sterile  and  lifeless  for  Hegel;  it  lacked  a  principle  of  movement  and 
change  that  could  universally  integrate  the  logical  categories  in  their  necessary  predications 
and  relations.  The  problem  with  this  fossilised  view  of  the  logical  categories  is  that  the 
70  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  M.  Human  historical,  social, 
scientific,  and  religious  development,  the  evolution  of  spirit,  to  put  it  in  Hegel's  terms,  have  posed  the  need 
for  the  reconstruction  of  logic  in  a  higher  form;  a  form  that  is  more  in  accord  with  these  historical  advances  of 
spirit.  The  development  of  Christianity,  combined  with  the  principle  of  individuality  that  distinguishes  the 
bourgeois  rational  enlightenment  outlook,  mark  the  turning  point  and  the  fulcrum  of  "the  world  revolution"  in 
thought  for  Hegel.  Those  twin  interrelated  developments,  embodied  in  Lutheran  protestantism  and  bourgeois 
philosophical  and  political  thought,  characterise  the  essential  difference  and  development  that  fundamentally 
marks  off  the  modem  viewpoint  from  the  ancient  and  medieval  in  Hegel's  historical  analysis  of  spirit. 
71  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  53. 
109 "determinations  are  accepted  in  their  unmoved  fixity  and  are  brought  only  into  an  external 
relation  with  each  other.  "72 
In  order  to  develop  this  system  of  logical  thought  it  is  however  necessary,  according  to 
Hegel,  to  outline  the  methodological  principle  of  activity  that  both  enables  and  shows  how 
the  categories  universally  interconnect  and  develop  in  their  systemic  relations.  At  the  same 
time,  for  Hegel,  the  understanding  of  the  dynamics  inherent  in  this  universal  interconnection 
will  also  allow  the  logical  thought  process  "to  ascertain  both  the  systematic  connection  of 
these  forms  and  their  value.  " 
Logic,  for  Hegel,  is  the  study  of  the  form  and  content  of  thought,  in  the  realm  of  pure 
thought;  it  is  the  analysis  and  relation  "of  the  pure  thought-forms"  through  the  systematic 
construction  of  the  categories  of  thought.  The  aim  of  the  logical  reconstruction  is  to 
integrate  the  logical  categories  with  the  ontological;  by  doing  so  he  aims  to 
comprehensively  unify  logic  and  metaphysics  through  the  analysis  of  the  nature  and  source 
of  all  being,  namely  universal  thought.  73 
To  pose  this  idealist  solution  of  Hegel  in  an  alternative  form.  Logic  and  metaphysics  have  to 
be  synthesised  and  shown  to  be  the  product  of  absolute  speculative  thought,  as  their 
common  universal  foundation.  Accordingly,  as  the  activity  of  thought,  viewed  in  this 
speculative  philosophical  manner,  "may  be  termed  Objective  Thoughts",  the  following 
consequence  ensues  for  Hegel. 
12  This  characterisation  is  at  the  core  of  Hegel's  critique  of  the  logical  foundations  of  the  metaphysics 
of  what  he  calls  the  "abstract  understanding.  "  This  difference  will  ftirther  manifest  itself,  later  in  the  thesis,  in 
Hegel's  critical  account  of  the  scientific  method  and  nomological  activity  that  this  form  of  thought  generates. 
73  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  24.  P.  36.  Hegel's  Italics.  In  the  Zusatz  to  this 
paragraph,  (P.  39.  ),  Hegel  states  the  following:  "If  in  pursuance  of  the  foregoing  remarks  we  consider  Logic  to 
be  the  system  of  the  pure  types  of  thought,  we  find  that  the  other  philosophical  sciences,  the  Philosophy  of 
Nature  and  the  Philosophy  of  Mind,  take  the  place,  as  it  were,  of  an  Applied  Logic,  and  that  Logic  is  the  soul 
which  animates  them  both.  Their  problem  in  that  case  is  only  to  recognise  the  logical  forms  under  the  shapes 
they  assume  in  Nature  and  Mind  -  shapes  which  are  only  a  particular  mode  of  expression  for  the  forms  of  pure 
thought.  "  The  dialectic  of  nature  and  mind  are  the  contrary  species  or  specific  difference  of  a  common  genus, 
namely  logic.  The  common  universal  content  takes  on  a  twofold  contrariety  of  form. 
110 "Logic  therefore  coincides  with  Metaphysics,  the  science  of  things  set  and  held  in 
thoughts  -  thoughts  accredited  able  to  express  the  essential  reality  of  things.  "' 
That  "essential  reality  of  things"  is  developed  through  the  generic  ontological  category  of 
substance.  In  the  Hegelian  logic  of  ontology,  the  primary  ontological  category  of  "being", 
through  the  dynamic  development  of  its  own  internal  categorial  contradictions,  makes  a 
transition  into  its  higher  form,  as  essence  and  as  substance.  As  substance  is  viewed  as  the 
generic  form  of  all  being,  then  the  question  of  what  is  being  is  for  Hegel,  like  Aristotle 
before  him,  the  question  of  what  is  substance. 
"This  being  is  substance;  as  the  final  unity  of  essence  and  being  it  is  the  being  in  all 
being;  it  is  neither  the  unreflected  immediate,  nor  an  abstract  being  standing  behind 
Existence  and  Appearance,  but  it  is  immediate  actuality  itself  and  this  as  absolute 
reflectedness-into-self,  as  a  subsisting  in  and  for  itself.  "" 
Philosophical  essentialism  seeks  to  determine  the  adequate  conceptual  forms  and  categories 
that  determine  the  ontological  relations  that  are  inherently  contained  in  the  category  of 
substance.  By  doing  so  it  aims  to  rationally  understand  substance  as  the  generic  type  of  all 
being  in  its  generalised  ontological  categories  and  determinate  forms  of  activities  and 
relations  - 
This  process  will  prove  to  be  inherently  dialectical  as  the  categories  and  qualities,  necessary 
to  understand  the  processes  contained  in  substantial  movement,  are  the  direct  expression  of 
the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  contained  within  the  category  of  substance.  This 
ontological  development  of  the  primacy  of  substance  is  the  dynamic  that  unites  and 
individuates  the  polar  determinations  inherent  within  its  necessary  forms  of  ontological 
predication;  these,  in  turn,  provide  the  source  for  cognising  the  principle  of  change  and 
alteration  contained  in  all  substantial  form  activity. 
I  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  24.  P.  36. 
75  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  555. 
ill Substantial  essence  is  the  kind  as  kind,  the  universal  form  particularising  itself  in  its 
necessary  specificity  and  individuation.  That  universal  form  particularising  and 
individuating  itself  is  the  product  of  the  activity  of  logical  thought;  it  is  the  product  of  mind 
and  spirit  in  their  absolute  conceptual  form.  This  universal  form  is  only  truly  captured  in  the 
medium  of  philosophical  logic. 
"The  universal  does  not  exist  externally  to  the  outward  eye  as  a  universal.  The  kind 
as  kind  cannot  be  perceived:  the  laws  of  the  celestial  motions  are  not  written  on  the 
sky.  The  universal  is  neither  seen  nor  heard,  its  existence  is  only  for  the  mind. 
Religion  leads  us  to  a  universal,  which  embraces  all  else  within  itself,  to  an  Absolute 
by  which  all  else  is  brought  into  being:  and  this  Absolute  is  an  object  not  of  the 
senses  but  of  the  mind  and  thought.  "76 
This  rational  universal,  "which  cannot  be  apprehended  by  the  senses",  and  whose  inherent 
medium  lies  in  the  realm  of  conceptual  thought,  nevertheless,  "contains  the  value  of  the 
thing  -  is  the  essential,  inward,  and  true.  "  Thought,  in  this  essentialist  and  idealist  account, 
is  "the  constitutive  substance  of  external  things.  " 
That  essential  reality  of  things,  the  universal  form  of  all  substantial  being,  is  ontologically 
grounded  in  conceptual  and  universal  thought.  The  genesis  and  unfolding  of  this  substantial 
being  is,  for  Hegel,  the  product  of  the  concept  or  the  notion.  The  potentiality  of  the  form 
"I  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  21z.  P.  34.  Thought,  in  its  pure  logical  form 
becomes  its  own  form  and  content,  its  own  subject  and  object,  whose  facts  are  the  generic  logical  and 
ontological  categories.  These  are  the  facts  and  content  of  thought,  their  universal  form  is  the  methodological 
and  systematic  order  that  they  take.  "For  in  point  of  contents,  thought  is  only  true  in  proportion  as  it  sinks 
itself  in  the  facts;  and  in  point  of  form  it  is  no  private  or  particular  state  or  act  of  the  subject,  but  rather  that 
attitude  of  consciousness  where  the  abstract  self,  freed  from  all  the  special  limitations  to  which  its  ordinary 
states  or  qualities  are  liable,  restricts  itself  to  that  universal  action  in  which  it  is  identical  with  all  individuals. 
In  these  circumstances  philosophy  may  be  acquitted  of  the  charge  of  pride.  And  when  Aristotle  summons  the 
mind  to  rise  to  the  dignity  of  that  attitude,  the  dignity  he  seeks  is  won  by  letting  slip  all  our  individual  opinions 
and  prejudices,  and  submitting  to  the  sway  of  the  fact.  "  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  23z. 
P.  36. 
112 activity  actualising  itself  through  superseding  its  determinate  negation  or  privation  is  the 
teleological  activity  of  substance  as  a  conceptual  subject. 
"In  the  living  organism,  on  the  contrary,  the  final  cause  is  a  moulding  principle  and 
an  energy  immanent  in  the  matter,  and  every  member  is  in  its  turn  a  means  as  well  as 
an  end  The  principle  of  inward  adaptation  or  design,  had  it  been  kept  to  and 
carried  out  in  scientific  application,  would  have  led  to  a  different  and  higher  method 
of  observing  nature.  "" 
The  genealogy  of  the  logical  concepts  is  elucidated  and  developed  through  the  genesis  of 
substance,  and  the  genesis  of  substance  is  the  Notion  for  Hegel.  Substance,  as  the  product  of 
universal  conceptual  thought  becomes  subject;  this  it  does  in  the  actualising  of  the 
conceptual  necessity  that  is inherent  in  the  form  activity. 
"Still,  in  the  sense  in  which  Aristotle,  too,  defines  Nature  as  purposive  activity, 
purpose  is  what  is  immediate  and  at  rest,  the  unmoved  which  is  also  setf-moving, 
and  as  such  is  Subject.  Its  power  to  move,  taken  abstractly,  is  being-for-seVor  pure 
negativity.  "" 
The  idealist  account  of  substance  as  subject  entails  that  it  is  a  being-for-self  that  has  a  telos, 
a  final  cause.  The  architectonic  inherent  in  substance  is  located  in  the  expression  of  the 
development  towards  its  final  and  end  form,  its  telos  or  goal.  The  dynamic  behind  that 
architectonic  is  the  positing  and  resolving  of  the  contradictions,  the  "pure  negativity", 
pertaining  to  its  specific  nature. 
I  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraphs  57/58.  P.  89-90. 
78  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Preface.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  Paragraph  22.  P.  12. 
113 This  is  the  source  of  its  activity  contained  in  its  concept  or  notion,  and  its  essence  as  form 
activity  and  subject.  These  are  the  core  elements  of  the  dynamics  contained  in  the  logic  of 
ontology  as  objective  logic,  as  the  logic  of  being  as  substance.  " 
How  though,  does  Hegel  go  about  developing  this  "total  reconstruction"  of  logical  thought 
from  the  logical  foundations  inherited  from  Aristotle?  This  generic  aspect  of  being  is 
analysed  in  its  fundamental  categories,  concepts,  -  and  relations,  from  their  abstract  simple 
relations  such  as  quality,  determinate  being,  being  for  self,  to  their  more  complex  forms  of 
determinations  that  are  necessary  for  developing  a  systematically  coherent  and  rational 
account  of  this  universal  presentation  of  all  being. 
In  Hegel's  idealism,  the  dialectical  method  is  both  universal  in  form  and  substance,  and  the 
evolution  of  the  categories  contained  in  the  objective  logic,  the  substantial  ontological 
content,  represent  the  genesis  and  the  conceptual  unfolding  of  the  universal  notion.  This,  in 
turn,  gives  the  categories,  concepts,  and  relations  their  concrete  meaning,  function,  and 
place  in  the  analysis  of  a  universally  interconnected  whole,  which  is  exhibited  in  the 
determinate  expressions  of  its  specific  differences  and  individuating  forms. 
By  reconstructing  a  logical  totality  of  conceptual  thought  he,  at  the  same  time,  outlines  the 
rational  elements  of  a  dialectical  methodology,  but  envelops  that  method  in  a  mystical  guise, 
in  the  form  of  an  "alienated  science"  generated  by  the  contemplative  philosopher  and 
conceived  as  the  dialectical  fusion  of  logic  and  metaphysics. 
"Hegel's  teleological  view  of  substance  is  also  then  derived  from  his  ancient  Greek  predecessor, 
Aristotle.  "Aristotle's  definition  of  life  virtually  implies  inner  design,  and  is  thus  far  in  advance  of  the  notion 
of  design  in  modem  Teleology,  which  had  in  view  finite  and  outward  design  only.  "  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic. 
Paragraph  205.  P.  269.  In  The  Philosophical  Propaedeutic.  Blackwell.  (1986.  )  P.  103.  Hegel  describes  the  end 
or  the  teleological  concept  in  the  following  form.  "There  is  Internal  Purposiveness  when  an  existence  has  its 
concept  within  itself  and  at  the  same  time  is  end,  means  and  self-realising  and  realised  End  in  its  own  self.  " 
114 Hegel's  Dialectical  Method. 
"On  the  other  hand,  the  investigation  of  the  forms  of  thought,  the  thought 
determinations,  is  very  profitable  and  necessary,  and  since  Aristotle  this  has  been 
systematically  undertaken  only  by  Hegel.  "'o 
Thepethod,  for  Hegel,  is  the  universal  element  of  the  form  that  the  categorial  content  of  the 
logic  takes.  What  ties  the  method  and  form  to  the  content  is  that  the  inner  self-movement  of 
the  categorial  content  of  the  logic  is  gleaned  through  the  activities  and  relations  of  the 
interconnected  and  universal  form  activity  of  the  ontological  categories. 
"However,  the  exposition  of  what  alone  can  be  the  true  method  of  philosophical 
science  falls  within  the  treatment  of  logic  itself;  for  the  method  is  the  consciousness 
of  the  form  of  the  inner  self-movement  of  the  content  of  logic.  "" 
As  a  result  of  this  idealist  form  of  ontological  primacy,  the  categories  of  thought,  as  Hegel 
tells  us,  have  to  be  studied  "in  their  essential  nature  and  complete  development"  in  order  to 
delineate  their  inherent  limitations,  internal  contradictions,  and  necessary  relations.  This 
"inner  self-movement"  is  the  source  of  the  contradiction  contained  within  the  logical 
categories.  As  such,  the  categories  evince  their  own  specific  forms  of  dialectical 
contradictions  and  relations. 
"So  that  what  we  want  is  to  combine  in  our  process  of  inquiry  the  action  of  the  forms 
of  thought  with  a  criticism  of  them.  The  forms  of  thought  must  be  studied  in  their 
essential  nature  and  complete  development:  they  are  at  once  the  object  of  research 
and  the  action  of  that  object.  Hence  they  examine  themselves:  in  their  own  action 
they  must  determine  their  limits,  and  point  out  their  defects.  This  is  that  action  of 
thought,  which  will  hereafter  be  specially  considered  under  the  name  of  Dialectic, 
81  F.  Engels.  Dialectics  of  Nature.  Progress  Publishers.  (1982.  )  P.  240. 
81  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  I.,  ogic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  53. 
115 and  regarding  which  we  need  only  at  the  outset  observe  that,  instead  of  being 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  categories  from  without,  it  is  immanent  in  their  own 
ac  ion. 
"82 
The  categories  themselves  are  the  outcome  of  dialectical  relations,  they  contain  opposed 
determinations,  and,  at  the  same  time,  they  are  universally  interconnected  and 
architectonically  developed  from  the  abstract  simple  to  the  more  complex  concrete 
categories  that  can  explain  their  movement  into  a  systematic  totality. 
The  logical  subject  becomes  a  totality  by  positing  and  resolving  the  specific  difference  of 
the  contradiction  pertaining  to  the  evolving  and  interrelated  categorial  and  conceptual 
relations  that,  at  each  subsequent  and  ongoing  level  of  ontological  development,  makes  it 
into  a  determinate  whole. 
The  need  to  develop  a  universal  systematic  relation  of  the  logical  categories  also  entails  that 
there  has  to  be  also  a  universal  method  for  interconnecting  the  parts  of  the  logic  with  the 
whole.  What  is  required  is  a  dialectical  method  for  developing  the  necessary  connections 
between  the  logical  forms  and  relations  of  the  content  of  the  categories. 
That  connection  is  provided  through  the  motor  force  of  polarity  and  contradiction  that 
universally  interconnects  the  primary  concepts  and  categories  in  their  necessary  relations. 
This  process  of  the  systematic  movement  and  development,  the  positing  and  resolving  of  the 
contradiction  of  the  logical  subject  in  all  its  evolving  categorial  and  conceptual  relations,  is 
essential  in  understanding  the  general  form  of  working  of  the  Hegelian  dialectic,  and  the  key 
rational  element  of  its  operation. 
"All  that  is  necessary  to  achieve  scientific  progress  -  and  it  is  essential  to  strive  to 
gain  this  quite  simple  insight  -  is  the  recognition  of  the  logical  principle  that  the 
negative  is  just  as  much  positive,  or  that  what  is  self-contradictory  does  not  resolve 
81  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  41z.  P.  66. 
116 itself  into  a  nullity,  into  abstract  nothingness,  but  essentially  only  into  the  negation 
of  its  particular  content,  in  other  words,  that  such  a  negation  is  not  all  and  every 
negation  but  the  negation  of  a  specific  subject  matter  which  resolves  itself,  and 
consequently  is  a  specific  negation,  and  therefore  the  result  essentially  contains  that 
from  which  it  results;  which  strictly  speaking  is  a  tautology,  for  otherwise  it  would 
be  an  immediacy,  not  a  result.  Because  the  result,  the  negation,  is  a  specij7c  negation 
it  has  a  content.  It  is  a  fresh  Notion  but  higher  and  richer  than  its  predecessor;  for  it 
is  richer  by  the  negation  or  opposite  of  the  latter,  therefore  contains  it,  but  also 
something  more,  and  is  the  unity  of  itself  and  its  opposite.  It  is  in  this  way  that  the 
system  of  Notions  as  such  has  to  be  formed  -  and  has  to  complete  itself  in  a  purely 
continuous  course  in  which  nothing  extraneous  is  introduced.  "83 
This  driving  contradiction,  where  the  contradiction  is  both  posited  in  its  positive  and 
negative  forms,  and  then  resolved  and  sublated  in  the  higher  form  that  unites  them,  is 
inherent  in  the  entire  compass  of  Hegel's  logical  abstractions.  It  is  through  the  development 
of  this  dynamic  contained  in  a  theoretical  totality  that  the  method  gains  its  adequate 
expression  as  the  conceptual  evolution  and  activity  of  the  substantial  self-moving  whole. 
The  central  nature  of  contradiction  has  then  to  manifest  its  activity  in  Hegel's  general 
application  of  it  to  the  conceptual  development  and  categories  of  the  Logic;  it  could  not  do 
otherwise.  The  forms  and  categories  of  thought  exhibit  this  deficiency  and  contradiction  as 
an  immanent  element  in  their  own  relational  activity. 
What  Hegel  has  contributed  to  thought,  and  this  is  no  small  achievement,  is  the  conscious 
and  systematic  ordering  of  the  basic  ontological  categories  into  a  coherent  logical  whole, 
with  the  principle  of  movement  and  change,  namely  posited  and  resolved  contradiction,  as 
the  dynamic  expression  underpinning  the  laws  of  motion  of  categorial  and  conceptual 
thought.  This  principle  is  the  foundation  for  their  universal  interconnection,  and  the  force 
for  elevating  the  logical  and  metaphysical  into  a  systematic  methodology. 
93  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  54. 
117 "This  movement  of  pure  essences  constitutes  the  nature  of  scientific  method  in 
general.  Regarded  as  the  connectedness  of  their  content  it  is  the  necessary  expansion 
of  that  content  into  an  organic  whole.  "" 
The  principle  of  contradiction,  as  the  motor  force  behind  the  process  of  movement  and 
change,  is dynamically  fused  with  the  logical  relations  of  the  substantial  categories.  The  aim 
of  this  synthesis  is  to  develop  the  conceptual  evolution  of  an  ontological  whole  of  categorial 
thought  terms  in  and  through  their  necessary  relations  and  inner  connections. 
It  is  through  developing  these  twin  primary  generic  principles  and  categories  of  substance 
and  contradiction  that  Hegel  reconstructs  the  logic  as  a  conceptual  totality  and  develops  the 
conceptual  framework  and  method  for  capturing  the  "consciousness  of  the  form  of  the  inner 
self-movement  of  the  content.  " 
This  elevation,  by  Hegel,  of  contradiction  into  a  meta-logical  principle  of  the  system  is  the 
key  then,  to  both  the  fuller  understanding  of  the  conceptual  framework  of  substance,  and 
how  that  generic  and  universal  determination  of  being  particularises  and  determines  itself 
through  its  individuation.  This  twofold  dynamic  is  also  then,  the  key  to  understanding  how 
Hegel  both  inherits,  develops,  and  systematises  philosophy  from  that  inherited  Aristotelian 
perspective.  85 
The  outlining  of  the  method  is,  at  the  same  time,  also  the  outlining  of  the  ontological 
categories,  predicates,  and  relations,  that  are  involved  in  the  construction  of  a  logical  and 
systematic  whole;  substantial  ontology  becomes  a  form  of  logical  necessity.  This  is  why  the 
84  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  Preface.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  Paragraph  34.  P.  20. 
85  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  History  of  Philosophy.  Volume  2.  Kegan  Paul.  (1894.  )  P.  140.  "The  principle  of 
individualisation,  not  in  the  sense  of  a  casual  and  merely  particular  subjectivity,  but  in  that  of  pure 
subjectivity,  is  peculiar  to  Aristotle.  Aristotle  thus  also  makes  the  Good,  as  the  universal  end,  the  substantial 
foundation,  and  maintains  this  position  against  Heraclitus  and  the  Eleatics.  The  Becoming  of  Heraclitus  is  a 
true  and  real  determination,  but  change  yet  lacks  the  determination  of  identity  with  itself,  the  constancy  of  the 
universal.  The  stream  is  ever  changing,  yet  it  is  nevertheless  the  same,  and  is  really  a  universal  existence.  " 
118 method  is  consequently  described  by  him  as  "nothing  but  the  structure  set  forth  in  its  pure 
essentiality.  " 
Hegel's  uniting  of  logic  and  ontology,  develops  the  general  laws  of  motion  that  are 
dialectically  contained  in  the  reciprocal  and  evolving  predicates  and  relations  expressed  in 
the  polarities  that  make  up  the  category  of  substance.  As  they  are  expressions  of 
fundamental  ontological  characteristics,  the  contradiction  then  is  expressed  in  all  the 
categories  and  conceptual  forms  of  determinate  being. 
4.  Method  as  Evolution  of  the  Whole. 
"The  True  is  the  whole.  But  the  Whole  is  nothing  other  than  the  essence 
consummating  itself  through  its  development.  Of  the  Absolute  it  must  be  said  that  it 
is  essentially  a  result,  that  only  in  the  end  is  it  what  it  truly  is;  and  that  precisely  in 
this  constitutes  its  nature,  viz.  to  be  actual,  subject,  the  spontaneous  becoming  of 
itself.  "" 
Dialectical  method,  according  to  Hegel,  is  expressed  in  the  evolution  of  the  whole;  the 
evolution  of  the  whole  is,  for  him,  the  movement  of  the  notion  itself.  The  method  is  then,  to 
surnmarise  the  analysis  so  far,  the  universal  element  of  the  form  of  the  logical  content, 
encapsulated  in  the  dialectical  movement  and  interconnecting  systematisation  of  the 
categories. 
The  aim  of  Hegel's  idealist  orientation  is  that  of  logically  developing  a  conceptual  and 
dialectical  totality  based  on  the  emergent  movement  of  the  categories  of  thought;  that  is, 
each  of  the  categories  are  shown  to  contain  their  own  polar  forms  of  opposition  that  are  both 
mutually  reciprocal  and  at  the  same  time  mutually  exclusive.  The  inherent  logical  dynamic 
contained  in  them  shows  their  dialectical  resolution  and  fusion  into  a  more  evolved  and 
higher  developed  categorial  and  ontological  concept. 
119 This  dialectical  evolution  of  the  categories,  from  their  primary  to  their  higher  evolving 
forms  finds  its  resolution  when  the  categories  are  integrated  into  a  systematic  whole  that 
now  contains  and  exhibits  a  systematic  principle  of  change  and  alteration,  namely,  the 
positing  and  resolving  of  a  determinate  totality  of  contradiction. 
The  laws  of  motion  of  the  subject  are,  in  consequence,  based  upon  how,  to  put  it  in  Hegel's 
terms,  it  mediates  itself  with  itself  through  its  negativity.  The  polar  difference  is  both 
sublated  and  retained  as  the  specific  difference  of  the  universal,  as  the  conceptual  source  of 
the  dynamics  of  the  whole  movement  and  process.  The  identity  is  itself  the  expression  of  the 
contradiction  contained  in  the  conceptual  and  substantial  essence  of  the  subject. 
The  "genesis  of  substance  is  the  notion"  for  Hegel,  and  the  conceptual  evolution  of  the 
notion  that  has  gained  this  absolute  form,  the  concept  of  the  concept  contained  in  all  being, 
is  its  true  being  revealed  to  itself.  For  Hegel,  the  method  has  emerged  as  the  "setf-knowing 
Notion  that  has  itseýV,  as  the  absolute,  both  subjective  and  objective,  for  its  subject  matter.  " 
The  content  of  that  whole  has  been  gleaned  through  the  subjectivity  of  the  notion,  its  real 
and  ideal  source;  the  concepts  and  ontological  categories  of  which  are  manifested  in 
objective  and  substantial  being  that  are  idealistically  sublated  as  the  product  of  the  evolution 
of  the  general  form  of  working  of  the  conceptual  categories  of  the  genesis  of  substance, 
namely  the  notion. 
"Further,  the  living  Substance  is  being  which  is  in  truth  Subject,  or,  what  is  the  same, 
is  in  truth  actual  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  movement  of  positing  itself,  or  is  the 
mediation  of  its  self-othering  with  itself.  This  Substance  is,  as  Subject,  pure  simple 
negativity,  and  is  for  this  very  reason  the  bifurcation  of  the  simple;  it  is  the  doubling 
which  sets  up  opposition,  and  then  again  the  negation  of  this  indifferent  diversity 
and  of  its  antithesis  [the  immediate  simplicity].  Only  this  self-restoring  sameness,  or 
"  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Preface.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  Paragraph  20.  P.  11. 
120 this  reflection  in  otherness  within  itself  -  not  an  original  or  immediate  unity  as  such 
-  is  the  True.  It  is  the  process  of  its  own  becoming,  the  circle  that  presupposes  its 
end  as  its  goal,  having  its  end  also  as  its  beginning;  and  only  by  being  worked  out  to 
its  end,  is  it  actual.  "" 
That  is,  substance  realises  itself  as  a  logical  subject  through  its  essential  conceptual  or 
teleological  activity.  At  the  same  time,  mind  or  spirit  realises  and  actualises  its  autonomy 
and  real  nature,  its  being-for-self  as  a  logical  subject.  This  absolute,  methodological  and 
logical  subject  unites,  in  a  single  identity  for  the  idealist,  the  subjective  and  objective 
aspects  of  cognition  and  the  objective  world. 
The  method  here  is  not  merely,  as  in  Kant,  an  instrument  and  means  of  knowledge,  it  is,  for 
Hegel,  knowledge  of  itself  as  the  essence  of  all  cognitive  and  objective  activity.  The  method 
is  the  "instrument  and  means  of  the  cognising  activity,  distinguished  from  that  activity,  but 
only  as  the  activities  own  essentiality.  "  The  method  has  now  emerged  as  rational  thought 
conscious  of  itself  in  its  highest  methodological  and  theoretical  form  of  activity. 
Accordingly,  this  idealist  account  entails  for  Hegel  that  science  itself  only  really  "exists  only 
in  the  self-movement  of  the  Notion.  "  Its  mystical  absolute  form  and  mode  of  expression,  as 
an  idealist  philosophy  of  science,  fetishises  the  method  itself.  This  is  yet  another  reason  why 
Marx  describes  his  thought  as  a  form  of  "alienated  science  thinking  itself.  " 
As  the  universal  form  and  method  that  generates  both  nature  as  objectivity  and  spirit  as  the 
cognitive  truth  of  the  substantial  process.  This  twofold  form  and  mode  of  a  common  unity 
and  content  is  expressed  in  the  dialectic  of  objective  and  subjective  logic.  This  bifurcation 
87  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Preface.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  Paragraph  18.  P.  10.  Hegel  also 
stresses  that  this  fundamental  polar  difference  between  nature  and  mind  is  not  only  the  expression  of  the  unity 
and  identity  of  their  common  content  the  Logical  Idea,  but  also  the  expression  of  the  necessary  difference  of 
the  division  and  contradiction  contained  within  it.  Without  the  polarity  and  contradiction  there  is  no 
movement  and  no  idealist  resolution  that  sublates  that  necessary  twofold  dynamic.  Without  the  common 
identity,  and  this  is  fundamental  for  a  dialectical  account,  there  is  no  specific  difference  and  movement;  there 
is  no  necessary  connection  between  the  two  poles. 
121 of  the  universal  method  is  reflected  in  both  the  dialectic  of  cognition,  and  in  the  analysis  of 
the  conceptual  necessity  of  substantial  form  activity. 
"The  method  is  therefore  to  be  recognised  as  the  unrestrictedly  universal,  internal 
and  external  mode;  and  as  the  absolutely  infinite  force,  to  which  no  object; 
presenting  itself  as  something  external,  remote  from  and  independent  of  reason, 
could  offer  resistance  or  be  of  a  particular  nature  in  opposition  to  it,  or  could  not  be 
penetrated  by  it.  It  is  therefore  soul  and  substance,  and  anything  whatever  is 
comprehended  and  known  in  its  truth  only  when  it  is  completely  subjugated  to  the 
method;  it  is  the  method  proper  to  every  subject  matter  because  its  activity  is  the 
Notion.  This  is  also  the  truer  meaning  of  its  universality:  according  to  the 
universality  of  reflection  it  is  regarded  merely  as  the  method  for  everything;  but 
according  to  the  universality  of  the  Idea,  it  is  both  the  manner  peculiar  to  cognition, 
to  the  subjectively  self-knowing  Notion,  and  also  the  objective  manner,  or  rather  the 
substantiality  of  things  -  that  is  of  Notions,  in  so  far  as  they  appear  primarily  to 
representation  and  reflection  as  others.  " 
The  result  of  the  relation  between  thought  and  being  is  cognitively  united  in  the  general 
form  of  working  of  dialectic  applied  to  the  primary  category  of  substance;  as  the  generic 
ontological  basis  for  the  analysis  of  all  being  and  activity.  The  method  of  cognition 
expresses  the  objective  general  manner  of  substance  in  its  categories,  concepts,  and  relations 
via  the  opposite  forms  of  motion  contained  in  the  analytic  and  synthetic  aspects  of  the 
cognitive  method  that  expresses  the  interconnected  evolution  of  the  categories  into  a 
systematic  whole. 
Method  is  then  on  this  account  consciousness  of  the  notion  in  this  its  universal  form,  a  form 
that  is  determined  in  and  for  itself.  Subject,  object,  and  method  are  posited  as  the  one 
identical  notion,  as  the  absolute.  The  method  is  then,  idealistically  construed  as  the  notion  of 
88  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  826. 
122 the  notion,  or  the  concept  of  the  concept;  alternatively,  it  is  logical  thought  in  the  form  of 
pure  and  absolute  reason,  as  a  form  of  "alienated  science  thinking  itself.  " 
Hegel  in  the  above  quote  reflects,  albeit  in  an  idealistic  form  that  sublates  the  polar 
difference  as  an  absolute  subject,  the  materialist  separation  of  the  cognitive  (subjective)  and 
the  substantial  (objective)  forms  of  dialectic.  What  he  is  also  telling  us  here,  which  is  of 
special  interest  for  the  investigation  of  the  thesis,  is  that  the  method  is  itself  the  expression 
of  the  general  form  of  working  of  dialectic,  applied  here  respectively  to  both  cognition  and 
objective  substantiality.  A  position  that  is  both  inverted  but  at  the  same  time  reflected,  in  the 
materialist  critique  of  Marx  and  Engels. 
The  Materialist  Critique. 
The  materialist  critique  of  this  idealist  account  of  the  identity  of  objectivity  and  subjectivity, 
is  that  the  ontological  primacy  and  grounding  lies  in  objective  materiality,  this  separates  the 
direct  unity  and  identity  of  thought  and  being  expressed  in  Hegel's  idealism.  The  idealist 
presuppositions  inherent  in  the  identity  of  thinking  and  being  in  Hegel  is  expressed  by 
Engels  in  the  following  form. 
"With  Hegel,  for  example,  its  affirmation  is  self-evident;  for  what  we  cognise  in  the 
real  world  is  precisely  its  thought-content  -  that  which  makes  the  world  a  gradual 
realisation  of  the  absolute  idea,  which  absolute  idea  has  existed  somewhere  from 
eternity,  independent,  of  the  world  and  before  the  world.  But  it  is  manifest  without 
further  proof  that  thought  can  know  a  content  which  is  from  the  outset  a  thought- 
content.  It  is  equally  manifest  that  what  is  to  be  proved  here  is  already  tacitly 
contained  in  the  premises.  "" 
The  separation  and  difference  of  the  contrary  poles  is  the  result  in  Hegel's  view  of  their 
direct  identity.  That  direct  identity  lies  within  their  common  content  and  source  logical 
123 thought,  as  an  idealist  sublation  of  the  polarity  of  objectivity  and  cognition  speculatively 
hypostasised  as  the  activity  of  the  notion  or  absolute  idea. 
The  target  of  dialectical  analysis  for  the  materialist  inversion  and  its  true  source  was  now 
the  real  world,  real  nature,  and  real  society,  not  the  philosophical  and  theosophical  view  of 
reason  as  absolute  and  divine.  Here,  in  the  following  passage,  we  have  Engels  own 
expression  and  variation  on  Marx's  theme  of  the  materialist  inversion  of  Hegel. 
"This  ideological  perversion  had  to  be  done  away  with.  We  comprehended  the 
concepts  in  our  heads  once  more  materialistically  as  images  [Abbilder]  or  real  things 
instead  of  regarding  the  real  things  as  images  of  this  or  that  stage  of  the  absolute 
concept.  Thus  dialectics  reduced  itself  to  the  science  of  the  general  laws  of  motion, 
both  of  the  external  world  and  of  human  thought  -  two  sets  of  laws  which  are 
identical  in  substance,  but  different  in  their  expression  in  so  far  as  the  human  mind 
can  apply  them  consciously,  while  in  nature  and  also  up  to  now  for  the  most  part  in 
human  history,  these  laws  exert  themselves  unconsciously,  in  the  form  of  external 
necessity,  in  the  midst  of  an  endless  series  of  seeming  accidents.  Thereby  the 
dialectic  of  concepts  itself  became  merely  the  conscious  reflex  of  the  dialectical 
motion  of  the  real  world  and  thus  the  dialectic  of  Hegel  was  placed  upon  its  head;  or 
rather,  turned  off  its  head,  on  which  it  was  standing,  and  placed  upon  its  feet.  "' 
The  question  is  what  is  the  nature  of  the  relation  of  these  two  sets  of  laws  for  the  materialist, 
the  natural  and  the  cognitive,  which  for  Engels  are  "identical  in  substance,  but  different  in 
their  expression"?  There  is,  at  the  bottom  of  this  proposition  of  Engels,  a  presupposition 
entailed.  This  presupposition,  inherent  to  a  monistic  account,  is  manifested,  but  in  their 
inverted  forms,  in  both  its  idealist  and  realist  forms  of  expression. 
"  F.  Engels.  Marx-Engels.  Selected  Works.  Volutne  2.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  )  P.  335. 
90  F.  Engels.  Marx-Engels.  Selected  Works.  Volume  2.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  )  P.  350. 
124 We  have  seen  how  Hegel  views  that  source  as  absolute  and  rational  thought,  but  Hegel's 
absolute  form  of  idealist  monism  is  replaced  with  a  realist  and  materialist  monism.  What 
separates  the  idealist  from  the  realist  here  is  whether  these  laws  find  their  foundation  in 
conceptual  thought  as  in  the  former,  or  material  reality  as  in  the  latter  viewpoint.  This  realist 
and  monist  materialist  difference  from,  and  direct  opposition  to,  a  monist  idealism, 
nevertheless  entails  a  further  theoretical  presupposition  that  Engels  draws  out  in  the 
following  remarks. 
"The  fact  that  our  subjective  thought  and  the  objective  world  are  subject  to  the  same 
laws,  and  hence,  too,  that  in  the  final  analysis  they  cannot  contradict  each  other  in 
their  results,  but  must  coincide,  governs  absolutely  our  whole  theoretical  thought.  It 
is  the  unconscious  and  unconditional  premise  for  theoretical  thought.  "91 
The  laws  of  dialectics,  whilst  they  do  apply  to  both  forms  in  the  materialist  account, 
nevertheless  entails  that  the  ontological  primacy  of  the  relation  is  on  the  objective 
expression  of  the  laws  of  dialectics;  our  subjective  and  cognitive  apprehension  of  them  is 
dependent  upon  that  objective  operation.  In  that  sense  alone  they  are  subject  to  the  same 
laws,  the  laws  of  cognition  are,  in  Engels  materialist  account,  both  dependent  upon  and 
reflect,  their  primary  natural  nomological  forms  of  necessity. 
This  is  the  inverted  materialist  reflection  of  the  twofold  form  and  content  of  the  method  of 
dialectic  expressed  by  Hegel  as  the  general  manner  of  cognition  and  the  objective  general 
manner  or  substantiality  of  things.  That  relation,  though,  is  not  one  of  direct  identity,  but  a 
practically  mediated  identity  between  subjectivity  and  objectivity;  the  mediating  element 
here  is  both  the  source  and  the  test  of  their  correspondence. 
91  F.  Engels.  Dialectics  of  Nature.  Progress  Publishers.  (1982.  )  P.  266.  The  materialism  of  the 
eighteenth  century  investigated  this  premise  as  regards  its  content  by  restricting  itself  to  the  proof  that  the 
content  of  all  thought  and  knowledge  was  derived  from  sensuous  experience.  Idealism  by  contrast,  and  Hegel 
in  particular,  investigated  this  from  the  point  of  view  of  not  only  the  content  of  logic  expressed  in  the 
ontological  and  conceptual  categories  of  ontology  and  epistemology,  but  also  by  analysing  the  active 
interrelations  of  the  predicational  forms  of  these  conceptual  thought-determinations. 
125 The  active  mediating  link  that  spans  that  dialectic  of  human  subjectivity  in  its  objective 
relation  with  nature  imposed  necessity,  is  social  labour.  The  development  of  consciousness 
and  rational  thought  is  itself  the  result  of  human  labouring  interaction  on  and  with  nature 
itself;  any  other  explanation  for  the  development  of  human  rationality  is  inherently  dubious 
for  Marx,  and  consequently  receives  short  shrift. 
"Since  the  reasoning  process  itself  arises  from  the  existing  conditions  and  is  itself  a 
natural  process,  really  comprehending  thinking  can  always  only  be  the  same,  and  can 
vary  only  gradually,  in  accordance  with  the  maturity  of  development,  hence  also  the 
maturity  of  the  organ  that  does  the  thinking.  Anything  else  is  drivel.  "' 
Conscious  dialectical  thought  is,  for  the  critical  materialist,  then  regarded  as  the  highest 
product  of  human  evolution  in  opposition  to  the  rest  of  nature,  not  the  source  of  the  proof  of 
logical  systematic  thought  standing  outside  and  above  real  man  and  real  nature,  as  it  is  in 
Hegel. 
What  Marx  and  Engels  reject  is  the  view  that  the  laws  of  dialectics  are  laws  of  absolute 
thought,  and  that  the  material  world  has  to  conform  to  an  idealist  system  of  thought.  Real 
nature  and  history  have  then  to  acquiesce  to  an  idealist  thought  totality  that  is  systematically 
imposed  on  that  real,  historical,  and  evolutionary  development  of  nature  and  society.  Both 
of  these  propositions  are  rejected  in  the  materialist  critique. 
"The  mistake  lies  in  the  fact  that  these  laws  are  foisted  on  nature  and  history  as  laws 
of  thought,  and  not  deduced  from  them.  This  is  the  source  of  the  whole  forced  and 
often  outrageous  treatment;  the  universe  willy-nilly,  has  to  conform  to  a  system  of 
thought  which  itself  is  only  the  product  of  a  definite  stage  of  evolution  of  human 
thought.  If  we  turn  the  thing  round,  then  everything  becomes  simple,  and  the 
I  K.  Marx.  Letter  to  Kugelmann.  III  July  1868.  Collected  Works.  Volume  43.  Lawrence  and 
Wishart.  (1988.  )  P.  69. 
126 dialectical  laws  that  look  so  extremely  mysterious  in  idealist  philosophy  at  once 
become  clear  and  shnple  as  noon  day.  "" 
Dialectics  is  reduced  from  its  idealist  and  mystified  form  through  the  gravitational  pull  and 
force  of  its  real  material  and  social  roots  to  its  central  and  rational  core,  to  the  science  of  the 
general  laws  of  motion  of  nature  and  thought.  What  remains,  that  still  has  a  rational  core  for 
Marx  and  Engels,  once  the  idealist  ontology  and  system  has  been  rejected,  is  the  Hegelian 
account  of  the  laws  of  motion  of  dialectics. 
The  problem  we  are  then  left  with,  is  how  to  divest  these  dialectical  laws  from  their  mystical 
form  and  content  by  both  deriving  and  applying  them  to  real  material  being.  The  laws  of 
motion  of  dialectics,  in  both  its  cognitive  and  substantial  forms  of  expression,  together  with 
its  idealist  teleological  explanation  of  substantial  necessity,  had  then  to  be  liberated  from 
Hegel's  balancing  of  dialectical  concepts;  they  had  to  be  put  on  a  materialist  footing.  The 
lightning  bolt  of  Hegel's  dialectic  had  to  be  grounded  in  its  new  material  content,  and  in  its 
real  material  roots. 
This  rational  cognitive  result  can  only  arise  from  deriving  the  method  from  the  dialectics 
involved  in  the  existing  conditions,  not  from  the  systematic  and  hermetically  sealed  totality 
of  the  movement  of  speculative  and  absolute  thought.  The  dialectical  relation  of  thought  and 
nature,  mediated  through  practical  activity,  is,  for  all  three  aspects  of  the  triadic  relation  of 
nature,  thought,  and  active  objective  mediation,  therefore  an  open-ended  and  evolving 
process  for  the  materialist. 
93  F.  Engels.  Dialectics  of  Nature.  Progress  Publishers.  (1982.  )  P.  62.  As  to  whether  they  become  as 
clear  and  simple  as  noonday  in  such  an  uncomplicated  manner  is  a  more  debatable  point.  The  inability  of 
socialists,  who  embrace  a  dialectical  method,  to  have  subsequently  done  so  is  testimony  to  the  fact  that  the 
solution  to  the  enigmatic  nature  of  the  materialist  inversion  of  Hegel's  dialectic  has  proven  more  elusive  than 
simple.  Hegel's  wry  critique  of  Fichte's  abject  failure  to  make  good  his  attempt  to  make  subjective  idealism 
clear  and  simple  as  noonday  to  everyday  thought,  as  exemplified  in  the  guise  of  common  sense  realism,  is 
probably  the  source  for  Engels  choice  of  words.  Opponents  of  Engels  would  probably  contend  that  he  has 
been  hoisted  on  his  own  petard. 
127 Engels  materialism  reduces  Hegel's  idealist  account  of  the  laws  of  dialectics  to  the  science 
of  the  most  general  laws  of  all  motion;  this  entails  for  him  that  they  apply  to  the  natural 
world,  human  history,  as  well  as  cognitive  thought,  as  the  inverted  form  of  Hegel's  idealist 
dialectic  of  substance  and  subject. 
"Dialectics  is  conceived  as  the  science  of  the  most  general  laws  of  all  motion.  This 
implies  that  its  laws  must  be  valid  just  as  much  for  motion  in  nature  and  human 
history  as  for  the  motion  in  thought.  "" 
The  question  that  still  largely  remains,  however,  is  how  these  dialectical  laws  of  motion 
materially  operate  in  nature,  human  history  and  thought.  Hegel's  philosophical  and 
speculative  thought  substituted,  for  the  real  but  unknown  interconnections,  the  mystification 
of  the  interconnections  of  the  categories  of  thought  as  the  source,  for  example,  of  human 
historical  development  presented  as  the  unfolding  of  the  logical  and  absolute  idea. 
In  place  of  the  philosophical  systems  that,  as  Engels  expresses  it,  "plugged"  the  factual  gaps 
in  knowledge,  there  is  now  a  dialectical  method  that  aims  at  the  comprehension,  by  means 
of  the  facts,  activities,  and  contrary  relations  that  are  objectively  generated,  of  the  universal 
interconnections  of  a  systematic  and  organic  whole.  Engels  expresses  this  need  for  a 
thoroughgoing  dialectical  dynamic  to  also  be  applied  to  human  social  development  in  the 
following  fashion. 
"Here,  therefore,  just  as  in  the  realm  of  nature,  it  was  necessary  to  do  away  with 
these  fabricated,  artificial  interconnections  by  the  discovery  of  the  real  ones  -a  task 
which  ultimately  amounts  to  the  discovery  of  the  general  laws  of  motion  which 
assert  themselves  as  the  ruling  ones  in  human  society.  "" 
91  F.  Engels.  Dialectics  of  Nature.  Progress  Publishers.  (1982.  )  P.  267.  The  opponents  of  the  view  that 
dialectics  applies  to  nature  generally  centre  their  criticism  on  the  work  of  Engels  rather  than  the  corresponding 
views  of  Marx,  Lenin,  and  Trotsky.  In  my  view  all  four  of  them  hold  to  this  view  of  the  all-encompassing 
nature  of  dialectical  laws.  There  is  no  contrary  evidence  in  any  of  their  writings  that  would  tend  to  cast  any 
real  doubt  on  this  viewpoint.  For  example,  see  S.  Hook.  From  Hegel  to  Marx.  Ann  Arbor.  (1962.  ).  P.  75-76. 
11  F.  Engels.  Dialectics  of  Nature.  Progress  Publishers.  (1982.  )  P.  353. 
128 The  discovery  of  the  general  laws  of  motion  that  operate  and  assert  themselves  in  human 
historical  and  social  development  were  expressed,  in  their  core  form  by  Marx,  in  the 
dynamic  dialectical  relationship  manifested  in  the  contradiction  between  the  development  of 
the  forces  of  production  and  the  social  relations  of  production.  This  analysis  of  the  evolving 
contradiction  contained  in  the  social  productive  forms  and  forces  of  labour  is  the  driving 
source  for  Marx's  own  account  of  human  historical  progress. 
Labour,  as  a  historically  evolving  social  genus,  a  genus  that  finds  its  specific  and  concrete 
expression  in  its  developing  social  forms  and  modes  of  production,  is  the  key  to  discovering 
the  real  interconnections  and  general  laws  of  motion  that  assert  themselves  as  the  driving 
forces  in  human  history  and  society.  These  are  the  real  material  and  social  connections  of 
the  human  subject,  as  opposed  to  the  artificial  interconnections  and  driving  force  fabricated 
in  Hegel's  idealist  account  of  the  history  of  spirit.  ' 
What  Hegel  contributed  to  philosophical  logic  was  a  systematic  dialectical  method.  A 
method  that  outlined  the  laws  of  motion  pertaining  to  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration 
that  applies  to  and  interconnects  a  substantial  whole  in  its  process  of  self-movement.  What 
Hegel  generates  is  an  alienated  account  of  science,  though  this  is  ultimately  derived  from 
real  nature,  reduces  that  natural,  substantial  activity  to  abstract  nature  in  the  form  of  an 
idealist  and  systematic  dialectical  movement  of  the  ontological  categories  inherent  in 
substance. 
What  is  central  to  this  "method  of  science"  for  Hegel,  is  the  ongoing  dialectical  polarity  and 
development,  with  the  resultant  ftision  into  a  new  category  that  marks  every  stage  of  the 
interconnected  whole  of  a  movement  and  process.  This  generalised  form  of  dialectic 
becomes,  in  turn,  and  by  dint  of  its  universal  and  abstract  generality,  the  methodological 
96  "Marx  and  I  were  pretty  well  the  only  people  to  rescue  conscious  dialectics  from  German  idealist 
philosophy  and  apply  it  in  the  materialist  conception  of  nature  and  history.  "  F.  Engels  Preface  to  the  second 
edition  of  Anti-Duhring.  September  1885.  Anti-Duhring.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1969.  )  P.  15. 
129 form  that  can  be  applied  to  the  specific  and  determinate  laws  of  motion  of  particular 
substantial  totalities  in  their  determinate  forms  of  particularisation  and  individuation. 
A  dialectical  account  of  method  seeks  to  capture  the  universal  interconnection  of  the 
specific  categories  of  the  substantial  subject  in  its  systematic  form  activities  and 
determinations;  it  aims  to  show  how  it  expresses  itself  in  its  specific  laws  of  motion  via  its 
necessary  activity  as  that  subject.  This  requires  understanding  the  contrary  forms  of  motion 
that  pertain  to  the  specific  predications  of  the  substantial  subject  in  process.  These  are,  and 
have  to  be  for  the  materialist,  derived  from  the  real  determinations  and  facts,  from  the  real 
motions  of  the  subject  in  process. 
The  nature  of  that  universal  form  activity  is  encapsulated  in  the  specific  identity  of  the 
subject  matter  in  its  determinate  moments  and  necessary  categorial  predications  and 
relations.  The  laws  of  dialectics,  whilst  having  universal  validity,  must  also  be  able  to 
capture  the  contrary  motions  in  the  specific  forms  that  are  relevant  for  the  subject  matter 
under  investigation. 
The  general  form  of  the  method  must  contain  the  flexibility  to  be  derived  from,  and  applied 
to,  the  material  facts  and  activities  of  the  specific  subject,  in  order  to  gain  an  adequate 
conceptualisation  of  it.  This  test  applies  to  all  and  any  form  of  general  scientific  method,  not 
just  a  dialectical  model;  unless  that  is,  one  holds  to  the  view  that  there  is  no  holy  grail  that 
can  pass  for  a  general  form  of  scientific  method. 
The  question  then  is  what  impact  this  derivation  of  the  contradictions  from  the  real 
determinations  of  the  subject  has  for  the  relation  between  the  idealist  predecessor  and 
materialist  successor  in  terms  of  their  inverted  forms  of  dialectical  method.  What  impact 
does  this  inversion  have  on  a  materialist  as  opposed  to  an  idealist  conception  of  laws  of 
dialectical  motion?  The  further  question  is  what  impact  this  has  on  the  nature  of  the  motor 
source  behind  those  laws  of  motion  that  applies  to  all  substantial  being,  namely 
contradiction? 
130 For  example,  and  this  is  fundamental,  Hegel's  systematic  balancing  of  the  idealist  concepts 
that  generate  a  substantial  systematic  whole  does  not  take  into  account  the  further  evolution 
of  the  real  contradictions  that  both  generate  and  underpin  the  motions  of  a  substantial 
subject;  there  is  no  account  in  Hegel  of  substantial  motion  that  not  only  evolves  and  matures 
into  a  systematic  subject,  but  also,  through  the  operation  of  these  same  laws  of  motion,  both 
declines  in  its  characteristic  form  of  activity,  and  creates  the  conditions  for  its  own 
supersession. 
What  Marx  had  to  do,  in  order  to  develop  theoretical  thought,  was  to  scientifically  develop, 
from  a  materialist  perspective,  the  methodological  form  that  would  enable  the  development 
of  a  generalised  concept  that  could  critically  encapsulate  the  nature  and  characteristic 
activity  of  the  mode  of  production  based  on  value  and  capital.  This  idealist  method  of 
Hegel,  inverted  by  Marx,  armed  him  with  the  methodology  that  would  enable  him  to 
encapsulate  the  laws  of  motion  and  central  contradictions  that  underpin  the  systematic  mode 
of  production  founded  on  value  and  capital. 
This  methodological  inversion  of  Marx  also  entailed  showing  that  the  laws  of  dialectical 
motion  that  apply  to  the  systematic  activity  of  capital,  in  turn  create  the  same  driving 
contradictions  that  develop  the  social  relations  and  material  conditions  for  its  supersession. 
A  fundamental  question  that  needs  then  to  be  addressed,  if  the  nature  of  dialectics,  in  either 
its  idealist  or  materialist  guises,  is  to  be  better  understood,  is  to  ascertain  what  the  nature  of 
contradiction  from  a  dialectical  perspective,  actually  entails.  This  is  a  question  that  has  not 
been  sufficiently  investigated,  but  cannot  be  side-stepped,  as  it  is  central  for  an 
understanding  of  not  only  the  nature  of  dialectics,  in  particular  an  understanding  of  its  laws 
of  motion,  but  also  the  relation  between  Hegel  and  Marx's  inverted  forms. 
131 In  order  to  begin  to  answer  this  fundamental  question  we  shall  have  to  investigate  Hegel's 
idealist  account  before  we  can  generate  what  the  materialist  inversion  of  this  process  may 
contain. 
132 CHAPTER  SEVEN. 
CONTRADICTION  AND  DIALECTIC. 
1.  Laws  of  Motion. 
"There  is  no  royal  road  to  science,  and  only  those  who  do  not  dread  the  fatiguing 
climb  of  its  steep  paths  have  a  chance  of  gaining  its  luminous  surnmits.  "91 
"Should  anyone  ask  for  a  royal  road  to  Science,  there  is  no  more  easy-going  way 
than  to  rely  on  sound  common  sense.  "  -  "True  thoughts  and  scientific  insight  are 
only  to  be  won  through  the  labour  of  the  Notion.  "" 
For  both  Hegel  and  Marx  then,  there  is  no  royal  road  to  science,  it  arises  after  a  long  period 
of  historical  development  and  is  the  product  and  result  of  hard-won  human  endeavour,  often 
at  a  high  personal  and  social  cost.  Science,  in  this  viewpoint,  seeks  to  find  the  intrinsic 
interconnections,  the  inner  essence  and  specific  difference  that  is  the  source  and  explanation 
behind  the  changes  and  processes  inherent  in  the  phenomenal  forms  of  appearance. 
The  aim  of  scientific  cognition  is  to  understand  the  forms  of  motion  that  expresses  the  inner 
nature  of  the  contradictions  that  drive  the  specific  and  determinate  nature  of  the  form 
activities  that  are  pertinent  to  the  substantial  subject  under  investigation.  As  Marx  notes, 
science  itself  would  be  superfluous  if  the  cause  of  the  phenomenal  form  were  obviously 
open  to  sensory  or  empirical  observation. 
91  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Preface  to  the  French  Edition.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  30. 
March  18  Ih  1872. 
98  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  Preface.  Paragraph  70.  P.  43.  "Science 
exists  solely  in  the  self-movement  of  the  Notion.  "  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  ) 
Preface.  Paragraph  71.  P-44. 
133 The  laws  of  the  celestial  motions  are  not,  as  Hegel  expressed  it,  "written  on  the  sky";  a  point 
that  Marx  echoes  here  when  discussing  the  relation  between  the  "general  and  necessary 
tendencies"  that  "must  be  distinguished  from  their  forms  of  manifestation.  " 
"But  this  much  is  clear;  a  scientific  analysis  of  competition  is  not  possible,  before  we 
have  a  conception  of  the  inner  nature  of  capital,  just  as  the  apparent  motions  of  the 
heavenly  bodies  are  not  intelligible  to  any  but  him,  who  is  acquainted  with  their  real 
motions,  motions  that  are  not  directly  perceptible  to  the  senses.  "" 
The  necessity  and  need  for  generating  a  scientific  method  is  manifested  then,  precisely  due 
to  the  very  fact  that  the  phenomenal  form  does  not  necessarily  openly  reveal  its  inner 
essential  being  and  nature.  Contradiction,  as  an  inner  difference  that  manifests  itself  in  an 
external  relation  and  opposition  means,  that  if  it  remains  unfathomed,  then  the  subject 
appears  as  being  solely  the  product  and  result  of  an  external  property  and  relation,  and 
whose  conditions  of  existence  also  appear  to  lie  solely  in  this  exterior  and  apparently 
contingent  relation.  " 
Marx  echoes  this  view  in  his  critique  of  value  as  being  a  specific  and  peculiar  social  form 
that  takes  on  a  reified  appearance;  an  appearance  that  belies  its  real  essential  nature  and 
inner  laws  of  motion.  Value,  as  a  social  relation  between  people  that  is  expressed  through 
things,  entails  for  Marx  that  value,  by  its  very  nature,  "does  not  stalk  about  with  a  label 
describing  what  it  is.  "  Marx's  attack  on  vulgar  political  economy  has  this  crudely  empirical 
account  of  science  in  mind  as  the  source  of  his  critique. 
K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  P.  300. 
11  "The  vulgar  economist  has  not  the  slightest  idea  that  the  actual,  everyday  exchange  relations  and 
the  value  magnitudes  cannot  be  directly  identical.  The  point  of  bourgeois  society  is  precisely  that,  a  priori,  no 
conscious  social  regulation  of  production  takes  place.  What  is  reasonable  and  necessary  by  nature  asserts  itself 
only  as  a  blindly  operating  average.  The  vulgar  economist  thinks  he  has  made  a  great  discovery  when,  faced 
with  the  disclosure  of  the  intrinsic  interconnection,  he  insists  that  things  look  different  in  appearance.  In  fact, 
134 "Here  it  will  be  shown  how  the  philistines  and  vulgar  economists  manner  of 
conceiving  things  arises,  namely,  because  the  only  thing  that  is  ever  reflected  in  their 
minds  is  the  immediate  form  of  appearance  of  relations,  and  not  their  inner 
connection.  Incidentally,  if  the  latter  were  the  case,  we  would  surely  have  no  need 
for  science  at  all.  "10' 
The  relation  between  the  contingent  and  the  necessary  relations  cannot  be  understood  if  the 
specific  nature  that  expresses  the  laws  of  motion  is  not  cognitively  grasped.  The  immediate 
form  of  appearance  of  relations  then,  does  not  necessarily  reveal  the  nomological 
foundations  of  those  relations;  the  subjects  or  entities  involved  appear  as  ontologically 
atomised,  fixed  in  their  separation  and  only  contingently  related  to  each  other. 
Science  aims,  in  the  dialectical  account,  to  reveal  the  source  of  the  laws  of  motion  that 
universally  interconnects  the  subject,  and  which  are  expressed  through  the  polar  parameters 
of  its  active  principle  of  change  and  alteration.  That  is,  if  the  real  motions  of  substantial 
activity  are  to  explain  their  apparent  motions. 
Value,  for  Marx,  is  a  universal  social  form,  a  social  substance  that  is  the  product  of  a 
historically  specific  and  particular  mode  of  labouring  activity.  The  exact  nature  and 
operation  of  value  itself,  as  a  social  substance,  is  the  subject  matter  of  Marx's  critical 
enquiries.  The  aim  of  the  critique  in  Capital  was  to  lay  bare  the  "economic  laws  of  motion" 
of  value  through  the  outlining  of  the  essential  forms  of  the  relations,  categories,  and 
activities  that  underpin  the  mode  of  production  founded  upon  capital. 
Method  and  proof  are  united  through  the  conceptualisation  of  the  laws  of  motion  that 
characterises  the  form  activity  of  the  specific  determinations  of  the  subject.  The  tracing  out 
of  the  inner  connections  and  forms  of  development  of  the  subject,  by  way  of  the  analysis  of 
he  prides  himself  in  clinging  to  appearances  and  believing  them  to  be  ultimate.  Why  then  have  science  at  all?  " 
K.  Marx.  Letter  to  Kugelmann.  111  July  1868.  Collected  Works.  Volume  43.  P.  69. 
101  K.  Marx.  Letter  to  Engels.  271  June  1867.  Collected  Works.  Volume  42.  Lawrence  and  Wishart. 
(1987.  )  P.  390. 
135 the  real  relations,  both  reveals,  and  contains  the  proof  and  demonstration  of  the  essential 
activity  of  the  subject.  The  concept  has  though  to  be  derived  from  the  real  relations  and  facts 
of  the  subject  and  not  imposed  on  them  as  the  product  of  the  movement  of  the  categories  of 
conceptual  thought. 
I  The  concept  of  value  is  proven  and  demonstrated  by  showing  how  value,  as  subject,  to 
borrow  Hegel's  expression,  "by  and  from  itself  makes  itself  what  it  is.  "  That  is,  by  showing, 
through  critical  analysis,  the  conceptual  and  categorial  relations  and  dialectical  forms  that 
encapsulates  the  movement  in  the  real  relations. 
"The  unfortunate  fellow  does  not  see  that,  even  if  there  were  no  chapter  on  'value'  at 
all  in  my  book,  the  analysis  that  I  give  of  the  real  relations  would  contain  the  proof 
and  demonstration  of  the  real  value  relation.  The  chatter  about  the  need  to  prove  the 
concept  of  value  arises  only  from  the  complete  ignorance  both  of  the  subject  under 
discussion  and  of  the  method  of  science.  "" 
The  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  laws  of  motion,  from  a  dialectical  perspective, 
requires  the  application  of  the  category  of  contradiction.  That  contradiction  is  both  the 
essence  and  the  driving  force  of  a  dialectical  method  of  analysis  is  a  widespread  and 
generally  held  viewpoint.  The  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  method  of  dialectic,  in  both  or 
either  of  its  idealist  or  materialist  variations  requires  then,  as  a  necessary  element,  an 
understanding  of  the  nature  of  contradiction. 
The  point,  however,  is  that  this  still  begs  the  question,  one  that  is  largely  unaddressed,  of 
what  the  nature  of  contradiction,  viewed  ftom  a  dialectical  perspective,  actually  is?  The  key 
question  then,  for  further  developing  the  investigation,  and  the  relation  of  Hegel's  dialectic 
to  Marx's,  is  to  attempt  to  ascertain  what  the  nature  of  Hegel's  view  of  contradiction 
actually  is? 
K.  Marx.  Letter  to  Kugelmann.  11'  July  1868.  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  43. 
Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1988.  )  P.  68. 
136 2.  The  Source  of  all  Dialectic. 
"John  Stuart  Mill,  on  the  contrary,  accepts  on  the  one  hand  Ricardo's  theory  of 
profit,  and  annexes  on  the  other  hand  Senior's  "remuneration  of  abstinence".  He  is  as 
much  at  home  in  absurd  contradictions,  as  he  feels  at  sea  in  the  Hegelian 
contradiction,  the  source  of  all  dialectic.  It  has  never  occurred  to  the  vulgar 
economist  to  make  the  simple  reflexion,  that  every  human  action  may  be  viewed,  as 
"abstinence"  from  its  opposite.  Eating  is  abstinence  from  fasting,  walking, 
abstinence  from  standing  still,  working,  abstinence  from  idling,  idling,  abstinence 
from  working,  &c.  These  gentlemen  would  do  well,  to  ponder,  once  in  a  way,  over 
Spinoza's:  "Determination  est  Negation.  "" 
Marx's  comments  cited  above,  albeit  limited  in  their  nature,  would  also  appear  to  confirm 
the  following  propositional  inference.  As  Hegelian  contradiction  is  "the  source  of  all 
dialectic"  it  is  logically  then  also  the  source  for  ascertaining  and  discovering  both  the 
general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics.  It  is  unthinkable  that  there  is  no  intimate 
and  necessary  connection  between  them. 
However,  as  Hegel  interprets  both  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics  in 
a  mystical  fashion,  then  does  it  not  also  follow  that  Hegel's  view  of  contradiction  is  also 
interpreted  in  a  mystical  fashion?  Is  this  connection  a  logical  consequence  given  that  these 
core  elements  are  not  only  fundamentally  interrelated,  but  that  the  analysis  of  contradiction 
is  itself  the  very  source  of  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics? 
Does  stripping  the  mystical  veil  from  Hegel's  dialectic  entail  stripping  the  mystical  veil 
from  his  analysis  of  contradiction  also?  If  so,  then  how  does  this  affect  Hegel's  account  of 
11  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  (Footnote.  )  P.  559.  Spinoza's  dictum 
that  "the  foundation  of  all  determinateness  is  negation"  is  taken  up  and  fully  endorsed  in  Hegel's  analysis  of 
contradiction  and  expressed  in  the  form  of  the  dialectic  of  negativity,  as  the  moving  and  generating  principle 
of  all  being. 
137 contradiction?  Or,  are  the  general  fonn  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics,  the  positive 
forms  and  rational  element  of  the  legacy  of  Hegel  according  to  Marx  and  Engels,  retained 
by  them  with  an  unreconstructed  Hegelian  view  of  contradiction? 
Given  that  Marx  tells  us  that  his  dialectical  method  is  not  only  different  from  Hegel's  but 
that  it  is,  in  fact,  the  "direct  opposite",  then  the  question  that  is  posed  by  this  is  whether  this 
inverted  and  direct  materialist  contrary  of  the  Hegelian  method  is  also  reflected  in  the 
analysis  of  contradiction  itself?  On  the  other  hand,  as  Hegelian  contradiction  is  the  source  of 
all  dialectic,  is  it  not  then  also  the  source  of  Marx's  dialectic? 
Before  we  can  even  begin  to  adequately  answer  the  question  of  the  nature  of  contradiction  in 
Marx,  the  Hegelian  analysis  and  application  of  the  concept  of  contradiction  has,  first  of  all, 
to  be  attempted  to  be  understood  in  Hegel's  own  terms.  Disregarding  then,  for  the  present 
moment,  whether  Marx's  view  of  dialectical  contradiction  is,  or  is  not  the  same  as  Hegel's, 
the  following  question  still  remains.  What  we  are  to  make  of  Marx's  assertion  that  Hegelian 
contradiction  is  the  source  of  all  dialectic?  " 
That  contradiction  is  the  driving  force  of  dialectics,  in  whatever  variation  and  hue,  whether 
materialist  or  idealist,  should  not  in  itself  be  that  controversial  a  question.  Most  sympathetic 
commentators  of  the  relation  of  Hegel  to  Marx  would  at  least  pay  lip  service  to  this;  but 
here,  contradiction  is  itself  quite  often  taken  as  a  presupposition;  moreover,  one  that  begs  for 
a  subsequent  and  deeper  analysis  of  its  determinate  and  specific  nature.  'O' 
1(4  The  emphasis  of  the  analysis  at  present  is  focussed  primarily  on  what  Hegel's  account  of 
contradiction  actually  is,  and  secondly  to  elucidate  the  essentials  of  the  rational  element  of  Hegel's  dialectic. 
To  understand  and  comprehensively  outline  the  nature  of  the  materialist  supersession  of  Hegel's  dialectic 
requires  having  a  thoroughgoing  comprehension  of  Hegel's  thought.  Both  in  its  own  idealist  terms,  and 
through  Marx's  critique.  Only  then  is  it  possible  to  adequately  develop  dialectical  thought  from  this 
foundation  and  historical  legacy;  the  horse  has  to  be  put  before  the  cart  in  order  for  further  movement  and 
progress  to  take  place. 
105  That  it  is  contradiction  that  is  the  motor  force  of  the  process,  is,  in  one  respect,  generally  held,  not 
only  in  non-Marxists  like  T.  Pinkard  and  K.  Hartmann,  but  also  by  Hegelian  influenced  Marxists  such  as  C. 
Arthur,  T.  Smith,  and  B.  Ollman.  The  weakness  in  all  their  interpretations,  in  my  reading,  is  in  their 
inadequate  understanding  of  the  nature  of  Hegel's  account  of  contradiction,  and  in  the  consequent  application 
of  Hegelian  contradiction  to  the  analysis  of  a  substantial  system.  This  weakness  in  their  accounts  is  further 
exposed,  in  my  view,  in  the  connection  that  I  make  in  the  relation  of  contradiction  and  law. 
138 Furthermore,  the  analysis  of  what  makes  a  contradiction  a  contradiction,  rather  than  its 
operation,  which,  I  think,  can  be  outlined  without  necessarily  understanding  the 
ontologically  necessary  nature  of  its  polar  forms,  will  in  turn  provide  deeper  ground  for  our 
spades  to  dig. 
By  posing  the  foundational  question  of  what  the  nature  of  contradiction  actually  is  in 
Hegel's  account,  then  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  rational  aspect  of 
Hegelian  dialectics  may  emerge.  This  question  is,  surprisingly,  a  little  investigated  issue 
considering  its  primary  centrality  to  a  rational  comprehension  of  dialectic  itself. 
3.  Contradiction  and  Method. 
"Contradiction  is  the  root  of  all  movement  and  vitality;  it  is  only  in  so  far  as 
something  has  a  contradiction  within  it  that  it  moves,  has  an  urge  and  activity.  "  106 
according  to  Hegel,  contradiction  is  "the  root  of  all  movement",  and  existence  itself  is 
only  possible  through  the  movement  of  a  contradiction,  it  then  logically  follows  that  it  holds 
a  principal  meta-logical  and  ontological  role  in  Hegel's  account  of  dialectic.  As  such,  the 
understanding  of  its  specific  nature  is  essential  to  gain  greater  clarity  into  the  Hegelian 
explication  of  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics. 
The  principles  of  change  and  alteration  contained  in  all  substantial  form  activity  are,  when 
logically  and  conceptually  developed  into  a  systematic  subject,  the  expression  of  the 
movement  of  the  laws  of  motion  of  a  developing  contradiction.  Contradiction  then,  as  the 
very  moving  principle  of  all  being,  has  to  be  regarded,  when  properly  cognised,  as  a  higher 
The  work  of  T.  Smith  and  C.  Arthur,  on  the  relation  between  Hegel's  Logic  and  Marx's  value  theory 
is,  even  if  critically  assimilated,  still  quite  heavily  influenced  by  the  work  of  K.  Hartmann  and  T.  Pinkard  on 
the  nature  of  Hegel's  logical-dialectical  account  of  a  structured  and  conceptual  totality.  See,  for  example,  the 
journal  Science  and  Society  Volume  62.  Systematic  Dialectic  by  C.  Arthur.  In  particular,  pages  448452. 
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139 expression  of  thought  than  an  abstract  and  formal  law  of  identity  that  seeks  to  avoid 
contradiction. 
"On  the  one  hand,  it  is  to  be  considered  as  the  positive  nature  of  something;  on  the 
other,  it  is  related  to  an  opposite,  and  every  nature  emerging  from  its  innocency, 
from  its  indifferent  self-identity,  spontaneously  relates  itself  to  its  other  and  thereby 
falls  to  the  ground  or,  in  the  positive  sense,  withdraws  into  its  ground.  ...  It  is  of  the 
greatest  importance  to  perceive  and  to  bear  in  mind  this  nature  of  the  reflective 
determinations  we  have  just  considered,  namely,  that  their  truth  consists  only  in  their 
relation  to  one  other,  that  therefore  each  in  its  very  Notion  contains  the  other; 
without  this  knowledge,  not  a  single  step  can  really  be  taken  in  philosophy.  "" 
As  motion  is  itself  the  movement  of  a  contradiction,  then  the  general  form  of  working  of  the 
dialectic  is  elucidated  through  revealing  how  "opposite  determinations"  can  be 
demonstrated  as  being  predicated  of  the  same  subject.  Accordingly,  the  dialectic  that  is  the 
dynamic  behind  speculative  thought  for  Hegel  consists  in  the  ability  of  thought  to  go 
beyond  an  abstract  form  of  identity  and  to  engage  with  the  real  determinations  and  opposite 
relations  in  their  interconnected  movements.  108 
A  dialectical  form  of  cognition,  by  contrast  to  the  fixed  and  contingently  related  opposites 
of  the  "abstract  understanding"  of  metaphysics,  consists  "in  the  grasping  of  opposites  in 
their  unity  or  of  the  positive  in  the  negative.  "  That  the  object  is  a  rational  determination  of 
opposites  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  concept  behind  that  determination  exemplifies  a 
dialectical  unity  in  thought. 
101  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  437  and  438  respectively. 
10'  "To  the  metaphysician,  things  and  their  mental  reflexes,  ideas,  are  isolated,  are  to  be  considered 
one  after  the  other,  and  apart  from  each  other,  are  objects  of  investigation  fixed,  rigid,  given  once  for  all.  He 
thinks  in  absolutely  irreconcilable  antithesis  ....  For  him  a  thing  either  exists  or  does  not  exist;  a  thing  cannot 
at  the  same  time  be  itself  and  something  else.  Positive  and  negative  absolutely  exclude  one  another;  cause  and 
effect  stand  in  rigid  antithesis  one  to  the  other.  "  F.  Engels.  Socialism:  Utopian  and  Scientific.  Marx  Engels. 
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140 Abstract  and  formal  thought  does  not  analyse  the  necessary  connection  between  these 
opposite  determinations  that  are  contained  within  the  unity  of  the  subject.  It  seeks  to  avoid, 
by  the  nature  of  its  own  philosophical  presuppositions,  any  rationally  engagement  with 
contradiction  as  a  principle. 
"But  formal  thinking  makes  identity  its  law,  and  allows  the  contradictory  content 
before  it  to  sink  into  the  sphere  of  ordinary  conception,  into  space  and  time,  in  which 
the  contradictories  are  held  asunder  in  juxtaposition  and  temporal  succession  and  so 
come  before  consciousness  without  reciprocal  contact.  On  this  point,  formal  thinking 
lays  down  for  its  principle  that  contradiction  is  unthinkable;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact 
the  thinking  of  contradiction  is  the  essential  moment  of  the  Notion.  Formal  thinking 
does  in  fact  think  contradiction,  only  it  at  once  looks  away  from  it,  and  in  saying  that 
it  is  unthinkable  it  merely  passes  over  from  it  into  abstract  negation.  "" 
Abstract  understanding,  in  the  Hegelian  critique,  sees  in  this  opposition  a  fixed  and  static 
external  relation,  not  one  that  is  inherent  and  immanent  to  the  specific  nature  of  the  subject 
and  its  activity.  Abstract  understanding  consequently  view  contradiction  as  an  impediment 
to  rational  thought,  as  unthinkable  to  the  abstract  universal  form  of  identity  that  marks 
external  reflection  in  its  cognitive  standpoint.  "O 
"It  must  not  therefore  be  considered  the  fault  of  a  subject  matter  or  of  cognition  that 
these  determinations,  through  their  constitution  and  an  external  connexion,  show 
themselves  dialectical.  On  that  assumption,  the  subject  matter  or  the  cognition  is 
G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  835. 
"If  in  the  light  of  the  present  discussion  we  cast  one  glance  more  on  the  metaphysical  method  as  a 
whole,  we  find  its  main  characteristic  was  to  make  abstract  identity  its  principle  and  try  to  defend  the  objects 
of  reason  by  the  abstract  and  finite  categories  of  the  understanding.  But  this  infinite  of  the  understanding,  this 
pure  essence,  is  still  finite:  it  has  excluded  all  the  variety  of  particular  things,  which  thus  limit  and  deny  it. 
instead  of  winning  a  concrete,  this  metaphysic  stuck  fast  on  an  abstract,  identity.  Its  good  point  was  the 
perception  that  thought  alone  constitutes  the  essence  of  all  that  is.  It  derived  its  materials  from  earlier 
philosophers,  particularly  the  Schoolmen.  In  speculative  philosophy  the  understanding  undoubtedly  forms  a 
stage,  but  not  a  stage  at  which  we  should  keep  forever  standing.  Plato  is  no  metaphysician  of  this  imperfect 
type,  still  less  Aristotle,  although  the  contrary  is  generally  believed.  "  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  ) 
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141 represented  as  a  subject  into  which  the  determinations  in  the  form  of  predicates, 
properties,  self-subsistent  universals  are  introduced  in  such  a  manner  that,  fixed  and 
correct  as  they  are  by  themselves,  they  are  brought  into  dialectical  relationships  and 
contradiction  only  by  extraneous  and  contingent  connexion  operating  in  and  by  a 
third  thing.  ""' 
For  Hegel,  this  opposition  reflects  a  necessary  internal  division  and  determination  expressed 
in  the  particular  form  of  the  universal.  This  is  manifested  in  a  necessary  relation  that  allows 
that  specific  difference  to  realise  its  nature  against  its  own  determinate  form  of  opposition, 
its  own  form  of  contradiction.  The  opposite  is,  in  this  dialectical  view  of  contradiction,  the 
other  of  itself.  As  such,  for  Hegel,  it  thus  includes  its  own  other,  and  by  doing  so  is  the 
contradiction  or  posited  dialectic  of  itself. 
Thus  all  oppositions  that  are  assumed  as  fixed,  as  for  example  finite  and  infinite, 
individual  and  universal,  are  not  in  contradiction  through,  say,  an  external 
connection;  on  the  contrary,  as  an  examination  of  theiý  nature  has  shown,  they  are  in 
and  for  themselves  a  transition;  the  synthesis  and  the  subject  in  which  they  appear  is 
the  product  of  their  Notion's  own  reflection.  If  a  consideration  that  ignores  the 
Notion  stops  short  at  their  external  relationship,  isolates  them  and  leaves  them  as 
fixed  presuppositions,  it  is  the  Notion,  on  the  contrary,  that  keeps  them  steadily  in 
view,  moves  them  as  their  soul  and  brings  out  their  dialectic.  ""' 
The  genuine  dialectical  element  that  allows  the  logical,  ontological,  and  conceptual 
categories  to  advance  is  the  negative  determination  that  they  contain  as  a  fundamental 
element  in  their  inner  nature.  It  is  "the  inwardness  of  the  content,  the  dialectic  which  it 
possesses  within  itself,  which  is  the  mainspring  of  the  advance".  All  determination  contains 
negation,  and  it  is  through  its  negation  that  it  becomes  that  specific  form  of  determination. 
G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  833. 
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142 "If  then  the  negative,  the  determinate,  relationship,  judgement,  and  all  the 
determinations  falling  under  this  second  moment  do  not  at  once  appear  on  their  own 
account  as  contradiction  and  as  dialectical,  this  is  a  solely  the  fault  of  a  thinking  that 
does  not  bring  its  thoughts  together.  For  the  material,  the  opposed  determinations  in 
one  relation,  is  already  posited  and  at  hand  for  thought.  ""' 
Formal  thought,  with  its  conception  of  identity  in  the  form  of  an  abstract  universal,  seeks 
vainly  to  avoid  contradiction.  If  the  entity,  thing,  or  concept  exhibits  a  contradiction,  then 
abstract  identity  posits  this  contradiction  either  as  an  error  in  the  thought  process  or  the 
concept  or  as  the  result  of  an  external  connection  or  relation  in  the  entity. 
Things,  in  the  form  of  abstract  universality  either  contain  one  of  the  poles  of  the  contrary 
predications  or  do  not;  it  does  not,  and  cannot,  contain  both  forms  of  the  contrary 
predications.  It  has  no  way  of  conceptualising  that  the  thing,  concept,  or  entity  embodies 
that  contradiction  as  part  of  its  nature  and  process  of  change  itself. 
"Contradiction  is  the  very  moving  principle  in  the  world:  and  it  is  ridiculous  to  say 
that  contradiction  is  unthinkable.  The  only  thing  correct  in  that  statement  is  that 
contradiction  is  not  the  end  of  the  matter,  but  cancels  itself.  But  contradiction,  when 
cancelled,  does  not  leave  abstract  identity;  for  that  is  itself  only  one  side  of  the 
contrariety.  The  proximate  result  of  opposition  (when  realised  as  contradiction)  is 
the  Ground,  which  contains  identity  as  well  as  difference  superseded  and  deposited 
to  elements  in  the  completer  notion.  "114 
Identity  is,  for  Hegel,  a  form  of  "simple  self-negativity.  "  That  is,  identity  contains  not  only 
difference,  but  also  that  difference  is  itself  cognised  as  an  inner  difference,  one  that  is 
expressed  in  its  substantially  necessary  form  activity.  As  the  difference  is  a  difference 
contained  within  the  universal  form,  it  then  assumes  the  status  of  a  universal  difference,  one 
113  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  835. 
114  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  119  Zusatz.  P.  174. 
143 that  is  particularised  and  expressed  as  a  specific  difference  or  contrariety  contained  in  that 
universal.  "' 
The  distinction  I  made  earlier  between  outlining  the  movement  of  a  contradiction  and 
understanding  what  makes  a  contradiction  a  contradiction,  though  fundamentally  connected, 
may  not  necessarily  be  distinguished  and  united  in  thought.  Given  that  we  have  said 
something  about  the  necessity  of  contradiction  for  all  processes  and  movements  according 
to  Hegel,  and  as  a  necessary  ontological  characteristic  of  all  being,  the  question  now  is,  what 
does  Hegel  understand  by  a  contradiction,  what  is  its  specific  nature  for  him?  "' 
4.  Polarity  and  Contradiction. 
What  is  it,  according  to  Hegel  that  makes  an  opposition  into  a  contradiction?  In  the  Science 
of  Logic,  Hegel  outlines  what  he  regards  are  the  conditions  where  an  opposition  could  be 
regarded  and  described  as  a  form  of  contradiction.  These  conditions  take  the  following 
forms. 
I's  "If  the  superficial  conception  of  what  the  Notion  is,  leaves  all  manifoldness  outside  the  Notion  and 
attributes  to  the  latter  only  the  form  of  abstract  universality  or  the  empty  identity  of  reflection,  we  can  at  once 
appeal  to  the  fact  that  quite  apart  from  the  view  here  propounded,  the  statement  or  definition  of  a  notion 
expressly  includes  not  only  the  genus,  which  itself  is,  properly  speaking,  more  than  a  purely  abstract 
universality,  but  also  the  specific  determinateness.  If  one  but  would  reflect  attentively  on  the  meaning  of  this 
fact,  one  would  see  that  differentiation  must  be  regarded  as  an  equally  essential  moment  of  the  Notion.  " 
G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  588-589 
116  T.  Smith  (L.  M.  C.  )  S.  U.  N.  Y.  Press.  (1990.  )  Smith's  book  contains  the  following  footnote  on  the 
nature  of  contradiction  itself  (P.  227-228).  Here  he  expresses  the  following  view;  "In  general  there  are  two 
standard  types  of  dialectical  contradictions.  The  first  occurs  when  something  (either  a  category  or  a  material 
reality)  is  asserted  to  be  a  simple  unity,  but  upon  closer  inspection  is  seen  to  include  implicitly  a  moment  of 
difference  that  is  not  unified.  The  second  occurs  when  a  category  or  a  material  reality  is  asserted  to  involve 
difference  only,  and  then  upon  closer  inspection  an  underlying  unity  is  seen  to  be  implicit.  Both  of  these 
"contradictions"  can  be  formulated  in  a  manner  that  does  not  involve  a  denial  of  the  law  of  contradiction.  " 
The  key  point  of  contradiction  is  missing  here,  that  of  polarity.  Moreover,  it  is  the  polarity  that  is  the 
source  of  the  dynamic  activity  and  law,  manifested  in  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  that  is  inherently 
contained  in  the  motion  of  a  substantial  entity  and  form.  Furthermore,  the  polarity  or  "difference"  is 
predicated  on  a  common  nature  or  quality  as  the  parameters  of  the  expression  of  that  commonality.  It  is  only 
in  the  following  sense  that  it  does  not  involve  a  denial  of  the  law  of  contradiction.  For  example,  a  determinate 
commodity  either  expresses  its  use  or  value  forms,  not  both  at  the  same  time.  Ile  real  point  is  that  of  grasping 
the  inherent  contradiction  in  the  opposite  predicational  motions  of  the  subject. 
144 "Opposites,  therefore,  contain  contradiction  in  so  far  as  they  are,  in  the  same  respect, 
negatively  related  to  one  another  or  sublate  each  other  and  are  indifferent  to  one 
another.  Ordinary  thinking  when  it  passes  over  to  the  moment  of  the  indifference  of 
the  determinations,  forgets  their  negative  unity  and  so  retains  them  merely  as 
'differents'  in  general,  in  which  determinations  right  is  no  longer  right,  nor  left  left, 
etc.  "117 
What  do  these  definitions  and  forms  of  relation,  expressed  by  Hegel,  entail  for  the  analysis 
of  the  movement  of  a  contradiction  as  being  that  of  polar  opposition?  Furthermore,  what  is 
the  nature  of  this  error  that  "ordinary  thinking"  lapses  into  when  focussing  on  the 
indifference  of  the  poles  that  it,  at  the  same  time,  forgets  their  "negative  unity"?  Just  what 
does  it  mean  to  be  negatively  related  to  your  opposite  in  the  same  respect? 
opposition,  in  the  form  of  contradiction,  is  a  "negative  unity"  that  contains  both  a  common 
content  and  a  difference,  this  further  entails  that  "its  moments  are  different  in  one  identity 
and  thus  are  opposites.  "  Opposition,  as  a  self-excluding  difference,  is  more  properly 
cognised,  in  Hegel's  account,  as  a  form  of  polarity,  where  the  positive  and  the  negative 
poles  of  the  relation  share  a  common  content  that  mediates  the  oppositional  forms  of  the 
relation. 
Each  pole  of  the  relation  is  the  opposite  or  negative  determination  of  the  other,  and  both 
poles  are  contained  as  moments  or  determinations  that  are  the  expression  of  the  unity  of  the 
common  mediation  or  content  that  underpins  their  relation. 
"But  the  positive  or  negative  in  itself  essentially  implies  that  to  be  an  opposite  is  not 
merely  a  moment,  does  not  stem  from  comparison,  but  is  a  determination  belonging 
to  the  sides  of  the  opposition  themselves.  They  are  therefore  not  positive  or  negative 
in  themselves  apart  from  the  relation  to  other;  on  the  contrary,  this  relation  -  an 
117  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  441. 
145 exclusive  relation  -  constitutes  their  determination  or  in  itself,  in  it,  therefore,  they 
are  at  the  same  time  explicitly  and  actually  [an  und  fur  sich]  positive  or  negative.  "' 
The  polar  opposition  is  not  just  the  expression  of  a  relation  to  something  external,  that 
externality  is  itself  only  the  manifestation  and  expression  of  its  own  specific  and 
determinate  nature;  the  relation  to  its  polar  opposition  then  is  inherently  contained  within 
itself.  As  the  opposition  is  contained  within  itself,  then  the  opposition  takes  the  form  of  an 
"inner  difference.  "  There  is,  in  a  dialectical  relation  of  opposition,  both  an  identity  and 
sameness  as  well  as  a  specific  difference  or  contrariety,  in  the  movement  of  the  polar 
opposites. 
"Difference  as  such  is  already  implicitly  contradiction;  for  it  is  the  unity  of  sides 
which  are,  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  one  -  and  it  is  the  separation  of  the  sides 
which  are,  only  as  separated  in  the  same  relation.  But  the  positive  and  negative  are 
the  posited  contradiction  because,  as  negative  unities,  they  are  themselves  the 
positing  of  themselves,  and  in  this  positing  each  is  the  sublating  of  its  self  and  the 
positing  of  its  opposite.  ""' 
Polarity  as  a  form  of  "explicit  contradiction"  means  not  only  that  both  poles  are  negative  to 
each  other,  but  that  each  of  the  poles  contains,  in  itself,  both  its  own  expression  and  its 
connection  and  relation  to  its  opposite.  Both  poles  of  the  relation  thus  express,  in  this 
account,  not  only  their  own  specific  or  positive  form,  but  also  their  own  opposite  or  negative 
form,  as  the  contrariety  inherently  contained  within  that  specific  and  positive  form  of  its 
determination;  a  contrariety  that  is,  moreover,  mediated  by  a  common  content.  'This 
commonality  of  content  entails,  for  Hegel,  that  the  opposition  can  then  be  characterised  as 
one  where  "the  antithesis  is  contained  within  the  antithesis  itself,  or  contradiction.  " 
G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  427. 
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146 Here  the  poles  are  a  contradictory  content  of  "opposite  determinations  in  one  relation.  " 
Polarity  is  also  expressed  by  Hegel  in  the  form  of  a  "specialised  contrariety  and  in  that  way 
a  contradiction.  "  What  is  it  that  makes  polarity  and  contradiction  a  form  of  "specialised 
contrariety"?  To  be  a  "specialised  contrariety"  or  to  be  "in  the  same  respect,  negatively 
related  to  one  another"  means  the  opposition  is  founded  upon  a  specific  and  essential  form 
of  twofold  difference. 
The  reason  that  the  opposition  is  a  specific  contrariety  of  a  twofold  difference  is  that  the 
polar  opposites  are  the  contrary  extremes  that  are  contained  within  a  common  genus  or  kind, 
as  the  expressions  of  the  contrary  predicational  relations  contained  within  that  common 
genus  or  kind.  Opposition,  in  the  form  of  contradiction,  is  then  a  "negative  unity"  that 
contains  both  a  common  identity,  and  at  the  same  time,  a  common  difference.  This  entails 
for  Hegel  that  "its  moments  are  different  in  one  identity  and  thus  are  opposites.  " 
Difference  as  opposition,  and  opposition  as  contradiction,  only  operates,  as  a  contradiction, 
when  the  opposites  are  reciprocally  related  poles,  where  each  of  the  poles  are  "intrinsically 
conditioned  by  one  another,  and  are  only  in  relation  to  each  other.  "  As  the  expression  of  a 
"specialised  contrariety"  that  shares  a  common  content  or  identity,  that  is both  manifested  in 
and  contains,  both  poles  of  the  reciprocal  relation.  As  the  parameters  that  both  inform,  limit 
and  determine  the  nature  of  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration,  manifested  in  the  contrary 
forms  contained  within  a  common  identity. 
Each  of  the  poles,  as  Hegel  expresses  it,  both  includes  and  excludes  the  other  "in  the  same 
respect".  How  does  that  dialectic  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  actually  operate  "in  the  same 
respect"?  Each  of  the  contrary  poles  of  the  relation  is  not  only  the  negative  of  an  other,  an 
other  with  an  independent  form  of  existence;  that  negative  is  contained  as  the  privative  state 
of  the  positive  pole  itself.  What  are  the  consequences  of  this  self-contained  antithesis? 
A  dialectic  of  independence  and  dependence,  of  exclusion  and  inclusion,  is  then  generated 
by  the  content  of  this  relation.  Polarity,  as  positive  and  negative,  posits  the  independence  of 
147 the  positive  and  negative  poles.  The  independence  of  each  of  the  poles,  their  exclusiveness, 
further  develops  from  this  posited  nature  of  the  poles  of  the  contrariety  being  fixed,  static,  or 
only  contingently  related;  they  are  driven  to  relate  themselves  to  their  own  opposite  form. 
What  moves  them,  according  to  Hegel,  is  their  self-negation,  it  is  this  internal  dynamic  that 
"transcends  the  positedness  of  independence.  " 
What  becomes  exclusive  to  it  is  that  its  own  privative  form,  the  inclusive  sense  of  its  own 
negation,  is  manifested  in  an  external  relation,  as  the  exclusive  sense  of  its  own  negation.  In 
consequence  of  this,  each  of  the  poles  of  the  relation  then  both  includes  and  excludes  the 
other,  accordingly,  it  follows  then  for  Hegel  that  in  a  way  it  also  both  includes  and  excludes 
itself,  in  this  sense,  for  Hegel,  it  is  a  living  contradiction. 
The  polarity  and  contradiction  involved  in  the  movement  is  that  the  self-exclusion,  the  self- 
existent  unity  and  independence  of  the  polar  opposition,  gives  way  to  its  opposite;  by  doing 
so,  the  independence  also  excludes  its  own  independence;  to  put  it  another  way,  it 
necessarily  has  to  relate  to  its  own  opposition.  The  dialectic  of  self-negation  entails  that  the 
poles,  viewed  as  fixed  and  unrelated  qualities  and  entities,  cannot  remain  so. 
"The  reflection-into-self  whereby  the  sides  of  opposition  are  converted  into  self- 
subsistent  self-relations  is,  in  the  first  instance,  their  self-subsistence  as  distinct 
moments;  as  such  they  are  only  implicitly  this  self-subsistence,  for  they  are  still 
opposites,  and  the  fact  that  they  are  implicitly  self-subsistent  constitutes  their 
positedness.  But  their  excluding  reflection  sublates  this  positedness,  converts  them 
into  explicitly  self-subsistent  sides,  into  sides  which  are  self-subsistent  not  merely 
implicitly  or  in  themselves  but  through  their  negative  relation  to  their  opposite;  in 
this  way,  their  self-subsistence  is  also  posited.  But  further,  through  this  their 
positing,  they  make  themselves  into  a  positedness.  They  destroy  themselves  in  that 
148 they  determinate  themselves  as  self-identical,  yet  in  this  determination  are  rather  the 
negative,  an  identity  with  self  that  is  a  relation  to  other.  "  120 
It  is  this  self-subsistence  and  unrelated  and  indifferent  nature  of  the  polar  opposites,  their 
posited  independence  for  Hegel,  "which  in  truth  perishes  in  contradiction.  "  Each  of  the 
poles,  both  gains  its  determination  in  relation  to  its  own  negative  pole,  and  maintains  itself 
only  through  its  relation  to  this  polar  opposite.  The  parameters  of  the  process  of  movement 
and  change  are  thus  founded  in  Hegel's  view  on  a  dialectic  of  sameness  and  difference. 
This  dialectical  polarity  of  sameness  and  difference  allows  the  specific  difference  of  the 
relation,  as  the  contrary  species  of  a  common  content,  to  be  cognitively  comprehended,  this 
is  achieved  by  pairing  difference  with  similarity;  with  the  reciprocal  relation  of  the  polarity 
of  this  dialectic  of  identity  and  difference  constituting  the  grounds  upon  which  scientific 
generalisation  of  the  nature  and  activity  of  the  common  content  of  the  subject  matter  can 
now  rest  upon. 
Here  is  Hegel's  expression  of  reciprocity  as  a  form  of  necessary  polarity;  it  is  worthwhile 
noting  that  the  specific  difference  has  no  real  substantial  being  on  its  own,  it  cannot  be 
regarded  as  an  isolated  abstraction  that  is  self-subsisting.  It  contains  a  necessary  connection 
to  its  contrary  pole  in  a  reciprocal  and  reflexive  relation  of  a  twofold  common  content. 
"Positive  and  negative  are  supposed  to  express  an  absolute  difference.  The  two 
however  are  at  bottom  the  same:  the  name  of  either  might  be  transferred  to  the  other. 
Thus,  for  example,  debts  and  assets  are  not  two  particular,  self-subsisting  species  of 
property.  What  is  negative  to  the  debtor  is  positive  to  the  creditor  ... 
In  opposition, 
the  different  is  not  confronted  by  any  other,  but  by  its  other.  Usually  we  regard 
different  things  as  unaffected  by  each  other  .. 
Everything  is  thus  put  outside  of  every 
other.  But  the  aim  of  philosophy  is  to  banish  indifference,  and  to  ascertain  the 
necessity  of  things.  By  that  means  the  other  is  seen  to  stand  over  against  its  other. 
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149 Thus,  for  example,  inorganic  nature  is  not  to  be  considered  merely  something  else 
than  organic  nature,  but  the  necessary  antithesis  of  it.  Both  are  in  essential  relation  to 
one  another;  and  the  one  of  the  two  is,  only  in  so  far  as  it  excludes  the  other  from  it, 
and  thus  relates  itself  thereto.  ""' 
The  basic  elements  for  the  operation  and  understanding  of  the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of 
opposites  have  already  been  roughly  sketched  and  outlined.  The  details  of  which  shall  be 
developed  as  the  investigation  of  the  thesis  ftirther  unfolds.  The  basic  nature  of  the  law  is 
that  the  opposition  is  viewed  as  a  polar  relation  that  is  itself  the  reciprocal  expression  of  an 
essential  and  specific  difference.  With  the  polar  extremes,  as  the  contrary  poles  of  a 
common  content  and  relation,  defining  the  specific  and  determinate  parameters  of  the 
identity. 
This  relation  of  reciprocity  or  correlation  is  the  basis  for  the  Hegelian  law  of  the 
interpenetration  of  opposites;  expressed  in  the  alternation  and  interpenetration  of  the  polar 
motions.  The  reason  that  the  polar  extremes  reciprocally  interpenetrate  for  Hegel  is  that 
there  is  "one  identical  content,  which  continues  in  the  two  correlatives.  "  This,  in  turn,  means 
that  they  "suspend  themselves  in  the  immediate  transition,  the  one  in  the  other.  The  content 
is  itself,  nothing  but  their  identity.  "  Alternatively  expressed,  they  are  negatively  related  to 
each  other  in  the  same  respect. 
Here  each  of  the  poles  maintains  its  nature  and  form  by  interpenetrating  with  its  direct 
opposition.  Likewise,  without  a  universal  foundation  for  the  contrariety,  the  "one 
mediation"  of  Hegel,  there  would,  in  turn,  be  no  basis  for  the  reciprocity  or  interpenetration 
of  opposites  inherent  to  the  specific  difference  expressed  in  this  dialectical  law.  As  such,  the 
polar  parameters  contain  the  determinate  forms  and  expressions  of  the  movement  and 
process  of  the  subject. 
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150 The  contradiction  in  the  movement  is  not  only  posited  but  also  resolved  in  the  movement 
and  transition  between  the  poles.  Not  only  then  is  the  opposition  and  polarity  manifested  in 
the  difference  between  the  poles,  but  each  of  the  poles  sublates  itself  by  its  movement  to  the 
other,  the  self  subsistence  of  the  poles  are  thus  shown  to  be  mediated,  each  by  and  through 
the  other.  To  put  it  another  way,  the  contraries  necessarily  reciprocally  act  upon  each  other, 
their  polar  opposition  interpenetrates  and  passes  into  and  out  of  each  other. 
What  has  to  be  analysed  now  is  the  notion  of  the  polar  forms  as  being  not  just  a  negative 
unity  of  opposites,  but  as  poles  that  are  also  self-relating  and  self-moving.  This  identity,  as 
simple  self-relating  negativity,  is  characterised  by  Hegel  as  an  "intro-reflected  difference"; 
this  is  the  source  for  the  dialectical  process  of  being-for-self.  As  movement  itself  is  an 
"existent  contradiction"  for  Hegel;  then  self-movement  is  therefore,  if  you  will  excuse  the 
inference,  the  movement  of  a  self-existent  contradiction. 
5.  The  Negation  of  the  Negation. 
"Similarly,  internal  self-movement  proper,  instinctive  urge  in  general,  (the  appetite 
or  nisus  of  the  monad,  the  entelechy  of  absolutely  simple  essence),  is  nothing  else 
but  the  fact  that  something  is,  in  one  and  the  same  respect,  self-contained  and 
deficient,  the  negative  of  itsey.  Abstract  self-identity  is  not  as  yet  a  livingness,  but 
the  positive,  being  in  its  own  self  a  negativity,  goes  outside  itself  and  undergoes 
alteration.  Something  is  therefore  only  in  so  far  as  it  contains  contradiction  within  it, 
and  moreover  is  this  power  to  hold  and  endure  the  contradiction  within  it.  ""' 
The  polarity  of  dialectical  contradiction  is  resolved  through  the  substantial  form  activity, 
and  the  form  of  motion  inherent  in  this  process  is  expressed  in  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the 
negation.  It  is  resolved  contradiction  as  a  self-transcending  relation,  as  the  expression  of  the 
form  activity  that  realises  and  actualises  the  substantial  nature  of  the  determinate  subject,  by 
affirming  itself  through  its  opposition. 
151 Self-exclusion  now  becomes  a  process  of  self-mediation.  It  necessarily  has  to  determine  and 
relate  itself  to  its  opposite  through  its  own  substantial  form  activity.  Substance,  as  a 
dialectical  unity  of  form  and  its  privation  is  the  ground  for  that  activity.  As  the  external 
expression  of  its  own  contradiction,  it  has  to  contain  that  opposition  as  a  moment  and 
determination  of  itself.  By  doing  so,  contradiction  resolves  itself.  Self-movement,  for  Hegel, 
"is  nothing  else  but  the  fact  that  something  is,  in  one  and  the  same  respect,  seýrlcontained 
and  deficient,  the  negative  of  itseV.  " 
Again  we  see,  and  here  Hegel  applies  it  to  the  process  of  substantial  self-movement,  that  the 
polar  contrarieties  inherent  to  the  substantial  form  activity  are  necessarily  related  to  each 
other  "in  one  and  the  same  respect".  The  form  and  the  privation,  its  "deficient"  negation  are 
intimately  bound  together  as  the  parameters  of  the  substantial  process.  It  is  that  mediation 
through  the  other  that  becomes  in  the  course  of  the  process,  self-mediation  as  substantial 
activity. 
Being-for-self,  in  Hegel's  terms,  "is  the  polemical  or  negative  attitude  against  the  limiting 
other.  "  This  negation  of  the  other,  because  it  is  already  contained  within  itself  as  an  inner 
negation  or  privation,  is  also  a  negation  of  itself,  a  negation  of  its  own  negative  condition. 
This  is  why,  as  the  substantial  activity  is  the  common  ground  for  the  polarity  of  the  contrary 
forms,  it  is designated  as  an  "intro-reflected"  difference. 
Identity  is,  for  Hegel,  a  negative  self-relation  that  draws  a  distinction  between  it  and  itself, 
this  it  does  by  relating  itself  to  its  own  external  opposition.  As  Hegel  expresses  this,  it  is 
"the  negative  as  determined  in  the  sphere  of  essence,  the  principle  of  all  self-movement", 
which  consists  solely  in  an  exhibition  of  contradiction. 
In  order  to  affirm  itself,  as  the  subject,  as  the  positive  pole  of  the  relation,  it  has  to  negate 
and  contain  the  other  polar  form.  In  one  sense,  (of  the  concept  of  auflieben),  it  is  by  negating 
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152 its  negation  that  it,  at  the  same  time,  both  negates  and  affirms  itselL  This  is  resolved 
contradiction  as  substantial  ground;  as  this  self-subsistence,  it  is  the  unity  of  essence. 
"The  resolved  contradiction  is  therefore  ground,  essence  as  unity  of  the  positive  and 
negative.  In  opposition,  the  determination  has  attained  to  self-subsistence;  but 
ground  is  this  completed  self-subsistence;  in  it,  the  negative  is  self-subsistent 
essence,  but  as  negative;  as  self-identical  in  this  negativity,  ground  is  just  as  much 
the  positive.  Opposition  and  its  contradiction  is,  therefore,  in  ground  as  much 
abolished  as  preserved.  "  123 
This  is  the  basis  for  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation.  This  negation  of  the  negation  is 
the  affirmation  of  self,  the  process  of  being-for-self.  It  first  of  all  posits  its  negative  then 
negates  it;  the  negative  other  becomes  contained  and  becomes  a  moment  or  a  determination 
of  the  self.  The  idea  of  containment  here  is  twofold,  it  means  that  each  pole  is  contained  as  a 
moment  or  determination  of  the  contradictory  pole.  It  also  means  that  in  order  for  either  pole 
to  affirm  itself  it  must  contain  its  own  negation  and  sublate  it  as  a  negative  moment  of  itself. 
This  gives  us  not  only  contrary  motions  between  the  poles,  the  interpenetration  of  opposites, 
but  this  interpenetration,  where  they  both  negate  and  affirm  themselves,  produces  a  result. 
The  movement  and  the  interpenetration  of  the  poles  allows  both  poles  to  not  only  express 
the  independence  of  their  polarity,  by  containing  and  negating  its  opposite  pole,  it  also 
posits  that  the  polar  extremes  are  defined  by  their  relation  to  their  specific  opposite;  this  it 
does  as  it  is  the  negation  of  itself. 
The  fact  that  it  contains  both  moments  entails  that  the  positive  result  of  the  process  is 
through  negating  the  other,  their  dialectical  opposition,  becomes,  in  fact,  a  moment  of  its 
own  active  self.  The  polarity  and  interconnection  of  the  dialectical  categories  are  brought 
out  in  their  reciprocal  relation  and  higher  unity;  in  the  resolved  dialectic  that  is  the 
realisation  of  the  substantial  form  activity  and  hence  of  its  determinate  and  specific  nature. 
153 This  gives  us  a  third  form  of  containment,  the  result  of  which  is  the  expression  of  the 
common  content  as  the  subject  with  a  twofold  polar  form;  the  unity  within  the  diversity  that 
affirms  itself  as  a  specific  subject.  The  mediation  of  the  common  content  between  the 
extremes  becomes  the  autonomous  subject  of  the  process,  which  takes  and  casts  off  both 
forms  in  turn,  in  order  to  posit  itself  as  a  being-for-self.  The  polar  reciprocity  is  manifested 
in  its  necessary  form  of  being,  in  the  fundamental  concept  of  the  essential  activities  that 
express  what  it  is  to  be  just  that  kind  of  thing. 
"In  general,  our  consideration  of  the  nature  of  contradiction  has  shown  that  is  not,  so 
to  speak,  a  blemish,  an  imperfection  or  a  defect  in  something  if  a  contradiction  can 
be  pointed  out  in  it.  On  the  contrary,  every  determination,  every  concrete  thing, 
every  Notion,  is  essentially  a  union  of  distinguished  and  distinguishable  moments, 
which,  by  virtue  of  the  determinate,  essential  difference,  pass  over  into  contradictory 
moments.  This  contradictory  side  of  course  resolves  itself  into  nothing,  it  withdraws 
into  its  negative  unity.  Now  the  thing,  the  subject,  the  Notion,  is just  this  negative 
unity  itself,  it  is  inherently  self-contradictory,  but  it  is  no  less  the  contradiction 
resolved:  it  is  the  ground  that  contains  and  supports  its  determinations.  ""' 
Summary. 
To  summarise  some  of  the  points  raised  so  far  in  the  analysis  of  this  chapter;  Hegel  defines 
contradiction  as  a  polar  opposition,  with  the  poles  being  negatively  related  to  each  other  in 
the  same  respect.  Similarly,  self-movement  is  viewed  as  a  process  of  change  and  alteration 
with  something  being  both  itself  and  the  negative  of  itself  in  one  and  the  same  respect. 
A  specialised  contrariety  or  contradiction  entails  that  the  contrary  poles  are  related  as  a 
twofold  form  of  identity  and  a  difference;  this  is  the  source  of  both  their  unity  and 
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154 opposition.  Their  polar  opposition  only  qualifies  as  a  contradiction  if  they  share  a  common 
content  and  ground,  that  is,  if  they  in  fact  are  negatively  related  to  each  other  in  the  same 
respect. 
The  nature  of  "the  same  respect"  is  the  common  identity,  the  genus,  quality,  or  kind.  With 
the  subject  of  the  process,  as  a  negative  unity,  containing  this  specific  difference  as  the  poles 
of  its  contrariety;  as  the  greatest  specific  difference  contained  within  that  common  identity 
or  universal  form.  Or,  alternatively,  as  the  parameters  of  the  process  of  movement  and 
change  of  the  substantial  subject. 
The  central  point  that  has  been  argued  for  in  the  present  analysis  is  the  importance  of 
polarity  as  the  essence  of  Hegel's  dialectical  account  of  contradiction,  and  its  consequent 
central  role  as  the  basis  for  his  dialectical  account  of  law  as  the  movement  of  a 
contradiction.  Hegel's  systematic  development  of  this  is  here  combined  with  some 
important  and  generalised  dialectical  propositions  of  Marx  and  Engels.  Propositions  that 
lead  to  the  following  consequences  for  a  dialectical  viewpoint  and  analysis. 
1.  That  the  polar  opposites  are  both  mutually  exclusive  and  mutually  related. 
2.  That  the  polar  extremes  remain  as  the  parameters  of  the  subject  in  process. 
That  the  self-identity  of  each  of  the  poles  is  also  the  result  of  the  relation  to  its  specific 
opposite.  [Spinoza's  all  determination  is  negation]. 
4.  That  each  pole  contains,  in  itself,  its  relation  to  its  other,  as  its  negation  or  privation,  its 
direct  contrary. 
5.  That  the  poles  are  in  a  mutually  reciprocal  relation,  where  the  polar  extremes  have  a 
mutual  action  and  reaction  from  and  to  each  other. 
6.  That  the  polar  opposition  rests  on  their  mutual  connection. 
7.  That  the  mutual  connection  rests  on  the  common  identity  of  their  polar  opposition. 
8.  That  the  polar  opposites  then,  are  both  separate  and  mutually  connected,  as  such,  they 
interpenetrate,  being  the  extremes  and  the  parameters  of  the  subject  in  process  in  its 
substantial  and  systematic  form  activity. 
155 9.  That  by  negating  its  negation,  by  overcoming  its  own  internal  and  external 
contradiction,  it  realises  its  nature  and  affirms  itself  as  the  subject  of  the  process. 
The  essential  thing  to  grasp  and  hold  on  to,  with  regard  to  a  dialectical  viewpoint,  is  the 
centrality  of  movement,  change,  motion,  and  process.  What  dialectics  as  a  method  seeks  to 
do  is  to  outline  the  general  form  of  working  of  the  laws  of  dialectical  motion  that  are 
universally  valid  for  analysing  the  change  through  contradiction  that  is  a  fundamental  part 
of  the  central  categories  inherent  in  all  substantial  ontology. 
This  fundamental  distinction  sets  a  dialectical  view  apart  from  what  Hegel  describes  as  the 
metaphysical  and  abstract  forms  of  thought.  This  form  of  abstract  philosophical  thought 
operates,  in  the  dialectical  critique,  with  fLxed  and  abstract  categories  that  have  no  necessary 
inner  connection  or  movement  towards  its  fundamental  relational  opposite. 
The  basis  for  a  dialectical  account  of  nomological  activity  rests  upon  the  understanding  of 
the  movement  and  development  of  the  contradiction  contained  in  the  specific  difference  of 
the  characteristic  form  activity  of  the  subject.  The  laws  of  dialectics,  in  this  essentialist 
account,  apply  to  the  substantial  form  activity  of  the  subject,  as  the  motor  force  behind  its 
principle  of  change  and  alteration.  These  laws  pertain  to  both  the  substantial  whole  and  to  its 
parts,  in  their  universal,  particular,  and  individuative  relations  and  manifestations. 
What  is  central  to  this  form  of  analysis  is  to  ascertain  the  source  of  the  principle  of  change 
and  alteration  that  is  inherent  in  the  subject's  characteristic  motion  and  substantial  form 
activity.  There  is  dialectical  motion  and  causation  because  there  are,  at  the  same  time,  two 
opposing  polar  forces  and  forms  giving  rise  to  contrary  and  reciprocal  motions  in  operation. 
The  source  of  this  process  of  movement,  change  and  development  is  the  result  of  the 
interaction  and  interconnected  unity  of  the  polar  parameters  contained  in  the  expression  of 
the  laws  of  dialectics.  It  is  to  the  analysis  of  these  laws  of  motion  that  the  investigation  will 
now  turn  its  attention  towards. 
156 In  a  letter  to  J.  Dietzgen,  (9'  May  1868.  ),  Marx  states  that  the  "true  laws"  of  dialectics  are 
already  contained  in  Hegel,  but  in  a  mystified  form  that  has  to  be  divested  or  stripped  from 
that  idealist  framework.  Marx  and  Engels  conscious  aim  was  to  divest  these  laws  of  motion 
of  dialectics  of  their  mystical  Hegelian  form  and  content.  Engels  outlines  what  he  and  Marx 
considered  to  be  a  necessary  task  in  order  to  extract  the  rational  kernel  of  dialectics  from 
Hegel's  idealist  thought. 
"The  laws  which  Hegel  developed  in  all-embracing  but  mystic  form,  and  which  we 
made  it  one  of  our  aims  to  strip  of  this  mystic  form  and  to  bring  clearly  before  the 
mind  in  their  complete  simplicity  and  universality.  "12' 
Furthermore,  the  systematic  exposition  of  dialectics  postulates  that  a  rational  account  of  law 
is  grounded  on  the  movement  inherent  within  a  contradiction.  Contradiction  and  law  are 
thus  inseparably  bound  together  for,  not  only  Hegel,  but  also  Marx. 
Given  acceptance  of  the  above  elucidation  of  Hegel's  views  on  contradiction  as  the  source 
of,  not  only  a  dialectical  methodology,  but  also  of  nomological  activity,  it  still  leaves  us 
with  one  central  task  to  perform.  The  remaining  question  to  be  answered  is  what  exactly  is 
the  nature  of  Hegel's  analysis  of  law  and  its  essential  relation  to  contradiction?  This  subject 
matter  is  now  the  topic  for  further  investigation. 
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LAW  AND  CONTRADICTION: 
A  PERMANENCE  OF  IMPERMANENCE. 
1.  The  Limits  of  Abstract  Understanding. 
"Two  philosophical  tendencies,  the  metaphysical  with  fixed  categories,  the 
dialectical  (Aristotle  and  especially  Hegel)  with  fluid  categories;  the  proofs  that 
these  fixed  oppositions  of  basis  and  consequence,  cause  and  effect,  identity  and 
difference,  appearance  and  essence  are  untenable,  that  analysis  shows  one  pole 
already  present  in  the  other  in  nuce,  that  at  a  definite  point  the  one  pole  becomes 
transformed  into  the  other,  and  that  all  logic  develops  only  from  these  progressing 
contradictions.  "  116 
Hegel's  account  of  nomological  activity  or  law  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  aspects  of 
Hegel's  thought  to  grasp  and  assimilate.  It  is,  however,  necessary,  in  order  to  ascertain  a 
more  comprehensive  understanding  of  dialectics,  that,  at  the  very  least,  an  attempt  be  made 
on  this  key  question.  To  omit  this  task  would  inevitably  lead  to  a  failure  in  gaining  a  fuller 
understanding  of  dialectics. 
It  is,  however,  notable  that  this  aspect  of  Hegel's  thought  is  largely  side-stepped  by 
commentators  of  whatever  shade  of  opinion;  nevertheless,  in  my  view  the  bullet  has  to  be 
bitten  on  this  one  as  its  nature  is  of  central  importance  for  a  clearer  understanding  of  what  a 
F.  Engels.  Anti-Duhring.  Lawrence  and  Wishart  (1969)  P.  16. 
F.  Engels.  Dialectics  of  Nature.  Progress  Publishers.  (1982.  )  P.  202-203.  Engels  then  goes  on  to 
say  that  this  process  is  "mystical  in  Hegel  himself,  because  the  categories  appear  as  pre-existing  and  the 
dialectics  of  the  real  world  as  their  mere  reflection.  In  reality  it  is  the  reverse:  the  dialectics  of  the  mind  is  only 
the  reflection  of  the  forms  of  motion  of  the  real  world,  both  of  nature  and  of  history.  " 
158 scientific  account  of  dialectics  entails.  The  analysis  of  polarity  and  contradiction,  contained 
in  the  previous  chapter,  will  provide  an  important  foundation  for  extricating  the  mystifýdng 
nature  of  his  argument  here.  "' 
The  argument  contained  in  the  Phenomenology  is  a  highly  complex  and  tortuous  one; 
developed  by  Hegel  in  his  own  inimitable  and  abstruse  fashion.  It  is  further  complicated  by 
the  fact  that  there  is  a  twofold  argument  going  on  at  the  same  time. 
Hegel's  intention  is  to  criticise  what  he  characterises  as  the  "Abstract  Understanding"  and 
the  partial  and  inadequate  account  of  law  that  this  form  of  metaphysics  generates;  the 
abstract  account  of  law,  produced  by  this  form  of  thought,  Hegel  designates  as  the  "first 
supersensible  world".  The  ultimate  aim  though  is  to  positively  set  out  his  own  dialectical 
account  of  nomological  activity,  characterised  by  him  as  the  "second  supersensible  world", 
precisely  through  a  dialectical  critique  of  this  abstract  account. 
Laws  of  motion  require  forces  to  be  in  operation;  a  central  component  and  aim  of  Hegel's 
account  of  law  is,  therefore,  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  the  specific  force, 
and  the  laws  of  motion  expressed  in  the  active  subject.  This  development  of  the  intimate 
connection  between  force  and  its  dialectical  form  of  expression,  and  its  relation  to  the 
explication  of  law,  is  at  the  core  of  his  argument. 
Force,  as  the  active  source  of  both  the  laws  of  motion,  and  the  principle  of  change  and 
alteration  of  the  subject  are,  as  one  would  expect  if  Hegel's  thought  is  to  be  logically 
consistent,  powered  by  the  dynamic  of  polar  contradiction.  There  is  then,  for  Hegel,  an 
intimate  connection  between  polarity  and  law. 
Whilst  the  argument  is  a  highly  complex  and  difficult  one  to  follow,  there  are  some  key 
issues  that  arise  from  it  that  can  be  analytically  set  forth.  The  summary  of  the  argument 
"  The  account  of  nomological  necessity  and  the  relationship  between  force  and  law  is  contained,  in 
its  most  condensed  form,  in  Chapter  Three  of  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  as  "Force  and  the  Understanding: 
159 presented  here  is  of  the  general  criticisms  that  Hegel's  analysis  develops  of  the  abstract 
account.  The  fundamental  problems  with  this  abstract  and  metaphysical  view  of  law  centres 
then  on  the  following  areas  for  Hegel. 
Firstly,  the  contradiction  that  is  expressed  between  the  "incessant  change"  and  the  "unstable 
appearance"  of  the  world,  and  the  abstract  view  of  law  which  is  characterised  by  him  as  an 
"inert  realm";  the  "direct  tranquil  image  of  incessant  change".  This  sets  up  a  dichotomy  for 
Hegel  between  the  external,  phenomenal  world  and  the  force  that  is  exerted  in  it,  in  contrast 
to  the  concept  of  law  generated  by  the  "abstract  understanding". 
Secondly,  this  contradiction  between  the  force  exerted  as  an  "incessant  change"  and  the  law, 
which  interprets  the  "absolute  flux"  of  the  appearance  as  a  simple,  abstract  universal  form  of 
unity,  inevitably  produces,  for  Hegel,  a  "defect  in  the  law". 
Thirdly,  and  following  on  from  the  above,  what  is  missing  in  the  content  of  the  law,  its 
"defect",  is  the  absolute  flux  of  appearance  itself.  What  the  abstract  account  of  law  lacks  is 
the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  that  is  exhibited  in  the  perceived  or  sensuous  world. 
Fourthly,  this  "defect"  in  the  "abstract  understanding"  and  its  account  of  law,  entails  that  the 
polar  expression  of  the  force  when  cognised  in  this  account  of  law,  is  interpreted  in  a  form 
that  is  abstractly  universal  and  indeterminate.  The  polarities  of  the  forces  involved  are 
collapsed  into  an  abstract  simple  unity  that  neither  explains  the  necessity  of  that  division, 
nor  its  specific  difference. 
The  polar  forms  that  express  the  parameters  of  the  force  behind  the  incessant  change  are 
seen,  at  best,  as  the  product  of  an  external  property  and/or  relation  that  manifests  itself  in  the 
form  of  an  external  cause  and  effect.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  two  sides  of  the  relation 
are  not  necessarily  connected  as  an  antithetical  opposition,  as  an  intrinsic  interconnection 
Appearance  and  the  Supersensible  World". 
160 contained  in  a  contradictory  polarity.  The  polar  divisions  are  not  understood  and  cognised  as 
being  related  through  their  own  essential  nature  and  inner  connection. 
This  abstract  account  of  law  of  the  "first  supersensible  world"  cannot  therefore  explain  the 
necessity  of  the  polarity  manifested  in  the  expression  of  force,  as  it  fails  to  account  for  it  as 
a  necessary  inner  difference  exhibited  in  the  law.  As  such  then,  there  is  a  divergence  and 
contradiction  between  the  manifest  expression  of  force  and  this  abstract  account  of  law.  The 
relations  of  force  and  law  are,  according  to  Hegel's  critique  of  this  abstract  account, 
indifferent  to  one  another  when  they  should  have  or  share  a  common  identity. 
Finally,  for  the  analysis  at  present,  the  abstract  account  of  law  also  "transcends  law"  itself 
for  Hegel.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  determinateness  of  the  specific  expressions  of  the 
law,  necessary  to  conceptually  capture  the  flux  of  the  external  changes,  "still  belongs  to 
appearance  or  rather  sensuous  being".  This  puts  the  abstract  account  in  contradiction  with  its 
desired  aim,  of  conceptualising  the  nomological  activity  that  can  rationally  explain  the 
external  phenomenal  flux  of  the  appearance. 
Hegel's  strategy  is  to  show  that  this  outcome  of  the  "abstract  understanding"  cannot,  due  to 
its  own  metaphysical  presuppositions,  fully  capture  the  changes  in  the  appearance  in  its 
conceptual  content  of  the  law.  This  gives  rise,  in  the  Hegelian  account,  to  a  fundamental 
problem  for  the  abstract  understanding  in  its  elucidation  of  law. 
The  central  problem  for  Hegel,  in  this  account  of  law,  is  its  confusion  over  the  relation 
between  its  own  generated  abstract  universal  view,  and  the  specific  differences  that  are 
contained  in  the  manifestation  of  the  law.  The  abstract  understanding  is  driven  beyond  the 
external  play  of  forces  to  what  it  regards  as  the  principle  or  law  inherent  or  underlying  the 
phenomenal  expression;  this  being  the  law  that  governs  all  the  manifestations  of  force.  The 
differences  contained  in  the  force,  and  expressed  in  the  law,  accordingly  become  in  this 
account,  abstractly  universal  and  indeterminate  in  their  nature. 
161 The  dialectical  difference  manifested  in  the  force  is  lost  in  the  abstract  unity,  and  this 
process  of  abstraction,  which,  according  to  Hegel,  "absorbs  the  differences  and  is  indifferent 
to  its  law  -  to  be  positive  and  negative",  means  that  this  view  of  law  and  its  relation  to  force 
is  thus  indifferent  to  its  external  manifestation  and  determinate  being.  This  "abstract  law"  is 
therefore  characterised  by  Hegel  as  "only  the  immediate  raising  of  the  perceived  world  into 
the  universal  element.  " 
In  this  sense  then,  for  Hegel,  this  generalised  abstract  view  of  law  is  a  "tranquil  kingdom  of 
law.  "  The  "absolute  flux"  of  appearance  in  the  manifestation  of  force  remains  external  to 
scientific  cognition.  The  reason  this  is  the  case  is  that  it  collapses  the  specific  expressions  of 
the  law  into  an  abstract  universal  unity.  The  result  of  this  abstract  law  is  then,  "not  the  unity 
of  these  specific  laws,  but  a  law  which  leaves  out  their  specific  character.  " 
By  doing  so  it  thus  separates  force  and  its  specific  expression  in  the  phenomenal  world, 
from  the  conceptual  understanding  of  the  law  of  the  phenomena.  The  central  problem  being 
that  this  view  of  law  expresses  an  indifference  to  this  inner  difference  contained  in  the  law, 
and  manifested  in  the  play  of  forces  in  the  phenomenal  world;  consequently,  the  nature  of 
the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  inherent  in  the  manifestation  of  the  force  remains 
outside  of  this  abstract  cognition  of  the  nomological  activity  pertinent  to  the  subject. 
What  an  "abstract  understanding"  account  fails  to  achieve  for  Hegel  is  to  sufficiently 
cognise  and  explain  the  necessity  of  the  inner  difference  that  is  contained  in  the  force,  and 
which  has  to  therefore  find  its  expression  contained  within  the  law.  As  such,  it  fails  then  to 
explain  the  nature  of  the  specific  difference  that  is  contained  within  its  own  abstract 
universal  form.  The  difference,  as  such,  is  interpreted  as  remaining  constantly  selfsame  in  its 
abstract  unity,  in  that  way  the  difference  is  abstractly  sublated  and  set  aside  in  the  search  for 
the  abstract  simple  universal  that  governs  this  account  of  law. 
This  is  characterised  by  Hegel  as  the  realm  of  the  "first  supersensible  world",  the 
"immediate  copy"  of  the  perceived  world,  where  the  external  relation  and  difference  is  not 
162 cognised  as  a  specific  difference  belonging  to  the  nature  of  the  thing  itself.  What  is  missing 
then  in  this  abstract  account  of  law  is  the  "absolute  flux"  of  appearance  itself,  this  is  the 
central  reason  why  it  is  a  "tranquil  kingdom"  of  law  and  only  the  "immediate  copy"  of,  the 
perceived  world. 
The  characteristic  principle  and  feature  generated  by  this  account  of  law  is  that  "differences 
arise  which  are  no  differences".  The  central  problem  for  this  view  is  that  we  are  left  with  an 
abstract  and  inert  unity  that  does  not  allow  the  change,  motion,  and  alteration  that  takes 
place  in  the  external  world  to  be  fully  cognised  and  integrated  into  the  account  of  the 
nomological  activity  of  the  subject. 
To  summarise  Hegel's  argument  so  far,  there  is  a  twofold  problem  with  this  abstract 
universal  account.  The  twofold  problem  generated  by  the  "abstract  understanding"  is  that 
firstly,  whilst  it  may  recognise  that  there  is  a  difference  contained  in  the  universal,  the 
differences  are  abstractly  absorbed.  The  law  then  does  not  capture  the  nature  of  that 
difference;  in  not  doing  so,  it  also  transcends  both  the  specific  form  of  the  expression  of  the 
law,  and  thus  transcends  a  rational  account  of  law  itself. 
The  second  problem  generated  by  "abstract  understanding"  is  that  if  it  does  concede  that  the 
universal  is  divided  in  itself,  the  difference  of  the  polar  forms  are  not  then  related  to  one 
another  through  their  own  essential  nature  and  universal  connection.  The  determinate 
differences  that  are  phenomenally  expressed  as  independent  and  externally  related 
determinations  of  force  are  sublated  by  the  abstract  universal  unity.  The  difference  is  then 
not  cognised  in  the  form  of  a  process  of  movement  and  change  inherent  to  the  subject  under 
investigation. 
As  this  principle  is  a  specific  difference,  a  contrariety  contained  within  the  universal  itself,  it 
is  also  then  a  form  of  universal  difference,  one  that  is  expressed  in  the  fonn  of  a  polar 
relation;  it  is,  in  a  nutshell,  a  form  of  universal  contradiction.  Negation,  according  to  Hegel, 
163 "is  an  essential  moment  of  the  universal,  and  negation,  or  mediation  in  the  universal,  is 
therefore  a  universal  difference.  " 
The  resultant  problem,  stated  in  the  following  form  by  Hegel,  is  that  the  abstract  universal 
account  of  law  entails  that  the  external  manifestation  of  force  is  indifferent  to  this  abstract 
and  inert  division  in  the  law,  and  the  differences,  the  parts  of  the  law,  are,  for  the  same 
reason,  indifferent  to  one  another.  Law  then  collapses  that  inner  difference  into  a  form  of 
abstraction  that  itself  absorbs  the  differences. 
The  difference  is  a  difference  cognised  within  the  orbit  of  an  abstract  universal  form.  The 
difference,  like  the  universal,  is  perceived  as  an  abstraction,  as  an  inert  and  fixed  predication 
or  quality  that  is  merely  attached  to  or  falls  under  an  abstract  universal  form.  As  an  inert 
unity  where  the  "differences  arise  that  are  no  difference"  for  the  "difference  remains 
constantly  self-same"  in  this  abstract  universal  principle  of  unity. 
Force  and  law  are  thus  not  reconciled  and  cognitively  united  in  the  active  specific  difference 
contained  in  them  both;  the  mutual  reciprocity  and  mutual  exclusivity  of  the  poles  are  not 
connected  in  their  common  content,  as  the  determinate  parameters  inherent  to  the  subject 
under  investigation.  The  specific  difference  contained  in  the  subject  is  not  understood  in  its 
reciprocal  motions  and  interrelations,  as  the  expression  of  a  universal  difference,  as  an 
"inner  difference"  contained  within  the  universal  expression  of  the  force  in  its  twofold  form. 
The  central  point  of  Hegel's  critique  and  his  resolution  of  this  problem  lies  then  in  the 
explication  of  this  "inner  difference"  contained  in  the  expression  of  force  and  law,  and  the 
need  for  it  to  be  interpreted  as  a  universal  containing  a  specific  and  determinate  opposition. 
By  cognising  this  we  can  cognise  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  that  operates  in  the 
external  world. 
To  take  an  example  from  Marx  to  help  illustrate  this  Hegelian  account  of  law,  classical 
political  economy  were,  in  a  sense,  correct  in  positing  labour  in  the  abstract  as  the  source  of 
value,  but  inadequate  in  that  it  could  not  explain  the  specific  difference  contained  within 
164 labour  that  could  explain  the  determinate  social  nature  and  expression  of  value.  That  labour 
is  the  source  of  value  is  formally  correct,  but  not  in  this  case  strictly  true  or  scientific,  for  it 
is  a  specific  mode  of  expression,  a  historical  and  transient  social  form  of  labour  that  is  the 
source  of  the  value  inherent  within  the  commodity. 
Classical  political  economy,  for  Marx,  makes  this  very  error  when  analysing  the  relation  of 
the  use  value  and  the  value  creating  aspects  of  labour,  which,  of  course,  is  itself  the 
expression  of  a  force,  one  that  has  a  twofold  character.  Classical  political  economy,  due  to 
its  abstract  and  inert  uniting  of  the  use  and  value  forms  of  the  commodity,  could  not 
engender  a  rational  account  of  the  specific  difference  and  relation  between  the  dialectic  of 
concrete  and  abstract  labour  that  is  generated  by  this  bifurcation  of  the  labour  power 
embodied  in  the  commodity. 
Its  account  of  labour  in  the  abstract  is  not  the  same  concept  as  Marx's  analysis  of  abstract 
labour.  The  difference,  for  example,  between  the  labour  embodied  within  the  commodity,  as 
an  inner  difference,  is  not  exposed  in  this  analysis;  it  is  an  analysis  that  collapses  them  into 
an  abstract  unity  of  human  labour  as  the  source  of  all  value. 
Marx's  specific  form  of  expression  of  abstract  labour,  and  its  dialectical  relation  with 
concrete  labour,  was  beyond  the  comprehension  of  the  methodology  employed  in  the 
classical  analysis  of  political  economy;  that  is  why,  from  the  perspective  of  Marx's 
dialectical  critique,  it  can  be  designated  as  a  form  of  expression  of  Hegel's  "abstract 
understanding". 
Whilst  there  is  a  very  real  difference  manifested  in  the  social  interactions  of  use  value  and 
value,  of  commodity  and  money,  the  phenomenal  forms  of  the  "play  of  forces"  to  use 
Hegel's  term,  the  source  for  both  these  forms  is  cognised  within  the  generalised  ahistorical 
abstraction  of  labour.  That  labour  was  the  source  of  value  was  not  the  immediate  problem, 
on  that  there  was  general  agreement;  but  how,  and  in  what  specific  form  labour  is  the  source 
that  creates  value  remained  an  unsolved  problematic. 
165 Smith  and  Ricardo's  ahistorical  and  fixed  abstraction  of  labour  and  value  did  not  allow  the 
specific  difference  of  value,  as  a  particular  and  historically  limited  species  of  social 
production,  to  be  analysed  dorrectly. 
"It  is  one  of  the  chief  failings  of  classical  economy  that  it  has  never  succeeded,  by 
means  of  its  analysis  of  commodities,  and,  in  particular,  of  their  value,  in 
discovering  that  form  under  which  value  becomes  exchange  value.  Even  Adam 
Smith  and  Ricardo,  the  best  representatives  of  the  school,  treat  the  form  of  value  as  a 
thing  of  no  importance,  as  having  no  connexion  with  the  inherent  nature  of 
commodities.  The  reason  for  this  is  not  solely  because  their  attention  is  entirely 
absorbed  in  the  analysis  of  the  magnitude  of  value.  It  lies  deeper.  The  value  form  of 
the  product  of  labour  is  not  only  the  most  abstract,  but  is  also  the  most  universal 
form,  taken  by  the  product  in  bourgeois  production,  and  stamps  that  production  as  a 
particular  species  of  social  production,  and  thereby  gives  it  its  special  social 
character.  If  then  we  treat  this  mode  of  production  as  one  eternally  fixed  by  nature 
for  every  state  of  society,  we  necessarily  overlook  that  which  is  the  differentia 
specifica  of  the  value  form,  and  consequently  of  the  commodity  form,  and  of  its 
further  developments,  money  form,  capital  form,  &c.  We  consequently  find  that 
economists,  who  are  thoroughly  agreed  as  to  labour  time  being  the  measure  of  the 
magnitude  of  value,  have  the  most  strange  and  contradictory  ideas  of  money,  the 
perfected  form  of  the  general  equivalent.  ""' 
What  was  posed  by  classical  political  economy  as  the  eternal  source  of  value  was  the 
abstract  universal  of  labour;  an  abstract  concept  of  labour  that  could  not  capture  the  contrary 
and  opposing  forces,  the  "differentia  specifica"  behind  the  phenomenal  forms  of  the 
expression  of  labour  in  its  commodity  and  money  forms. 
118  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  85.  (Footnote.  ) 
166 Whilst  it  was  a  necessary  first  step  in  understanding  the  law  of  the  phenomena,  it  is 
inadequate,  in  its  own  terms,  of  generating  a  more  concrete  analysis  of  the  specific 
difference  contained  within  the  law  of  value.  To  paraphrase  Hegel,  it  is  only  the  raising  of 
the  perceived  world  into  the  universal  element. 
Hegel,  not  unsurprisingly,  is  also  critical  of  the  viewpoint,  which  posits  that  a  necessary 
intrinsic  relation  and  interconnection  is  viewed  as  merely  the  expression  of  an  external 
property,  connection,  or  relation.  The  specific  difference,  for  example,  of  the  positive  and 
negative  poles  inherent  in  magnetism,  is  not  cognised  as  an  inner  essential  difference.  In  the 
abstract  account,  the  specific  difference  expressed  in  the  force  is  nullified  and  absorbed  in 
the  external  manifestation  and  relation. 
"Even  when  the  specific  determinateness  -  say  one  like  Magnetism,  for  example,  -  is 
in  itself  concrete  or  real,  the  Understanding  degrades  it  into  something  lifeless, 
merely  predicating  it  of  another  existent  thing,  rather  than  cognising  it  as  the 
immanent  life  of  the  thing,  or  cognising  its  native  and  unique  way  of  generating  and 
expressing  itself  in  that  thing.  The  formal  Understanding  leaves  it  to  others  to  add 
this  principle  feature.  Instead  of  entering  into  the  immanent  content  of  the  thing,  it  is 
forever  surveying  the  whole  and  standing  above  the  particular  existence  of  which  it 
is  speaking,  i.  e.  it  does  not  see  it  at  all.  Scientific  cognition,  on  the  contrary, 
demands  surrender  to  the  life  of  the  object,  or  what  amounts  to  the  same  thing, 
confronting  and  expressing  its  inner  necessity.  ""' 
Consequently,  the  twofold  polarity  manifested  in  the  force  is  not  understood  as  a  necessary 
connection;  the  positive  and  negative  poles  of  their  nomological  expression  arc  thus  left 
essentially  unexplained,  as  there  is  no  account  of  the  necessity  of  their  intrinsic 
interconnection  in  the  subject.  This  further  entails  that  as  the  polar  forms  have  no 
explainable  necessary  connection,  they  appear  indifferent  to  the  inner  relation. 
167 Moreover,  the  universal  form  is  also  then  apparently  indifferent  to  its  own  polar 
manifestation.  They  merely  exert  their  forces  and  nomological  activity  in  their  external 
relations;  the  appearance  of  force  and  its  nomological  corollary  are  thus  cognitively 
divorced..  This  "notion  of  force"  is  then,  for  Hegel,  "an  abstraction  which  absorbs  the 
differences  of  what  attracts  and  what  is  attracted.  "  Force  and  its  expression  in  law  are 
inevitably  then,  a  cognitive  failure  for  the  critical  dialectic  of  this  abstract  view. 
What  Hegel  is  essentially  driving  at  here,  in  his  critique  of  abstract  understanding,  is  that  the 
ontological  contradiction  has  to  be  viewed  as  an  inner  difference  in  the  subject's  activity 
that  determines  the  nature  and  parameters  of  that  subject's  activity.  The  polar  forms  interact 
and  interpenetrate  through  the  dynamic  contradiction  contained  in  the  twofold  relation  of  the 
substantial  force  that  is  expressed  in  its  phenomenal  manifestations  and  relations. 
The  principle  of  change  and  alteration,  the  movement  of  the  interpenetration  of  the  polar 
parameters,  represents  not  only  the  specific  difference  and  division  within  its  being,  but  the 
force  expressed  in  that  necessary  inner  division  of  the  substantial  relation  has  to  be  reflected 
in  the  understanding  of  its  nomological  form  activity.  This  dialectic  inherent  in  force  and 
law  for  Hegel,  is  thus  the  key  to  Marx's  critique  of  classical  political  economy  and  his 
resolution  of  the  nature  and  substance  of  value  itself. 
Marx's  account  of  the  value  form  will  reject  the  value  relation  being  analysed  as  merely  the 
result  of  an  external  property  and  relation;  value  is  not  based  on  external  accident  or 
relational  contingency,  but  on  a  substantial  nature  that  is  expressed  in  its  necessary 
determinations  and  objective  relations. 
There  is  a  distinction  made  in  the  dialectical  critique,  between  the  necessity  of  the  division, 
for  example,  that  the  commodity  has  both  a  use  value  and  an  exchange  value  form,  and  the 
necessity  of  the  twofold  nature  of  that  division,  their  nomological  division.  Classical 
political  economy  had  the  former  but  not  the  latter  in  its  abstract  analysis  of  value. 
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168 This  was  due  to  the  lack  of  understanding  of  the  specific  difference  and  expression  of  the 
dialectic  of  the  twofold  concrete  and  abstract  forms  of  labour,  the  substantial  dialectical 
force  and  power  contained  within  the  twofold  nature  of  the  generalised  commodity  forin. 
Value  is  the  product  of  the  development  of  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour  power,  both 
concrete  and  natural,  abstract  and  social,  that  is  embodied  within  the  commodity  form.  It  is 
the  substantial  activity  of  abstract  human  labour  power,  as  an  alienated  social  form  of  labour 
manifested  in  the  product  of  labour,  the  commodity,  that  explains  the  apparently  contingent 
and  accidental  appearance  of  the  simple  value  form  and  its  twofold  expression  in  the 
relation  of  the  relative  and  equivalent  forms  of  value. 
How  though  does  Hegel  attempt  to  dialectically  resolve  what  he  sees  as  the  inherent 
problems  of  abstract  understanding  in  its  account  of  law?  By  attempting  to  elucidate  this 
essential  aspect  of  Hegel's  dialectical  account  of  law,  it  should  in  turn,  provide  valuable 
connections  with  Marx's  value  theory  that  will  allow  his  dialectical  method  and  critique  of 
political  economy  to  be  more  thoroughly  investigated  and  understood. 
2.  A  Permanence  of  Impermanence. 
"We  have  to  think  pure  change,  or  think  antithesis  within  the  antithesis  itself,  or 
contradiction.  For  in  the  difference  which  is  an  inner  difference,  the  opposite  is  not 
merely  one  of  two  -  if  it  were,  it  would  simply  be,  without  being  an  opposite  -  but  it 
is  the  opposite  of  an  opposite,  or  the  other  is  itself  immediately  present  in  it.  ""' 
The  resolution  of  the  nature  and  relation  of  the  specific  and  inner  difference  lies  in  not  only 
accepting  that  there  is  a  common  unity  that  is  the  underlying  source  of  the  twofold  form,  but 
that  this  twofold  polar  form  has  to  be  integrated  into  the  account,  as  a  dialectic  of  identity 
and  difference.  Hegel's  formulation  of  this  transition  is  quite  mystical  in  its  expression, 
169 however,  there  has  to  be  some  attempt  to  make  sense  of  his  argument  here  as  it  is  crucial  for 
a  fuller  account  of  dialectic. 
What  Hegel  generates  is  a  second  principle,  which  both  supersedes  the  first  principle 
generated  by  the  "abstract  understanding"  and  contains  it  as  moment  or  determination;  this 
is  the  realm  of  the  "second  supersensible  world".  The  ahn  of  the  analysis  here  is  to  integrate 
the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  into  the  account  of  law  in  order  to  adequately  capture 
the  principle  of  movement  and  change  in  the  phenomenal  expression  of  the  force 
underpinning  the  law. 
This  dialectic  inherent  in  appearance  has  to  be  integrated  into  what  Hegel  calls  the  "law  of 
appearance"  in  order  to  explain  the  flux  of  change  in  the  phenomenal  play  of  forces.  The 
"law  of  appearance"  states,  like  its  abstract  predecessor  that  "differences  arise  which  are  no 
differences";  this  is  alternatively  expressed  by  Hegel  in  the  form  of  the  universal  abstraction 
that  the  "seýf-same  repels  itself  from  itself". 
What  is  also  contained  in  the  "law  of  appearance"  for  Hegel  is  "that  the  differences  are  only 
such  as  are  in  reality  no  differences  and  which  cancel  themselves;  in  other  words,  what  is 
not  setf-same  is  seVlattractive.  "  Here,  we  have  a  principle  of  dialectical  change  and 
alteration  expounded  as  a  process  where  "like  becomes  unlike  and  unlike  becomes  like.  " 
The  dialectic  of  the  forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction,  as  we  shall  analyse  later  in  the  thesis, 
provides  the  source  for  this  Hegelian  account  of  the  phenomenal  manifestation  and  polar 
interaction  of  the  force  and  law.  This  dialectic  generates  a  new  principle  of  law  that  is  in 
opposition  to  that  previously  generated  by  abstract  understanding. 
"And  thus  we  have  a  second  law  whose  content  is  the  opposite  of  what  was 
previously  called  law,  viz.  Difference  which  remains  constantly  selfsame;  for  this 
new  law  expresses  rather  that  like  becomes  unlike  and  unlike  becomes  like.  The 
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170 Notion  demands  of  the  thoughtless  thinker  that  he  bring  both  laws  together  and 
become  aware  of  their  antithesis.  The  second  is  certainly  also  a  law,  an  inner  self- 
identical  being,  but  a  selfsameness  rather  of  the  unlike,  a  permanence  of 
impermanence.  ""' 
Only  then  is  it  difference  as  an  "inner  difference",  as  a  difference  in  its  own  self,  or,  for 
Hegel,  difference  as  "infinity".  That  is,  only  then  is  it  a  form  of  nomological  and  universal 
difference;  only  then  is  it  a  form  of  universal  contradiction.  The  cognising  of  the  principle  of 
change  and  alteration,  as  an  inner  difference,  is  then  the  key  element  of  Hegel's  dialectical 
resolution  and  analysis  of  the  relation  of  force  and  its  expression  and  law. 
Taken  together,  both  these  principles  are,  for  Hegel,  the  inverted  expression  of  the 
phenomenal  world.  In  this  "inverted  world"  the  inner  difference  contained  in  the  law  now 
reflects  the  contrary  forms  of  the  phenomenal  play  of  forces.  The  result  is  an  "inverted 
world"  where  the  essence  is  the  inversion  of  the  flux  in  the  appearance;  an  appearance 
where  the  contrary  play  of  forces  were  cognised  by  the  "abstract  understanding"  as 
I  externally  and  not  intrinsically  related. 
The  difference  in  the  flux  of  the  twofold  force  of  external  appearance  is  now  cognised  as 
being  both  an  inner  difference  and  identity  between  the  polar  forces;  that  difference  is  both 
posited  and  cancelled  in  their  dialectical  movement  and  relation.  For  Hegel,  the  polar 
reciprocity  now  contained  in  the  relation  of  force  and  law  entails  that  "it  is  itself  and  its 
OPPOS  I ite  in  one  unity.  " 
"Each  of  the  two  worlds  is  really  the  opposite  of  itself.  The  se4fsame  really  repels 
itself  from  itself,  and  what  is  not  selfsame  really  posits  itself  as  selfsame.  In  point  of 
fact,  it  is  only  when  thus  determined  that  the  difference  is  inner  difference,  or  the 
difference  in  its  own  se4f,  the  like  being  unlike  itself,  and  the  unlike,  like  itself.  ""' 
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171 The  result  of  this  for  Hegel  is  that  "the  inverted  world"  of  the  universal  law  is  now  the  direct 
opposite  and  corollary  of  the  phenomenal  world  through  the  raising  of  cognition  to  the  level 
of  the  "second  supersensible  world.  "  As  the  first  "supersensible  world"  was  only  the 
"immediate  raising  of  the  perceived  world  into  the  universal  element"  or  law,  the  problem 
was  that  the  perceived  world  "retained  for  itseýf  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration.  " 
This  principle  of  change  and  alteration  is  now  reflected  in  the  law  itself,  in  the  movement  of 
the  universal  whose  active  dialectical  process  consists  of  the  subject,  in  its  phenomenal 
expression  of  a  twofold  force,  being  characterised  in  its  activity  as  "self-sundering  and 
becoming  self-identical.  "  The  polar  opposition  is  now  characterised  as  an  "inner  difference" 
of  the  universal,  as  a  universal  difference  that  contains  a  twofold  external  expression  whose 
polar  independence  is  cancelled  in  the  relation  and  higher  common  unity. 
The  principle  of  change  and  alteration,  inherent  in  the  process  of  phenomenal  change,  is  the 
contradiction  that  is  posited  and  resolved  in  the  contrary  movements  of  force  as  the  active 
polar  expression  of  the  substantial  form  activity.  An  activity  that  both  posit  the  opposite 
poles  of  the  relation  as  independent  moments,  and  resolves  that  external  contradiction 
through  the  mutual  interpenetration  and  transformation  of  those  opposites. 
By  doing  so  the  subject  manifests  itself  in  the  higher  unity  of  that  common  content  that 
mediates  the  inner  difference  of  the  polar  extremes  that  are  the  parameters  of  the  substantial 
form  activity  of  the  subject.  This  it  does  through  the  positing  and  superseding  of  the  specific 
difference  and  division  of  the  substantial  form  activity  in  relation  to  its  own  privation  and 
negation,  as  the  expression  of  a  "specialised  contrariety.  " 
This  account  of  nomological  activity  directly  ties  in  with  the  essentialist  analysis  of 
substance  and  contradiction  in  Hegel  that  was  analysed  earlier;  as  a  specific  difference  that 
is  expressed  in  the  dialectic  of  its  internal  and  external  forms  of  polar  opposition.  The  two 
172 combined  elements,  of  a  substantial  force  in  its  twofold  dialectical  forms  of  expression,  now 
give  us  a  nomological  foundation  for  the  rational  account  of  substantial  activity. 
This  dialectical  process  of  the  nomological  activity  is  established  as  the  stable  ground  and 
existence  for  the  opposition  contained  within  the  substantial  subject  to  posit  and  resolve  its 
contradiction.  This  is  essentially  why,  for  a  scientific  account  of  law,  we  have  to,  according 
to  Hegel,  "think  antithesis  within  the  antithesis  itseýf,  or  contradiction.  " 
At  the  end  of  the  Hegelian  analysis  of  this  process,  the  result  of  the  interpenetration  of  these 
opposite  laws  of  motion  that  are  contained  as  an  inner  difference  in  a  dialectical  account  of  a 
systematic  subject,  is  that  the  fusion  of  the  contrary  movement  between  the  poles  is  resolved 
in  the  affirmation  of  the  identity  of  the  subject. 
"The  different  moments  of  sey-sundering  and  becoming  sey-identical  are  therefore 
likewise  only  this  movement  of  setf-supersession.  "  133 
This  movement  of  self-supersession  is  achieved  through  the  dialectic  of  negativity  as  the 
moving  and  generating  principle;  this  dynamic  is  expressed  in  the  process  as  i  determinate 
negation,  and  resolved  as  the  self-affirmation  through  the  negation  of  that  determinate 
negation.  It  is  precisely  by  analysing  the  nature  of  the  determinate  negation  or  the  "inner 
difference"  involved  in  the  form  activity  that  allows  the  cognition  of  the  substantial  nature 
of  the  specific  difference  in  its  polar  division  and  dynamic  expression  to  be  cognised  and 
outlined. 
This  contrariety  in  its  essential  character,  as  the  parameters  of  the  external  process  of 
change,  is  the  source  for  the  laws  of  motion  of  the  subject.  This  is  the  dialectical  principle  of 
change  and  alteration  that  Marx  applies  to  the  dialectic  of  labour  and  its  subsumption  under 
the  forms  and  mediations  of  value.  Alternatively,  it  is  how  value  arises  and  becomes  the 
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173 subject  of  the  movement  and  process  through  the  self-mediating  dialectic  of  abstract  and 
concrete  labour  as  the  source  of  its  principle  of  change  and  alteration. 
Hegel's  criticism  of  abstract  understanding,  and  its  account  of  law,  centred  then  on  its 
inability  to  capture  that  a  concrete  analysis  of  a  universal  kind  and  nature  required 
understanding  that  its  particular  and  specific  forms  are  expressed  in  the  contrary  parameters 
and  motions  inherent  in  their  process  of  change. 
Hegel's  trenchant  criticisms  of  an  abstract  understanding  of  force  and  law  finds,  in  my 
analysis,  its  materialist  resonance  in  Marx's  critical  conception  of  the  limitations  of  classical 
political  economy.  Value,  as  abstract  human  labour  power,  the  social  form  of  the  product  of 
commodified  labour  power,  actualises  itself  by  duplicating  itself;  by  self-sundering  and 
becoming  self-identical. 
This  general  dialectical  account  of  law  developed  by  Hegel  and  applied  to  the  specific  forms 
of  labour  contained  in  the  value  relation  by  Marx,  is  now  the  subject  matter  of  the  argument. 
A  further  analysis  of  this  twofold  character  of  labour  power  as  a  force,  in  this  case  a  force 
that  is  both  natural  and  social  in  its  expression  and  its  relation,  to  the  substance  and  form  of 
the  law  of  value  is  therefore  necessary  in  order  to  tease  out  and  further  develop  the  present 
line  of  investigation. 
What  is  of  importance  to  bring  out  is  the  connection  that  I  am  trying  to  make  between 
Marx's  analysis  and  usage  of  the  concept  of  labour  power,  and  Hegel's  view  of  the  relation 
between  force  and  law. 
3.  Force  and  Labour  Power. 
What  separates  Marx  from  his  predecessors  in  classical  political  economy  is  the  twofold 
character  of  labour,  or  to  be  more  precise  in  my  analysis,  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour 
power  that  is  embodied  in  the  commodity.  The  specific  expression  of  labour  power  in  the 
174 form  of  abstract  human  labour,  as  the  force  and  substance  of  value,  is  the  key  to  Marx's 
scientific  understanding  of  the  law  of  value. 
This  dialectical  conception  of  the  diremption  and  specific  difference  contained  in  the 
twofold  character  of  the  labour  embodied  in  the  commodity  is  the  source  of  the  expression 
of  a  force  and  law.  The  law  that  is  in  operation  is  the  law  of  value,  and  the  force 
underpinning  this  is  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour  power  embodied  within  the 
commodity  form. 
The  connection  between  labour  power  and  the  law  of  value  is  thus  imperative  for  a  clearer 
comprehension  of  value,  as  it  is  the  foundation  and  the  social  force  behind  the  expression  of 
the  law  of  value.  It  thus  has  to  be,  in  my  view,  necessarily  reflected  and  located  in  the 
analysis  of  the  very  nomological  nature  and  substance  of  value  itself.  As  we  shall  see,  this 
strategy  is  at  the  core  of  Marx's  dialectical  analysis  of  value. 
Classical  political  economy,  by  not  having  a  clearly  defined  dialectical  distinction  and 
difference  between  concrete  and  abstract  labour,  could  not  fully  ascertain  both  the  nature  of 
value,  and  consequently  coherently  explain  the  contrary  motions  of  use  and  exchange  value, 
of  concrete  and  abstract  labour,  contained  in  the  expression  of  the  law  of  value. 
The  exercise  and  expenditure  of  labour  power  under  the  specificities  of  the  value  form 
produces  a  twofold  result.  It  also  produces  a  twofold  content  and  form.  The  commodity 
form  expresses  this  in  its  dual  nature,  being  both  a  use  value  and  a  value.  The  concrete 
labour  producing  a  use  value  form,  and  the  abstract  universal  labour  producing  a  value  form, 
the  twofold  natural  and  social  expressions  of  the  commodity  form  itself.  A  twofold  result, 
like  a  twofold  effect,  requires  a  twofold  cause,  given  that,  as  Aristotle  expresses  it,  contrary 
effects  need  and  require  contrary  causes. 
Concrete  labour  power,  expressed  as  a  force,  is  relatively  unproblematic;  it  forms  the  use 
value  from  the  materials  and  instruments  of  labour  employed  in  the  productive  activity. 
175 What  the  exact  nature  of  the  type  of  labour  that  produces  value,  and  how  it  comes  to 
subsume  its  dialectically  opposite  form,  concrete  labour,  as  a  moment  and  determination  of 
itself,  is  however  a  little  more  problematic  to  ascertain. 
Labour  itself  is  a  power  and  the  specific  social  and  value  form  of  labour  power,  abstract 
human  labour  power,  according  to  Marx,  is  the  force  and  substance  behind  the  phenomenal 
expression  of  the  law  of  value.  The  analysis  of  the  specific  nature  of  this  substance  and  force 
that  is  the  source  of  the  value  form,  itself  congealed  and  objectified  in  the  product  of 
materialised  concrete  labour,  is  the  key  to  unlocking  the  nature  and  operation  of  value  and 
the  laws  of  motion  of  value.  "' 
It  is,  as  Marx  notes,  a  fundamental  peculiarity  of  Iabour  under  the  value  form  that  the 
amount  of  labour  power  expended  and  embodied  in  the  commodity  and  measured  in  time 
becomes  an  objective  social  quality  of  the  product  of  labour.  This  "differentia  specifica  of 
the  value  form"  marks  it  out  from  all  other  forms  of  human  social  labour. 
Now  abstract  labour,  or  abstract  human  labour  power,  is,  for  Marx,  the  source  of  the  social 
substance  of  value.  As  such,  it  has  a  substantial  form  activity,  but  this  still  begs  the  question 
as  to  what  the  exact  nature  of  this  peculiar  and  specific  social  substance  actually  is,  and  how 
it  realises  this  active  and  peculiar  social  nature? 
The  labour  power  that  forms  the  substance  of  value  is  social  rather  than  physiological  in  its 
nature,  it  is  the  totality  of  the  expenditure  of  the  labour  power  of  society  reduced  to  its 
average  form,  its  general  and  universal  form  of  simple  human  labour  power.  It  is  simple 
131  Marx,  in  a  letter  to  Engels  (8h  January  1868.  ),  states  that  there  are  three  fundamentally  new 
elements  in  his  analysis  of  capital.  These  new  elements,  in  contrast  to  classical  political  economy,  show  that 
firstly  Marx  begins,  unlike  his  predecessors,  by  dealing  with  the  generalforin  of  surplus  value. 
Secondly,  the  double  character  of  labour,  which  Marx informs  us,  is  "in  fact  the  whole  secret  of  the 
critical  conception.  " 
Thirdly,  that  he  reveals  how  wages  are  the  irrational  outward  form  of  a  hidden  relationship.  Marx 
Engels.  Collected  Works.  Letters.  Volume  42.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1987.  )  P.  514.  It  is  this  second  element 
that  is  of  special  interest  at  the  moment,  though,  it  should  be  noted,  that  the  general  form  of  surplus  value  will 
176 unskilled  human  labour  power  that  is  the  source  of  all  the  values  of  both  the  products  of 
labour  and  the  cost  of  labour  power  itself. 
The  emphasis  that  I  place  on  the  importance  of  labour  power  is  a  surprisingly  novel 
interpretation  of  Marx's  account  of  abstract  labour  and  the  role  of  labour  power  in  the 
process  of  value  creation  and  realisation.  However,  there  are  two  possible  objections  to  this 
analysis  and  stress  on  labour  power  as  the  key  to  unlocking  the  nature  of  Marx's  account  of 
the  law  of  value  and  abstract  labour. 
These  are  based  firstly  on  the  idea  that  labour  power  is  not  in  itself  value,  a  point  that  I  agree 
with,  and  which  is  itself  clearly  expressed  by  Marx.  However,  though  labour  power  is  not  in 
itself  value,  it  is,  in  its  objective  expression  and  embodiment  in  the  commodity  form,  its 
"jelly"  or  "congealed  state",  the  creator  of  value. 
Secondly,  and  related  to  the  former,  is  that  Marx  does  not  have  a  physiological  or  materio- 
technical  conception  of  value.  This  view  has  been  most  forcefully  expressed  in  the  work  of 
I.  I.  Rubin.  Again  I  agree  that  this  is  the  case;  my  view  of  abstract  labour  as  simple  human 
labour  power  is  not  fundamentally  natural  and  anthropological  but  social  in  its  nature  and 
expression.  135 
Rubin  assumes  that  labour  power  has  to  be  viewed  either  solely  physiologically,  as  an 
ahistorical  and  natural  characteristic,  or  in  a  material-technical  sense  when,  in  fact,  Marx 
be  generated  and  derived  from  the  application  of  the  general  form  of  working  of  dialectic  to  the  twofold 
character  of  the  labour  power  that  is  embodied  in  the  commodity. 
"I  I.  I.  Rubin.  Essays  on  Marx's  Theory  of  Value.  Black  and  Red.  (1972.  )  See  the  chapter  on  Abstract 
Labour  for  his  argument  against  a  physiological  conception  of  value  as  abstract  labour.  Pages  131-158.  The 
position  I  am  attempting  to  put  forward  is  based  on  a  critical  account  of  the  following  view.  Labour  power  is 
not  itself  value  however  it  is  the  source  that  creates  value.  At  the  same  time,  value  is  a  social  entity  or  form, 
and  independent  and  atomised  concrete  labour  only  produces  a  use  value.  It  would  seem  then  that  value, 
though  it  presupposes  physical  and  concrete  labour,  couldn't  be  based  on  that  independent  concrete  labour 
employed  in  the  productive  process,  for  value  is  a  social  and  not  a  physiological  product,  and  labours;  are 
socially  equated  as  values  only  through  exchange.  This  view  of  Rubin's,  expressed  in  his  book,  contains  a 
problem  however,  that  value  only  then  seems  really  to  exist  and  manifest  itself  in  exchange. 
177 also  has  a  social  characterisation  of  labour  power  in  the  process  of  both  value  creation  and 
realisation. 
This,  social  nature  and  reified  expression  of  labour  power  however,  is  specific  and  peculiar 
to  the  commodity  form  of  the  product  of  labour  and  no  other  social  form  of  labour. 
Otherwise,  value  would  exist  in  all  forms  of  human  society,  as  labour  power  is  expressed  in 
all  modes  of  social  labour,  as  the  active  nature  of  the  human  subject. 
What  abstract  labour  betokens  is  the  fact  that  all  the  determinate  products  of  private  or 
individual  labour  manifested  in  the  world  of  commodities  have  a  value.  This  social  value 
form  of  the  expression  of  human  labour  power  is  only  manifested  and  realised  in  the 
circulation  and  exchange  of  connnodities.  The  further  question  generated  by  this  though,  is 
where  is  the  value  substance  of  the  commodity  created? 
In  particular,  this  has  expressed  itself  in  the  following  question;  that  of  the  relation  between 
the  process  of  value  creation  and  value  realisation  in  Marx's  analysis  of  the  operation  of 
capital  as  a  mode  of  production  and  circulation  of  value  and  surplus  value.  This  social 
characterisation  of  the  category  of  labour  power  in  Marx  is  missing  from  Rubin's  account, 
and  is,  in  my  view,  the  hidden  source  and  solution  to  the  debate  over  this  vexed  question 
that  has  been  generated  by  his  work.  136 
Marx  himself,  in  my  view,  gives  the  answer  to  this  question  in  volume  one  of  Capital,  and  I 
will  address  this  answer  of  Marx  to  the  dilemma  derived  from  Rubin's  work  later  in  the 
thesis.  To  summarise  the  investigation  so  far,  the  advantages,  in  my  view,  of  laying  stress  on 
136  1.1.  Rubin.  Abstract  Labour  and  Value  in  Marx's  System.  Capital  and  Class.  Number  5.  (Summer 
1978.  )  P.  107-139.  In  this  later  article,  he  does  attempt  to  rectify  this  problematic  area  and  argue  for  the  view, 
contained  in  Marx,  that  value  is  created  in  production  and  realised  in  exchange.  The  problem  is  that  he  offers 
no  adequate  account  of  how  this  process  is  realised  that  would  avoid  us  from  the  tendency  of  lapsing  into  a 
physiological  or  material-technical  argument  for  the  creative  source  of  value  and  not,  as  he  correctly  points 
out,  a  social  origin.  This  lacuna  in  his  argument  notwithstanding,  much  of  Rubin's  analysis  has  been  both  an 
important  and  rightly  influential  contribution  in  developing  a  more  rigorous  understanding  of  Marx's 
fundamental  concept  of  abstract  labour. 
178 the  importance  of  labour  power  for  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  Marx's  analysis 
consists  largely,  but  not  exhaustively,  in  the  following  points. 
Firstly,  it  allows  the  intrinsic  relation  between  a  force  manifesting  itself  and  the  laws  of 
motion  of  the  substantial  subject  in  its  characteristic  activity,  to  be  more  fully  brought  out 
into  the  open  in  the  analysis.  Laws  of  motion  require  forces,  and  these  forces  have  both  a 
substantial  form  activity  and  a  materialised  content.  The  analysis  of  the  twofold  form  and 
content  of  the  force  allows  its  nomological  activity  to  be  better  comprehended.  This  general 
nature  is  central  to  the  strategy  that  Marx  employs  in  his  critical  conception  of  all  the 
relations  that  are  subsumed  under  the  value  form. 
Secondly,  the  dialectical  basis  for  this  movement  of  an  interpenetrating  contradiction,  where 
the  force  receives  its  due  expression  in  the  account  of  law,  provides  the  basis  for  a  deeper 
understanding  of  that  substantial  form  activity  of  value.  The  integration  of  force  with  law 
allows  for  a  more  penetrating  connection  to  be  made  in  the  dialectical  understanding  of  the 
law  of  value. 
Thirdly,  the  pivot  for  a  scientific  comprehension  of  value,  as  Marx  stresses,  lies  in  the 
analysis  of  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour  power  that  is  embodied  within  the  commodity 
form.  This  distinction  within  labour  finds  its  origins  in  the  bifurcation  of  the  labour  power 
that  is  expressed  in  the  natural  and  social  forms  of  the  commodity. 
Fourthly,  by  introducing  the  importance  of  the  category  of  alienated  labour  power  early  on 
in  the  analysis,  it  highlights  its  importance  for  not  only  a  fuller  understanding  of  the  social 
substance  of  abstract  labour  and  value;  it  also  lays  the  basis  for  a  better  comprehension  of 
Marx's  later  usage  of  it  in  the  labour  process  itself.  That  way  the  category  of  alienated 
labour  power  has  not  fallen  from  the  sky  to  enter  the  production  process  of  capital,  but  has 
179 already  been  logically  introduced  from  the  outset  as  a  central  core  element;  as  the  essence  of 
the  analysis  of  the  substance  of  value  itself.  137 
Last,  and  by  no  means  least  for  the  comprehension  of  a  rational  form  of  dialectic,  it  allows 
for  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  importance  of  Hegel  for  Marx's  thought  to  be  further 
developed. 
With  the  above  points  in  mind,  what  is  now  necessary  is  to  further  elaborate  this 
relationship  between  Hegel's  account  of  force  and  law,  and  Marx's  employment  of  it  in  the 
analysis  of  abstract  labour,  the  value  form,  and  the  law  of  value  in  chapter  one  of  volume 
one  of  Capital.  It  is  now  time  to  further  analyse  how  Marx  develops  his  unique  concept  of 
abstract  labour  as  the  social  substance  of  value,  and  the  role  of  labour  power  in  the 
explication  of  a  scientific  account  of  the  law  of  value  itself. 
"I  Marx  also  seems  to  indicate  the  importance  of  establishing  this  relation  in  the  following  passage 
from  the  Marginal  Notes  on  Wagner.  Here  he  is  explaining  the  importance  of  the  twofold  character  of  labour 
embodied  in  the  commodity.  "the  concrete  modes  of  labours  which  create  use-values,  and  of  abstract  labour, 
of  labour  as  expenditure  of  human  labour  power,  irrespective  of  what  'useful'  manner  it  is  expended  in 
(which  is  the  basis  for  the  presentation  of  the  process  of  production,  later  on);  ...  the  fact  that  surplus-value 
itself  is  derived  from  a  use-value  of  labourpower  which  is  'specific'  and  applies  exclusively  to  it,  etc.,  etc.  "  K. 
180 CHAPTER  NINE. 
FORCE,  LAW,  AND  VALUE. 
1.  Abstract  Labour. 
"Where  science  comes  in  is  to  show  how  the  law  of  value  asserts  itself.  "  138 
Value,  for  Marx,  does  not  stalk  about  with  a  label  telling  us  what  it  is.  Moreover,  as  it  is  a 
reified  social  form  of  labour,  value  thus  seems  to  be  an  inherent  property  of  all  labour,  as 
natural  and  material  as  the  use  value  of  the  commodity  itself.  Value,  though,  is  exclusively 
social  in  its  nature  and  origins,  and  its  social  foundations  are  revealed  in  Marx's  concept  of 
abstract  labour.  What  is  though,  the  mysterious  nature  of  this  peculiar  social  substance? 
Value,  as  abstract  human  labour  power,  is  a  historically  specific  social  form  and  result.  It 
then  has,  however,  a  historically  specific  and  determinate  social  nature,  and  that  peculiar 
nature  is  fundamentally  related  to  the  social  form  of  expressing  the  objectification  of  the 
labour  power  embodied  within  the  commodity. 
What  determines  its  specific  social  nature  and  content  is,  at  the  same  time,  the  common 
source  that  universalises  and  generalises  the  myriad  and  specific  forms  of  concrete  labour 
itself  through  the  act  of  exchange.  Part  of  the  peculiarity  of  grasping  the  mystifying  nature 
of  value  as  abstract  labour  lies  in  the  concept,  developed  by  Marx,  of  homogeneous  and 
simple  human  labour  power;  the  socialising  source  and  substantial  force  behind  the 
expression  of  the  category  of  value. 
Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  New  Park  Publications.  (1976.  )  P.  216.  The  development  of  this  relation 
provides  the  solution  to  the  dilemma  in  Rubin's  account. 
181 A  social  category,  which  posits  that  human  labour  power  has  been  embodied  within  the 
commodity  in  the  production  process,  and  can  thus  be  equated  and  exchanged  for  all  the 
other  myriad  forms  of  concrete  and  privately  produced  labour.  The  essence  of  the  value 
relation  of  the  commodity  form  is  that  it  expresses,  in  an  abstract  and  homogeneous  social 
form,  that  human  labour  power  has  been  expended  in  their  production. 
"The  commodities  social  form  is  their  relationship  to  one  another  as  equal  labour; 
hence  -  since  the  equality  toto  coelo  (utterly)  different  labour  can  only  consist  in  an 
abstraction  from  their  inequality  -  their  relationship  to  one  another  as  human  labour 
in  general:  expenditures  of  human  labour  power,  which  is  what  all  human  labours  - 
whatever  their  content  and  mode  of  operation  -  actually  are.  "  139 
In  the  value  form,  all  labour  is  equateable  with  all  other  forms  of  labour.  This  historical 
evolution  and  development  of  all  labour  as  having  the  character  of  being  abstract  human 
labour,  only  fully  establishes  itself  in  a  system  based  on  capital  accumulation;  as  the  mode 
of  commodity  production  and  exchange  that  expresses  its  more  completely  formed  nature. 
The  social  totality  of  labour  thus  manifests  itself  as  a  world  of  commodities. 
Abstract  human  labour  power  is  labour  power  that  is,  by  its  very  nature,  indifferent  to  its 
particular  concrete  manifestation.  What  abstract  labour  is  saying  in  its  social  relation,  in  the 
value  language  of  commodities,  is  that  all  the  myriad  of  particular  concrete  forms  of  labour 
can  be  socially  equated  by  dint  of  the  fact  that  they  are  all  particular  embodiments  and 
expressions  of  human  labour  power.  This  social  equalisation  of  all  concrete  labours  can  only 
be  socially  expressed  by  homogenising  and  reducing  them  to  their  common  denominator,  as 
expressions  of  simple  human  labour  power. 
How  though  does  Marx's  analysis  of  the  labour  power  embodied  in  the  commodity  manifest 
itself  as  a  dialectical  process?  The  twofold  nature  of  a  commodity,  as  having  both  a  use  and 
138  K.  Marx.  Collected  Works  Volume  43.  Lawrence  and  Wishart  (1987)  P.  68. 
182 a  value  form  can  logically  only  be  a  result  of  a  dialectic  expressed  within  the  labouring; 
activity  itself,  where  the  one  labouring  activity  specifies  itself  in  a  twofold  form  of  the 
product  of  labour. 
Labour  as  genus,  as  a  universal  activity,  specifies  itself  as  a  social  value  form  in  and  through 
this  twofold  character,  its  diremption  into  its  concrete  and  abstract  forms  of  natural  and 
social  labour.  A  polar  opposition  that  is  the  expression  of  the  determinate  and  essential  form 
activity  for  realising  its  universal  nature  as  a  thing  with  a  social  value;  this  being  the  case 
only  by  dint  of  the  presupposition  that  it  is  a  thing  with  a  social  use. 
"It  follows  from  the  preceding  not  that  there  are  two  differing  kinds  of  labour  lurking 
in  the  commodity,  but  rather  that  the  same  labour  is  specified  in  differing  and  even 
contradictory  manner  -  in  accordance  with  whether  it  is  related  to  the  use  value  of 
the  commodity  as  labour's  product  or  related  to  the  commodity  value  as  its  merely 
objective  expression.  Just  as  the  commodity  must  be  above  all  else  an  object  of  use 
in  order  to  be  a  value,  just  so  does  labour  have  to  be  before  all  else  useful  labour  - 
purposeful,  productive  activity  -  in  order  to  count  as  expenditure  of  human  labour 
power  and  hence  as  simple  human  labour.  " 
Labour  as  genus  takes  on  a  twofold  specific  difference,  as  a  reciprocal  and  reflexive 
movement  of  a  contradiction  contained  within  the  product  of  labour  itself  in  its  natural  and 
social  forms  of  expression.  This  twofold  contrary  expression  of  labour  requires  a  twofold 
contrary  force  in  the  characterisation  of  the  labour  power  embodied  in  the  commodity.  Marx 
expresses  the  specific  difference  of  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour  power  contained  in 
the  value  relation  of  the  commodity,  in  the  following  comments  that  differentiate  labour 
power  in  its  abstract  social  and  concrete  natural  forms  of  expression. 
131  K.  Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  Capital  Volume  I-  (First  Edition)  Chapter  1.  New  Park 
Publications.  (1976)  P-32. 
"0  K.  Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  New  Park.  Publications.  (1976.  )  P.  16. 
183 "On  the  one  hand  all  labour  is,  speaking  physiologically,  an  expenditure  of  human 
labour  power,  and  in  its  character  of  identical  abstract  human  labour,  it  creates  and 
forms  the  value  of  commodities.  On  the  other  hand,  all  labour  is  the  expenditure  of 
human  labour  power  in  a  special  form  and  with  a  definite  aim  and  in  this,  its 
character  of  concrete  useful  labour,  it  produces  use  values.  ""' 
At  the  same  time  then,  the  concrete  labour  power  embodied  in  the  commodity,  becomes  the 
congealed  material  expression  of  abstract  human  labour  power,  as  the  peculiar  source  of  the 
social  manifestation  of  the  product  of  labour  as  having  a  social  value.  The  social  relation 
between  the  producers  becomes  expressed  through  the  relation  of  their  products  of  labour, 
with  value  as  their  alienated  and  reified  social  expression. 
"The  labour  however,  that  forms  the  substance  of  value,  is  homogeneous  human 
labour,  expenditure  of  one  uniform  labour  power.  The  total  labour  power  of  society, 
which  is  embedded  in  the  sum  total  of  the  value  of  all  commodities  produced  by  that 
society,  counts  here  as  one  homogeneous  mass  of  human  labour  power,  composed 
though  it  be  of  innumerable  individual  units.  Each  of  these  units  is  the  same  as  any 
other,  so  far  as  it  has  the  character  of  the  average  labour  power  of  society,  and  takes 
effect  as  such;  that  is,  so  far  as  it  requires  for  producing  a  commodity,  no  more  time 
than  is  needed  on  average,  no  more  than  is  socially  necessary.  "  142 
The  intimate  connection  between  socially  homogenised  labour  power  in  general  or  simple 
labour  power  and  abstract  labour  as  the  substance  of  value  has  to  be  recognised  for  what  it 
is.  It  is  the  reified  social  expression  of  the  entire  myriad  and  disparate  forms  of  concrete 
labour,  the  totality  of  the  labour  power  of  society  that  socially  expresses  itself  as  the 
expenditure  of  one  uniform  labour  power,  "that  forms  the  substance  of  value". 
K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  53. 
K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.,  (1974.  )  P.  46. 
184 The  value  form  of  the  commodity  is  the  manifestation  of  a  specific  social  form  of  alienated 
labouring  activity,  where  the  exchange  value  of  the  commodity  becomes  the  social  form  for 
the  "expression  of  the  human  labour  power  expended  in  its  production.  "  This  reified  form  of 
labour  power  is  fundamentally  social  in  both  its  nature  and  form  activity;  the  analysis  of  the 
specific  manner  and  form  of  the  particularising  of  this  genus  of  social  labour  becomes  the 
central  scientific  problem  that  requires  a  resolution  for  Marx. 
"A  coat  is  only  value  insofar  as  it  is  a  reifled  expression  of  the  human  labour  power 
expended  in  its  production,  and  is  thus  a  coagulation  of  abstract  human  labour  - 
abstract  labour,  because  abstraction  is  made  from  the  determinate,  useful,  concrete 
character  of  the  labour  contained  in  it  -  human  labour,  because  in  this  case  labour 
counts  only  as  expenditure  of  labour  power  in  general.  "  I' 
Value  does  not  then  contain  an  atom  of  use  value,  it  is  a  social,  or  to  use  Marx's 
employment  of  a  Hegelian  term,  a  "supersensible"  substance.  What  is  enigmatic  is  the 
specific  social  nature  of  the  "supersensible"  quality  of  value  that  is  "congealed"  and 
expressed  in  the  commodity.  As  value  is  a  purely  social  relation,  value  can  only  then  acquire 
this  equateable  form  by  being  the  expression  or  embodiment  of  "one  identical  social 
substance,  viz.,  human  labour". 
It  then  has  to,  and  can  only,  express  itself  in  the  active  social  relation  of  commodities,  in  the 
mutual  and  reciprocal  alienation  that  is  the  essence  of  the  exchange  process.  Value,  as 
abstract  human  labour  power,  is  then  the  social  expression  and  product  of  the  human  labour 
power  that  is  congealed  and  manifested  within  the  commodity  form.  '" 
Socially  related,  equated,  and  measured  in  the  form  of  value,  it  is  the  social  expression  of 
the  manifestation  of  the  magnitude  of  the  duration  of  the  human  labour  power  that  is 
""  K.  Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  Capital  Volume  1.  (Appendix  to  First  Edition)  New  Park. 
(1976.  )  P.  52. 
'"'The  value  of  the  commodities,  however,  represents  human  labour  in  the  simplest  form,  the 
expenditure  of  human  labour  power  in  general.  "  K.  Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  New  Park.  (1976.  )  P.  14. 
185 embodied  in  the  production  of  the  commodity.  The  substance  of  value,  abstract  labour,  only 
fully  manifests  itself  then  in  the  totality  of  the  relations  that  are  expressed  in  the  "world  of 
commodities";  where  the  substance  of  value  subsumes  all  the  myriad  forms  and  expressions 
of  concrete  labour  and  gives  them  a  social  value  form. 
How  does  Marx  develop  the  dialectical  relation  that  is  inherent  in  the  social  expression  of 
this  substance  of  value?  Moreover,  how  does  his  exposition  of  the  value  substance,  form, 
and  relation  connect  to  Hegel's  account  of  force  and  its  twofold  expression,  as  the  core  of 
Hegel's  dialectical  account  of  law? 
Hegel  presents  the  process  of  a  substantial  force,  taking  on  a  material  form,  as  a  substantial 
relation  whose  nomological  content  is  expressed  in  its  twofold  determinate  moments  or 
polar  forms  of  its  manifestation.  The  mystical  appearance  of  the  Hegelian  mode  of 
expression  here  will  have  to  be  unpacked  and  divested  of  this  form,  in  order  for  this  relation 
of  Hegel  and  Marx  to  begin  to  more  clearly  emerge.  If  this  can  be  achieved  then  it  should 
further  expose  and  reveal  his  account  as  an  important  element  of  the  rational  kernel  that  is 
contained  in  the  mystical  shell  of  Hegel's  thought. 
"In  order,  then,  that  Force  may  in  truth  be,  it  must  be  completely  set  free  from 
thought,  it  must  be  posited  as  the  substance  of  these  differences,  i.  e.  first  the 
substance  as  this  whole  Force,  remaining  essentially  in  andfor  itsey,  and  then  its 
differences  as  possessing  substantial  being,  or  as  moments  existing  in  their  own 
account.  Force  as  such,  or  as  driven  back  into  itself,  thus  exists  on  its  own  account  as 
an  exclusive  One,  for  which  the  unfolding  of  the  [different]  'matters'  is  another 
subsisting  essence;  and  thus  two  distinct  independent  aspects  are  set  up.  "' 
The  substantial  force,  in  this  case  abstract  human  labour  power,  expresses  itself  by 
objectifying  the  contradiction  contained  within  its  nature.  This  is  manifested  in  the  exchange 
relation  embodied  in  the  commodity  form.  The  force,  as  this  whole  substance,  the  "one 
186 homogeneous  mass  of  human  labour  power",  both  dirempts  itself  and  gives  each  of  the 
twofold  forms  of  its  expression  an  independent  existence,  as  the  social  expression  of  the 
value  relation  of  the  commodities  manifested  in  the  exchange  process. 
This  it  does  by  both  positing  and  resolving  its  specific  contradiction  or  twofold  nature, 
through  the  determinate  relations  that  it  enters  into  with  others  of  its  own  substantial  kind; 
by  equating  the  concrete  commodities  as  social  values,  it  thus  realises  the  potentiality  of  the 
substantial  form  activity  expressed  in  the  twofold  force.  The  elementary  form  of  value  is 
thus  Marx's  application  of  the  embryonic  expression  of  this  Hegelian  dialectic  contained  in 
force. 
The  dialectical  account  of  force  in  Hegel  is  conceived  as  a  process  where  the  force 
actualises  itself  by  duplicating  itself  into  two  forces.  If  the  concept  of  force  become  actual 
by  its  duplication  into  two  forces,  then  entailed  in  this  is  that  both  sides  of  the  relation  are 
the  result  of  this  double  and  opposite  form  of  the  manifestation  of  force.  This  dialectical 
diremption  and  duplication  contained  within  the  expression  of  force  requires  yet  further 
elucidation  and  analysis  to  draw  out  its  connection  with  Marx's  expression  of  the  law  of 
value. 
2.  Force  and  the  Elementary  Form  of  Value. 
"The  whole  mystery  of  the  form  of  value  lies  hidden  in  this  elementary  form.  Its 
analysis,  therefore,  is  our  real  difficulty.  "  146 
"In  general,  to  be  for  itself  and  to  be  in  relation  to  another  constitutes  the  nature  and 
the  essence  of  the  content,  whose  truth  consists  in  its  being  unconditionally 
universal;  and  the  result  is  simply  and  solely  universal.  ""' 
115  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  82. 
I'll  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  55. 
187 What  was  shown  to  be  fundamental  to  Hegel's  approach,  to  the  resolution  of  what  he 
regarded  as  the  inherent  problem  with  the  abstract  understanding's  account  of  law,  was  the 
notion  that  a  substantial  systematic  subject  contains  an  "inner  difference.  "  This  inner 
difference,  as  the  manifestation  of  a  force,  is  objectively  expressed  in  a  twofold  relational 
form;  this  twofold  form  has  then  to  be  exhibited  and  contained  in  the  account  of  the 
operation  of  the  law  explaining  the  phenomena,  as  it  is  the  dynamic  source  of  the  content  of 
the  objective  expression  of  the  law. 
The  idea  that  there  is  a  doubling  of  form  that  produces  an  identity,  one  containing  a  specific 
difference,  is  a  characteristic  principle  of  a  dialectical  analysis  of  law  and,  consequently,  of 
the  general  form  of  working  of  dialectic  itself.  The  inner  difference  of  the  force  is  expressed 
in  the  substantial  form  activity;  in  the  essential  forms  of  determination  that  objectively 
makes  the  entity  that  specific  form  of  subject.  The  contrariety  or  inner  difference  contained 
within  the  substantial  form  is  reflected,  in  Hegel's  analysis,  in  the  contrariety  contained  in 
the  objective  expression  of  the  force. 
The  contradictions  contained  within  realising  value  in  its  commodity  form,  simply  as  it  is  a 
unity  of  use  and  exchange  value,  are  resolved  by  externalising  them,  by  duplicating  them  in 
a  relation  to  another  commodity.  Moreover,  this  relation  is  itself  an  expression  of  the 
movement  of  a  polar  contradiction,  as  a  dialectic  whose  inner  difference  is  only  expressed 
and  manifested  in  an  external  relation. 
"The  commodity  is  right  from  the  start  a  dual  thing,  use  value  and  value,  product  of 
useful  labour  and  abstract  coagulate  of  labour.  In  order  to  manifest  itself  as  what  it 
is,  it  must  therefore  double  its  form.  It  possesses  right  from  nature  the  form  of  a  use 
value.  That  is  its  natural  form.  It  only  earns  a  value  form  for  itself  for  the  first  time  in 
circulation  with  other  commodities.  But  its  value  form  has  then  to  be  itself  an 
G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  80. 
188 objective  form.  The  only  objective  forms  of  commodities  are  their  use  forms,  their 
natural  forms.  ""' 
This  dialectic  of  self  and  other  first  exposes  the  polarity  of  the  forms  of  the  twofold 
expression  of  the  labour  power  necessary  for  the  comprehension  of  the  value  relation.  The 
inner  difference  of  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour  embodied  in  the  commodity  is 
contained  in  both  of  the  commodities.  The  value  relation  is  therefore  first  objectively 
expressed  through  the  two  bodily  forms  of  the  commodities  brought  together  in  the 
exchange  relation.  Each  of  the  poles  of  the  relation  expressing  a  contradiction  within  itself 
that  first  manifests  that  twofold  contrariety  in  its  self,  only  in  its  relation  to  its  other. 
"The  opposition  or  contrast  existing  internally  in  each  commodity  between  use-value 
and  value,  is,  therefore,  made  evident  externally  by  two  commodities  being  placed  in 
such  relation  to  each  other,  that  the  commodity  whose  value  it  is  sought  to  express, 
figures  directly  as  a  mere  use-value,  while  the  commodity  in  which  that  value  is  to 
be  expressed,  figures  directly  as  mere  exchange-value.  Hence  the  elementary  form  of 
value  of  a  commodity  is  the  elementary  form  in  which  the  contrast  contained  in  that 
commodity,  between  use-value  and  value,  becomes  apparent.  """ 
The  simple  polar  relation  of  value  illustrates  this  negative  unity  of  the  twofold  forms  of  the 
expression  of  the  labour  power  embodied  within  the  commodity.  The  dialectic  of  concrete 
and  abstract  labour  is  first  brought  out  in  the  simple  value  form  and  relation.  The  human 
labour  power  embodied  within  the  commodity  thus  embryonically  expresses  itself  in  the 
specific  social  form  of  value,  as  the  relational  expression  of  a  social  quality  or  substance, 
and  the  social  manifestation  of  a  force. 
"Human  labour  power  in  motion,  or  human  labour,  creates  value,  but  is  not  itself 
value.  It  becomes  value  only  in  its  congealed  state,  when  embodied  in  the  form  of 
148  K.  Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  New  Park.  (1976.  )  P.  21-22. 
141  K.  Marx.  Capital  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  67. 
189 some  object.  In  order  to  express  the  value  of  the  linen  as  a  congelation  of  human 
labour,  that  value  must  be  expressed  as  having  objective  existence,  as  being 
something  materially  different  from  the  linen  itself,  and  yet  something  common  to 
the  linen  and  all  other  commodities.  ""0 
In  the  value  relation  of  one  commodity  to  another,  the  "one  stands  forth  in  its  character  of 
value  by  reason  of  its  relation  to  the  other.  "  The  simple  form  of  value  is  a  specific  and 
determinate  manifestation  and  application  of  this  generalised  content  of  the  Hegelian 
dialectic  of  self  and  other,  as  the  initial  and  elementary  expression  of  a  substantial  form. 
This  embryonic  form  contains  the  key  to  its  rational  comprehension. 
This  process  is  expressed  through  the  contrary  motions  and  specific  determinations  of  a 
common  identity  and  substantial  form  activity;  an  activity  that  is  contained  in  the 
manifestation  of  its  necessary  and  reciprocal  relation  to  others  of  its  common  kind.  Here  is 
how  Hegel  expresses  that  "inner  difference"  of  a  common  unity  inherent  to  the  polarity  that 
is  expressed  in  the  substantial  force. 
"Through  the  notion  of  inner  difference,  these  unlike  and  indifferent  moments  are  a 
difference,  or  only  a  difference  of  what  is  self-same,  and  its  essence  is  unity.  As 
positive  and  negative  they  stimulate  each  other  into  activity,  and  their  being  is  rather 
to  posit  themselves  as  not-being  and  to  suspend  themselves  in  the  unity.  The  two 
distinguished  moments  both  subsist;  they  are  implicit  and  opposites  in  themselves, 
i.  e.  each  is  the  opposite  of  itself,  each  has  its  'other'  within  it  and  they  are  only  one 
unity.  "  15' 
The  point  that  Hegel  is  driving  towards  is  that  a  universal  force  and  law,  as  the  expression  of 
a  specific  form  activity,  is  manifested  in  the  process  of  the  particularisation  and 
individuation  of  that  form  activity.  As  a  substantial  form  that  exercises  a  force  in  its 
110  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  58. 
Is'  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  99-100. 
190 characteristic  activity,  and  this  force,  manifested  in  a  determinate  and  necessary  substantial 
form  activity,  operates  in  a  nomological  fashion,  as  the  common  content  of  the  twofold 
relational  expression. 
This  general  content  of  the  dialectic  of  self  and  other  defines  the  universal  conditions  and 
parameters  within  which  the  substantial  process  operates  in  this  its  elementary  fashion.  With 
the  force  expressing  itself  as  an  identity  that  includes  a  specific  difference,  and,  according  to 
Hegel,  "difference  is  nothing  else  than  being-for-another.  "  This  inner  difference  or 
contradiction  does  not  remain  inner,  but  objectively  expresses  itself  in  a  necessary  external 
relation  by  doubling  its  form. 
The  inner  difference  and  opposition  of  the  contrary  poles  of  the  value  relation,  expressed  in 
the  social  nature  of  the  commodity,  not  only  obtain  their  specific  determination  objectively 
in  relation  to  its  own  form  of  internal  opposition,  but  the  opposition  itself  only  obtains  its 
specific  nature  in  the  ontological  unity  of  the  common  genus  of  abstract  human  labour  that 
sublates  and  contains  the  parameters  of  the  specific  difference  of  the  twofold  labour 
embodied  in  the  commodity. 
"By  equating  the  other  commodity  to  itseY  as  value,  it  relates  itseýr  to  itsetf  as  value. 
By  relating  itself  to  itself  as  value,  it  distinguishes  itself  from  itsetf  as  use  value,  at 
the  same  time.  By  expressing  its  magnitude  of  value  in  the  coat  (and  magnitude  of 
value  is  both  things:  value  in  general,  and  quantitatively  measured  value),  it  endows 
its  reality  of  value  with  aform  of  value  which  differs  from  its  immediate  existence. 
By  revealing  itself  in  this  manner  as  a  thing  which  is  differentiated  within  itself,  it 
reveals  itself  for  the  first  time  really  as  a  commodity  -a  useful  thing  which  is  at  the 
same  time  value.  "  152 
This  it  does  through  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  that  is  inherent  within  the 
dialectic  of  concrete  and  abstract  labour  whose  contrariety  manifests  itself  in  the  expression 
191 of  value.  The  twofold  expression  of  labour  power  as  a  force  takes  a  twofold  form  in  the 
commodity,  as  a  use  value  and  a  value,  which  itself  doubles  its  form  in  the  value  relation,  in 
its  relative  and  equivalent  forms  of  expression. 
If  the  nature  and  the  essence  of  the  content  for  Hegel  is  a  dialectic  of  being  for  self  and 
being  in  relation  to  another,  how  then  does  the  twofold  content  of  this  dialectic  of  self  and 
other  unfold  and  manifest  itself  as  the  expression  of  force  and  law? 
"Here,  these  two  sides  are  moments  of  Force;  they  are  just  as  much  in  a  unity,  as  this 
unity,  which  appears  as  the  middle  term  over  against  the  independent  extremes,  is  a 
perpetual  diremption  of  itself  into  just  these  extremes  which  exist  only  through  this 
process.  ""' 
As  Hegel  further  expresses  this  process,  "what  they  are,  they  are,  only  in  this  middle  term 
and  in  this  contact.  "  This  expression  of  force  is  the  source  of  the  twofold  parameters  of  the 
qualitative  nature  of  its  active  substantial  activity.  The  question  is  though;  does  this 
Hegelian  analysis  help  to  reveal  the  manner  in  which  Marx  investigates  how  the  law  of 
value  asserts  itself?  To  answer  this  is  to  further  elucidate  the  connection  between  Hegel's 
account  of  force  and  law,  and  how  Marx's  analysis  of  the  simple  value  form,  are  further 
related. 
The  common  feature  of  value  inherent  in  both  commodities  is  brought  out  in  that  x  of 
commodity  A  is  exchanged  for  y  of  commodity  B.  This  manifests  the  value  of  commodity  A 
in  its  relative  opposite  commodity  B.  The  relative  and  equivalent  forms  are,  in  Marx's 
account,  both  mutually  related  and  mutually  exclusive;  in  other  words,  they  are  the  polar 
opposites  of  a  contradiction  that  has  a  twofold  form  of  expression;  to  borrow  Marx's  phrase, 
they  are  as  "necessarily  opposite  as  they  are  connected.  " 
152  K.  Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  New  Park.  (1976.  )  P.  19. 
153  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  82. 
192 That  "unity"  of  the  "middle  term"  that  mediates  the  "independent  extremes",  the  common 
content  or  'third'  that  is  value  in  Marx's  terms,  is first  expressed  in  the  simple  value  relation 
between  two  commodities,  as  the  poles  of  the  "self-diremption"  that  is  inherent  to  the  social 
expression  of  the  value  relation.  "' 
In  what  sense,  though,  is  the  dynamic  of  Hegel's  view  of  a  force  that  self-sunders  and 
becomes  self-identical  further  related  to  Marx's  analysis  of  the  simple  value  form?  In 
Hegel's  terms,  the  process  of  the  manifestation  of  force  and  law  is  inherent  with  a  principle 
of  change  and  alteration  that  is  expressed  in  the  dialectical  relation  between  its  polar  forms. 
How  does  this  principle  of  change  and  alteration  manifest  itself? 
The  self-diremption  of  force,  in  Hegel's  account,  splits  into  an  antithesis  of  an  active  and  a 
passive  force;  as  a  force  that  solicits  and  a  force  that  is  solicited,  a  force  that  repels  and  a 
force  that  attracts.  The  relationship  is  expressed  in  the  repulsion  and  attraction  contained 
within  the  force,  and  revealed  in  this  opposition  of  the  active  soliciting  and  passive  solicited 
sides;  as  the  dual  content  of  the  dialectic  of  self  and  other. 
Force,  in  this  its  expression,  is  a  "perpetual  diremption"  of  itself  into  these  "independent 
extremes.  "  As  the  polar  contrariety  or  specific  difference  of  a  shared  common  content; 
where  the  two  poles  of  the  force  only  exist  within  this  determinate  process;  as  the  specific 
parameters  that  contain  the  contrary  motions  inherent  to  the  principle  of  change  and 
alteration  that  are  initially  expressed  in  this  simple  dialectic  of  self  and  other.  Here  is  how 
Hegel  expresses  this  dialectic  "interplay"  of  self  and  other  in  the  twofold  manifestation  of  a 
universal  force  that  both  solicits  and  is  solicited. 
"The  interplay  of  the  two  forces  thus  consists  in  their  being  determined  as  mutually 
opposed,  in  their  being  for  one  another  in  this  determination,  and  in  the  absolute, 
immediate  alternation  of  the  determinations  -  consists  i.  e.  in  a  transition  through 
154  "What  is  present  in  this  interplay  is  likewise  merely  the  immediate  alternation,  or  the  absolute 
interchange,  of  the  detenninateness  which  constitutes  the  sole  content  of  what  appears:  to  be  either  a  universal 
193 which  alone  these  determinations  are  in  which  the  forces  seem  to  make  an 
independent  appearance  ...  The  external  soliciting  Force  appears  as  a  universal 
medium,  but  only  through  its  having  been  solicited  by  the  other  Force  to  do  so;  but 
this  means  that  the  latter  gives  it  that  character  and  is  really  itself  essentially  a 
universal  medium;  it  gives  the  soliciting  Force  this  character  just  because  this 
determination  is  essential  to  it,  i.  e.,  because  this  is  really  its  own  self.  "  155 
This  Hegelian  expression  of  the  specific  nature  and  difference  of  the  twofold  forces  in 
operation  is  encapsulated  in  the  elementary  or  simple  dialectical  form  of  the  value 
expression,  where  the  polar  relation  is  shared  between  the  active  relative  and  passive 
equivalent  forms  of  value.  By  actively  soliciting  its  value  expression  in  the  passive  bodily 
form  of  another  commodity,  it  repels  its  own  value  form,  and  by  repelling  its  value 
expression  it  realises  it  only  through  the  attraction  of  the  bodily  form  of  the  other.  Value 
thus  manifests  itself  in  the  use  value  of  an  other  commodity,  and  use  value  becomes  the 
form  of  expression  of  value. 
The  actualisation  of  its  movement  being  the  substantial  form  activity  positively  resolving 
the  contrary  states  of  its  being  in  its  affirmative  form.  A  form  that  is  expressed  through  the 
polar  parameters  acting  in  a  reciprocal  and  reflexive  relation.  Each  of  the  poles  of  the 
contrary  determination  then  gains  its  specific  form  of  the  relational  identity  through  the 
opposite,  and  at  the  same  time  affirms  itself  as  being  of  a  like  nature.  Marx  reflects  this  very 
process  in  the  simple  value  relation. 
"The  relative  form  and  the  equivalent  form  are  two  intimately  connected,  mutually 
dependent  and  inseparable  elements  of  the  expression  of  value;  but  at  the  same  time 
they  are  mutually  exclusive,  antagonistic  extremes  -  i.  e.  poles  of  the  same 
expression.  They  are  allotted  respectively  to  the  two  different  commodities  brought 
into  relation  by  that  expression  ...  A  single  commodity  cannot,  therefore, 
medium  or  a  negative  unity.  "  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  89-90. 
155  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  84-85. 
194 simultaneously  assume  in  the  same  expression  of  value,  both  forms.  The  very 
polarity  of  these  forms  makes  them  mutually  exclusive.  "  116 
This  interpenetration  is  captured  by  Hegel's  formulation  of  the  dialectic  inherent  in  this 
process  of  force  expressing  itself  in  a  nomological  manner.  That  dual  content  of  an  active, 
soliciting,  "negative  unity"  or  one,  a  being-for-self  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand,  a 
passive,  solicited,  "universal  medium  of  many  subsistent  matters",  a  being-for-other  on  the 
other  hand.  Their  universal  difference  and  unity  being  expressed  in  the  polar  reciprocity  of 
the  relation  and  expression  of  the  substantial  force. 
"They  do  not  exist  as  extremes  which  retain  for  themselves  something  fixed  and 
substantial,  transmitting  to  one  another  in  their  middle  term  and  in  their  contact  a 
merely  external  property;  on  the  contrary,  what  they  are,  they  are,  only  in  this  middle 
term  and  in  this  contact  .... 
Force  that  solicits  and  force  that  is  solicited. 
Consequently,  these  moments  are  not  divided  into  two  independent  extremes 
offering  each  other  only  an  opposite  extreme:  their  essence  consists  simply  and 
solely  in  this,  that  each  is  solely  through  the  other,  and  what  each  is  it  immediately 
no  longer  is,  since  it  is  the  other.  ""' 
The  relation  of  simple  exchange  is  itself  the  expression  of  a  polar  contradiction  of  identity 
and  difference  based  on  the  reciprocity  inherent  in  a  contrariety  that  shares  a  common 
content,  in  this  specific  case  the  reciprocal  polarity  inherent  within  the  expression  of  value. 
Their  common  content  of  self  and  other,  itself  based  on  the  social  substance  of  abstract 
human  labour  power,  entails  that,  as  the  expression  of  a  polar  contradiction,  they  are  both,  to 
put  it  in  Hegel's  terms,  "negatively  related  to  each  other  in  the  same  respect.  " 
The  simple  value  form  and  relation  exemplifies  this  contrary  form  and  content  of  a 
substantial  universal  force.  The  active  relative  form  of  value  expresses  its  value  form  in  its 
156  K.  Marx.  Capital  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  55  and  P.  57  respectively. 
"I  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  85-86. 
195 other;  it  solicits  its  own  value  expression  through  its  opposite,  the  equivalent  form  of  value. 
The  passive  equivalent  form,  as  a  being  for  other,  becomes  the  mode  of  being  for  the 
expression  of  the  relative  value  of  the  other.  Its  status  as  an  equivalent  is,  as  Marx  expresses 
it,  "only  a  reflection-determination  of  linen.  " 
In  this  sense,  each  of  the  twofold  forms  of  the  labour  power  embodied  in  the  commodities 
"passes  over  into"  its  own  other.  Alternatively  posed,  a  la  Hegel,  it  is  the  process  where  like 
becomes  unlike  and  unlike  becomes  like.  Abstract  labour  manifests  itself  in  a  different  form 
of  concrete  labour,  and  concrete  labour  becomes  the  form  of  manifestation  of  its  dialectical 
opposite,  abstract  labour. 
"By  means,  therefore,  of  the  value  relation  expressed  in  our  equation,  the  bodily 
form  of  commodity  B  becomes  the  value  form  of  commodity  A,  or  the  body  of 
commodity  B  acts  as  a  mirror  to  the  value  of  commodity  A.  By  putting  itself  in 
relation  with  commodity  B,  as  value  in  propria  persona,  as  the  matter  of  which 
human  labour  is  made  up,  the  commodity  A  converts  the  value  in  use  B,  into  the 
substance  in  which  to  express  its,  A's  own  value.  The  value  of  A,  thus  expressed  in 
the  use  value  of  B,  has  taken  the  form  of  relative  value.  ""' 
The  specific  contraries  contained  in  the  universal  form  and  its  substantial  expression  as  an 
active  force  are  the  parameters  and  poles  of  the  process  of  movement  and  change.  The  self 
objectively  requires  an  other,  in  a  double  form  that  reflexively  and  reciprocally  reflects  its 
own  specific  difference  or  polar  contradiction,  for  the  relation  to  manifest  itself  in  its  simple 
and  germ  form. 
The  value  of  commodities  has  a  "purely  social  reality"  that  is  only  acquired  in  so  far  as  they 
are  expressions  and  embodiments  of  one  identical  social  substance,  namely  abstract  human 
labour  power.  This  it  does  by  showing  the  forms  of  development  of  the  laws  of  motion  and 
principle  of  change  and  alteration  inherent  to  their  specific  form  activity.  An  activity  that 
196 both  abolishes  their  apparent  unconnected  immediacy  of  being  and  their  fted  state  and 
condition. 
The  substantial  and  essential  activity  itself  is  twofold;  it  both  posits  the  determinate  quality 
of  a  kind,  and  posits  the  identity  of  the  two  particulars  as  a  single  kind.  That  is,  it  is  the 
expression  of  the  particularity  of  the  determinate  difference  contained  in  the  substantial 
form  activity  that  manifests  itself  in  the  relation  between  two  members  of  the  same 
substantial  kind  that  exhibits  them  as  having  a  common  essence. 
"But  for  us,  as  remarked  above,  something  more  was  apparent,  viz,  that  the 
differences,  qua  differences  of  content  andform,  vanished  in  themselves;  and  on  the 
side  of  form,  the  essence  of  the  active,  soliciting,  or  independent  side,  was  the  same 
as  that  which,  on  the  side  of  content,  presented  itself  as  Force  driven  back  into  itself, 
the  side  which  was  passive,  which  was  solicited  or  for  an  other,  was,  from  the  side 
of  form,  the  same  as  that  which,  from  the  side  of  content,  presented  itself  as  the 
universal  medium  of  the  many  'matters'.  ""9 
In  the  simple  form  of  value,  the  relative  and  equivalent  form  could  be  played  by  either  of  the 
two  commodities  that  express  the  value  relation.  It  is  not  yet  developed  into  either  a  fixed 
opposition  or  a  totality  of  relations.  Each  of  the  sides  contains  both  antithetical  poles,  but  a 
commodity  cannot  express  both  forms  at  the  same  time;  the  twofold  forms  are  themselves 
contrary  and  mutually  exclusive.  This  inverse  reciprocity  is  solely  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
value  substance  and  relation  is  here  expressed  in  its  elementary  form. 
"In  the  simple  form  of  relative  value  or  the  expression  of  the  equivalence  of  two 
commodities,  the  development  of  the  form  of  value  is  correspondent  for  both 
commodities,  although  in  each  case  in  the  opposite  direction.  The  relative  value 
expression  is  in  addition  identical  with  reference  to  each  of  both  commodities,  for 
"I  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  59. 
119  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  85. 
197 the  linen  manifests  its  value  in  only  one  commodity  (the  coat)  and  vice  versa,  but 
this  value  expression  is  double  for  both  commodities,  different  for  each  of  the  same. 
Finally,  each  of  both  commodities  is  only  an  Equivalent  for  the  single  other  species 
of  commodity,  and  thus  only  a  single  Equivalent.  "" 
According  to  Hegel,  the  "essence  of  the  active  and  passive  forms  is  the  same.  "  That  is,  they 
share  a  common  content  and  quality,  in  the  specific  case  of  Marx's  analysis  of  value, 
abstract  human  labour  power.  Homogeneous  human  labour  power  takes  the  role  of  the 
mediating  unity  of  the  active  universal  form  that  is  expressed  in  its  relative  and  equivalent 
polarities  via  the  dialectic  of  abstract  and  concrete  labour;  with  value  as  the  common 
essence  behind  the  active  and  passive  forms  of  commodity  exchange. 
Value,  as  the  substantial  force  of  abstract  labour  subsumes  the  concrete  labour  and  makes  it 
a  moment  or  determination  of  its  own  substantial  form  activity.  Private  labour  and  its 
product,  the  commodity,  becomes  social  through  the  mediation  of  the  substance  of  abstract 
labour,  by  the  social  measurement  of  the  quantitative  determination  of  the  labour  power  that 
is  embodied  in  the  commodity.  As  the  process  by  which  the  labour  time  spent  on  creating  it 
"becomes  expressed  as  one  of  the  objective  qualities  of  that  article.  " 
That  all  the  products  of  labour  have  a  value,  as  the  social  form  of  expressing  that  human 
labour  power  is  embodied  in  them,  is  first  manifested  through  the  alienated  and  reciprocal 
act  of  exchange.  This  distinction  within  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour  power  that  is 
embodied  within  the  commodity  form  is  thus  basis  for  Marx's  uniquely  scientific  account  of 
value. 
This  notion,  peculiar  to  dialectic,  of  contradiction  as  the  expression  of  the  specific  difference 
within  a  common  genus  or  kind;  a  difference  that  doubles  its  form  in  order  to  both  posit  and 
resolve  its  contradiction,  is  essential  for  grasping  the  dynamics  behind  the  general  form  of 
working  of  dialectic,  and  consequently,  Marx's  analysis  of  the  value  form  and  relation. 
160  K.  Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  New  Park.  (1976.  )  P.  24. 
198 This  conceptual  evolution  of  a  substantial  force,  from  this  its  elementary  dialectical  form,  is 
the  source  for  how  it  later  becomes  a  more  fully  "developed  actuality"  and  totality  that  is 
itself  initially  brought  out  and  expressed  as  an  alternation  of  the  two  moments  or 
determinations  of  this  its  double  form  of  expression. 
This  development  of  the  subject  in  its  essential  determinations  and  relations  universally 
connects  them  as  an  evolving  totality  of  relations  and  determinations;  each  of  those  evolving 
and  more  developed  determinations  and  forms  are  themselves  based  on  the  common  driving 
contradiction  inherent  to  its  specific  nature  and  difference,  and  expressed  in  the  substantial 
twofold  force  contained  in  their  form  activity. 
Value,  expressed  in  this  its  simplest  form  and  content  as  a  dialectic  of  self  and  other,  is  the 
initial  process  of  this  universal  and  substantial  form  and  content  particularising  and 
individuating  itself  in  its  universal  and  specific  form  of  activity.  By  doing  so  it  will  further 
develop  and  evolve  to  subsume  the  totality  of  both  concrete  labouring  activity  itself,  and  its 
product. 
The  further  development  of  the  analysis,  from  this  initial  and  elementary  expression  of  a 
dialectic  of  self  and  other  to  a  dialectic  of  one  and  many,  will,  as  we  shall  see,  both  bring  out 
that  universality  of  value  in  the  world  of  commodities,  and  at  the  same  time,  more  fully 
develop  abstract  labour  as  a  totality  of  homogeneous  human  labour  power. 
199 CHAPTER  TEN. 
THE  VALUE  FORM. 
1.  Abstract  Labour  and  Pure  Quantity. 
"Pure  Quantity  must  here  be  distinguished  from  determinate  quantity,  or  Quantum. 
As  the  former,  Quantity  is,  first,  real  Being  for  Self,  which  has  returned  upon  itself 
and  as  yet  has  no  determinateness;  as  infinite,  homogenous  unity  which  continues 
into  itself.  "  161 
"Let  us  now  consider  the  residue  of  each  of  these  products;  it  consists  of  the  same 
unsubstantial  reality  in  each,  a  mere  congelation  of  homogeneous  human  labour,  of 
labour-power  expended  without  regard  to  the  mode  of  its  expenditure.  All  that  these 
things  now  tell  us  is,  that  human  labour-power  has  been  expended  in  their 
production,  that  human  labour  is  embodied  in  them.  When  looked  at  as  crystals  of 
this  social  substance,  common  to  them  all,  they  are  -  Values.  ""' 
Commodities,  as  Marx  tells  us,  come  in  a  myriad  of  different  concrete  forms  and  qualities, 
but  in  their  exchange  value  form  they  are  merely  different  quantities  and  "consequently  do 
not  contain  an  atom  of  use  value.  "  The  use  value  or  material  form  of  the  commodity  being 
merely  the  material  depository  of  the  exchange  value.  Yet,  this  quantitative  expression  of 
value  manifests  itself  in  the  world  of  commodities  as  being  their  common  and  universal 
property. 
161  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Volume  One.  (Johnston  and  Struthers  translation.  )  Allen  and 
Unwin  (196  1.  )  P.  198. 
11  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  46. 
200 Just  as  exchange  value  appears,  at  first  glance,  as  an  accidental  and  purely  relative  thing, 
something  that  is  not  intrinsic  to  the  nature  of  the  commodity  form  itself,  then  this  intrinsic 
nature  of  value,  as  Marx  puts  it,  "seems  a  contradiction  in  terms.  "  How  then  can  this  purely 
quantitative  expression  of  commodities  assume  a  common  qualitative  nature? 
We  have  already  gone  some  way  down  the  road  to  answering  this  question  in  the  analysis  of 
the  substance  of  value  and  its  elementary  expression  in  the  relation  of  two  commodities. 
This  elementary  expression  of  value,  however,  does  not  fully  bring  into  relief,  both  the 
substance  of  value,  and  the  value  relation  in  its  entirety.  Abstract  labour  and  value  have  yet 
to  prove  themselves  as  a  social  totality. 
In  order  for  a  fuller  expression  of  how  the  substance  and  the  form  of  value  coheres  itself  into 
a  world  of  commodity  relations  and  exchange,  based  on  the  value  form  itself,  the  substance 
of  value  and  its  universal  social  form  have  to  be  shown  how  they  manifestly  emerge  and 
assert  themselves  as  the  reified  social  expression  of  this  totality  of  the  product  of  labour,  the 
commodity. 
What  the  logical  and  conceptual  relations  that  underpinned  the  analysis  of  value  in  Marx, 
have  been  shown  to  express  and  exemplify,  are  some  core  elements  contained  in  the 
Hegelian  account  of  the  relation  of  force  and  law.  This  dialectical  account  of  force  and  its 
twofold  form  of  expression,  both  allowed  greater  elucidation  and  underpinned,  in  my  view, 
the  laws  of  motion  of  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour  power,  both  concrete  and  abstract, 
that  are  contained  in  the  contrary  relations  of  the  expression  of  value. 
By  abolishing  the  immediacy  of  the  use  value  form  of  the  commodity,  through  the  principle 
of  change  and  alteration  inherent  in  the  dialectic  of  the  active  relative  and  passive  equivalent 
forms  of  the  expression  of  value,  abstract  labour  both  subsumes  concrete  labour,  and  makes 
it  a  subordinate  moment  or  determination  of  its  own  activity. 
201 Value  overcomes  its  privative  condition  or  state,  its  use  value  form,  and  realises  its  value 
form  by  transforming  the  bodily  form  of  another  commodity  to  act  as  its  own  value 
expression;  through  doing  so,  the  potentiality  of  the  substance  of  value  actualises  its 
peculiar  and  specific  social  nature. 
These  active-soliciting  and  passive-solicited  poles  of  the  twofold  form  of  expression 
contained  in  Hegel's  account  of  force  and  law,  in  my  view,  provide  for  a  fuller 
understanding  of  Marx's  dialectical  analysis  of  how  the  value  of  a  commodity  is 
determinately  expressed.  In  the  analysis  of  value,  the  use  value  becomes  a  moment  of  value 
in  process.  This  is  the  sole  aim  of  the  substantial  form  activity  and  process  of  the  value 
inherent  within  the  commodity  form,  to  abolish  its  use  value  form  and  realise  its  value  form. 
We  have  also  seen,  at  least  in  its  initial  expression,  the  importance  of  this  Hegelian  account 
of  force  and  law  for  Marx's  analysis  of  the  substance  of  value,  abstract  human  labour  power, 
as  the  determinate  content  of  the  social  nature  of  value.  What  other  elements  of  Hegel's 
logical  thought  will  prove  useftil  for  Marx's  analysis  of  the  fuller  expression  of  both  abstract 
labour,  and  its  individuation  into  the  single  universal  equivalent  of  the  money  form?  For 
example,  does  the  dialectic  of  quality  and  quantity,  that  are  contained  and  employed  in 
Marx's  analysis  of  the  expression  of  value,  have  its  source  in  Hegel's  account  of  quality  and 
quantity? 
There  are  two  main  areas  of  Hegel's  analysis  that  I  think  are  fundamental  for  a,  fuller 
understanding  of  Marx's  account  of  the  substance  and  form  of  value.  These  are,  firstly,  the 
dialectic  of  repulsion  and  attraction  that  coheres  the  different  entities  into  a  common  but 
indifferent  form  that  manifests  the  atomised  elements  into  a  unified  totality;  this  specific 
contrariety  of  the  expression  of  force  provides  the  dialectical  dynamic  for  Hegel's  account 
of  the  transition  from  quality  to  quantity. 
Secondly,  Hegel's  account  of  the  category  of  measure  as  involving  a  series  of  measure 
relations.  This  dialectic  is  the  inverse  expression  of  the  transition  of  quality  into  quantity,  as 
202 it  provides  the  dynamic  for  the  transition  of  quantity  into  quality.  These  twofold  dialectical 
transitions  of  quality  and  quantity  find  their  unity  in  measure,  itself  a  "qualitative  quantity" 
for  Hegel;  this  provides  the  resolution  of  the  dialectic  in  his  exposition. 
Both  the  above  areas  of  Hegel's  thought  will  allow,  in  my  view,  greater  insight  into  Marx's 
account  of  the  dynamic  of  abstract  labour  as  the  social  substance  of  value,  and  its  further 
development  and  embodiment  into  a  single  universal  form  of  value,  the  money  form. 
The  fundamental  distinction  and  difference  between  the  categories  of  quality  and  quantity 
for  Hegel  is  that  quality  is  primary  and  immediate  determinateness  and  quantity  is  this 
determinateness  that  has  become  indifferent  to  this  immediate  being  of  quality.  What  is  of 
central  importance  here,  for  the  present  study,  is  that  in  the  Hegelian  account  of  the 
transition  from  quality  into  quantity,  quantity  takes  on  an  indifference  to  the  determinate 
qualitative  nature  of  the  one  or  unit. 
This  is  reflected  in  Marx's  distinction  of  the  use  and  exchange  value  aspects  inherent  in  the 
commodity  form,  where  the  commodity  value  is  indifferent  to  its  mode  of  expressing  itself. 
In  Marx's  terms,  the  particular  qualities  of  the  use  value  of  the  commodity  are  treated 
indifferently  by  the  quantitative  value  relation;  it  makes  no  difference  to  the  commodity 
which  particular  use  value  expresses  the  equivalent  form,  any  bodily  form  of  commodity 
would  suffice  for  this. 
It  is  through  the  logical  unfolding  of  these  ontological  categories  and  relations,  uniquely 
developed  dialectically  by  Hegel,  and  applied  by  Marx  to  political  economy,  that  will,  to 
paraphrase  Hegel  (by  replacing  the  category  of  being  here  with  the  category  of  value),  both 
bring  out  the  totality  of  value  and  abolish  the  immediacy  of  the  form  of  value. 
That  is,  in  Marx's  terms,  how  the  useful  products  of  labour  become  a  totality  of  commodity 
values  and  generate  a  universal  form  of  value  itself.  Let  us  explore  the  first  of  these  areas, 
203 the  dialectic  of  repulsion  and  attraction,  before  later  considering  the  second,  the  analysis  of 
measure. 
Value,  in  its  soliciting  and  solicited,  its  active-relative  and  passive-equivalent  forms  are,  in 
my  account,  Marx's  expression  of  the  Hegelian  modal  forms  of  the  forces  of  repulsion  and 
attraction  applied  to  the  specificities  of  value.  We  have  already  seen  their  expression  in  the 
simple  form  of  value  relation.  What  are  then,  the  determinate  operational  forms  and 
relations,  contained  in  the  forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction  in  Hegel's  analysis,  that  are 
useful  for  Marx's  critical  exposition  of  value  in  its  more  developed  expressions  of  the 
expanded  and  general  form  of  value? 
Attraction,  for  Hegel,  is  the  moment  of  continuity  of  quantity,  and  repulsion  is  the  moment 
of  discreteness  contained  in  quantity.  How  does  this  unfolding  dialectic  of  continuous  and 
discrete  magnitude,  inherent  within  the  category  of  quantity  in  Hegel,  allow  a  fuller 
understanding  of  Mark's  account  of  abstract  human  labour  and  the  value  expression?  Let  us 
investigate  this  relation  a  little  further  to  see  what  it  can  reveal. 
Hegel  expresses  a  difference  in  the  category  of  magnitude  between  what  he  calls  "Pure 
Quantity"  and  "Quantum";  the  differentiation  is  ftirther  posed  in  the  following  terms  that 
correlate  to  the  quantitative  expressions  of  the  forces  of  attraction  and  repulsion.  Pure 
quantity  is  magnitude  that  is  continuous,  and  quantum  is  magnitude  that  is  discrete. 
Quantity,  as  the  generalised  category  of  magnitude  embodies  both  forms,  it  has  then  two 
moments  or  determinations;  it  is  the  expression  of  the  dialectic  of  continuous  and  discrete 
magnitude.  Quantum,  as  the  discrete  form  of  magnitude  is,  for  Hegel,  the  determinate  being 
of  quantity,  as  a  unit  of  quantity;  it  is  then  the  determinate  form  of  being  that  quantity  takes, 
for  example,  as  a  single  commodity  with  a  determinate  exchange  value. 
"Pure  Quantity",  as  the  continuous  form  of  magnitude  is,  in  my  analysis,  both  akin  to,  and 
the  source  for,  Marx's  analysis  of  abstract  labour  as  the  social  substance  of  value. 
204 "Quantum",  as  the  discrete  form  of  the  magnitude  of  quantity,  is  then  the  source  for  Marx's 
analysis  of  the  determinate  magnitude  of  the  exchange  value  of  the  commodity.  The 
continuous  form  of  magnitude  as  the  moment  of  attraction  or  "ideality"  in  Hegel,  is  the 
expression  of  the  universal  form  that  unites  the  many,  the  totality  of  the  discrete  forms  of 
magnitude. 
In  terms  of  Marx's  value  theory,  abstract  labour  as  one  homogeneous  mass  of  human  labour 
power,  is  manifested  in  the  totality  of  the  discrete  forms  of  the  magnitudes  of  labour  power 
embodied  in  the  world  of  commodities.  Let  us  see  how  Hegel  further  develops  the  relational 
forms  of  dialectic  that  are  contained  in  the  expression  of  the  category  of  quantity;  by  doing 
so  this  will,  at  the  same  time,  further  reveal  the  basis  for  the  elementary  expression  of  value 
in  Marx. 
Quantity,  in  Hegel's  account,  has  "two  sources",  these  being  "the  exclusive  unit  and  the 
identification  and  the  equalisation  of  these  units.  "  Hegel  does  not  see  these  twofold 
relational  determinations  of  the  continuous  and  discrete  forms  as  two  species  of  magnitude 
that  are  unrelated,  "as  if  the  characteristic  of  one  did  not  attach  to  the  other.  "  They  are 
understood,  in  my  interpretation,  as  the  specific  difference  and  contrariety  that  is  contained 
in  the  very  modal  expression  of  quantitative  magnitude  itself.  "' 
Furthermore,  quantity,  as  this  dialectical  combination  of  discrete  and  continuous  magnitude 
entails  that  the  expression  of  the  discrete  unit  progresses  into  its  relation  with  continuous 
magnitude.  That  relation  is  first  expressed  in  two  discrete  units.  Quantum,  in  this  its 
independent  character  for  Hegel,  "is  external  to  itself",  this  is  expressed  in  its  relation  to  an 
other;  it  is  this  relation  that  initially  constitutes  its  quantitative  quality.  This  external 
"I  "Continuous  and  discrete  magnitude  can  be  regarded  as  species  of  quantity,  provided  that 
magnitude  is  posited,  not  under  external  determinateness,  but  under  the  determinatenesses  of  its  own 
moments;  the  ordinary  transition  from  genus  to  species  allows  atenwl  characteristics  to  be  attributed  to  the 
former  according  to  some  extemal  basis  of  classification.  "  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press. 
(1993.  )  P.  200-201.  They  are  then,  the  twofold  contrary  and  specific  dialectical  forms  of  the  expression  of 
magnitude  itself,  as  its  essential  and  necessary  forms  of  determination  intrinsic  to  its  nature.  That  is,  to  pose  it 
in  Aristotelian  terms,  they  are  the  contrary  species  of  the  common  genus  of  magnitude. 
205 "otherness"  for  Hegel  is  not  "something  indifferent  and  outside  it  but  a  function  proper  to 
it.  " 
The  motor  forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction,  contained  within  quantity,  with  their  discrete- 
continuous  expressions  of  magnitude,  are  then  manifested  in  their  simplest  form  as  a 
quantitative  ratio.  This  mutual  reciprocity  of  repulsion  and  attraction  in  its  discrete  and 
continuous  forms  first  manifests  itself  in  the  relation  between  two  quanta;  expressed  in  the 
dialectic  of  self  and  other  as  the  two  sides  of  the  quantitative  ratio. 
"Quantum  is  thus  posited  as  repelled  from  itself,  with  the  result  that  there  are  two 
quanta  which,  however,  are  sublated,  are  only  as  moments  of  one  unity,  and  this 
unity  is  the  determinateness  of  quantum.  Quantum  as  thus  seV-related  as  an 
indifferent  limit  in  its  externality  and  therefore  posited  as  qualitative,  is  quantitative 
ratio  ....  It  has  in  this  unity  not  an  indifferent,  but  a  qualitative,  determination;  in 
this  its  externality  it  has  returned  into  itself,  and  in  it  quantum  is  that  whichit  is.  "  164 
The  quantitative  ratio,  which  is  a  mode  of  being  that,  in  its  exponent  for  Hegel,  is  an 
immediate  quantum,  is  also  the  expression  of  the  qualitative  nature  of  the  mediation.  It  is  the 
relation  and  reference  of  one  quantum  to  another  that  form  the  two  sides  of  the  ratio.  These 
two  sides  are,  like  the  relative  and  equivalent  forms  of  value,  both  mutually  exclusive  and 
mutually  connected. 
2.  The  Quantitative  expression  of  the  Simple  Value  Form. 
Quantity,  for  Hegel,  is  not  only  magnitude  that  is  continuous  and  discrete,  each  individual 
unit  that  repulses  itself  is  also  an  expression  of  both  an  intensive  and  extensive  magnitude. 
This  entails  that  in  the  mutual  relational  repulsion  and  attraction  of  two  discrete  forms  of 
magnitude,  this  further  dialectic  of  quantity  is  relationally  reflected  in  the  internal  and 
external  determinations  of  magnitude  contained  within  each  unit.  This  dialectic  is  the  source 
206 for  their  determinate  quantum  and  the  external  expression  of  relationship  of  similar 
magnitudes  of  quanta. 
"Extensive  and  intensive  magnitude  are  thus  one  and  the  same  determinateness  of 
quantum;  they  are  only  distinguished  by  one  having  the  amount  within  itself  and  the 
other  having  amount  outside  itselL""' 
The  two  sides  not  only  reflect  the  discrete  and  the  continuous  elements  of  magnitude  that 
share  a  homogeneous  unity  of  a  pure  quantity;  they  also  represent  the  intensive  and 
extensive  determinations  inherent  to  quantum.  The  dialectic  of  quantity  here  involves  a 
quantitative  ratio,  this  marks  the  "intensive"  and  "extensive"  aspects  of  determinate  quantity 
or  quantum,  as  opposed  to  the  discrete  and  continuous  elements  of  magnitude  at  the  start  of 
Hegel's  quantitative  analysis. 
The  difference  is  that  the  latter  apply  to  the  category  of  quantity  in  general,  and  the  former 
applies  to  the  limit  or  determinateness  of  it;  hence  its  expression  as  both  a  quantum  and  a 
direct  ratio.  The  quantitative  expression  is  now  further  specified  and  manifested  as  a 
determinate  relation  of  two  quantum,  in  the  unity  of  the  intensive  and  extensive  aspects  of 
quantum  in  its  determinate  relation. 
This  relation  of  intensive  and  extensive  magnitude,  contained  within  each  commodity,  is 
first  expressed  in  the  relation  between  two  commodities,  as  a  quantitative  dialectic  of  self 
and  other.  This  provides  the  basis  for  the  equal  quantitative  determinations  of  the  magnitude 
of  the  exchange  value  relations  between  two  qualitatively  different  forms  of  commodities. 
Hegel  expresses  this  relation  in  a  manner  that  clearly  foreshadows  Marx's  account  of  the 
value  relation. 
G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  240. 
G.  W.  F  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  220.  "A  quantum,  therefore,  in 
accordance  with  its  quality,  is  posited  in  absolute  continuity  with  its  externality,  with  its  otherness.  "  Ibid. 
P.  225. 
207 "In  Ratio,  Quantum  is  external  to  and  different  from  itself:  this  its  externality  is  the 
relation  of  one  Quantum  to  another,  each  of  which  has  value  only  in  this  its  relation 
to  its  Other;  and  this  relation  constitutes  the  determinateness  of  Quantum,  which 
exists  as  such  a  unity.  Here  its  determination  is  not  indifferent,  but  qualitative:  in  this 
its  externality  it  has  returned  upon  itself,  and  in  it  is  that  which  it  is.  "166 
What  determines  their  similarity  of  quantitative  expression  is  the  magnitude  of  the  human 
labour  power  that  is  embodied  within  their  production.  This  abstract  social  form  and  relation 
provides  the  source  for  the  common  quality  that  unites  them  both.  This  embryonic 
expression  of  a  quantitative  quality  is  the  result  of  the  relation  between  the  two  quanta,  in 
Marx's  terms  this  is  first  manifested  in  the  simple  value  relation  between  two  commodities. 
The  properties  that  a  thing  exhibits  are,  as  Marx  expresses  it,  not  the  result  of  an  external 
relation  but  only  manifest  themselves  in  that  relation.  This  distinction  of  discrete  and 
continuous  magnitude  is  further  expressed  and  reflected  in  the  intensive  and  extensive 
determination  of  the  two  sides  of  the  relation  that  expresses  the  determinate  exchange  value 
of  the  commodity.  With  repulsion,  as  the  active  expression  of  the  relative  form  of  value,  and 
attraction,  as  the  passive  equivalent  form  of  value. 
Again  the  intensive  and  extensive  magnitudes  for  Hegel  are  not  two  separate  species  of 
which  one  involves  a  character  not  possessed  by  the  other;  they  share  a  common  nature. 
Hegel  expresses  this  very  process,  that  of  the  qualitative  form  of  a  quantitative  relation,  in 
his  description  of  the  determinate  expression  of  one  quantum  to  another  quantum. 
"Quantum  in  qualitative  form  is  quantitative  relation.  Quantum  merely  passes 
beyond  itself-,  in  relation  it  passes  over  into  its  otherness  in  such  a  way  that  the  latter, 
which  forms  its  determination,  is  posited  simultaneouslY,  and  is  another  Quantum; 
166  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Volume  one.  (Johnston  and  Struthers  translation.  )  Allen  and 
Unwin  (1961.  )  P.  256.  Hegel  also  expresses  this  relation  as  a  qualitative  one  that  brings  out  the  value  in  the 
relation  in  the  Logic.  "But  the  two  quanta  are  not  reckoned  at  their  immediate  value:  their  value  is  only  in  this 
relation.  "  Paragraph  105.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  P.  156. 
208 we  then  find  that  it  has  returned  to  itself  and  that  it  is  related  to  itself  (namely  in 
Otherness).  "" 
In  its  externality,  and  through  its  quantitative  relation  to  an  other,  it  expresses  its  own 
quality;  as  a  quality,  which,  as  it  is  quantitatively  expressed  in  and  through  the  other,  it  has 
in  common  with  the  other.  Marx  also  expresses  this  same  qualitative  nature  that  underpins 
the  quantitative  equality  of  the  determinate  magnitudes  of  two  commodities  in  their 
common  value  expression. 
"What  does  this  equation  tell  us?  It  tells  us  that  in  two  different  things  -  in  lquarter 
of  corn  and  x  cwt.  of  iron,  there  exists  in  equal  quantities  something  common  to 
both.  The  two  things  must  therefore  be  equal  to  a  third,  which  in  itself  is  neither  the 
one  nor  the  other.  Each  of  them,  so  far  as  it  is  exchange  value,  must  therefore  be 
reducible  to  Us  third.  "  168 
Value,  as  abstract  labour  is  this  'third'  that  initially  brings  out  the  common  content  of  the 
social  form  of  labour  embodied  within  the  two  related  commodities.  This  value  relation 
finds  its  determinate  expression  in  the  exchange  value  of  the  commodity  only  when  it  is 
expressed  through  another  commodity  body. 
As  we  have  seen,  according  to  Hegel,  the  qualitative  nature  of  quantity  is  that  quantity  is 
external  to  itseýf.  The  analysis  of  the  simple  value  form  and  relation  of  Marx  is  derived  from 
this  Hegelian  form  of  dialectical  analysis.  The  essence  of  value,  as  abstract  human  labour 
power,  is  the  source  for  the  expression  of  the  common  content  of  both. 
"One  forgets  that  magnitudes  of  different  things  are  only  quantitatively  comparable 
after  their  reduction  to  the  same  unit.  Only  as  expressions  of  the  same  unit  do  they 
have  the  same  denominator,  and  are  hence  commensurable  quantities.  In  the  above 
167  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Volume  one.  (Johnston  and  Struthers  translation.  )  Allen  and 
Unwin.  (1961.  )  P-199. 
209 expression,  the  linen  relates  itself  thus  to  the  coat  as  to  something  like  itself,  or  the 
coat  is  related  to  the  linen  as  a  thing  of  the  same  substance,  having  a  like  essence.  It 
is  set  qualitatively  equal  to  the  linen.  ""' 
Two  forms  of  the  expression  of  the  same  quality,  both  in  equal  but  discrete  quantities,  are  in 
a  measured  relation.  What  it  is  continuous  with,  and  what  it  passes  over  into,  is  itself.  The 
value  quality  is,  and  can  in  fact  only  be  expressed,  in  and  through  that  dialectical  relation  of 
self  and  other.  The  substantial  social  force  of  commodified  human  labour  power  and  its 
alienated  product  can  only  be  expressed  in  the  reified  form  of  abstract  labour  or  value 
through  the  relation  of  one  commodity  to  an  other. 
The  relation  between  two  quanta,  each  of  which  expresses  the  same  qualitative 
determination  of  quantum,  is  the  result  of  Hegel's  analysis  of  direct  ratio.  In  this  form  of 
direct  ratio,  which  could  be  the  product  of  an  accidental  relation,  the  qualitative  nature  of  the 
expression  of  quantity  is  not  obviously  revealed  in  this  simple  quantitative  relation  of  two 
discrete  quanta.  Here  is  how  Hegel  expresses  this  embryonic  qualitative  relation  of  direct 
ratio. 
"In  this,  the  qualitative  moment  does  not  yet  emerge  explicitly  as  such;  its  mode  is 
still  only  that  of  quantum,  namely,  to  be  posited  as  having  its  determinateness  in  its 
very  externality.  "' 
Like  Marx's  account  of  the  simple  or  accidental  form  of  value,  it  appears  to  be  the  result  of 
a  merely  contingent  relation,  as  the  expression  of  an  indifferent  and  external  quantitative 
relation.  It  is  though,  the  initial  but  yet  to  become  more  fully  emergent  expression  of,  a 
qualitative  and  common  form  and  unity. 
K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  45. 
169K.  Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  New  Park.  (1976.  )  P.  52. 
170  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  315. 
210 Let  us  see  how  Hegel  further  develops  the  dialectical  dynamics  and  motor  forces  necessary 
for  comprehending  this  evolution,  from  its  simplest  expression  of  a  dialectic  of  self  and 
other  into  an  emergent  quantitative  and  qualitative  totality.  At  the  same  time,  this  will  reveal 
its  important  influence  in  Marx's  exposition  of  the  process  of  the  subsumption  of  labour  and 
its  product  by  the  social  substance  of  abstract  labour  and  value,  their  common  essence. 
3.  The  Dialectic  of  One  to  Many  or  the  Expanded  form  of  Value. 
The  simple  form  of  value,  as  it  appears  as  an  accidental  and  quantitative  relation,  does  not 
fully  manifest  the  value  creating  substance  that  underpins  the  exchange  relation.  It  is,  as 
Marx  puts  it,  through  the  expression  of  equivalence  between  different  sorts  of  conunodities, 
that  "alone  brings  into  relief  the  specific  character  of  value  creating  labour. 
This  it  does  by  reducing  the  different  varieties  of  concrete  labour  to  their  common  social 
quality,  namely  abstract  human  labour  power.  This  value  creating  substance  of  abstract 
labour  is  more  fully  manifested  with  its  further  development  into  the  expanded  form  of 
value. 
As  a  commodity  finds  its  relative  value  expression  in  a  particular  quantity  of  another 
commodity,  it  can  then  potentially  express  its  relative  value  in  a  myriad  of  quantitatively 
determinate  relations  with  other  commodity  forms.  This  quantitative  aspect  of  value  can 
thus  be  expressed  not  only  in  one  other  commodity,  but  also  in  a  whole  series  of  other 
commodities. 
The  dialectic  of  self  and  other,  expressed  in  the  relative  and  equivalent  poles  of  the  simple 
form  of  value,  now  makes  the  transition  and  becomes  a  more  evolved  dialectic  of  one  to 
many;  as  a  series  of  expressions  of  the  relative  value  form  of  a  particular  commodity.  The 
equivalent  form  of  the  relative  expression  of  value  can  now  be  expressed  in  potentially 
limitless  acts  of  exchange  relations,  with  the  same  relative  form  of  value  expressing  itself  in 
a  series  of  equivalent  forms. 
211 Hegel  also  expresses  this  dialectical  dynamic  of  the  development  of  a  single  to  a  series  of 
measure  relations,  inherent  in  Marx's  account.  It  is  this  development  into  an  expanded  series 
of  quantitative  relations  that  more  fully  brings  out  the  "distinctive  character"  of  its 
qualitative  nature  for  Hegel. 
"The  qualitative  exponent,  as  one  immediate  quantum,  expresses  only  one  relation. 
The  distinctive  character  of  the  self-subsistent  measure  finds  its  true  expression  in 
the  characteristic  series  of  exponents  which  it,  taken  as  unit,  forms  with  other  self- 
subsistent  measures;  for  one  of  these  measures  when  brought  into  relation  with  the 
rest  of  them  and  taken  as  unit  forms  another  series.  Now  it  is  the  interrelationship  of 
the  members  of  such  a  series  that  constitutes  the  qualitative  aspect  of  the  self- 
subsistent  measure. 
"  171 
The  motor  force  for  this  evolution  into  a  more  expanded  form  of  quantitative  relation  lies  in 
the  further  development  of  the  dialectic  of  the  forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction.  The 
relation  of  the  one  and  the  many  that  Hegel  develops  here,  is  a  dialectic  of  mutual  exclusion 
and  mutual  connection,  with  repulsion  as  the  positing  of  each  single  unit,  and  attraction  as 
the  positing  of  their  relation  as  a  many.  This  process  is  exhibited  through  the  further 
development  of  the  dialectic  of  the  discrete/intensive  and  continuous/extensive  forms  of 
magnitude. 
"Continuity  is  only  coherent,  compact  unity  as  unity  of  the  discrete;  posited  as  such 
it  is  no  longer  only  a  moment  but  the  whole  of  quantity,  continuous  magnitude  .... 
This  continuity  in  the  discrete  consists  in  the  ones  being  the  same  as  one  another,  or 
in  having  the  same  unity.  Discrete  magnitude  is,  therefore,  the  asunderness  of  the 
manifold  one  as  self-same,  not  the  manifold  one  in  general  but  posited  as  the  many 
of  a  unity.  "  172 
171  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  352. 
172G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  199  and  200  respectively. 
212 The  discrete  unit  finds  that  the  quantitative  expression  of  its  own  quantitative  nature  is 
manifested  externally  through  relating  to  an  other  discrete  unit.  The  further  quantitative 
relations,  that  the  discrete  unit  enters  into  with  a  series  of  other  discrete  units,  brings  out  the 
continuous  unity  of  magnitude,  and  posits  that  continuity  as  the  expression  of  a  common 
unity  or  equality. 
This  quantitative  relation  of  equality  belies  a  common  qualitative  expression  that  links  the 
one  to  the  many.  This  undifferentiated  many  is  the  homogeneous  totality  that  is  now 
determinately  expressed  as  continuous  magnitude,  a  continuous  magnitude  that  is  the 
totality  of  all  the  discrete  magnitudes  or  single  units. 
"In  continuity,  plurality  is  posited  as  it  is  in  itself,  each  of  the  many  is  what  the 
others  are,  each  is  equal  to  the  other,  and  hence  plurality  is  simple  and 
undifferentiated  equafity. 
"  173 
For  Hegel,  the  negative  relation  of  one  to  itself  is  the  manifestation  of  the  force  of  repulsion; 
it  posits  itself  as  itself,  this  it  does,  and  can  only  do,  in  its  relation  to  others.  Each  of  the 
individual  units  repel  themselves  from  themselves,  repulsion  is  their  common  relation.  This 
positing  of  the  individual  unit  by  repulsion,  is  then,  also  the  positing  of  many  individual 
units;  the  "mutual  repulsion  is  the  posited  determinate  being  of  the  many  ones.  " 
To  put  it  in  Marx's  terms,  each  single  commodity  seeks  to  express  its  relative  exchange 
value.  The  relative  expression  of  value  presupposes  another  commodity  that  it  can  express 
its  inherent  value  form  in;  the  development  into  the  expanded  form  of  relative  value 
presupposes  many  commodities  that  it  can  express  its  inherent  value.  in.  This  develops  a 
whole  series  of  measure  relations  contained  in  the  developed  expression  of  the  relative 
exchange  value  for  each  commodity. 
113  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Volume  one.  (Johnston  and  Struthers  translation.  )  Allen  and 
Unwin.  (1961.  )  P.  201. 
213 The  self-existing  unit  both  excludes  the  others  and  at  the  same  time  relates  itself  to  the  many 
which  it  excludes;  this  they  all  do.  Repulsion  thus  posits  both  the  individual  unit  and  also  a 
multitude  of  individual  units,  each  of  which  relates  itself  in  the  same  fashion.  By  doing  so, 
quantity  shows  itself  to  be  both  discrete,  as  a  one,  and  continuous,  as  a  many,  at  the  same 
time  they  express  their  qualitatively  common  nature  and  sameness.  This  manifested  in  their 
commonality  or  "ideality"  of  attraction. 
"Both  repulsion  and  attraction  are  in  the  first  place  distinct  from  one  another,  the 
former  as  the  reality  of  the  ones,  the  latter  as  their  posited  ideality.  The  relation  of 
attraction  to  repulsion  is  such  that  the  former  has  the  latter  for  presupposition. 
Repulsion  provides  the  material  for  attraction.  If  there  were  no  ones  there  would  be 
nothing  to  attract;  the  conception  of  a  perpetual  attraction,  of  an  absorption  of  the 
ones,  presupposes  an  equally  perpetual  production  of  them.  ""' 
All  commodities  actively  express  themselves  in  the  evolution  of  the  simple  to  the  expanded 
form  of  value  relation,  as  it  is  their  common  social  substance  and  driving  force.  The  active 
nature  of  the  commodity  form  is  to  divest  itself  of  its  privative  state,  its  use  value  form,  and 
realises  its  true  social  form  of  activity  as  exchange  value;  value  is  thus  the  "ideal"  form  of 
the  concrete  commodity. 
The  evolution  of  abstract  labour  into  the  value  form  for  Marx  is  thus  driven  by  the  ftirther 
development  of  the  relative  form  of  value  where  each  commodity  seeks  to  express  its  value 
in  relation  to  all  other  commodities.  The  development  of  the  value  form  for  Marx  takes  then, 
its  starting  point  from  the  active  relative  expression  of  the  value  form  of  the  commodity. 
Attraction  is,  however,  also  inseparable  from  repulsion;  in  the  same  way  that  the  value 
expression  of  a  single  commodity  could  take  either  the  relative  or  the  equivalent  form,  but 
not  both  at  the  same  time,  this  being  dependent  on  which  side  it  takes  in  the  value 
214 expression.  The  commodity  form  presupposes  other  cornmodities  that  it  can  reciprocally 
alienate  itself  in  and  expresses  its  own  value  nature.  This  mutual  repulsion  or  exclusion 
dialectically  inverts  and  turns  into  its  opposite,  mutual  attraction  or  relation. 
"In  starting,  however,  with  the  repulsion  of  the  determinately  present  ones  and  so, 
too,  with  attraction  posited  as  externally  connected  with  it,  the  two  determinations, 
although  inseparable  are  held  apart  as  distinct;  but  it  has  been  found  that  not  merely 
is  repulsion  presupposed  by  attraction,  but  equally,  too,  there  is  a  reverse  relation  of 
repulsion  to  attraction,  and  the  former  equally  has  its  presupposition  in  the  latter.  ""' 
This  self-presupposition  of  the  relative  and  equivalent  forms  of  value  entails,  as  in  the 
Hegelian  account  of  the  relation  of  repulsion  and  attraction,  that  the  "two  determinations 
each  for  itself,  means  that  each  contains  the  other  as  a  moment  within  it.  "  The  binding 
together  of  the  two  sides  lies  in  their  common  nature,  both  being  values. 
The  relation  for  Hegel  is  such  that  in  repulsion,  "the  self-negating  of  each  in  itself"  turns 
into  its  opposite,  attraction,  as  "the  self-positing  of  each  as  its  own  other.  "  This  dialectic  of 
repulsion  and  attraction  is  therefore  expressed,  or  shared  between,  the  two  polar  forms  of 
the  value  relation. 
Repulsion  and  attraction  turns  out  to  be  a  relation  whereby  each  presupposes  the  other  as  its 
own  negative  determination  and  mediation;  this  negative  self-relation  is  expressed  in  the 
mutual  independence  and  mutual  relation  of  the  one  with  the  many;  in  the  relation  of  the 
individual  to  the  common  kind.  One  determines  itself  as  a  many  and  the  many  determine 
themselves  as  a  one. 
"Their  independence  consists  in  this,  that  in  this  mediation  they  are  posited  as 
another  determining  for  each  other  (Repulsion  is  the  positing  of  the  Many, 
174G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  173. 
171  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  175. 
215 Attraction  of  the  One;  the  latter  is  also  the  negation  of  the  Many,  the  former,  the 
negation  of  their  ideality  in  the  One),  and  in  that  Attraction  is  Attraction  only  by  the 
mediation  of  Repulsion,  and  Repulsion  Repulsion  only  by  the  mediation  of 
Attraction.  "  "' 
This  development  of  the  dialectic  of  quantity  and  quality  is  driven  by  the  universality  of  the 
forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction,  manifested  in  both  the  discrete  and  continuous,  and 
intensive  and  extensive  expressions  of  the  forms  of  magnitude,  and  more  fully  revealed  in 
the  expanded  dialectical  relation  of  the  one  and  the  many.  What  constitutes  the  "moment  of 
continuity"  in  quantity  in  Hegel's  analysis  is  the  force  of  attraction. 
This  homogeneous  nature,  of  an  indifferent  plurality  externally  related  to  each  other,  is  the 
qualitative  element  contained  in  the  relative  expression  of  quantity.  What  that  continuity 
depends  upon  for  Hegel  "is  the  common  element.  "  Attraction,  for  Hegel,  is  then  the  moment 
of  not  only  continuity,  but  also  ideality,  as  the  positing  of  the  many  in  an  undifferentiated 
homogeneous  unity,  as  an  expression  of  one  common  substance. 
Hegel  has  the  view  that  it  is  this  externality  of  many  ones,  as  discrete  self-repulsing  units,  in 
which  atomism  "remains  entangled.  "  They  are  then  viewed  as  being  merely  externally  and 
contingently  related  as  self-acting  individual  units.  For  Hegel  the  opposite  is  the  case,  and 
this  is  shown  in  the  qualitative  relation  that  is  inherent  in  the  continuity  of  the  one. 
"We  saw,  when  examining  the  One  that,  in  its  own  true  nature,  it  passes  over  into  its 
ideality,  which  is  Attraction,  and  that  thus  continuity  is  not  external  but  peculiar  to 
it,  and  founded  in  its  essence.  ""' 
I'll,  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Volume  one.  (Johnston  and  Struthers  translation.  )  Allen  and 
Unwin.  (1961.  )  P.  189. 
177  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Volume  one.  (Johnston  and  Struthers  translation.  )  Allen  and 
Unwin.  (1961.  )  P.  202.  See  also  Hegel's  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  100z.  P.  148-149. 
216 This  is  the  motor  force  and  expression  of  the  dynamic  movement  of  the  contradiction 
contained  in  the  specific  determination  of  an  individuated  substance  to  the  rest  of  its  kind. 
This  qualitative  relation  of  the  many  to  each  other  is  the  source  for  both  its  "forth-putting" 
and  its  "passing  over  into  the  other";  this  is  the  determinate  characteristic  that,  for  Hegel, 
"brings  out  the  totality"  in  the  sphere  of  being.  It  is  the  dialectical  activity  of  the  forces  of 
repulsion  and  attraction  that  both  ties  them  together  and  brings  out  their  common  unity, 
quality,  and  nature. 
This  dialectic  of  one  and  many  that  produces  a  common  homogeneous  unity  is  also  the 
motor  force  behind  the  expression,  in  Marx's  value  theory,  of  the  fuller  development  into 
the  expanded  form  of  the  value  relation  that  is  manifested  in  the  more  evolved  exchange 
relations  between  commodities.  This  further  brings  out  the  social  nature  of  the  force 
underlying  the  value  creating  substance,  abstract  human  labour  power.  This  reified  form  of 
labour  power,  measured  in  time,  is  the  source  for  the  determinate  exchange  value  inherent 
within  the  commodity. 
"Our  analysis  has  shown,  that  the  form  or  expression  of  the  value  of  a  commodity 
originates  in  the  nature  of  value,  and  not  that  value  and  its  magnitude  originate  in  the 
mode  of  their  expression  as  exchange-value.  ""I 
That  common  pole  of  attraction  in  Hegel's  analysis  of  quantity  is  expressed  as  the  social 
form  of  value  in  Marx.  It  is  also  the  development  of  the  dialectic  from  its  initially  apparent 
quantitative  to  expanded  qualitative  expression  of  the  common  element  necessary  for  an 
understanding  of  the  development  of  Marx's  concept  of  abstract  labour;  as  the  one 
homogeneous  mass  of  human  labour-power  in  the  reified  form  that  the  social  substance  of 
value  takes. 
This  development  of  the  dialectic  from  the  simple  or  accidental  form  of  self  and  other,  to  the 
expanded  form  of  self  and  many  others,  more  fully  brings  out  that  abstract  labour  is  the 
217 social  substance  that  is  the  essence  of  the  value  form  and  expression.  This  it  does  as  it  is 
now  cohered  in  a  more  expanded  social  relation  and  form  that  unites  the  one  with  the  many, 
"with  the  whole  world  of  commodities.  " 
"It  is  thus,  that  for  the  first  thne,  this  value  shows  itself  in  its  true  light  as  a 
congelation  of  undifferentiated  human  labour.  For  the  labour  that  creates  it,  now 
stands  expressly  revealed,  as  labour  that  ranks  equally  with  every  other  sort  of 
human  labour,  no  matter  what  its  form.  ""' 
This  expanded  form  shows  that  the  relative  form  of  the  expression  of  value  remains 
unaltered  in  magnitude,  regardless  of  which  other  commodity  form  its  value  is  expressed  in. 
Furthermore,  it  also  confirms  that  value  is  no  accidental  expression  manifested  in  the 
exchange  relations  of  commodities,  but  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  value  that  manifests  itself  in 
the  exchange  relation  between  different  and  contingently  related  commodities.  The  inverse 
of  the  phenomenal  appearance  is  revealed  in  the  essence  that  underlies  it. 
"The  accidental  relation  between  two  individual  commodity-owners  disappears.  It 
becomes  plain,  that  it  is  not  the  exchange  of  commodities  which  regulates  the 
magnitude  of  their  value;  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  it  is  the  magnitude  of  their  value 
which  controls  their  exchange  proportions.  "" 
The  products  of  human  labour  have  always  had  the  potentiality  of  being  reciprocally 
alienated,  of  being  mutually  exchanged.  This  potentiality  only  and  necessarily  actualises 
itself  through  the  homogeneous  quality  and  substance  of  abstract  human  labour;  this  social 
form  of  the  universalisation  and  equalisation  of  all  concrete  forms  of  labour  and  its  product 
is  expressed  in  all  the  evolving  determinate  forms  that  abstract  labour  as  value  takes. 
178  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  66. 
179  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  68. 
"I  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  69. 
218 4.  Bad  Inrinite. 
How  does  this  analysis  of  the  expanded  form  of  value  in  Marx  tie  in  with  Hegel's  concept  of 
a  "bad  infinite"?  The  core  of  the  problem  here  for  Marx  is  that  the  substance  of  value  is  not 
yet  a  totality,  it  is  "deficient  in  unity.  "  What  prevents  the  full  development  to  the  money 
form  in  this  expanded  series  of  measure  relations  is  that  abstract  labour,  as  the  universal 
substance,  has  yet  to  individuate  itself  in  a  single  form.  This  single  universal  form  has  not 
yet  congealed  itself  through  these  dialectical  relations;  this  now  results  in  a  myriad  of 
particular  relative  and  equivalent  forms  of  value. 
"In  the  first  place,  the  relative  expression  of  value  is  incomplete  because  the  series 
representing  it  is  interminable.  The  chain  of  which  each  equation  of  value  is  a  link,  is 
liable  at  any  moment  to  be  lengthened  by  each  new  kind  of  commodity  that  comes 
into  existence  and  furnishes  the  material  for  a  fresh  expression  of  value.  In  the 
second  place,  it  is  a  many-coloured  mosaic  of  disparate  and  independent  expressions 
of  value.  And  lastly,  if,  as  must  be  the  case,  the  relative  value  of  each  commodity  in 
turn,  becomes  expressed  in  this  expanded  form,  we  get  for  each  of  them  a  relative 
value-form,  different  in  every  case,  and  consisting  of  an  interminable  series  of 
expressions  of  value.  ""' 
It  is  a  "bad  infinite"  for  Marx  because  every  commodity  can  not  only  express  its  value  in  an 
ever-expanding  series  of  measure  relations,  but,  every  other  relative  form  of  value  can,  at 
the  same  time,  play  this  role  of  universal  equivalent  for  all  other  commodities  in  their 
developed  expression  of  value.  The  other  related  problem  with  this  is  that  every  new  form  of 
commodity  also  has  the  potential  to  do  so.  This  defect  of  the  simple  and  expanded  forms  is 
also  encapsulated  in  Hegel's  analysis  of  measure  as  a  series  of  measure  relations. 
"But  further,  those  measures  which  together  with  the  two,  or  rather  indefinitely 
many  self-subsistent  measures  of  the  first  series  -  measures  which  are  compared 
219 only  with  each  other  -  yield  a  series  of  exponents  of  the  ratios  between  the  members 
of  that  series,  are  similarly  in  themselves  self-subsistent  measures,  each  being  a 
specific  something  with  its  own  intrinsic  measure  ratio.  "  182 
The  simple  and  expanded  forms  of  the  value  expression  cannot,  in  themselves,  cohere  this 
expanding  totality  of  the  products  of  labour,  into  a  fully  developed  universality  of  a  value 
form.  Marx  expresses  the  "bad  infinite"  of  the  expanded  form  of  value  and  its  impact  on  the 
equivalent  form  in  the  following  fashion: 
"The  defects  of  the  expanded  relative  value-form  are  reflected  in  the  corresponding 
equivalent  form.  Since  the  bodily  form  of  each  single  commodity  is  one  particular 
equivalent  form  amongst  numberless  others,  we  have,  on  the  whole,  nothing  but 
fragmentary  equivalent  forms,  each  excluding  the  others.  In  the  same  way,  also,  the 
special,  concrete,  useful  kind  of  labour  embodied  in  each  particular  equivalent,  is 
presented  only  as  a  particular  kind  of  labour,  and  therefore  not  as  an  exhaustive 
representative  of  human  labour  generally.  The  latter,  indeed,  gains  adequate 
manifestation  in  the  totality  of  its  manifold,  particular,  concrete  forms.  But,  in  that 
case,  its  expression  in  an  infinite  series  is  ever  incomplete  and  deficient  in  unity.  "  183 
The  list  of  potential  universal  equivalents,  like  the  commodity  form  itself,  is  therefore 
continually  growing  and  ever-expanding.  The  continuous  and  discrete  forms  of  magnitude, 
contained  in  the  expanded  form  of  value,  though  a  more  developed  totality  and  generality,  a 
totality  that  is  now  a  more  adequate,  but  not  yet  a  fully  formed  expression  of  one 
homogeneous  mass  of  human  labour  power.  This  is  expressed  in  Marx  as  the  defects  that  are 
inherent  within  the  simple  and  expanded  forms  of  value. 
K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  69. 
G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  353.  Hegel  further  expresses  this 
deficiency  in  unity  in  the  following  form.  "The  exponents  of  these  ratios  are  not  exclusive  determinations  of 
measure;  their  progress  is  continuous  but  it  contains  an  immanent  specifying  law  which  is  distinct  from  the 
formally  progressive  ratios  in  which  the  amounts  are  combined  and  makes  the  former  progress 
incommensurable  with  the  latter.  "  (Ibid.  )  P.  366. 
181  K.  Marx.  Capital  Volume  one.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  69-70. 
220 "The  two  earlier  forms  either  express  the  value  of  each  commodity  in  terms  of  a 
single  commodity  of  a  different  kind,  or  in  a  series  of  many  such  commodities.  In 
both  cases,  it  is,  so  to  say,  the  special  business  of  each  single  commodity  to  find  an 
expression  for  its  value,  and  this  it  does  without  the  help  of  the  others.  "'" 
Moreover,  as  each  commodity  has  to  seek  out  its  own  expression  of  value,  the  totality,  and 
hence  abstract  human  labour  power  in  the  universal  form  of  value,  forever  remains,  in  these 
forms,  "incomplete  and  deficient  in  unity.  "  What  is  needed  to  fully  actualise  this  potentiality 
is  a  generalised  social  form,  based  on  the  commodification  and  universalisation  of  labour 
power,  as  the  single  source  of  the  exchangeability  of  all  concrete  products  of  labour  through 
the  market. 
It  becomes  this  totality  only  when  abstract  labour  actively  individuates  itself,  by  all  other 
commodities  excluding  a  single  commodity  form  of  value.  How  then  does  this  dialectic 
change  its  qualitative  and  quantitative  nature  and  become  a  unifying  totality? 
5.  The  Dialectic  of  Many  to  One  or  the  Money  Form. 
"The  positing  of  the  totality  requires  the  double  transition,  not  only  of  the  one 
determinateness  into  its  other,  but  equally  the  transition  of  this  other,  its  return,  into 
the  first.  The  first  transition  yields  the  identity  of  both,  but  at  first  only  in  itseýf  or  in 
principle;  quality  is  contained  in  quantity,  but  this  is  still  a  one-sided 
determinateness.  That  the  converse  is  equally  true,  namely,  that  quantity  is  contained 
in  quality  and  is  equally  only  a  sublated  determinateness,  this  results  from  the 
second  transition  -  the  return  into  the  first  determinateness.  This  observation  on  the 
I"  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  71. 
221 necessity  of  the  double  transition  is  of  great  importance  throughout  the  whole 
compass  of  scientific  method.  ""' 
The  real  infinite,  according  to  Hegel,  "consists  in  being  at  home  with  itself  in  its  other,  or,  if 
enunciated  as  a  process,  in  coming  to  itself  in  its  other.  "  This  consists,  for  Hegel,  in  a 
passing  over  into  the  other,  but  a  passing  over  that  is,  in  the  passage,  self-related,  or  to  put  it 
negatively  "what  is  altered  is  the  other.  "  This  dialectic  is  completed  through  the  totality  of 
the  relations  now  generated  by  the  forces  of  repulsion  and  attraction. 
The  repulsion  of  the  many  ones  now  reciprocally  transforms  itself  into  its  opposite,  what 
Hegel  calls  the  one  one  of  attraction.  "This  positing  of  themselves  by  the  many  ones  into  a 
single  one  is  attraction.  "  Attraction  is,  for  Hegel,  the  force  whereby  the  dialectic  is  realised 
through  the  common  repulsion  that  leads  to  the  many  ones  positing  a  single  one,  that  single 
one  is  "ideality  realised.  "  Here,  this  process  of  the  dialectic  of  repulsion  and  attraction  is 
realised  when  the  repulsion  of  the  many  is,  by  their  own  activity,  inverted  into  its  opposite; 
here  repulsion  "passes  over  into  attraction,  the  many  ones  into  one  one.  " 
"It  is  only  attraction  itself  that  is  a  positing  of  a  one  distinct  from  other  ones;  these 
are  only  immediate  ones  which  should  maintain  themselves  through  repulsion;  but 
through  their  posited  negation  arises  the  one  one  of  attraction,  which  is  consequently 
determined  as  mediated,  the  one  posited  as  one.  The  first  ones,  as  immediate,  do  not 
in  their  ideality  return  into  themselves  but  have  this  ideality  in  another  one. 
The  one  one,  however,  is  the  realised  ideality,  posited  in  the  one;  it  is  attraction 
through  the  mediation  of  repulsion,  and  it  contains  this  mediation  in  itself  as  its 
detemination.  ""' 
185  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  323.  Hegel  then  continues  in  the 
following  vein.  "Quantum  is  now  no  longer  an  indifferent  or  external  determination  but  as  such  is  sublated 
and  is  quality,  and  is  that  by  virtue  of  which  something  is  what  it  is;  this  is  the  truth  of  quantum,  to  be 
Measure.  "  (Ibid.  P.  323-324.  ). 
186  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  174.  Hegel  also  expresses  this 
process  in  the  following  form.  "But  in  the  relative  repulsion  and  attraction,  which  presupposes  immediate, 
determinately  existent  ones,  it  is  posited  that  each  is  in  its  own  self  this  negation  of  itself  and  is  thus  also  the 
222 This  reciprocal  exclusion  of  repulsion,  through  its  own  dialectical  negation,  is  turned  into  its 
opposite,  attraction,  where  the  reciprocal  exclusion  of  the  many  is  shown  to  be  based  on  a 
necessary  connection.  That  connection,  "the  nexus  binding  the  many  with  one  another  is  by 
no  means  a  mere  accident:  as  we  have  already  remarked,  the  nexus  is  founded  on  their  very 
nature.  "1" 
Hegel  expresses  the  further  development  of  this  qualitative  aspect,  inherent  within  the 
further  development  and  expansion  of  quantity,  as  a  form  of  "elective  affinity.  "  This  process 
leads  to  the  development  of  an  "exclusive  measure.  "  This  marks  a  change  from  the  self- 
subsistent  series  of  measure  relations  that  characterises  the  bad  infinite  of  the  expanded  form 
of  value  in  Marx.  This  process,  for  Hegel,  the  transition  of  quantity  into  quality  and  vice 
versa,  is  represented  through  the  development  of  a  nodal  line  of  measure  relations.  One  that 
itself  posits  a  measure  relation  that  is  qualitatively  distinct  from  the  preceding  series  of 
measure  relations  - 
"Here  we  have  a  measure  relation,  a  self-subsistent  reality  which  is  qualitatively 
distinguished  from  others.  Such  a  being  for  self,  because  it  is  at  the  same  time 
essentially  a  relation  of  quanta,  is  open  to  externality  and  to  quantitative  alteration;  it 
has  a  range  within  which  it  remains  indifferent  to  this  alteration  and  does  not  change 
its  quality.  But  there  enters  a  point  in  this  quantitative  alteration  at  which  the  quality 
is  changed  and  the  quantum  shows  itself  as  specifying,  so  that  the  altered 
quantitative  relation  is  converted  into  measure,  and  thus  into  a  new  quality,  a  new 
something.  The  relation  which  has  taken  place  of  the  first  is  determined  by  this, 
partly  according  to  the  qualitative  identity  of  the  moments  which  are  in  affinity,  and 
partly  according  to  the  quantitative  continuity.  ""' 
continuity  of  itself  in  its  other.  The  repulsion  of  the  determinately  existent  ones  is  the  self-preservation  of  the 
one  through  the  mutual  repulsion  of  the  others.  "  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  ) 
P.  177. 
181  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  98z.  P.  144. 
"I  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  367. 
223 This  process  exemplifies  Hegel's  dialectic  of  quality  to  quantity  and  the  result  of  this 
dialectic  being  that  of  the  transition  to  the  category  of  measure  and  essence.  Both  contrary 
motions,  of  quality  into  quantity  and  quantity  into  quality,  are  in  operation  at  the  same  time. 
The  dialectical  evolution  of  this  categorial  development  into  a  single  universal  form;  a  form, 
whose  result  is  itself  measure,  is  itself  described  by  Hegel  as  a  "qualitative  quantity.  " 
"This  transition  of  the  qualitative  and  the  quantitative  into  each  other  proceeds  on 
the  basis  of  their  unity,  and  the  meaning  of  this  process  is  only  to  show  or  to  posit 
the  determinate  being  of  such  a  substrate  underlying  the  process,  a  substrate  which  is 
their  unity  .... 
In  this  unity  of  the  substrate  with  itself  the  measure  determination  is 
sublated  and  its  quality  is  an  external  state  determined  by  the  quantum.  This  process 
is  equally  the  progressive  determination  of  measure  in  its  realisation  and  also  the 
reduction  of  measure  to  the  status  of  a  moment.  "  189 
In  Marx's  value  theory  that  dialectic  of  one  to  many,  as  the  expanded  value  expression  of 
each  single  commodity,  becomes  an  inverted  dialectic  of  many  to  one,  where  all  other 
commodities  now  exclude  a  single  commodity  as  the  measure  of  the  totality  of  the 
quantitative  value  relations  contained  in  the  world  of  commodities.  That  commodity  is  now 
the  universal  form  of  the  commodity  itself,  the  money  form.  That  exclusive  and  excluded 
one  is  the  general  individuation  of  abstract  labour,  as  the  "substrate  underlying  the  process" 
into  the  unity  and  totality  of  the  value  form  in  a  single  entity. 
This  it  has  achieved  through  the  quantitative  and  qualitative  changes  inherent  in  the  nodal 
line  of  measure  relations  in  their  dialectically  evolving  simple  and  expanded  forms  of  value. 
What  has  revealed  itself  in  Marx's  application  of  this  dialectic  of  Ilegel's  is  the  objective 
manifested  form  of  the  substance  of  value,  or,  alternatively  expressed,  value  as  the  subject 
of  the  activity  has  now  assumed  an  independent  and  common  universal  form. 
224 "The  general  form  of  value  C,  results  from  the  joint  action  of  the  whole  world  of 
commodities,  and  from  that  alone.  A  commodity  can  acquire  a  general  expression  of 
its  value  only  by  all  other  commodities,  simultaneously  with  it,  expressing  their 
value  in  the  same  equivalent;  and  every  new  commodity  must  follow  suit.  It  thus 
becomes  evident  that,  since  the  existence  of  commodities  as  values  is  purely  social, 
this  social  existence  can  be  expressed  by  the  totality  of  their  social  relations  alone, 
and  consequently  that  the  form  of  their  value  must  be  a  socially  recognised  form.  "" 
The  evolution  and  transition  of  these  two  forms,  the  simple  and  expanded  into  the  general 
form,  marks  a  dialectical  shift  and  transition  from  the  development  of  a  quantitative 
homogeneous  totality  into  the  development  of  a  new  quality;  or,  to  be  more  precise,  they 
mark  the  transition  into  the  qualitative  quantity  that  is  the  category  of  measure  for  Hegel. 
The  first  function  of  money,  as  the  universal  form  of  value  for  Marx,  is  the  role  of  money  as 
measure.  Hegel  expresses  this  process  in  the  following  form;  it  "is  the  very  essence  of  being 
to  characterise  itself,  and  its  complete  characterisation  is  reached  in  measure.  "  Moreover,  for 
Hegel,  measure  "is  implicitly  essence;  and  its  process  consists  in  realising  what  it  is 
implicitly.  " 
This  process  in  Marx  has  been  shown  to  be  the  product  and  result  of  an  underlying  and 
substantial  essence,  abstract  human  labour  power.  What  has  now  fully  expressed  itself  is, 
not  only  the  substance  of  value,  but  also  the  specific  and  determinate  form  that  this 
individuated  substance  of  value  takes,  the  money  form. 
This  process,  as  the  evolving  contradiction  that  is  contained  in  a  potential  totality,  is  itself 
resolved,  as  a  totality,  by  separating  the  value  quality  of  the  commodity  form  from  itself  and 
individuating  its  universality  of  exchange  in  a  single  and  general  form,  the  money  form. 
189  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Science  of  Logic.  Humanities  Press.  (1993.  )  P.  373  and  374  respectively. 
11  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  71. 
225 "In  this  manner  the  labour  realised  in  the  values  of  commodities  is  presented  not 
only  under  its  negative  aspect,  under  which  abstraction  is  made  from  every  concrete 
form  and  useful  property  of  actual  work,  but  its  own  positive  nature  is  made  to 
reveal  itself  expressly.  The  general  value  form  is  the  reduction  of  all  kinds  of  actual 
labour  to  their  common  character  of  being  human  labour  generally,  of  being  the 
expenditure  of  human  labour  power.  ""' 
Value,  in  terms  of  its  evolution  from  direct  barter,  has  now  become  the  money  form.  This  is 
achieved  through  objectively  separating  the  use  values  of  the  commodities  from  their 
inherent  exchange  value,  and  positing  value  in  an  independent  form  that  now  dialectically 
interpenetrates  with  the  whole  world  of  commodities.  This  separating  off,  of  the  commodity 
form  of  value  from  a  single  universal  equivalent  form  of  value,  a  process  that  does  not 
manifest  itself  in  substantial  nature,  has  its  own  particular  social  expression  of  reification  for 
Marx. 
"It  is  as  if  alongside  and  external  to  lions,  tigers,  rabbits,  and  all  other  actual  animals, 
which  form  when  grouped  together  the  various  kinds,  species,  subspecies,  families, 
etc.  of  the  animal  kingdom,  there  existed  also  in  addition  the  animal,  the  individual 
incarnation  of  the  entire  animal  kingdom.  Such  a  particular,  which  contains  within 
itself  all  really  present  species  of  the  same  entity,  is  a  universal  (like  animal,  god, 
etc.  ).  192 
In  exchange,  the  commodity  and  money  forms  now  become  independent  moments  or 
determinations  of  the  exchange  process  itself.  What  we  now  have  is  the  posited 
contradiction  between  the  commodity  and  the  money  form  as  the  twofold  phenomenal  forms 
191  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  72. 
192  K.  Marx.  Value  Studies  by  Marx.  New  Park.  (1976.  )  P.  27.  This  hiving  off  of  a  particular 
commodity  to  represent  all  forms  of  appearance  of  value  as  "the  universal  materialisation  of  abstract  human 
labour"  entails  that  the  "specific  labour  materialised  in  it  now  thereby  counts  as  universal  form  of  realisation 
of  human  labour,  as  universal  labour.  "  (Ibid.  ). 
226 of  the  expression  of  value  itself.  Measure,  as  Hegel  expresses  it,  "is  the  reduction  of 
measure  to  the  status  of  a  moment.  " 
Marx  achieves  this  in  the  analysis  of  value  by  the  logical  and  conceptual  explication  of  the 
process  of  the  separation  and  doubling  of  the  forms  of  value  from  the  primary  commodity 
form  and  its  evolution  into  the  money  form.  In  terms  of  Hegel's  Logic  we  have  now  moved 
on  to  the  sphere  of  essence  where  the  contradiction,  implicit  in  the  sphere  of  being,  is  now 
made  explicit.  This  dialectical  process  is  also  reflected,  in  Marx's  account,  in  the  evolution 
of  value  into  the  generalised  contradiction  between  the  commodity  and  money  forms. 
"The  antagonism  between  the  relative  form  of  value  and  the  equivalent  form,  the  two 
poles  of  the  value  form,  is  developed  concurrently  with  that  form  itself.  "  193 
Value,  as  a  process,  actualises  itself  by  separating  itself,  by  duplicating  or  doubling  its  form. 
This  as  we  have  seen,  it  does  through  the  evolution  of  the  dynamic  dialectic  of  the  twofold 
character  of  the  labour-power  embodied  within  the  twofold  form  of  the  commodity.  It 
resolves  this  contradiction  by  generalising  it,  by  externalising  its  twofold  form  in  the 
relation  of  the  commodity  and  its  own  universal  form  of  expression,  the  money  form.  The 
germ  of  the  money  form  has  been  shown  to  be  contained  in  the  commodity  form  in  Marx's 
dialectic. 
227 CHAPTER  ELEVEN. 
DIALECTICAL  MOTION  AND  PROCESS. 
Doubling  of  Form. 
"What  constitutes  dialectical  movement  is  the  co-existence  of  two  contradictory 
sides,  their  conflict  and  their  fusion  into  a  new  category.  ""' 
The  central  source  and  principle  of  motion  contained  in  the  general  form  of  working  of  the 
dialectic  has  proven  to  be  that  of  polar  contradiction.  This  twofold  character  of  polarity  has 
also  been  manifested  in  Hegel's  analysis  of  force  and  law,  and  reflected  in  Marx's  analysis 
of  value.  This  dialectical  doubling  of  form,  manifested  in  an  external  relation,  is  the  result  of 
the  twofold  diremption  of  the  force  characteristic  of  the  substantial  form  activity. 
The  necessity  for  grasping  the  Hegelian  principles  inherent  to  this  nomological  unfolding 
has  consequentially  proven  to  be  pivotal  for  the  comprehension  of  the  substantial  and 
dialectical  activity  of  the  subject  in  process.  The  principle  of  change  and  alteration 
underlying  the  interpenetration  of  the  polar  parameters  of  the  process  were  analysed  as  the 
product  of  not  only  their  specific  form  of  inner  difference,  but  also  as  the  expression  of  their 
universal  nexus  - 
This  universal  nexus  is  also  characteristically  expressed  as  the  common  unity  or  genus  that 
mediates  the  specific  difference  exhibited  in  the  reciprocity  of  the  contrary  polar  extremes  of 
that  common  identity.  This  is  the  core  dynamic  of  Hegel's  essentialist  account  of  the  laws  of 
193  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  73. 
11  K.  Marx.  Poverty  of  Philosophy.  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  6.  Lawrence  and 
Wishart.  (1976.  )  P.  168. 
228 motion,  of  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  contained  in  the  universal  form  activity  of  a 
substantial  subject  expressed  through  its  dialectical  doubling  of  form. 
This  dialectical  kernel  of  the  source  of  motion  and  movement  expresses  itself  at  the  outset 
of  the  analysis  of  the  process,  from  the  simplest  forms  of  determination  to  the  more  complex 
forms  of  relations  that  expresses  its  systematic  nature  and  universal  interconnections.  This 
conceptual  evolution  is,  as  we  shall  further  investigate,  also  reflected  in  Marx's  application 
of  the  dialectic  to  political  economy. 
From  the  dialectical  nature  of  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour  power  embodied  in  the 
commodity  all  the  subsequent  contradictions  of  capital  will  ensue.  Marx's  analysis  thereby 
starts  from  this  simple  and  universal  difference  expressed  in  the  commodity  form  of  use  and 
exchange  value,  of  concrete  and  abstract  labour,  and  proceeds  to  analyse  the  substance  and 
form  of  the  commodity  value  in  order  to  develop  the  movement  of  this  dialectic  contained 
within  the  expression  of  human  labour  power. 
This  relation  between  the  dialectical  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites,  expressed  in 
this  notion  of  a  doubling  of  form,  is further  exemplified  and  dialectically  reflected  in  Marx's 
view  of  how  value,  as  subject,  develops  a  modus  vivendi  for  resolving  the  inner 
contradiction  and  connection  pertaining  to  its  nature.  This  it  does  by  objectifying  the 
contrary  opposition  inherent  within  the  commodity  form  in  and  through  an  external  relation. 
"The  exchange  of  commodities  implies  contradictory  and  mutually  exclusive 
conditions.  The  differentiation  of  commodities  into  commodities  and  money  does 
not  sweep  away  these  inconsistencies,  but  develops  a  modus  vivendi,  a  form  in 
which  they  can  exist  side  by  side.  This  is  generally  the  way  in  which  real 
contradictions  are  reconciled.  For  instance,  it  is  a  contradiction  to  depict  one  body  as 
constantly  falling  towards  another,  and  as,  at  the  same  time,  constantly  flying  away 
229 from  it.  The  ellipse  is  a  form  of  motion  which,  while  allowing  this  contradiction  to 
go  on,  at  the  same  time  reconciles  it.  "" 
The  conflict  and  fusion  inherent  within  the  polar  reciprocity  is  resolved  in  the  dialectical 
movement  of  the  contradiction,  through  the  unity  and  difference  contained  in  the 
interpenetration  of  opposites.  This  resolution  is  now  expressed  in  a  new  and  more  developed 
category,  in  this  case  the  evolution  of  the  simple  form  of  circulation  that  now  posits  the 
money  form  of  value  in  its  dialectical  relation  with  the  commodity. 
The  dialectical  doubling  of  form  is  now  on  a  more  evolved  and  higher  level,  with  the 
internal  contradiction  in  the  commodity  between  use  and  exchange  value  now  objectively 
expressed  in  the  relation  between  the  commodity  form  and  its  universal  equivalent,  the 
money  form.  The  contradictions  within  the  exchange  process,  inherent  in  the  barter  form, 
are  resolved  by  generalising  them. 
"The  process  then  differentiates  them  into  commodities  and  money,  and  thus 
produces  an  external  opposition  corresponding  to  the  internal  opposition  inherent  in 
them,  as  being  at  once  use  values  and  values.  Commodities  as  use  values  now  stand 
opposed  to  money  as  exchange  value.  On  the  other  hand,  both  opposing  sides  are 
commodities,  unities  of  use  value  and  value.  But  this  unity  of  difference  manifests 
itself  at  two  opposite  poles,  and  at  each  pole  in  an  opposite  way.  Being  poles  they 
are  as  necessarily  opposite  as  they  are  connected.  "196 
Here  Marx  is  clearly  expressing  the  view  that  a  polar  contradiction,  a  "unity  of  difference" 
is  both  necessarily  opposite,  and  at  the  same  time,  necessarily  connected.  Ifere  he  is  also 
expressing  the  Hegelian  position  that  the  antithesis  is  contained  within  the  antithesis,  in  this 
specific  case  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour,  and  the  twofold  character  that  the  form  of 
"I  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  I.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  106. 
'K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974  -)  P.  106-107. 
230 that  labour  takes  within  the  commodity,  is  now  dirempted  and  expressed  in  an  objective  and 
generalised  relation. 
Value  itself,  and  this  is  of  some  importance,  mediates  between  the  extremes  of  the 
commodity  and  money  forms.  It  sunders  itself  in  two,  to  paraphrase  Hegel,  in  order  to 
express  itself  as  value,  in  order  for  value  as  the  substantial  subject  of  the  process  to  become 
self-identical.  This  process  is  reflected  in  the  following  comments  of  Marx. 
"A  law  of  capital  in  general  that,  in  order  to  realise  itself,  it  must  posit  itself  doubly, 
and  must  realise  itself  in  this  double  form,  ....  While  the  general  is  therefore  on  the 
one  hand  only  a  mental  [gedachte]  mark  of  distinction  [differentia  specifica],  it  is  at 
the  same  time  a  particular  real  form  alongside  the  form  of  the  particular  and 
individual.  ""' 
In  Hegel's  account  of  force  and  law,  the  nomological  expression  of  the  dialectic  contained 
within  the  twofold  expression  of  force,  entails  that  the  independence  of  the  two  forces  is  the 
result  of  the  "self-diremption"  or  "self-sundering"  of  the  force  itself.  Force  splits  itself  into 
an  antithesis  in  order  to  express  itself  as  a  unity,  as  being  self-identical  and  self-moving  in 
its  activity  of  change  and  alteration.  Force  manifests  and  expresses  itself  externally  in  a 
double  and  opposing  form.  However,  this,  as  Hegel  himself  recognises,  does  seem  to  pose  a 
potential  problem  and  barrier  to  be  overcome. 
"There  are  at  the  same  time  two  forces  present;  the  Notion  of  both  is  no  doubt  the 
same,  but  it  has  gone  forth  from  a  unity  to  a  duality.  Instead  of  the  antithesis 
remaining  entirely  and  essentially  only  a  moment,  it  seems,  by  its  self-diremption 
into  two  wholly  independent  forces  to  have  withdrawn  from  the  controlling  unity.  "  198 
11  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P-449-450. 
198  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  84. 
231 This  external  diremption  into  two  independent  forces  opens  the  possibility,  for  the 
materialist  critique,  of  an  absolute  or  irreconcilable  antagonism  between  the  inner  difference 
and  contradiction  rather  than  its  idealist  conceptual  reconciliation.  It  is  not,  for  the 
materialist,  a  matter  of  idealistically  balancing  dialectical  concepts,  but  of  expressing  the 
development  and  evolution  of  the  real  contradictions  that  are  expressed  within  the  real 
relations  - 
"' 
The  fact  that  value,  in  order  to  resolve  the  contradictions  inherent  within  barter,  has  to  be 
expressed  objectively  in  the  exchange  relation  in  two  independent  and  antithetical  forms,  the 
commodity  and  money  form,  lays  open  the  possibility  of  crisis.  Value,  then,  manifests  itself 
in  its  own  material  forms  of  Hegelian  self-sundering. 
This  dialectical  doubling  of  form  into  the  commodity  and  money  forms  not  only  resolves 
the  contradictions  within  barter;  it  raises  those  contradictions  onto  a  higher  objective  form, 
in  the  circulation  relations  between  the  twofold  forms.  The  process  of  circulation  itself  now 
develops  its  own  modus  vivendi,  its  own  forms  of  dialectical  separation  and  fusion,  at  the 
same  time  it  also  poses  their  potential  non-interpenetration  and  resultant  crisis  in  its  laws  of 
motion,  as  a  material  expression  of  the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites. 
Here,  it  not  only  "seems,  by  its  self-diremption  into  two  wholly  independent  forces  to  have 
withdrawn  from  the  controlling  unity",  value  both  can,  and  does,  lose  the  struggle  for  its 
"controlling  unity".  This  dialectical  diremption  and  doubling  of  value  into  the  commodity 
and  money  forms  manifests  itself,  in  opposition  to  its  ideal  conceptual  positing  and 
resolving  of  the  contradiction,  into  what  Marx  expresses  as  an  "absolute  contradiction".  2W 
'"The  consequences  for  this  twofold  objective  form  of  polarity  will  have  significant  repercussions  for 
not  only  a  materialist  critique  of  absolute  idealism,  but  also  the  materialist  account  of  an  evolutionary  form  of 
dialectic  itself.  This  requires  that  both  poles  are  not  in  a  fixed  relation  where  the  opposition  between  them  is 
not  only  reciprocal  and  self-reflexive,  the  polarity  itself  is  also  subject  to  a  movement  and  development  in  the 
relationship  between  the  poles.  This,  will,  in  turn,  alter  the  nature  of  the  subject  that  expresses  itself  in  this 
twofold  polar  form. 
100  "In  a  crisis,  the  antithesis  between  commodities  and  their  value  form,  money,  becomes  heightened 
into  an  absolute  contradiction.  "  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  P.  138.  Abstract  human  labour  power  or  value,  as 
a  manifestation  of  a  social  force,  not  only  splits  into  an  antithesis  in  order  to  expresses  itself;  by  doing  so  it 
232 2.  The  Twofold  Forms  of  Circulation. 
But  that  it  does  exist  in  these  opposite  ways  simply  means  that  the  two  moments  are 
at  the  same  time  themselves  independent.  It  is  therefore  this  movement  of  the  two 
moments  in  which  they  perpetually  give  themselves  independence  and  then 
supersede  themselves  again  which  we  are  now  to  consider.  "20' 
The  exchange  process  of  simple  circulation  between  commodity  and  money  posits  that 
purchase  and  sale  are  the  positive  and  negative  poles  of  the  exchange  relation.  in  simple 
commodity  circulation  there  are  two  antithetical  and  opposing  motions  that  interpenetrate 
and  pass  into  their  opposites.  Buyer  and  seller  act  out  the  contrary  forms  of  the  exchange 
relation  of  the  two  mutually  exclusive  and  mutually  connected  forms  of  value. 
The  commodity  and  money  forms  interpenetrate  and  pass  into  their  polar  opposite  forms. 
They  each  negate  themselves  in  the  other,  but  by  doing  so  they  also  actively  express  value 
and  the  value  relation  in  that  process.  The  conversion  of  a  commodity  into  money,  is  the 
simultaneous  conversion  of  money  into  a  commodity.  M-C,  a  purchase,  is,  at  the  same  time, 
C-M,  a  sale.  From  the  pole  of  the  commodity  owner  it  is  a  sale,  from  the  pole  of  the  money 
owner  it  is  a  purchase.  As  Marx  expresses  it,  "the  apparently  single  process  is  in  reality  a 
double  one.  " 
What  in  an  exchange  relation  is  a  single  act  by  two  poles  of  the  relation,  become  two 
contrary  acts  when  expressed  in  the  activity  of  a  single  subject.  The  starting  point  of 
commodity  is  negated  in  money,  only  to  return  to  itself  as  the  commodity  form.  What  we 
have  in  the  motion  of  simple  circulation  is  the  social  relation  between  three  "dramatis 
personae",  one  of  whom  sells  in  the  first  transaction  and  buys  in  the  second  transaction. 
also  has  to,  at  least  in  some  form,  necessarily  maintain  itself  in  a  dialectical  relation  to  its  opposing  pole, 
concrete  labour.  This  substantive  relation  being  due  to  the  presupposition,  inherent  in  the  value  relation,  of 
concrete  labour  as  the  predicated  and  necessary  condition  of  its  own  social  nature  and  form  of  existence. 
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233 This  gives  us  a  circular  movement  that  contains  four  extremes.  The  process  of  C-M-C  can 
then  be  represented  as  a  circular  motion  that  is  completed  through  two  contrary  rectilinear 
-  motions,  C-M  and  M-C. 
In  the  process  of  circulation  there  are  however  not  just  one  form  of  circulation,  that  of  the 
simple  commodity  form;  this  form  will  itself  further  evolve  and  give  rise  to  its  own  opposite 
form  of  circulation,  namely  M-C-M.  With  the  separation  of  value  into  the  commodity  and 
money  forms,  capital  can  now  first  manifest  itself  in  the  process  of  circulation.  As  itself  the 
expression  of  two  forms  of  rectilinear  motion,  only  this  time,  M-C  and  C-M. 
What  we  now  have  is  the  doubling  of  the  forms  of  circulatory  motion  contained  in  the 
further  development  of  the  value  relation.  Both  forms  are  themselves  the  result  of  two 
contrary  motions:  C-M  and  M-C  and  its  direct  opposite:  M-C  and  C-M.  What  the  two  forms 
of  circulation  have  in  common  is  that  both  circuits  are  resolvable  into  the  antithetical  poles 
of  sale  and  purchase,  and  each  circuit  is  the  unity  of  the  same  two  antithetical  phases. 
What  distinguishes  and  fundamentally  differentiates  the  circuit  C-M-C  from  M-C-M  is  the 
inverted  order  of  succession  of  the  two  phases  of  purchase  and  sale.  Simple  commodity 
circulation  begins  with  a  sale  and  ends  with  a  purchase;  in  the  circulation  of  capital  we  still 
have  four  extremes  and  three  dramatis  personae,  but  the  one  subject  this  time  buys  in  order 
to  sell.  The  circulation  of  capital  therefore  begins  with  a  purchase  and  ends  with  a  sale. 
We  have  then,  two  contrary  forms  of  circulation  with  opposite  starting  points  and  results. 
Simple  circulation  begins  and  ends  with  a  commodity  via  the  intervention  or  mediation  of 
money,  the  money  changes  its  place  twice.  The  circulation  of  money  as  capital  begins  and 
ends  with  money  mediated  through  the  double  change  of  place  of  the  commodity  form.  In 
sum,  we  have  two  contrary  forms  of  motion  in  relation  to  each  form  of  circulation,  and  we 
also  have  two  contrary  forms  of  circulation  as  a  whole,  expressed  in  the  substantive  opposite 
motions  and  ends  that  characterise  them. 
234 Simple  commodity  circulation,  selling  in  order  to  buy,  has  consumption  as  its  aim;  the 
commodity  falls  out  of  circulation  and  its  use  value  consumed.  The  money  is  continually 
transferred  into  the  hands  of  another  personage.  202  The  circulation  of  money  as  capital, 
buying  in  order  to  realise  a  profit,  has  the  expansion  of  itself,  more  exchange  value,  as  its 
aim  and  characteristic  activity.  The  money,  moreover,  returns  to  its  initial  subject  and  agent. 
In  simple  circulation,  money  acts  as  measure  and  medium  of  circulation,  the  aim  is 
consumption,  in  the  circulation  of  money  as  capital,  value,  in  this  its  highest  form  is  the 
subject  of  the  process;  it  is  the  point  of  departure  and  return  of  the  whole  activity. 
"The  circulation  of  money  as  capital  is,  on  the  contrary,  an  end  in  itself,  for  the 
expansion  of  value  takes  place  only  within  this  constantly  renewed  movement.  The 
circulation  of  capital  therefore  has  no  limits.  "'O' 
What  fundamentally  separates  the  circuit  C-M-C  from  M-C-M  is  that  in  the  latter,  it  is  a 
complete  activity  of  a  single  subject.  Marx  expresses  this  self-returning  activity  inherent  in 
the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation,  in  the  form  of  a  reflux  back  to  the  point  of  departure; 
in  this  case  money  as  capital  is  the  active  subject  of  the  process.  This  it  does  through  the 
self-mediation  and  subsumption  of  itself,  by  assuming  a  dual  mode  of  expression,  as  the 
unity  of  the  extremes  of  its  determinate  and  specific  twofold  content  and  form. 
"In  simple  circulation,  C-M-C,  the  value  of  the  commodities  attained  at  the  most  a 
form  independent  of  their  use  values,  i.  e.,  the  form  of  money;  but  that  same  value 
now  in  the  circulation  M-C-M,  or  the  circulation  of  capital,  suddenly  presents  itself 
as  an  independent  substance,  endowed  with  a  motion  of  its  own,  passing  through  a 
202  This  would  be  a  further  example  of  Hegel's  "bad  infinite"  applied  to  political  economy;  as  the 
money  form  continually  transforms  itself  into  new  hands,  it  is  continually  moving  away  from  its  starting  point, 
as  Marx  expresses  it.  Money  as  capital,  however,  expresses  a  unity  that  money,  as  medium  of  circulation  does 
not,  it  refluxes  back  to  its  starting  point,  as  the  unity  of  activity  of  a  single  subject. 
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235 life  process  of  its  own,  in  which  money  and  commodities  are  mere  forms  which  it 
assumes  and  casts  off  in  turn.  Nay,  more:  instead  of  simply  representing  the  relations 
of  commodities,  it  enters  now,  so  to  say,  into  private  relations  with  itself.  It 
differentiates  itself  as  original  value  from  itself  as  surplus  value.  ""4 
The  circulation  process  of  capital  is  actively  expressed  in  the  movement  to  the  negation  of 
its  form,  M-C,  and  in  turn,  the  negation  of  that  negation,  C-M,  where  it  is  the  realised 
affirmation  of  itself  expressed  in  the  return  to  its  own  point  of  departure.  In  this  process  the 
magnitude  of  M  "expands  spontaneously.  "  The  active  self-movement  of  adding  surplus 
value  from  original  capital  is  its  own  fundamental  nature  that  is  manifested  as  an  active  and 
"automatic  expansion.  " 
However,  circulation  in  and  of  itself  has  no  principle  of  self-renewal;  it  has  to  be  constantly 
mediated  by  the  extremes  of  commodity  and  money,  but  it  does  not  posit  those  extremes. 
What  circulation  really  presupposes,  as  its  mediation,  is  commodity  production  that  creates 
exchange  values  to  be  realised  in  circulation.  As  circulation  does  not  have  its  own  principle 
of  self-renewal,  it  has  to  rely  on  its  dialectical  opposite  and  mediation,  namely  production, 
to  carry  this  principle  within  it. 
Circulation  not  only  presupposes  production;  it  necessarily  ensues  from  this  that  it,  as  Marx 
notes,  "returns  into  it  as  into  its  ground.  "  The  drive  is  for  capital  to  create  its  own  mode  of 
production  and  thus  replicate  and  self-expand  in  accordance  with  its  evolved  and  mature 
form  of  activity;  the  activity  that  can  adequately  express  its  own  substantial  social  nature, 
the  creation  of  value  and  surplus  value. 
"This  is  their  point  of  departure,  and  through  its  own  motion  it  goes  back  into 
exchange-value-creating  production  as  its  result.  We  have  therefore  reached  the 
point  of  departure  again,  production  which  posits,  creates  exchange  values;  but  this 
time,  production  which  presupposes  circulation  as  a  developed  moment  and  which 
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236 appears  as  a  constant  process,  which  posits  circulation  and  constantlY  returns  from  it 
into  itself  in  order  to  posit  it  anew.  "' 
3.  Negation  of  Negation  as  Being-for-self. 
Capital,  as  a  system  of  self-expanding  value,  requires  that  it  becomes  a  systematic  unity  of 
both  production  and  circulation,  with  value  accumulation  as  its  own  specific  form  of 
activity.  Value,  as  active  capital,  is  now  the  substance  and  ground  of  the  activity  that  itself 
takes  the  twofold  form  of  production  and  circulation.  By  doing  so  it  resolves  the 
contradiction  within  its  nature,  by  subsuming  production  as  a  determinate  moment  of  its 
own  form  activity  and  realising  itself  in  its  own  presupposition,  circulation. 
Resolved  contradiction,  according  to  Hegel,  is  ground  as  essence,  as  the  unity  of  positive 
and  negative.  The  unity  of  this  polarity  for  Hegel,  as  we  saw  earlier,  is  based  on  a  universal 
nexus;  the  "middle  term"  that  stands  over  and  against  the  "independent  extremes",  and  is  a 
"perpetual  diremption"  of  itself  into  just  these  extremes.  The  movement  of  self-supersession 
contained  and  expressed  in  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  is  encapsulated  then  for 
Hegel  in  this  process  of  its  systematic  self-sundering  and  becoming  self-identical. 
"That  the  self-identical  divides  itself  into  two  means,  therefore,  just  as  well  that  it 
supersedes  itself  as  already  divided,  supersedes  itself  as  an  otherness  ..  The  different 
moments  of  setf-sundering  and  of  becoming  setf-identical  are  therefore  likewise  only 
this  movement  of  setf-supersession.  "' 
The  substantial  subject  in  its  nomological  activity  exemplifies  this  Hegelian  view  of 
contradictory  change  as  a  "permanence  of  impermanence"  as  it  takes,  and  in  turn  casts  off, 
its  twofold  form  in  order  to  express  its  true  substantial  nature.  Substance,  as  essence  is  the 
ground  of  all  determinate  being;  this  it  is  because  substance  has  now  shown  itself  to  be  both 
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237 self-causing  and  self-acting.  This  essential  activity  can  alternatively  be  expressed  as  the 
process  whereby  substance  becomes  subject. 
This  process  and  movement  of  the  dialectical  subject  "necessarily  develops"  from  its 
mediating  position  to  where  the  category  or  subject  mediates  itself  through  the  polar 
extremes.  Marx  expresses  this  very  dialectical  process  of  the  coming  to  be  of  value  as 
capital;  a  process  that  is  expressed  here  in  an  unambiguous  and  largely  unrefined  Hegelian 
manner. 
"It  is  important  to  note  that  wealth  as  such,  i.  e.  bourgeois  wealth,  is  always 
expressed  to  the  highest  power  as  exchange  value,  where  it  is  posited  as  mediator,  as 
the  mediator  of  the  extremes  of  exchange  value  and  use  value  themselves.  This 
intermediary  situation  [Mitte]  always  appears  as  the  economic  relation  in  its 
completeness,  because  it  comprises  the  opposed  poles,  and  ultimately  always 
appears  as  a  one-sidedly  higher  power  vis  a  vis  the  extremes  themselves;  because  the 
movement,  or  the  relation,  which  originally  appears  as  mediatory  between  the 
extremes  necessarily  develops  dialectically  to  where  it  appears  as  mediation  with 
itself,  as  the  subject  [Subjekt]  for  whom  the  extremes  are  merely  its  moments,  whose 
autonomous  presupposition  it  suspends  in  order  to  posit  itself,  through  their 
suspension,  as  that  which  alone  is  autonomous.  "207 
Substance,  according  to  Hegel,  as  the  "absolute  form-activity  and  the  power  of  necessity"  is 
"the  wealth  of  all  content.  "  In  order  to  be  so,  it  has  to  have  a  systematic  form  of  activity  that 
returns  to  itself,  to  the  subject  as  both  the  point  of  departure  and  result;  that  is,  it  has  to  be 
self-replicating  and  self-moving  in  the  essential  and  necessary  activity  that  makes  it  that 
specific  subject. 
'  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  331-332.  We  saw  Hegel's  formulation  of  this  same 
process  earlier  on  in  the  thesis,  when  we  were  investigating  his  account  of  force  and  law  and  its  importance 
for  the  understanding  of  Marx's  concept  of  value.  As  Hegel  expressed  it,  the  "unity  appears  as  the  middle  term 
over  against  the  independent  extremes,  is  a  perpetual  diremption  of  itself  into  just  those  extremes  which  exist 
only  through  this  process.  "  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  O.  U.  P.  (1977.  )  P.  82-83. 
238 This  it  becomes  when  the  subject  subsumes  both  the  polar  forms  of  the  relation  and 
manifests  its  own  self-activity  through  these  polar  forms.  Central  to  this  process  of  self- 
movement  is  how  the  Hegelian  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites  leads  to  the  law  of 
the  negation  of  the  negation. 
"In  Reciprocity,  although  causality  is  not  yet  invested  with  its  true  characteristic,  the 
rectilinear  movement  out  from  causes  to  effects,  and  from  effects  to  causes,  is  bent 
d  flnitum  of  causes  and  effects  is,  round  and  back  into  itself,  and  thus  the  progress  a  in 
as  a  progress,  really  and  truly  suspended.  This  bend,  which  transforms  the  infinite 
progression  into  a  self-contained  relationship.  "208 
This  dialectical  interpenetration  of  opposites,  here  expressed  by  Hegel  as  the  reciprocal 
dialectic  of  two  rectilinear  movements  of  cause  to  effect  and  effect  to  cause,  are  the  sources 
of  the  active  twofold  form  activity  and  force  behind  the  interpenetration  of  opposites.  That 
reciprocal  causation,  when  the  interpenetration  of  opposites  turns  into  the  substantial  form 
activity  of  a  self-returning  subject,  both  subsumes  and  transforms  the  reciprocal  polarity  into 
a  self-contained  activity,  into  a  circular  form  of  motion. 
This  "bend"  which  transforms  the  infinite  progress  of  the  rectilinear  movements  of  cause 
and  effect  into  a  self  contained  relationship  is  the  "bend"  of  circular  motion;  but  circular 
motion  that  refluxes  back  to  its  point  of  departure.  Here  the  movement  from  cause  to  effect 
and  effect  to  cause  is  both  suspended  and  united  in  the  reciprocal  nature  of  the  "self- 
contained"  relation. 
As  the  self-activity  of  a  substantial  subject  containing  a  nornological  activity  with  a 
principle  of 
. 
change  and  alteration,  whose  laws  of  motion  and  determinate  forms  of 
interaction  encapsulate  the  necessary  form  activity  and  nature  of  the  self-replicating  and 
self-expanding  subject.  This  was  achieved  by  capital  in  circulation  returning  to  production 
239 and  positing  the  unity  of  capital  as  these  twofold  contrary  forms  and  determinations  of 
production  and  circulation.  Here  circulation  does  "bend"  back  into  itself  with  capital 
becoming  the  subject  of  the  whole  process. 
Capital  has  now  become  the  result  of  these  dialectical  processes  of  the  interpenetration  of 
opposites  that  now,  instead  of  having  their  own  specific  forms  of  rectilinear  movement,  now 
becomes  the  circulatory  movement  of  a  subject  that  is  the  unity  of  both  forins  of  polar 
interpenetration.  The  progress  ad  infinitum  of  the  rectilinear  motions  is  suspended  into  the 
circular  motion  of  systematic  replication  and  self-movement.  Like  the  activity  of  capital,  it 
returns  into  it  as  into  its  ground. 
Hegel  further  expresses  this  dialectic  of  causality  and  reciprocity,  inherent  in  the  substantial 
dialectical  activity  of  a  subject  in  process,  in  the  following  form.  As  the  process  of  the 
substantial  form  activity  self-sundering  and  becoming  self-identical  through  a  circular 
movement  that  returns  to  itself.  As  the  unity  of  production  and  circulation  in  Marx's  account 
of  capital,  or  as  the  unity  of  causality  and  reciprocity  as  Hegel  expresses  this  movement  of 
the  subject  of  the  process. 
"The  circulation  of  substance  through  causality  and  reciprocity  therefore  only 
expressly  makes  out  or  states  that  self-subsistence  is  the  infinite  negative  self- 
relation  -a  relation  negative  in  general,  for  in  it  the  act  of  distinguishing  and 
intermediating  becomes  a  primariness  of  actual  things  independent  one  against  the 
other  -  and  infinite  se?  f-relation,  because  their  independence  only  lies  in  their 
identity  .... 
An  independence  which,  though  self-repulsive  into  distinct  independent 
elements,  yet  in  that  repulsion  is  self-identical,  and  in  the  movement  of  reciprocity 
still  at  home  and  conversant  only  with  itself.  "" 
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240 It  is  through  this  process  that  the  interpenetration  of  opposites  becomes  transformed  into  the 
law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation,  as  the  nomological  activity  of  the  subject  of  the  whole 
process.  The  twofold  forms  of  motion,  from  production  to  circulation  and  from  circulation 
back  to  production,  become  a  unitary  circular  motion;  a  form  of  motion  that  unites  the  same 
subject  as  point  of  departure  and  terminus  of  the  whole  activity. 
"In  the  circulation  of  capital,  the  point  of  departure  is  posited  as  the  terminal  point 
and  the  terminal  point  as  the  point  of  departure.  The  capitalist  himself  is  the  point  of 
departure  and  of  return.  He  exchanges  money  for  the  conditions  of  production, 
produces,  realises  the  product,  i.  e.  transforms  it  into  money,  and  then  begins  the 
process  anew.  The  circulation  of  money,  regarded  for  itself,  necessarily  becomes 
extinguished  in  money  as  a  static  thing.  The  circulation  of  capital  constantly  ignites 
itself  anew,  divides  into  its  different  moments,  and  is  a  perpeluum  mobile.  "210 
In  this  form  of  circular  motion  based  on  two  contrary  and  reciprocal  forms  of  rectilinear 
motion,  we  have  the  general  form  of  working  of  the  Aristotelian  and  Hegelian  account  of 
nomological  activity,  as  an  infinite  circular  motion  that  returns  upon  itself.  This  process  has 
been  reflected,  albeit  with  a  materialist  foundation  and  application,  in  Marx's  dialectic  of 
value  and  in  the  form  of  circulation  that  expresses  its  more  developed  concept  as  capital, 
expressed  in  the  laws  of  motion  of  the  twofold  determinate  forms  that  underpins  its  circular 
movement. 
This  development  of  the  substantial  form  activity  is  the  process  where  the  common  quality, 
as  Marx  expressed  it,  which  originally  appears  as  mediatory  between  the  extremes, 
necessarily  develops  dialectically  to  become  the  autonomous  subject  of  the  process.  This 
process  and  movement  is  expressed  in  the  reciprocal  action  involved  in  the  polar  alternation 
of  the  conditions  of  its  systematic  replication  and  sclf-expansion. 
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241 The  result  is  the  circular  motion  that  exemplifies  the  negation  of  the  negation  as  the  self- 
active  process  of  a  substantial  subject  that  systematically  reproduces  itself,  and  its 
conditions  of  existence,  through  its  own  substantial  form  activity.  Force  self-sunders  in 
order  to  become  self-identical  as  Hegel  puts  it.  Value  duplicates  itself  in  order  to  realise 
itself  as  capital,  in  order  to  act  as  the  self-expanding  value  subject  of  the  whole  process. 
In  Hegelian  terms,  it  suspends  its  presuppositions  in  order  to  presuppose  itself  as  the 
autonomous  subject,  a  subject  that  is  now  shown  to  be  the  common  expression  of  the 
twofold  form  of  the  polar  relation.  The  subject,  in  turn,  now  presupposes  itself  as  the 
starting  point  and  return  of  the  whole  process.  The  motion  inherent  in  the  law  of  the 
interpenetration  of  opposites  thus  intrinsically  leads  to  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the 
negation;  expressed  as  the  realised  substantial  form  activity  of  the  subject. 
"The  total  production  process  of  capital  includes  both  the  circulation  process  proper 
and  the  actual  production  process.  These  form  the  two  great  sections  of  its 
movement,  which  appears  as  the  totality  of  these  two  processes.  On  one  side,  labour 
time,  on  the  other,  circulation  time.  And  the  whole  of  the  movement  appears  as  a 
unity  of  labour  time  and  circulation  time,  as  unity  of  production  and  circulation.  This 
unity  itself  is  motion,  process.  Capital  appears  as  this  unity-in-process  of  production 
and  circulation,  a  unity  which  can  be  regarded  both  as  the  totality  of  the  process  of 
its  production,  as  well  as  the  specific  completion  of  one  turnover  of  the  capital,  one 
movement  returning  into  itself.  ""' 
The  systematic  result  of  capital  as  the  unity  of  its  own  twofold  forms  of  specific  diffcrcncc 
and  determination,  namely  production  and  circulation,  is  itself  the  historical  result  of  an 
evolving  process.  Here  capital,  as  Marx  expresses  it,  posits  itself  "as  a  spccific  unity  of 
circulation  and  production.  "  Value,  in  the  form  of  capital  has  now  bccome  the  subjcct  of  ale 
process,  as  a  relative  form  of  the  Hegelian  expression  of  law  as  a  pcrmancnce  of 
impermanence. 
242 "Capital  posits  the  permanence  of  value  (to  a  certain  degree)  by  incarnating  itself  in 
fleeting  commodities  and  taking  on  their  form,  but  at  the  same  time  changing  them 
just  as  constantly;  alternates  between  its  eternal  form  in  money  and  its  passing  form 
in  commodities;  permanence  is  posited  as  the  only  thing  it  can  be,  a  passing  passage 
-  process  -  life.  But  capital  obtains  this  ability  only  by  constantly  sucking  in  living 
labour  as  its  soul,  vampire-like.  The  permanence  -  the  duration  of  value  in  its  form 
as  capital  -  is  posited  only  through  reproduction,  which  is  itself  double,  reproduction 
as  commodity,  reproduction  as  money,  and  unity  of  both  these  reproduction 
processes.  In  its  reproduction  as  commodity,  capital  is  fixated  in  a  particular  form  of 
use  value,  and  is  thus  not  general  exchange  value,  even  less  realised  value,  as  it  is 
supposed  to  be.  The  fact  that  it  has  posited  itself  as  such  in  the  act  of  reproduction, 
the  production  phase,  is  proved  only  through  circulation.  ""' 
Capital  has  to  take  on  a  historically  evolving  and  universally  interconnected  series  of 
twofold  forms  in  order  for  it  to  be  realised  value  as  capital,  as  the  systematic  subject  of  its 
own  self-process.  Capital  not  only  has  to  take  the  forms  of  commodity  and  money;  it  also 
has  to  take  the  forms  of  simple  circulation  and  the  circulation  of  money  as  capital. 
Furthermore,  it  has  to  take  the  twofold  forms  that  encapsulates  this  whole  process,  as  a 
specific  and  determinate  mode  of  production  and  circulation  based  on  surplus  value  creation 
and  capital  realisation  and  accumulation. 
The  systematic  outcome  is  realised  in  the  totality  of  the  expressions  of  all  the  specific  and 
determinate  forms  of  the  dialectic  of  negativity,  of  the  polar  contradictions  and  reciprocal 
relations  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites,  that  characterise  cach  successive  mode  and 
determinate  movement  of  the  systematic  subject.  All  these  determinate  modcs  and  forms, 
along  with  the  systematic  whole  itself,  are  cohered  together,  and  resolved  in  their  ongoing 
contradictions,  as  the  result  of  the  operation  of  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation. 
"'  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  620. 
212  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  646. 
243 Here  we  have  another  key  sense  of  Hegel's  systematic  employment  of  the  concept  of 
aufheben;  where  the  autonomy  of  the  poles  are  cancelled  in  all  their  dialectical  forms  and 
relations,  and  the  unity  of  the  polar  forms  and  movements  of  all  its  determinate  modes  and 
forms  of  being,  are  retained  as  the  dialectical  activity  of  the  systematic  subject  of  the  whole 
process. 
This  process  is  the  dialectical  outcome  of  the  positing  and  resolving  of  the  contradiction  in 
all  the  determinate  and  specific  forms  that  characterise  the  essential  nature  of  the  subject; 
characteristically  expressed  by  Marx  as  a  determinate  form  of  modus  vivend!  that  resolves 
the  contradiction  by  both  externalising  and  generalising  it. 
"The  simultaneity  of  the  process  of  capital  in  different  phases  of  the  process  is 
possible  only  through  its  division  and  break-up  into  parts,  each  of  which  is  capital, 
but  capital  in  a  different  aspect.  This  change  of  form  and  matter  is  like  that  in  the 
organic  body 
... 
The  important  thing  here  above  all  is  to  examine  capital  as  such  for 
itself  first  of  all;  since  the  aspects  being  developed  here  are  those  which  make  value 
in  general  into  capital;  which  constitute  the  specific  distinguishing  characteristics  of 
capital  as  such.  "213 
This  process  of  dialectical  movement  receives  its  general  form  of  categorial  and  conceptual 
reflection  in  Hegel's  idealist  but  systematic  logical  thought  process.  it  also,  as  we  have 
attempted  to  show,  finds  its  materialist  reflection  in  Marx's  analysis  of  the  general  form  and 
concept  of  capital.  Capital  is  now  the  subject  of  the  dialectical  process.  As  a  systematic 
subject,  its  forms  of  motion  are  reflected  within  its  own  characteristic  activities,  forms  of 
determination,  and  universal  interconnections. 
244 4.  Spiral  Development 
All  these  determinate  forms  and  ongoing  modes  of  expressions  of  the  systematic  relations 
are  all  united  in  the  activity  of  value  as  capital,  as  a  determinate  whole  with  its  own  specific 
expression  of  the  dialectical  laws  of  motion.  This  is  exemplified  in  the  twofold  nature  of  the 
circulation  of  capital  as  a  whole,  its  two  all  embracing  phases  of  its  fixed  and  circulating 
forms,  that  become  the  determinant  moments  of  the  general  form  of  capital  itself.  214 
As  fixed  and  circulating  forms  of  capital,  each  respectively  representing  the  specific 
difference  of  the  process  in  motion  of  production  and  circulation.  These  two  moments  or 
determinations  are  a  moving  unity  of  difference  that  interpenetrates  in  the  circulation  of 
capital  as  a  totality.  Circulating  capital  is  transformed  into  fixed  capital,  and  fixed  capital 
reproduces  itself  in  circulating  capital.  "As  circulating  capital  it  fixates  itself,  and  as  fixated 
capital  it  circulates.  "  Both  forms  can  do  so  only  in  so  far  as  capital  appropriates  living 
labour.  215 
But  as  it  is  in  the  process  of  going  from  one  phase  into  the  other,  it  is,  "at  the  same  time, 
within  each  phase,  posited  in  a  specific  aspect,  restricted  to  a  particular  form,  which  is  the 
negation  of  itself  as  the  subject  of  the  whole  movement.  "116  When  capital  assumes  then,  any 
one  of  its  phases  or  determinate  and  specific  modes,  it  is  also  the  negating  of  itself  as  the 
211 
subject  of  a  determinate  and  circular  process. 
211  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  661. 
"I  Marx  also  writes  that  "besides  the  distinction  between  constant  capital  and  variable  capital,  which 
arises  out  of  the  immediate  production  process  of  capital,  there  is  the  further  distinction  between  fixed  and 
circulating  capital,  which  arises  out  of  the  circulation  process  of  capital.  "  K.  Marx,  letter  to  Engels  (2  nd 
August  1862.  ).  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Letters.  Volume  41.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1985.  )  P.  397. 
215  "The  distinction  between  circulating  capital  and  fixed  capital  thus  appears  initially  as  a  formal 
characteristic  of  capital,  depending  on  whether  it  appears  as  the  unity  of  the  process  or  as  one  of  its  specific 
moments.  "  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  621. 
216  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  620. 
217  "It  is  extremely  important  to  grasp  these  aspects  of  circulating  and  fixed  capital  as  specific 
characteristic  forms  of  capital  generally,  since  a  great  many  phenomena  of  the  bourgeois  economy  -  [would 
otherwise  be]  incomprehensible.  "  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  623.  "Much  confusion  in  political 
economy  has  been  caused  by  this,  that  the  aspects  of  circulating  and  fixed  capital  are  initially  nothing  more 
than  capital  itself  posited  in  the  two  aspects,  first  as  the  unity  of  the  process,  then  as  a  particular  one  of  its 
phases,  itself  in  distinction  to  itself  as  unity  -  not  as  two  particular  kinds  of  capital,  not  capital  of  two 
245 Both  forms  can  only  be  mediated  by  capital  dividing  itself  and  alternating  between  its 
production  as  a  commodity  and  its  realisation  as  surplus  value  in  circulation.  These  specific 
moments  or  determinations,  as  in  the  externalisation  of  value  into  the  commodity  and 
money  form,  may  fail  to  reciprocally  and  reflexively  interpenetrate;  capital  will  then  have 
failed  to  actualise  itself  as  the  unity  of  all  its  determinate  moments,  as  the  subject  of  the 
whole  process. 
Capital,  however,  as  the  unity  of  production  and  circulation,  is  value  in  that  it  not  only 
reproduces  itself,  but  also  is  value  that  posits  greater  value.  Its  movement  consists  of 
"relating  to  itself  while  it  produces  itself";  that  is  as  the  foundation  of  its  own  substantial 
self-activity,  "as  value  presupposed  to  itself  as  surplus  value,  or  to  the  surplus  value  as 
posited  by 
it.  "  218 
Value,  in  its  highest  form  of  capital,  is  the  subject  predominant  over  the  "different  phases  of 
this  movement,  as  value  sustaining  and  multiplying  itself  in  it.  "  In  this  form  of  circulating 
capital,  value,  in  this  its  highest  form,  acts  "as  the  subject  of  these  metamorphoses 
proceeding  in  a  circular  course  -  as  a  spiral,  as  an  expanding  circle  -  capital  is  circulating 
Capital.  "219 
particular  kinds,  but  rather  as  different  characteristic  forms  of  the  same  capital.  "  K.  Marx.  Grundrissc. 
Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  621-622.  This  distinction  in  Marx's  analysis  is  a  further  reflection,  as  we  saw  earlier  in  the 
twofold  character  of  the  labour  embodied  in  the  commodity,  of  the  problem  that  political  economy,  due  to  its 
lack  of  dialectical  method,  had  not  scientifically  grasped.  Namely,  the  nature  and  substantial  activity  of  value 
itself.  Again,  to  reinforce  the  point,  it  has  to  be  understood  as  the  common  genus  that  contains  a  specific 
contrariety,  as  its  twofold  form  of  specific  difference  and  determination  that  expresses  the  parameters  of  the 
process  of  the  subject. 
211  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  745. 
219  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  620.  "Circulating  capital  is  therefore  initially  not  a 
particular  form  of  capital,  but  is  rather  capital  itself,  in  a  further  developed  aspect,  as  subject  of  the  movement 
just  described,  which  it,  itself,  is  as  its  own  realisation  process.  In  this  respect  therefore,  every  capital  is 
Circulating  capital.  "  This  concept  of  circulating  capital  as  the  twofold  activity  of  fixed  and  circulating  capital 
is  the  general  activity  of  capital;  this  can  also  be  expressed  as  the  general  concept  of  capital,  the  dialectic  of 
capital  in  its  general  form  of  working. 
246 The  product  and  airn  of  capital  is  profit,  its  own  form  of  self-measure;  this  is  the 
characteristic  activity  of  capital  as  subject  of  the  process,  "capital  relates  to  itself  as  self- 
increasing  value,  i.  e.  it  relates  to  surplus  value  as  something  posited  and  founded  by  it.  " 
Each  of  the  circulation  of  the  determinate  moments  of  capital,  in  the  production  of  surplus 
value  and  its  realisation  of  surplus  value  in  exchange,  expressed  as  the  turnover  time  of  the 
life  process  of  capital's  cycle  of  reproduction  and  accumulation,  is  a  twofold  circular  motion 
that  takes  the  form  of  a  self-expanding  circle,  a  spiral. 
"After  it  has  distinguished  the  profit,  as  newly  reproduced,  from  itself  as 
presupposed,  self-realising  value,  and  has  posited  profit  as  the  measure  of  its 
realisation,  it  suspends  the  separation  again,  and  posits  it  in  its  identity  to  itself  as 
capital  which,  grown  by  the  amount  of  the  profit,  now  begins  the  same  process  anew 
in  larger  dimensions.  By  describing  its  circle  it  expands  itself  as  the  subject  of  the 
circle  and  thus  describes  a  self-expanding  circle,  a  spiral.  " 
5.  Rubin  Revisited. 
The  problem  that  arose  earlier  in  the  thesis  with  regard  to  abstract  labour  and  the  account  of 
Rubin,  was  that  of  the  exact  nature  of  the  relation  of  value  creation  in  production  and  value 
realisation  in  exchange.  The  dilemma,  inherited  from  Rubin's  work,  is  that  value  is  only 
realised  in  the  process  of  exchange,  where  all  private  labours  become  part  of  the  totality  of 
social  labour,  and  achieve  this  status  only  through  the  exchange  process. 
We  are  then  left  with  the  tension  that  value  does  not  really  seem  to  exist  except  in  the  act  of 
exchange,  yet  at  the  same  time,  value  is  created  in  production  but  only  realised  in  exchange. 
The  latter  formulation  is  the  correct  one  in  my  view,  but  the  following  question  still  remains 
to  be  answered.  How  then  is  this  social  substance  of  value  created  in  private  production  and 
realised  in  exchange? 
247 Rubin,  following  Marx  in  the  C.  C.  P.  E.,  posits  that  value  is  "latent"  within  the  commodity 
form.  Marx  expresses  this  "latent"  nature  of  value  in  this  text  in  the  following  form.  "Social 
labour  time  exists  in  these  commodities  in  a  latent  state,  so  to  speak,  and  becomes  evident 
only  in  the  course  of  their  exchange.  "22' 
The  point  though  is  what  is  the  nature  of  this  potentiality  of  value  that  is  latent  within  the 
commodity  form,  what  does  Marx  mean  here  by  latent?  Marx  in  volume  one  of  Capital 
gives  us  a  definite  solution  to  this  very  problem,  but  before  going  on  to  expound  this 
solution  in  Marx,  let  us  have  recourse  to  an  ancient  predecessor  of  Marx  that  may  shed  some 
light  on  this  dilemma. 
A  solution  to  this  problem  of  the  specific  nature  here  of  latent  lies,  in  my  view,  in  a 
distinction  contained  within  Aristotle's  concept  of  potentiality  that  is  expressed  in  De 
Anima;  this  distinction  takes  the  following  form.  Knowledge  of,  to  take  Aristotle's  example, 
grammar  is  a  potential  that  exists  in  a  generic  sense  within  humanity,  each  has  the  potential 
of  acquiring  this  quality.  There  are  also  those  who  have  already  acquired  this  grammatical 
quality  but  it  remains  in  an  unexercised  state  or  condition. 
"Thus,  both  the  first  two,  (being)  potential  knowers,  (become  actual  knowers),  but 
the  one  by  being  altered  through  learning  and  frequent  changes  from  an  opposite 
disposition,  the  other  by  passing  in  another  way  from  the  state  of  having  arithmetical 
or  grammatical  knowledge  without  exercising  it  to  its  exercise.  "' 
This  distinction,  and  here  I  opt  for  the  latter  form  of  Aristotle's,  seems  pertinent  to  the 
question  of  value  creation  and  realisation  in  Marx  for  the  following  reasons.  Marx's  critique 
of  value  is  not  dealing  with  its  elementary  form  of  barter,  nor  for  that  matter  with  petty 
K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  746. 
K.  Marx.  A  Contribution  to  the  critique  of  political  economy.  Progress  Publishers  (1970)  P.  45 
Aristotle.  De  Anima.  Book  two  Chapter  five.  417a2l.  Clarendon  Aristotle  Series.  O.  U.  P.  (1963.  ) 
P.  23. 
248 commodity  production,  but  with  value  in  the  historically  developed  form  of  the  capitalist 
relations  of  production,  a  form  that  presents  itself  as  a  world  of  commodities. 
The  earlier  forms  of  the  value  expression,  would  be  encapsulated  in  the  first  exposition  of 
Aristotle's  distinction  within  the  latency  of  a  potentiality,  where  the  use  value  assumes  its 
value  form  through  a  transition  to  its  opposite  in  isolated  or  semi-developed  forms  of 
exchange.  In  the  latter,  more  historically  evolved  form,  this  is  no  longer  the  case,  even 
though  it  still  manifests  itself  through  the  opposition  of  use  and  exchange  value.  However,  it 
is  now  a  fully  developed  process,  the  product  of  a  determinate  and  specific  mode  of 
commodity  production  and  exchange  for  capital  accumulation. 
The  dilemma  and  lacuna,  contained  in  Rubin's  exposition,  is  that  this  distinction  is 
conflated  and  not  fully  thought  through  and  developed  in  his  analysis.  In  particular,  this  is 
revealed  in  the  nature  of  the  social  relations  of  production  based  on  capital  accumulation. 
Alienated  and  commodified  labour  power,  as  the  direct  dialectical  opposite  of  capital,  and 
the  substantial  social  relation  and  form  that  value  creating  labour  takes,  provides  the 
solution  to  this  problematic  contained  in  Rubin's  analysis. 
The  reason  it  does  so  is  that  value,  as  a  system,  though  it  has  evolved  from  petty  commodity 
production,  is  no  longer  based  on  this  earlier  social  relation.  The  social  relations  of 
production  generated  by  capital  are  based  upon  the  specific  social  relation  of  alienated  and 
commodified  labour.  One,  moreover,  that  presupposes  the  propertylessness  of  the  labourers 
who  are  thus  forced  to  sell  their  labour  power;  to  alienate  it  in  exchange  to  the  owners  of  the 
means  of  production.  This  is  achieved  by  alienating  labour  from  its  material  conditions  of 
production;  by  privatising  them  as  an  others  alien  property. 
Alienated  commodified  labour  power,  and  this  is  central  to  solving  the  lacuna  in  Rubin, 
itself  becomes  socially  distributed  as  the  source  of  the  total  labour  power  of  society;  it  is 
only  in  this  alienated  social  form  of  labour  power  that  abstract  universal  labour  becomes  the 
substantial  power  that  creates  value  in  the  world  of  commodities.  This  essential  and 
249 antithetical  pole  of  capital  and  value  is  expressed  in  the  ownership  and  command  of  the  use 
value  of  commodified  labour  power  itself  by  capital,  and,  as  Marx  observes,  it  "consists  in 
the  subsequent  exercise  of  its  force.  " 
As  Marx  also  expresses  this  dialectic  inherent  in  the  social  relation  of  production,  it  is  not 
the  worker  who  applies  the  means  of  production  but  the  means  of  production  that  apply  the 
worker.  Capital  thus  universalises  and  commodifies  human  labour  power  and  sets  it  to  work, 
to  create  itself,  to  create  value  and  surplus  value.  The  twofold  character  of  the  labour  power 
embodied  in  the  commodity  is  not,  however  then,  just  manifested  in  exchange;  it  has  its 
systematic  source  and  roots  in  the  determinate  and  specific  social  relations  pertinent  to  the 
capitalist  mode  of  production. 
This  production  for  value  realisation  and  accumulation  is  the  source  of  the  twofold  character 
of  the  labour  power  employed  in  capitalist  commodity  production;  this  is  the  essence  of  the 
social  relation  of  production  under  value.  This  twofold  character  of  the  labour  power 
embodied  in  the  commodity  is,  and  has  to  be,  reflected  in  the  productive  process  of  value 
and  surplus  value  creation. 
Capital,  within  the  confines  of  the  productive  process,  takes  the  double  form  of  constant  and 
variable  capital;  that  is,  it  takes  the  form  of  means  of  production  and  commodified  labour 
power.  This  distinction  within  capital,  unique  to  Marx,  is  a  further  reflection  and 
development  of  the  use  and  value  aspects  inherent  in  the  twofold  character  of  the  labour 
embodied  in  the  commodity.  The  only  power  that  can  both  create  and  maintain  value  is 
commodified  labour  power,  this  alienated  form  of  labour  power  is  now  a  systematic  power 
of  capital  itself. 
The  valorisation  process  has  to  take  place  in  the  process  of  production  where  both  poles  of 
the  commodity,  as  a  use  value  and  a  value,  are  created.  This  is  generated  in  the  privatised 
nature  or  ownership  of  the  productive  process,  where  labour  not  only  maintains  past  value, 
but  also  takes  on  additional  value  in  the  finished  product  or  commodity.  Living 
250 coniniodified  labour  power,  in  the  form  of  variable  capital,  is  incorporated  into  dead 
objectified  labour,  the  constant  part  of  capital.  Value,  as  capital,  valorises  itself  by  "sucking 
in"  living  labour. 
The  two  aspects  of  the  production  process;  the  creation  of  the  use  value  and  value,  the 
qualitative  and  quantitative  aspects  of  the  commodity,  are  then  reflected  within  the 
productive  process  of  capital  itself  by  Marx. 
"If  we  proceed  further,  and  compare  the  process  of  producing  value  with  the  labour- 
process,  pure  and  simple,  we  find  that  the  Iatter  consists  of  the  useful  labour,  the 
work,  that  produces  use-values.  Here  we  contemplate  the  labour  as  producing  a 
particular  article;  we  view  it  under  its  qualitative  aspect  alone,  with  regard  to  its  end 
and  aim.  But  viewed  as  value-creating  process,  the  same  labour-process  presents 
itself  under  its  quantitative  aspect  alone.  Here  it  is  a  question  merely  of  the  time 
occupied  by  the  labourer  in  doing  the  work;  of  the  period  during  which  the  labour- 
power  is  usefully  expended.  Here,  the  commodities  that  take  part  in  the  process,  do 
not  count  any  longer  as  necessary  adjuncts  of  labour-power  in  the  production  of  a 
definite,  useful  object.  They  count  merely  as  depositories  of  so  much  absorbed  or 
materialised  labour;  that  labour,  whether  previously  embodied  in  the  means  of 
production,  or  incorporated  in  them  for  the  first  time  during  the  process  by  the  action 
of  labour-power,  counts  in  either  case  only  according  to  its  duration;  it  amounts  to  so 
many  hours  or  days  as  the  case  may  be.  "" 
This  social  foundation  of  value,  of  alienated  commodified  labour  power,  as  a  human  social 
relation  of  production  that  is  expressed  in  things,  in  the  product  of  production;  as  the  social 
manifestation  of  the  duration  of  time  that  the  labour  power  has  been  embodied  within  the 
commodity.  As  such,  the  determination  of  the  social  nature  of  its  value  does  not  contain  an 
atom  of  use  value;  the  specific  concrete  labour  and  the  use  value  created  by  it  do  not 
determine  its  value. 
251 The  very  peculiarity  of  value,  as  a  specific  social  form  of  labour,  is  that  the  amount  of 
labour  power  that  is  embodied  in  the  product,  and  measured  in  time,  takes  an  objective  and 
abstract  social  form,  as  a  value.  This  is  not  only  true  with  regard  to  the  product  and  the 
result  of  the  production  process,  the  commodity  form,  but  this  is  also  rooted  within  the 
production  process  itself  for  Marx. 
"We  now  see,  that  the  difference  between  labour,  considered  on  the  one  hand  as 
producing  utilities,  and  on  the  other  hand,  as  creating  value,  a  difference  which  we 
discovered  by  our  analysis  of  a  commodity,  resolves  itself  into  a  distinction  between 
two  aspects  of  the  process  of  production.  ""' 
The  twofold  forms  of  labour  take  on  a  twofold  character  as  they  are  subsumed  by  value  in 
the  production  process.  From  the  point  of  view  of  capital  in  both  its  constant  and  variable 
determinations,  subsumed  labour  manifests  itself  in  the  following  respective  forms  in 
Marx's  analysis  of  the  process  of  valorisation,  that  of  "contained"  and  "applied"  labour. 
"The  labour  which  is  contained  here  in  the  means  of  production  is  a  particular 
quantum  of  universal  social  labour  and  displays  itself  consequently  in  a  certain 
value-magnitude  or  sum  of  money,  'in  fact'  in  the  price  of  these  means  of 
production.  The  labour  which  is  applied  is  a  particular  additional  quantum  of 
universal  social  labour,  and  displays  itself  as  additional  value-magnitude  and  sum  of 
money.  ""5 
The  social  expression  of  that  employment  of  the  force  of  alienated  labour  power  being  the 
creation  of  both  value  and  surplus  value.  This  distinction  is  of  fundamental  importance  as 
this  alien  social  command  over  labour  is  the  only  source  that  has  the  ability,  or  the  power,  to 
"I  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  190. 
221  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  19  1. 
21-'  K.  Marx.  Results  of  the  Immediate  Process  of  Production.  Contained  in  Value  Studies  by  Marx. 
New  Park.  (1976.  )  P.  95-96. 
252 create  the  potentiality  and  reality  of  value  and  surplus  value  through  its  concrete  productive 
activity.  This  it  does,  as  we  have  just  seen,  in  its  specific  manifestations  of  the  dialectical 
doubling  of  form  in  the  process  of  production,  as  the  specific  difference  of  constant  and 
variable  capital. 
A  process  where  that  totality  of  human  labour  power  is  expressed  socially  as  value,  by  its 
reduction  to  the  simple  human  or  average  labour  power  pertaining  to  the  specific  market 
society  in  question,  with  each  unit  of  value  as  a  determinate  quantum  of  exchange  value. 
This  employment  and  commodification  of  labour  power  in  the  production  process  is,  as 
Marx  notes,  "the  differentia  specifica  of  capitalistic  production.  " 
"Labour  power  is  sold  today,  not  with  a  view  of  satisfying,  by  its  services  or  its 
product,  the  personal  needs  of  the  buyer.  His  aim  is  augmentation  of  his  capital, 
production  of  commodities  containing  more  labour  than  he  pays  for,  containing 
therefore  a  portion  of  value  that  costs  him  nothing,  and  that  is  nevertheless  realised 
when  the  commodities  are  sold.  Production  of  surplus  value  is  the  absolute  law  of 
this  mode  of  production.  Labour  power  is  only  saleable  so  far  as  it  preserves  the 
means  of  production  in  their  capacity  of  capital,  reproduces  its  own  value  as  capital, 
and  yields  in  unpaid  labour  a  source  of  additional  capital.  "" 
In  order  to  do  so,  capital  must  posit  and  overcome  an  essential  barrier  to  surplus  value 
creation,  that  between  necessary  labour  time  and  surplus  labour  time.  This  driving 
contradiction,  inherent  to  the  process  of  surplus  value  creation  and  realisation,  will  have  its 
determinate  effects  in  the  necessary  changps  within  the  organic  composition  of  capital  in  its 
constant  and  variable  components.  227 
221  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  P.  580. 
227  "Capital,  as  the  positing  of  surplus  labour,  is  equally  and  in  the  same  moment  the  positing  and  the 
not-positing  of  necessary  labour;  it  exists  only  in  so  far  as  necessary  labour  both  exists  and  does  not  exist.  "  K. 
Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  401. 
253 The  result  of  this  dialectical  shift  in  the  organic  composition  of  capital  expresses  itself  in  the 
historical  tendency  for  the  rate  of  profit  to  decline.  This  dialectical  law  is  the  most  important 
law  of  political  economy  for  Marx,  and  is  also  the  fundamental  expression  of  the  finite  and 
transitory  nature  of  the  existence  of  value  and  capital. 
254 CHAPTER  TWELVE. 
THE  CONTRADICTION  OF  METHOD  AND  SYSTEM. 
1.  The  General  Form  of  Working  and  Laws  of  Dialectics. 
The  thesis  has  attempted  to  locate  and  analyse  some  central  issues  in  dialectics  that  could 
shed  some  light  on  not  only  the  nature  of  Marx's  materialist  inversion  of  his  idealist 
predecessor,  but  also  what  still  remains  rational  in  Hegelian  dialectics,  despite  the  mystical 
veil  that  it  is  enveloped  within.  Through  the  analysis  of  elements  of  the  key  primary 
theoretical  texts  and  some  written  correspondence,  the  rational  kernel  that  remained  of 
Hegel's  dialectic  was  posited  as  the  combined  relation  of  the  general  form  of  working  and 
the  laws  of  dialectics. 
The  thesis  has  consequently  attempted  to  discover  some  of  the  fundamentals  pertaining  to 
the  operation  and  relationship  of  both  these  combined  elements.  Two  other  primary 
constituents  that  were  necessarily  integrated  into  this  investigation  were  the  category  of 
substance  and  the  source  of  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  that  is  immanent  within  it, 
namely  contradiction. 
This,  in  turn,  gave  us  the  basis  and  foundation  for  the  laws  of  motion  pertaining  to  a 
dialectical  methodology.  The  core  of  the  nomological  analysis  being  applied  to  cognising 
the  specific  and  determinate  categorial  and  ontological  forms  of  motion  that  make  up  the 
principle  of  change  and  alteration  contained  in  the  process  of  substantial  change.  Dialectics, 
as  a  method,  is  the  attempt  to  theoretically  analyse  the  interconnections  of  the  ontological 
255 categories  necessary  for  understanding  the  nomological  nature  of  substantial  entities  whose 
activity  integrates  them  into  an  organic  and  systematic  whole. 
The  thesis  has  therefore  attempted  to  locate  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of 
dialectics  contained  in  the  Hegelian  account  within  these  broad  parameters;  with  the  motor 
force  of  the  dynamics  fuelled  by  the  interconnected  movement  and  relation  of  the  laws  of 
dialectical  contradiction.  The  analysis  of  these  core  elements  of  a  dialectical  process, 
contained  in  the  laws  of  motion  and  change  should,  in  turn,  have  allowed  us  to  develop  a 
better  understanding  of  what  constitutes,  for  Marx,  the  rational  content  that  still  remains  of 
Hegel's  dialectic. 
The  general  form  of  working  of  dialectic  being  expressed,  in  its  systematic  form,  in  the 
ongoing  and  inclusive  process  of  the  nomological  movement  of  the  primary  contradiction 
contained  and  developed  within  a  substantial  and  systematic  whole.  It  is  through  the 
positing  and  resolving  of  the  determinate  contradictions  and  specific  differences,  contained 
and  expressed  in  the  inclusive  and  interconnected  forms  of  its  substantial  activity,  that 
substance  becomes  subject.  As  the  active,  autonomous,  and  self-moving  agent  of  its  own 
substantial  process  of  self-realisation. 
Consequently,  this  methodological  interconnection  is  also  expressed  in  the  relation  of  the 
parts  of  a  system  to  the  workings  of  the  system  as  a  whole.  With  the  relation  of  part  and 
whole  manifested  and  sublated  in  the  interrelationship  of  the  laws  of  motion  of  dialectics. 
The  main  laws  generated  by  dialectics  in  Engels  account  are  expressed  in  the  following  laws 
of  motion. 
l.  The  law  of  the  transformation  of  quality  into  quantity  and  vice  versa. 
2.  The  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites,  that  is,  the  mutual  penetration  of  polar 
opposites  and  their  transformation  into  each  other  when  caff  ied  to  extremes. 
3.  The  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation. 
256 4.  Spiral,  or  self-expanding  form  of  development.  22" 
In  line  with  the  above  relation  of  the  categories  and  the  laws  expressed  by  Engels,  the 
evolving  totality  of  these  laws  can  also  be  interpreted  as  the  systematic  coherence  of  a 
substantial  form  in  its  principle  of  change  and  alteration.  As  a  substantial  totality 
individuating  itself  as  a  subject,  and  containing  a  specific  difference  that  is  the  determinate 
manifestation  of  its  universal  nature  and  the  expression  of  the  contrariety  contained  within 
its  laws  of  motion  and  form  activity. 
The  logical  and  conceptual  evolution  of  the  subject  aims  at  reflecting  that  systematic  totality 
in  its  real  process.  This  it  does  by  way  of  outlining  the  generic  forms  of  the  substantial  and 
essential  categorial  relations  that  allows  the  theoretical  method  to  be  both  applied  to,  and 
explain,  the  phenomenal  appearance  in  its  specific  and  concrete  determinations  and  laws 
relevant  to  the  subject  matter  under  investigation. 
Thus,  with  the  method  divested  of  its  mystical  aura,  and  the  logical  systematic  whole  not 
forced  on  nature,  society  and  history,  then  it  can,  in  turn,  be  derived  from  and  applied  to, 
real  nature  and  real  society  in  their  evolutionary  and  systematic  changes.  This  required  a 
revolutionary  break  from  the  idealist  glorification  by  Hegel  of  his  logical  system;  it  also 
required  the  dialectical  criticism  of  this  idealist  systematic  whole  itself  from  a  materialist 
perspective. 
This  process  was  first  undertaken  by  Marx  in  the  1844  Manuscripts.  We  have,  though,  come 
a  long  way  from  this  earlier  critical  analysis  of  the  dialectic  of  negativity  in  Hegel,  and  its 
inversion  from  the  pseudo-essence  of  speculative  thought  to  the  real  essence  of  objective 
labouring  activity.  The  culmination  of  this  long  journey,  undertaken  by  Marx,  lies  in  his 
critique  of  political  economy  and  the  mode  of  production  founded  on  capital  accumulation. 
"  F.  Engels.  Dialectics  of  Nature.  Progress  Publishers.  (1982.  )  P.  17. 
257 At  the  same  time,  and  notwithstanding  this,  the  application  of  the  dialectical  method  to 
political  economy  by  Marx,  as  I  have  also  attempted  to  demonstrate,  required  digging  deep 
into  the  resources  contained  in  Hegel's  systematic  dialectical  thought  in  order  to  begin  to 
bear  genuine  scientific  rewards. 
The  thesis  has  also  attempted  to  elucidate  that  Marx's  application  of  the  dialectical  method 
to  political  economy,  is  itself  a  logical  and  conceptual  outcome  of  Marx's  own  critical 
inversion  of  this  idealist  dialectic  of  Hegel.  Marx's  development  of  the  concept  and  general 
form  of  working  of  capital  is  an  exemplar  of  this  inverted  form  of  dialectical  method  of 
Hegel  applied  to  political  economy.  "' 
"It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  new  forces  of  production  and  relations  of 
production  do  not  develop  out  of  nothing,  nor  drop  from  the  sky,  nor  from  the  womb' 
of  the  self-positing  Idea;  but  from  within  and  in  antithesis  to  the  existing 
development  of  production  and  the  inherited,  traditional  relations  of  property.  While 
in  the  completed  bourgeois  system  every  economic  relation  presupposes  every  other 
in  its  bourgeois  economic  form,  and  everything  posited  is  thus  a  presupposition,  this 
is  the  case  with  every  organic  system.  This  organic  system  itself,  as  a  totality,  has  its 
presuppositions  and  its  development  to  its  totality  consists  precisely  in  subordinating 
all  elements  of  society  to  itself,  or  in  creating  out  of  it  the  organs  which  it  still  lacks. 
This  is  historically  how  it  becomes  a  totality.  The  process  of  becoming  this  totality 
forms  a  moment  of  its  process,  its  development.  "  230 
The  apparently  Rxed  and  ongoing  activity  of  the  system,  in  this  case  not  only  capital  as  a 
mode  of  production  and  circulation,  but  also  Hegel's  reified  system  of  logic,  were  shown  to 
both  be  relative  historical  products  and  not  absolute  truths  about  the  human  condition.  Both 
11  "The  exact  development  of  the  concept  of  capital  [is]  necessary,  since  it  [is]  the  fundamental 
concept  of  modem  economics,  just  as  capital  itself,  whose  abstract,  reflected  image  [is)  its  concept  [dessen 
abstraktes  Gegenbild  sein  Begriffl,  [is]  the  foundation  of  bourgeois  society.  Ile  sharp  formulation  of  the  basic 
presuppositions  of  the  relation  must  bring  out  all  the  contradictions  of  bourgeois  production,  as  well  as  the 
boundary  where  it  drives  beyond  itself.  "  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  331. 
230  K.  Marx.  Grundrisse.  Penguin.  (1974.  )  P.  278. 
258 of  these  systematic  forms  belied  the  real  source  of  the  movement  and  development  of  their 
own  specific  internal  contradictions  and  laws  of  motion. 
Marx  was  the  only  radical  theoretician  of  the  nineteenth  century  that  was  capable  of 
combining  the  critiques  of  both  the  social  forms  and  modes  of  capital,  articulated  in 
classical  political  economy,  and  the  closed  idealist  philosophical  system  of  Hegel.  These 
two  forms  of  theoretical  advancement  were  amongst  the  highest  intellectual  products  that 
were  generated  by  the  bourgeois  social  relations  of  that  period. 
Both  of  these  forms  of  Marx's  critique  were,  from  1844  onwards,  fundamentally 
interconnected;  the  latter  form,  as  the  thesis  has  attempted  to  show,  led  to  the  development 
of  a  materialist  methodology  for  the  former.  By  synthesising  both,  Marx  was  able  to  make 
the  theoretical  advances  that  he  did  in  the  materialist  understanding  of  human  historical 
development. 
The  fundamental  contradiction  in  Hegel's  work,  expressed  by  Marx  and  Engels,  is  that 
between  the  dialectical  method  and  Hegel's  idealist  system.  This  contradiction  is  now  the 
subject  matter  for  further  investigation;  an  investigation  that  can  begin  to  draw  together  the 
elements  already  analysed  in  the  contradiction  between  the  rational  and  mystical  sides  that 
pertain  to  Hegel's  dialectic. 
2.  The  Contradiction  of  Method  and  System 
Engels  expressed  what  he  regarded  as  his  own  and  Marx's  relation  and  debt  to  Hegel's 
philosophy,  in  the  following  fashion.  The  relation  is  described  by  him  in  terms  of  how  he 
and  Marx  both  "proceeded  from  as  well  as  how  we  separated  from  it". 
However,  Hegel's  "powerful"  thought  could  "not  be  disposed  of  by  simply  being  ignored.  " 
Nor  could  it  be  treated  in  the  same  manner  as  Feuerbach,  who  "broke  through  the  system 
259 and  simply  discarded  it.  But  a  philosophy  is  not  disposed  of  by  simply  discarding  it.  "  What 
was  required,  according  to  Engels,  was  the  following  strategy  to  be  adopted. 
"It  had  to  be  "sublated"  in  its  own  sense,  that  is,  in  the  sense  that  while  its  form  had 
to  be  annihilated  through  criticism,  the  new  content  which  had  been  won  through  it 
had  to  be  saved.  ""' 
The  analysis  of  this  contradiction  lies  at  the  core  of  Engels  critical  summation  of  Classical 
German  Philosophy.  Hegel  then,  was  "not  simply  put  aside"  by  Marx  and  Engels;  their 
criticisms,  themselves  dialectical  in  their  scope  and  nature,  entailed  going  well  beyond  that 
of  Feuerbach's.  "On  the  contrary,  one  started  out  from  his  revolutionary  side",  that  is,  from 
the  dialectical  method.  However,  in  its  idealist  form  "this  method  was  unusable"  for 
application  to  a  materialist  account  of  science.  "' 
This  was  due  to  two  primary  factors,  firstly,  the  idealist  point  of  departure  and  result,  and 
secondly,  the  related  problem  of  the  apparent  foreclosure  of  any  further  form  of 
development.  This  twofold  and  combined  error,  expressed  in  both  his  cyclical  account  of 
nature,  and  in  his  cognising  the  evolution  of  human  historical  objectivity  in  the  idealised 
form  of  spirit;  both  forms  being  enveloped  in  Hegel's  system  of  absolute  thought. 
As  a  result  of  these  idealist  presuppositions  of  Hegel,  the  dialectical  method,  in  this  form, 
bequeathed  itself  with  some  unresolvable  contradictions  and  unforeseen  evolutionary 
difficulties. 
In  Engels  view,  the  central  contradiction  contained  in  Hegel's  idealism  is  the  contradiction 
between  the  open-ended,  the  ever-changing  and  evolving  nature  that  is  the  inherent  logic  of 
"I  F.  Engels.  Ludwig  Feuerbach  and  the  end  of  Classical  German  Philosophy.  Marx-Engels  Selected 
Works.  Volume  2.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  )  P.  325  and  333. 
232  "But  these  constructions  are  only  the  frame  and  scaffolding  of  his  work.  If  one  does  not  loiter  here 
needlessly,  but  presses  on  farther  into  the  immense  building,  one  finds  innumerable  treasures  which  today  still 
possess  undiminished  value.  "  F.  Engels.  Ludwig  Feucrbach  and  the  end  of  Classical  German  Philosophy. 
Marx-Engels  Selected  Works.  Volume  2.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  )  P.  330. 
260 the  method,  and  the  closed,  final,  and  absolute  nature  of  the  system.  The  two  are  ultimately 
incompatible,  and  the  unfolding  of  this  primary  contradiction  of  Hegel's  idealism  sowed  the 
seeds  and  the  groundwork  for  its  logical  and  scientific  supersession  into  a  materialist  form. 
The  Hegelian  system  was  then  suffering,  in  Engels  criticism,  from  one  internal  and 
"incurable  contradiction";  this  being  that  it  was  working  with  the  proposition  that  human 
history  was  the  result  of  the  process  of  evolution  that  was  ongoing  and  lacked  a  final 
absolute  form.  Conversely,  it  also  maintained  that  Hegel's  system  was  the  final  and  absolute 
form  of  knowledge  of  this  systematic  and  universal  whole. 
This,  in  itself,  is  in  contradiction  to  the  fundamental  law  of  dialectical  reasoning,  that  of 
constant  motion,  change,  and  evolution.  The  inversion  of  this  idealist  method  and  content 
poses  the  logic  of  evolution  as  the  new,  open-ended,  natural  and  social  content  of  that 
dialectical  method.  The  core  of  this  "incurable  contradiction"  in  Hegel's  method  is  that  the 
dialectic  is,  in  its  essence,  critical  and  revolutionary;  it  is  in  this  sense  and  in  this  sense  only, 
that  it  is  absolute. 
"It  reveals  the  transitory  character  of  everything  and  in  everything;  nothing  can 
endure  before  it  except  the  uninterrupted  process  of  becoming  and  passing  away,  of 
endless  ascendancy  from  the  lower  to  the  higher.  And  dialectical  philosophy  itself  is 
nothing  more  than  the  mere  reflection  of  this  process  in  the  thinking  brain.  It  has,  of 
course,  also  a  conservative  side:  it  recognises  that  definite  stages  of  knowledge  and 
society  are  justified  for  their  time  and  circumstances;  but  only  so  far.  The 
conservatism  of  this  mode  of  outlook  is  relative;  its  revolutionary  character  is 
absolute  -  the  only  absolute  dialectical  philosophy  admits.  "" 
This  inherently  revolutionary  character,  in  an  absolute  sense,  was  a  "necessary  conclusion 
from  his  method"  that  Hegel,  as  Engels  expresses  it,  "never  drew  with  such  explicitness.  " 
211  F.  Engels.  Ludwig  Feuerbach  and  the  end  of  Classical  German  Philosophy.  Marx-Engels  Selected 
Works.  Volume  two.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  )  P.  328. 
261 Consequently,  this  intrinsic  logical  dynamic  of  dialectics  is  not  so  "sharply  delineated"  in 
Hegel.  This  revolutionary  result  is  the  only  logical  conclusion  of  the  application  of  a 
dialectical  method  to  all  processes  of  development  whether  natural  or  social  for  the 
materialist. 
The  Hegelian  system  is  a  system  that  regards  the  alienated  form  of  the  idea,  nature,  as  a 
development  in  space  but  outside  of  time.  The  reason  for  this,  according  to  Engels,  is  that  he 
was  compelled  to  fashion  a  philosophical  system;  a  system  that  contained  an  absolute  and 
eternal  truth  that  itself  marks  the  end  of  the  idealist  account  of  the  historical  process  of  spirit 
and  mind. 
Nature  is,  in  the  Hegelian  cosmology,  cyclical  and  eternal.  Engels  critique  of  this  centres  on 
this  logical  and  idealist  form  of  expression  in  Hegel,  where  nature  "displays  simultaneously 
and  alongside  of  one  another  all  the  stages  of  development  comprised  in  it,  and  is 
condemned  to  an  eternal  repetition  of  the  same  process.  " 
"This  absurdity  of  a  development  in  space,  but  outside  of  time  -  the  fundamental 
condition  of  all  development  -  Hegel  imposes  upon  nature  just  at  the  very  time 
when,  geology,  embryology,  the  physiology  of  plants  and  animals,  and  organic 
chemistry  were  being  built  up,  and  everywhere  on  the  basis  of  these  new  sciences 
brilliant  foreshadowings  of  the  later  theory  of  evolution  were  appearing  (for  instance 
Goethe  and  Lamarck).  But  the  system  demanded  it;  hence  the  method,  for  the  sake 
of  the  system,  had  to  become  untrue  to  itself.  "" 
234  F.  Engels.  Ludwig  Feuerbach  and  the  end  of  Classical  German  Philosophy.  Marx-Engels  Selected 
Works.  Volume  two.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  )  P.  339.  This  viewpoint  of  Engels  is  also  reflected  in 
Trotsky's  criticisms  of  what  he  regards  as  the  most  important  law  of  dialectical  thought  that  is  both  contained 
in  Hegel  and  discovered  by  him,  the  law  of  the  transformation  and  interpenetration  of  quality  and  quantity. 
"Hegel  himself  undoubtedly  did  not  give  the  law  of  the  transition  of  quantity  into  quality  the 
paramount  importance  which  it  fully  deserves.  Hegel  relied  upon  the  Kant-Laplace  theory,  but  he  did  not  yet 
know  either  Darwinism  or  Marxism.  "  L.  Trotsky.  Trotsky's  Notebooks.  C.  U.  P.  (1986.  )  1933-193S.  P.  88-89. 
262 The  historical  irony  of  this  is  at  the  same  time  that  Hegel  imposes  this  system  on  nature, 
scientific  developments  were  already  blowing  asunder  a  closed  system  that  balanced  the 
dialectical  concepts  in  an  absolute  idealist  manner  and  form.  The  deathblows  that  natural, 
evolutionary  science  inflicts  on  idealism  exposes  the  contradictions  of  the  hermetically 
sealed  system  of  Hegel's  dialectical  thought.  It  also  poses  the  conditions  for  the 
development  of  its  contrary  polar  opposite  and  subsequent  materialist  supersession. 
This  idealist  inversion  of  real  nature  and  real  human  history  took  its  heavy  toll  on  the 
dialectical  method.  In  that  the  idealist  content  of  the  system  is  both  in  contradiction  with, 
and  at  the  same  time  ideologically  "smothered",  the  open-ended  nature  of  the  "revolutionary 
side"  of  the  dialectical  method  of  cognising  the  processes  of  development  and  change. 
"Thus",  according  to  Engels,  "ultimately,  the  Hegelian  system  represents  merely  a 
materialism  idealistically  turned  upside  down  in  method  and  content.  "235 
What  though,  does  Engels  means  by  this  statement;  what  is  the  content  and  method  posited 
by  Engels  a  reference  to  here?  Furthermore,  how  is  this  criticism  integrated  and  understood 
in  conjunction  with  his  earlier  criticism  of  the  contradiction  between  system  and  method 
contained  in  Hegel? 
To  answer  the  questions  posed  by  Engels  remarks  is  also  to  develop  Engels  own  variations 
on  the  central  theme  of  the  thesis;  the  issue  of  comprehending  the  nature  and  consequences 
of  the  inverted  critique  of  Hegel's  idealist  dialectic.  How  though  was  this  method  rendered 
usable  from  its  idealist  and  mystical  form  and  applied  to  materialist  science? 
Well,  the  method  is  clearly  dialectics,  and  the  central  contradiction  here  was  the  constraints 
of  the  idealist  straitjacket  on  ftirther  development;  one  that  is  ultimately  in  opposition  to  the 
11  F.  Engels.  Ludwig  Feuerbach  and  the  end  of  Classical  German  Philosophy.  Marx-Engels  Selected 
Works.  Volume  two.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  )  P336.  This  formulation  by  Engels  is  also  the  source  and 
inspiration  for  Lenin's  study  of  Hegel's  Logic.  "I  am  in  general  trying  to  read  Hegel  materialistically:  Hegel  is 
materialism  which  has  been  stood  on  its  head  (according  to  Engels)  -  that  is  to  say,  I  cast  aside  for  the  most 
part  God,  the  Absolute,  the  Pure  Idea,  etc.  "  V.  I.  Lenin.  Collected  Works.  Volume  38.  Progress  Publishers. 
(1972.  )  P.  104. 
263 inverted,  open-ended  and  constantly  changing  evolution  of  the  materialist  model.  In  terms  of 
method  then  the  following  is  clear  from  Engels,  the  system  subverts  the  method  and  makes 
it  untrue  to  itself.  The  method  becomes  contained  within  the  idealist  parameters  of  the 
logical  system. 
The  open-ended  nature  of  the  movement  of  a  dialectical  contradiction  is  therefore  limited  to 
the  positing  and  resolving  of  the  primary  contradiction  of  the  dialectic  of  subject  and  object 
contained  and  sublated  within  an  idealist  logical  and  systematic  whole.  A  contradiction  that 
is  resolved  by  hypostasising  thought  and  reason  itself,  as  an  absolute  whose  source 
ultimately  lies  outside  nature  and  human  consciousness. 
The  method  for  Hegel,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  both  the  general  form  of  cognition  and 
what  he  termed  the  objective  substantiality  of  things.  The  method,  as  the  self-movement  and 
self-activity  of  the  notion,  is  the  universal  form  of  the  content;  that  content  is  the  system  of 
logic.  The  content  of  this  idealist  method  is  systematic  logical  thought  treated  as  the 
absolute,  as  the  autonomous  subject  of  the  process. 
In  terms  of  content,  then  the  absolute  idea  is  the  movement  behind  the  universal  form  of  the 
categories  of  objective'  and  subjective  logic.  Nature  and  society  become  inverted  as  the 
product  of  the  systematic  and  universal  interconnection  of  the  logical  thought  categories.  In 
this  sense  the  system  could  be  described  as  materialism  turned  upside  down  in  content;  that 
is,  in  its  ontological  presuppositions,  as  the  laws  of  motion  of  the  categories,  and  the  point 
of  departure  and  return  of  their  idealist  circularity  of  movement. 
The  categories  generated  by  this  logical  expression  are  hypostasised  outside  of  real  time  and 
imposed  on  real  nature,  but  these  same  categories  are  derived  from  their  objective,  natural, 
and  ontological  expressions;  the  mystified  content  of  the  hermetically  sealed  idealist 
account  of  logic  is  thus  nature  and  society.  The  categories,  as  Marx  expressed  it  in  1844, 
being  torn  from  real  nature  and  real  mind,  and  posited  as  the  point  of  departure  and  result  of 
264 the  whole  process.  Engels  variation  is,  in  my  view  here,  merely  reflecting  this  earlier 
critique  of  Marx. 
The  materialist  dialectic,  as  the  logic  of  evolutionary  change  and  development,  has  for  its 
content,  not  the  idealist  logical  philosophical  system  of  categories,  but  natural  and  social 
history.  This  is  the  new  content  that  is  generated  from  the  materialist  critique  of  Hegel's 
system;  here  substantial  form  activity  no  longer  has  an  idealist-conceptual  teleology, 
whether  natural  or  social,  but  an  evolutionary  form  of  material,  natural,  and  social 
development.  In  this  sense  the  system  could  also  be  described  as  materialism  turned  upside 
down  in  terms  of  content. 
Engels  point  is  further  stressed  in  that  it  is  the  idealist  nature  of  the  system  that  is  imposed 
upon,  and  imposes  the  logical  forms  and  laws  on,  not  only  nature,  thought,  and  history,  but 
on  the  dialectical  method  and  the  "new  content"  itself.  That  is,  the  idealist  system  also 
imposes  itself  on  the  general  form  of  working  and  the  laws  of  dialectics.  It  is,  moreover,  in 
this  sense  that  the  system  is  describable  as  materialism  turned  upside  down  in  method  and 
content. 
On  the  other  hand,  to  dialectically,  but  only  partially,  counterbalance  the  sublating  nature  of 
the  materialist  critique,  Hegel's  system  entailed  that  for  the  first  time,  and  here  is  its  great 
merit  for  Engels,  that  the  whole  world,  natural,  historical,  and  intellectual  is  conceived  as  a 
process.  That  is,  it  is  conceived  as  in  constant  motion,  change,  transformation  and 
development;  the  attempt  is  then  made  to  cognitively  trace  out  the  internal  connections  that 
makes  a  continuous  whole  of  all  this  movement  and  development. 
This  nomological  absolute  has  then  to  be  reflected  in  the  analysis  of  a  systematic  form;  but 
not  as  a  systematic  form  that  is  a  reified  thought  totality,  a  closed  system  of  logical  thought. 
The  system,  in  its  relation  to  nature  and  society  becomes  open-ended  and  evolving. 
Moreover  then,  not  only  does  the  systematic  account  have  to  be  a  reflection  of  the  specific 
265 form,  whether  natural  and  social,  but  it  also  has  to  be  reflected  and  applied  to  the  forms  of 
decline,  transition,  and  supersession  that  take  place  in  both  nature  and  human  society. 
The  revolutionary  side  of  Hegel's  dialectic,  for  Engels,  attributes  the  world  as  being 
composed  of  a  complex  series  of  processes  of  coming  to  be  and  passing  away,  that  at  the 
same  time  entails  despite  contingency,  accident,  and  even  retrogression,  that  a  progressive 
development  asserts  itself  in  the  end.  This  continual  process  of  change  and  development 
through  contradiction  operates  in  a  nomological  fashion. 
The  mystified  form  of  Hegelian  dialectic,  for  Marx,  glorified  the  existing  states  of  affairs, 
but  the  "rational  form"  of  dialectic,  in  line  with  the  materialist  methodological  inversion, 
presented  the  direct  opposite  of  this  idealist  conceptual  apotheosis.  The  following  is  Marx's 
own  variation  on  Engels  distinction  between  the  relative  and  absolute  nature  of  dialectical 
change,  here  with  regard  to  a  systematic  social  form. 
"In  its  rational  form  it  is  a  scandal  and  an  abomination  to  bourgeoisdom  and  its 
doctrinaire  professors,  because  it  includes  in  its  comprehension  and  affirmative 
recognition  of  the  existing  state  of  things,  at  the  same  time  also,  the  recognition  of 
the  negation  of  that  state,  of  its  inevitable  breaking  up;  because  it  regards  every 
historically  developed  social  form  as  in  fluid  movement,  and  therefore  takes  into 
account  its  transient  nature  not  less  than  its  momentary  existence;  because  it  lets 
nothing  impose  upon  it,  and  is  in  its  essence  critical  and  revolutionary.  "  116 
The  above  remarks  of  Engels  and  Marx,  in  my  view,  also  admit  the  following  inference  as 
regards  the  relation  of  the  absolute  and  relative  nature  of  necessity  involved  and  inherent  in 
all  substantial  and  systematic  being  by  the  objective  operation  of  the  dialectical  laws.  Given 
that  constant  change  is  the  only  absolute  of  dialectics,  as  such  it  is  the  only  absolute  in  terms 
of  substantial  necessity,  whether  natural  or  social. 
"I  K.  Marx.  Capital.  Volume  one.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1974.  )  Afterword,  to  the  second  German 
edition.  P.  29. 
266 Consequently,  all  forms  of  substantial  being  are  themselves  relative  and  transitory;  the  laws 
of  dialectics  that  apply  to  it  apply  then  in  a  relative  manner,  the  only  absolute  of  the  process 
is  that  substantial  change  is  in  a  constant  process  of  coming  to  be  and  ceasing  to  be,  and  no 
system,  natural  or  social  is  immune  from  this  form  of  change.  Therefore,  all  other  forms  of 
substantial  necessity  based  on  a  dialectical  account  of  law  are  relative  and  transitory  in  their 
operation. 
All  motion  and  movement,  are  in  this  account,  expressed  as  the  dynamic  combination  of  the 
relative  and  the  absolute  or  constant;  this  is  fundamentally  entailed  in  the  dialectical  account 
of  motion.  For  example,  if  human  historical  development  is  posited  as  the  constant  of  the 
social  process,  the  historical  evolution  and  successive  developments  of  the  modes  of 
productive  activity  of  social  labour  are  the  relative  and  evolving  forms  of  the  expression  of 
this  historical  constant.  237 
That  there  are  laws  that  underpin  all  social  forms  are  due  to  natural  necessity,  they  do 
though,  take  on  specific  and  evolving  forms  of  development.  The  development  of  the  social 
form  of  labour,  for  example,  takes  on  an  evolving  and  ongoing  progression  in  Marx's 
historical  account.  This  relative  and,  in  so  far  as  human  social  development  still  has 
potential  for  further  evolutionary  change,  constant  element  contained  in  Marx,  is  itself 
founded  and  dependent  upon  the  continuing  operation  of  nomological  and  natural  necessity. 
Marx,  in  a  letter  to  Kugelmann,  makes  a  distinction  between  the  historical  constancy  of 
natural  laws,  and  the  relation  between  this  and  their  historically  specific  social  and  human 
forms  of  expression.  This  is  reflected  here  in  his  view  of  the  dialectical  relation  of  the 
successive  modes  of  production  and  their  specific  social  forms  of  distribution  of  labour. 
231  Lenin  asserts  a  similar  and  related  view  in  the  following  form.  "The  distinction  between 
subjectivism  (scepticism,  sophistry,  etc.  )  and  dialectics,  incidentally,  is  that  in  (objective)  dialectics  the 
difference  between  the  relative  and  the  absolute  is  itself  relative.  For  objective  dialectics  there  is  an  absolute 
within  the  relative.  For  subjectivism  and  sophistry  the  relative  is  only  relative  and  excludes  the  absolute.  "  V.  I. 
Lenin.  Notes  on  dialectics.  Collected  Works.  Volume  38.  Progress  Publishers.  (1972.  )  P.  360. 
267 "It  is  self-evident  that  this  necessity  of  the  distribution  of  social  Iabour  in  specific 
proportions  is  certainly  not  abolished  by  the  specific  form  of  social  production;  it 
can  only  change  its  form  of  manifestation.  Natural  laws  cannot  be  abolished  at  all. 
The  only  thing  that  can  change,  under  historically  differing  conditions,  is  the  form  in 
which  these  laws  assert  themselves.  ""' 
What  is  interesting  in  the  above  is  the  combination  of  natural  necessity  and  its  evolving 
social  forms  of  expression.  What  changes  is  how  the  law  asserts  itself,  what  specific  and 
evolving  social  forms  it  takes.  The  economic  categories  are  then  only  the  abstract 
expressions  of  the  actual  and  real  relations;  they  are  neither  the  source  for  the  real  categories 
nor  can  they  be  posited  as  eternal  laws  as  they  are  historical,  specific,  and  transient  in  their 
forms  of  expression. 
As  such,  they  are  the  specific  social  expression  of  the  natural  and  general  laws  that  underpin 
human  productive  activity,  relative  laws  that  remain  true  only  as  long  as  these  economic 
categories  take  that  historically  specific  form  of  social  expression.  Only  so  long,  that  is,  as 
the  contradictions  within  its  specific  form  of  self-activity  can  continue  to  re-create  and 
positively  resolve  the  conditions  of  its  existence,  and  thus  affirm  itself  as  the  specific  form 
of  the  subject  of  the  movement. 
The  dialectic  contained  in  value  and  its  mode  of  organising  the  productive  activity  of  social 
labour  not  only  arises  in  opposition  to  all  previous  historical  social  forms,  it  has  itself  a 
limited  historical  life  span  and  process.  The  laws  of  motion  of  dialectics  aims  to  show  how 
substantial  systematic  processes  arise  and  establish  themselves  in  their  specific  nomological 
forms  of  activity.  It  also  shows  how,  in  its  rational  form,  through  the  further  development  of 
these  very  same  laws  of  motion,  the  specific  form  of  the  substantial  and  systematic  subject 
is  ultimately  subordinate  to  laws  of  decline  and  evolutionary  transition. 
11  K.  Marx.  Letter  to  Kugelmann.  IP  July.  1868.  Collected  Works.  Volume  43.  Lawrence  and 
Wishart.  (1988.  )  P.  68. 
268 "The  one  thing  which  is  of  moment  to  Marx,  is  to  find  the  law  of  the  phenomena 
with  whose  investigation  he  is  concerned;  and  not  only  is  the  law  of  moment  to  him, 
which  govern  these  phenomena,  in  so  far  as  they  have  a  definite  form  and  mutual 
connexion  within  a  given  historical  period.  Of  still  greater  moment  to  him  is  the  law 
of  their  variation,  of  their  development,  i.  e.,  of  their  transition  from  one  form  into 
another,  from  one  series  of  connections  into  a  different  one  ..... 
The  scientific  value 
of  such  an  inquiry  lies  in  the  disclosing  of  the  special  laws  that  regulate  the  origin, 
existence,  development,  death  of  a  given  social  organism  and  its  replacement  by 
another  and  higher  one.  ""' 
The  contradictions  have  their  own  inevitable  logic  of  supersession  contained  within  it,  the 
dialectic  sweeps  away  all  existence  that  comes  before  it.  There  can  be  no  idealist  resolution 
of  these  objective  material  contradictions  if  one  holds  onto  the  logic  of  the  material  polarity 
and  opposition  as  an  ongoing  and  evolving  development  of  a  totality,  without  hypostasising 
or  fetishising  it  as  a  closed  and  fully  realised  system. 
These  laws  being  historically  specific  and  evolving,  arise,  mature,  decline  and  develop  into 
a  higher  mode  and  form  of  social  organisation.  Marx  himself  expresses  the  following 
theoretical  consequence  for  the  evolutionary  criticism  of  an  idealist  account  of  a  system 
when  it  is  applied  to  a  social  form. 
"But  there  is  also  something  else  behind  it.  Once  interconnection  has  been  revealed, 
all  theoretical  belief  in  the  perpetual  necessity  of  the  existing  conditions  collapses, 
even  before  the  collapse  takes  place  in  practice.  Here,  therefore,  it  is  completely  in 
the  interests  of  the  ruling  classes  to  perpetuate  the  unthinking  confusion.  "240 
231  K.  Marx.  Afterword  to  the  second  German  edition  of  Capital.  Volume  1.  Lawrence  and  Wishart. 
(1974.  )  P.  27  and  28  respectively. 
240  K.  Marx.  Letter  to  Kugelmann.  11'  July.  1868.  Marx  Engels.  Collected  Works.  Volume  43. 
Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1988.  )  P.  69. 
269 This  materialist  and  evolutionary  foundation  for  the  dialectic  also  raises  a  central  question 
of  the  critique  of  Hegel's  idealist  systematic  form  with  regard  to  method  and  content.  This 
question  has  been  lurking  in  the  background  of  the  thesis  almost  since  its  inception.  Does 
the  nature  of  a  dialectical  view  of  contradiction  itself  become  altered  with  its  inversion  of 
ontological  foundation?  How  does  the  materialist  grounding  of  the  dialectic  affect  Marx's 
contention,  expressed  earlier  in  the  thesis,  that  Hegelian  contradiction  is  the  source  of  all 
dialectic? 
3.  Dialectical  Laws  as  the  Logic  of  Evolution. 
One  can  also  pose  this  question,  of  the  problematical  nature  of  contradiction,  in  a  way  that 
ties  in  with  the  inference  that  was  previously  made  from  Engels  critique.  Namely,  in  terms 
of  the  status  of  substantial  necessity  in  relation  to  the  absolute  nature  of  change  itself,  vis  a 
vis  the  relative  and  transitory  forms  that  it  takes  in  social,  natural,  and  material  being. 
Given  that  Hegel  integrates  the  laws  of  motion  of  dialectics,  the  systematic  movement  of  the 
positing  and  resolving  of  contradiction  into  a  logical  and  idealist  totality,  as  the  explanation 
of  the  motor  force  of  the  logical  and  systematic  whole  actualising  itself,  then  the  following 
question  can  be  generated  ftom  this. 
How  does  the  conceptual  and  reflexive  integration  of  the  objective  operation  of  the  laws  of 
dialectics,  into  an  idealist  thought  system,  affect  the  fundamentally  revolutionary  content 
and  f6fin  of  those  laws  of  contradiction?  Hegel's  idealist  balancing  of  concepts  entails  the 
idealist  balancing  of  the  contradictions  into  a  systematic  whole. 
Alternatively  posed,  in  what  way  are  the  laws  of  dialectics,  if  you  will  excuse  the  phrase, 
perverted  by  the  idealist  system  that  is  itself,  to  draw  out  the  inference  from  Engels,  the 
inverted  and  mystified  form  of  a  materialist  method  and  content? 
270 On  the  one  hand,  dialectical  laws,  as  the  laws  of  motion  of  a  systematic  totality,  do  operate 
in  any  given  organic  systematic  totality.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  in  a  materialist  form  of 
dialectic,  the  view  that  any  organic,  natural  and  social  system  inevitably  exhausts  itself  in  its 
specific  forms  of  motion  and  activity.  If  further  development  is  to  take  place,  then  there  are 
required  laws  of  motion  that  can  explain  this  evolutionary  movement  into  a  new  specific 
form  of  nomological  motion  and  activity. 
This  entails  that  there  are  also  in  any  organic  system  the  operation  of  laws  of  decline  and 
supersession.  This  intermediate  process  of  transition  being  a  fundamental  determination  and 
category  that  has  to  be  more  fully  integrated  into  the  concept  of  processes  of  movement  and 
change  in  the  materialist  account  of  nomological  forms. 
The  laws  of  dialectics  have  to,  in  order  to  be  consistently  logical  and  rational  in  their 
materialised  form,  encapsulate  this  absolute  form  of  change  as  a  historical  process;  in  the 
form  of  a  materialised  subject  that  has  laws  of  being  that  arise,  mature,  decline,  and 
supersede  into  a  higher  evolutionary  form. 
The  relative  necessity  of  the  laws  of  motion  of  a  systemic  whole  gives  way,  through  the 
development  of  the  contradictions  contained  within  that  specific  form  of  relative  necessity, 
to  the  conditions  that  allow  the  emergence  of  a  new  and  higher  form  of  systematic 
expression.  The  absolute  nature  of  change  thus  manifests  itself  in  the  transition  from  one 
systematic  relative  form  to  a  new  systematic  relative  form;  one  that  arises  out  of  the 
conditions  created  by  its  predecessor. 
The  system,  whether  natural  or  social,  itself  posits  its  own  demise  and  supersession;  the 
system  is  thus,  ultimately  in  contradiction  with  itself.  The  only  other  possibilities  and 
parameters  within  this  dialectical  process  being  either  that  the  evolutionary  development  is 
itself  regressed,  or  the  onset  of  stasis  in  the  specific  and  determinate  forms  of  nomological 
activity  entails  that,  due  to  the  contradictions  remaining  unresolved,  its  evolutionary 
possibilities  have  exhausted  themselves  and  extinction  ensues. 
271 System  and  its  supersession  are  outwith  the  scope  of  Hegel's  dialectical  laws  and  forms  in 
the  Logic;  the  aim  primarily  is  to  outline  the  universal  categories  and  concepts  in  their  polar 
forms  of  relations  and  universal  interconnections  that  determine  and  make  up  a  substantial 
whole.  A  substantial  whole  that  Hegel  contends  is  generated  from  this  systematic  logical 
totality. 
The  need  to  blunt  the  method  favours  the  former  at  the  expense  of  the  latter.  In  the  Logic, 
which  is  the  main  centre  of  attention  here,  there  is  no  theory  of  the  laws  of  motion  of  a 
system  in  decline  and  transition,  only  in  its  arisal  and  maturity  into  a  conceptually  evolved 
systematic  whole.  The  absolute,  as  the  logical  idea,  by  its  very  divine  nature,  does  not 
decline  and  give  rise  to  a  higher  form. 
The  limiting  of  the  dialectic  to  a  system  without  supersession  is  due  to  the  idealist  necessity 
for  enclosing  the  alienated  philosophical  expression  as  a  speculative  form  of  systematic 
totality  that  is  infinite  and  eternal.  That  is,  it  is  outwith  real  space  and  real  time,  and, 
consequently  outwith  real  natural  and  social  history.  Absolute  reason,  in  this  its  highest 
product,  as  a  form  of  alienated  science,  is  outwith  all  real  development.  This  is  also  another 
reason  why  Engels  argues  that  the  laws  of  dialectics  were  imposed  on  nature  and  history  by 
Hegel  rather  than  deduced  from  them. 
What  Hegel  contributes  are  these  dialectical  laws  as  a  logical  systematic  whole;  but  a  logical 
systematic  whole  that  is  absolute  and  fixed,  impervious  to  all  outside  activity  from  whatever 
quarter.  Marx,  in  the  Paris  Manuscripts  of  1844  reflected  this  criticism  at  the  outset  of  the 
thesis,  where  the  result  of  the  entire  compass  of  philosophical  abstraction  was  the  dialectic 
of  pure  thought;  as  a  self-enclosed  totality  of  thought  that  eternally  revolves  within  its  own 
circle,  hermetically  and  conceptually  separated  from  real  nature  and  real  mind. 
The  new  dialectical  content,  including  that  of  the  laws  generated  by  Hegel's  thought,  as 
Engels  put  it,  had  to  be  saved  and  retained,  but  the  idealist  form  of  the  laws  of  dialectics  put 
272 on  an  evolutionary  materialist  foundation.  The  laws  of  motion  of  contradiction,  and  hence 
the  laws  of  dialectics  underpinning  any  system,  have  then  to  be  open-ended  and  evolving. 
The  fundamental  theoretical  question,  to  return  to  it  then  is,  does  a  materialist  dialectic,  and 
hence  view  of  contradiction  and  laws  of  motion  and  development,  differ  in  any  substantial 
sense  from  an  idealist  account  of  contradiction?  This,  despite  the  fact  that  Hegelian 
contradiction  is  the  source  of  all  dialectic?  How  can  these  seemingly  contradictory  aspects 
of  Marx's  view  be  reconciled? 
The  further  and  related  question  generated  by  this  is  whether  the  systematic  operation  of  the 
laws  of  Hegelian  dialectics  can  theoretically  accommodate,  in  a  generalised  form,  the 
process  of  decline  and  supersession  into  a  new  systematic  form  of  operation.  Are  they 
capable,  in  their  present  nomological.  expressions,  of  capturing  this  process  of  decline  and 
supersession,  or  do  these  nomological  forms  have  to  be  either  re-jigged  or  added  to,  or  both, 
in  order  to  capture  this  process  of  decline  and  supersession? 
4.  Law  and  Systematic  Totality. 
The  first  thing  to  ascertain  is  how  these  general  laws  of  dialectics  actually  operate  in  a 
systematic  fashion  for  Hegel.  This  entails  working  out  how  the  dialectical  laws  of  motion  in 
Hegel  operate  as  a  systematic  whole,  in  order  to  investigate  if  and  if  so  how  these  same  laws 
could  possibly  accommodate  decline  and  supersession.  Let  us  then  look  at  the  former  before 
going  on  to  discuss  the  latter.  How  then  do  these  laws  proceed  to  interconnect,  interact  and 
progress  towards  a  substantial  whole? 
Laws  of  dialectics,  to  give  them  their  general  character,  are  themselves  the  general  processes 
that  express  the  laws  of  motion  that  underpin  the  movement  and  development  of  the  specific 
ontological  contradiction  contained  in  a  systematic  subject. 
273 The  relation  of  these  nomological  forms  is  that  they  express  the  laws  of  motion  of  the 
systematic  movement  of  the  contradiction  contained  in  the  determinate  activity  of  the 
subject  under  investigation.  The  driving  force  for  the  whole  structure  is  the  methodical 
unfolding  of  the  movement  of  the  positing  and  resolving  of  the  specific  contradiction 
applied  to  the  predicational  forms  of  the  universal  categories,  qualities,  and  relations 
inherent  to  all  substantial  being. 
In  broad  terms,  the  substantial  ontological  divisions  of  motion  in  Hegel  are  those  of 
immediacy,  mediation,  and  being  for  self.  These  stages  of  substantial  motion  find  their 
reflection  in  the  further  conceptual  divisions  of  the  universal,  the  particular,  and  the 
individual.  In  turn,  the  conceptual  categories  of  the  universal,  the  particular,  and  the 
individual  are  reflected  in  the  primary  ontological  categories  of  the  Logic  of  Hegel,  namely, 
being,  essence,  and  notion. 
Furthermore,  there  is  a  direct  and  respective  correlation  between  these  three  central 
categories  of  the  Logic  and  the  three  core  laws  of  dialectics.  What  we  have  is  the 
development  and  movement  of  a  contradiction  seen  in  its  necessary  ontological  and 
nomological  divisions. 
In  line  with  the  divisions  outlined  by  Engels,  the  category  of  being  relates  primarily  to  the 
law  of  transformation  contained  in  the  dialectic  of  quality  and  quantity.  The  category  of 
essence  relates  primarily  with  the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites.  Finally,  the 
category  of  the  notion  relates  to  the  law  of  negation  of  negation.  This  third  law  figures,  in 
Engels  analysis,  "as  the  fundamental  law  for  the  construction  of  the  whole  system.  ""' 
However,  these  three  analytical  distinctions  of  the  nomological  forms  of  activity  should  be 
understood  in  general  terms,  and  not  viewed  as  rigid,  separate,  and  unconnected  in  both 
their  relation  and  application.  The  three  separate  expressions  of  nomological  activity  operate 
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274 in  all  three  primary  logical  categories  within  their  evolving  and  developing  ontological  and 
predicational  limitations. 
That  is,  their  interrelation  is  determined  by  the  operation  of  the  primary  logical  category,  in 
this  case,  being,  essence,  and  notion,  and  its  specific  conceptual  forms  of  predication,  with 
the  dominant  law  in  operation  in  the  three  logical  categories  maintaining  its  relation  and 
own  determinate  form  of  expression  that,  at  the  same  time,  pertains  and  relates  to  the  laws 
as  a  systematic  whole. 
Furthermore,  the  contradictions  within  each  of  the  three  primary  ontological  categories  are 
themselves  the  product  of  the  posited  and  resolved  contradiction  that  marks  off  each 
successive  stage  of  the  determinate  development  of  the  substantial  subject.  This  driving 
ontological  contradiction,  and  its  determinate  forms  of  inner  interconnections  and  external 
relations,  are  the  expressions  and  reflections  of  the  developing  and  evolving  relations  and 
connections  contained  within  the  laws  of  dialectics. 
We  have  already  seen  some  evidence  in  Hegel  that  would  tend  to  support  this  view  of  the 
dynamics  of  the  process.  When  we  were  discussing  the  dialectic  in  Hegel's  method  for 
developing  the  categories  from  their  simple  to  more  complex  forms;  here  the  conceptual 
evolution  contained  not  only  the  positive  form  of  the  category,  but  also  its  own  negative 
form.  Moreover  the  resolution  of  this  categorial  contrariety  lay  in  the  unity  of  both  forms 
and  their  transition  into  a  higher  form  of  category,  which  then  posits  its  own  form  of 
negation,  and  so  on,  and  so  on.  The  dynamic  of  this  process  continues  till  the  systematic 
whole  of  categories  is  established. 
The  positing  and  resolving  of  contradiction  is  then  the  motor  force  that  operates  on  both  a 
systematic  level,  and  at  the  level  of  each  of  the  specific  dialectical  laws  that  make  up  that 
systematic  whole.  It  is,  therefore,  also  in  operation  in  the  categorial  relations  that  make  up 
each  primary  ontological  category  and  specific  dialectical  law.  That  is,  each  of  the  laws  of 
dialectics  has  its  own  specific  form  of  that  architectonic  of  negation  and  negation  of  the 
275 negation  inherent  in  the  dialectic,  and  contained  in  the  process  of  sublating  that  specific 
stage  of  the  contradiction. 
The  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  is  the  foundation  for  the  whole  system  because  it  is 
the  law  that  underpins  and  resolves  the  contradictory  activity  of  both  the  determinate  parts 
that  make  up  the  whole,  and  resolves  their  integration  into  a  systematic  and  substantial 
whole.  As  the  architectonic  of  negation  and  negation  of  negation  operates  in  the  specific 
parts  and  in  the  systematic  whole,  it  necessarily  both  sublates  and  retains  the  other 
dialectical  laws. 
What  is  the  key  to  a  fuller  comprehension  of  this  process  is  to  ascertain  how  the  analysis  of 
contradiction  operates  at  each  stage  of  its  ongoing  and  interconnected  development  with  the 
other  dialectical  laws.  That  is,  these  nomological  divisions  should  not,  and  this  is  of 
fundamental  import,  be  viewed  or  interpreted  as  being  abstractly  kept  apart;  they  do,  in  fact, 
interrelate  and  universally  interconnect. 
This  they  do  in  a  twofold  form.  The  primary  law  in  operation  contains  the  others  as  a 
subordinate  or  secondary  expression  of  its  own  specific  nomological  form.  Secondly,  each 
of  the  dialectical  laws  successively  builds  upon  and  integrates  and  sublates  its  nomological 
antecedent. 
In  my  analysis,  the  law  of  the  transformation  of  quality  into  quantity,  and  vice  versa,  also 
contains  its  own  variations,  pertinent  to  the  development  of  its  own  specific  ontological 
categories,  of  both  the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites  and  the  law  of  the  negation  of 
the  negation. 
These  operate,  as  outlined  above,  in  the  generalised  dialectical  form  of  the  negation,  as  the 
positing  of  the  positive  and  negative  poles  of  the  relation,  and  the  negation  of  the  negation, 
that  resolves  that  polar  contradiction  in  their  higher  unity  in  a  new  dialectical  category.  This 
276 dynamic  pertains  to  all  the  predicational  categories,  and  allows  them  to  posit  and  resolve  the 
contradiction  pertaining  to  its  specific  and  determinate  nature. 
That  is,  though  the  law  of  quality,  quantity,  and  their  transition  to  measure,  is  the  primary 
law  in  operation  in  the  category  of  being,  the  outlining  of  the  movement  of  the  contradiction 
in  this  law  also  requires,  though  subordinate  in  their  ontological  and  predicational 
expression  at  this  point,  these  generalised  methodological  forms  of  the  law  of  the 
interpenetration  of  opposites,  and  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation.  " 
The  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites  both  sublates  the  law  of  the  transformation  of 
quality  and  quantity,  and  their  dialectical  resolution  and  higher  unity  of  measure;  at  the 
same  time  it  contains  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  necessary  to  resolve  the 
contradictions  posed  in  each  successive  categorial  development  of  the  contradiction 
contained  in  the  category  of  essence,  where  the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites  is 
now  the  operational  and  nomological.  primary  form.  " 
Finally,  the  law  of  the  negation,  as  well  as  operating  as  the  resolving  of  the  specific 
categorial  contradictions  contained  in  the  ontological  forms  of  predication  relevant  to  the 
other  two  dialectical  laws,  also  sublates  the  previous  two  laws  and  contains  them  as 
moments  or  determinations  of  its  own  form  of  systematic  operation.  "' 
242  The  dynamic  contained  in  the  category  of  being,  for  Hegel,  is  the  process  of  how  a  specific  form 
and  totality  of  being  coheres  itself  as  a  universal  form  and  by  doing  so  makes  the  transition  to  its  essential  and 
universal  form.  The  characteristic  and  defining  activity  of  this  category  and  law  of  the  dialectic  of  quality, 
quantity,  and  measure  both  "brings  out  the  totality  of  being"  for  Hegel,  and  "abolishes"  the  immediacy  of  the 
form  of  being. 
241  The  dynamic  contained  in  the  category  of  essence,  for  Hegel,  is  that  it  brings  out  the  contradiction 
contained  in  being,  and  poses  the  contradiction  as  an  objective,  external  relation.  "In  essence  everything  is 
relative.  "  Essence  is  the  sphere,  for  Hegel,  where  the  contradiction  in  being  is  made  explicit. 
2"  The  conceptual  evolution  of  Marx's  value  theory  outlined  in  the  thesis  materially  reflected  this 
totality  of  process.  The  law  of  the  transformation  of  quality,  quantity,  and  measure  was  the  primary  law  in 
operation  in  the  analysis  of  the  substance  and  form  of  value.  The  application  of  this  dynamic  lay  at  the  heart  of 
Marx's  analysis  of  how  the  commodity  form,  through  the  dialectical  opposition  and  evolution  of  the  relative 
and  equivalent  forms  of  value,  coheres  itself  in  the  universal  value  form  of  money.  The  operation  of  the 
negation  of  the  negation  lay  in  their  dialectical  result  of  measure,  the  unity  and  resolution  of  quality  and 
quantity. 
277 The  importance  of  the  relation  of  the  parts  to  the  whole,  in  this  case  each  of  the  specifically 
defined  general  laws,  have  also  then,  to  be  related  and  integrated  within  the  evolving  and 
systematic  ontology  that  integrates  the  totality  as  a  whole.  The  law  of  the  negation  of  the 
negation  plays  this  fundamental  role  in  both  the  relations  within  the  parts,  and  the  relation  of 
the  parts  to  the  whole. 
From  the  subject's  simplest  initial  universal  form,  to  a  complex  totality  of  determinate 
forms  and  specific  relations  that  expresses  the  process  of  the  development  of  the  primary 
ontological  contradiction  pertaining  to  its  substantial  and  specific  determinate  nature.  The 
laws  of  dialectics,  if  they  are  to  be  validated  as  a  correct  scientific  method,  should  be  able  to 
encapsulate  the  dynamic  forms  of  motion  of  those  determinate,  particular,  and  opposing 
forms  of  activity  contained  in  the  contradictory  evolution  of  a  systematic  and  specific 
subject. 
The  question  now  is  whether  and  if  so  how,  do  these  dialectical  laws  operate  in  the  process 
of  decline  and  supersession?  Furthermore,  if  they  do  continue  to  operate  in  the  process  of 
decline  and  transition,  then  how  does  this  operation  affect  the  relationship,  outlined  above, 
within  the  systematic  relations  of  the  Hegelian  laws  of  dialectics  themselves?  Moreover, 
how  does  this  impact  on  the  fundamental  contradiction  in  Hegel's  idealist  dialectic,  that 
between  method  and  system? 
The  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites  was  the  primary  law  in  operation  in  the  twofold  forms  of 
the  circulation  of  the  commodity  and  money  forms.  The  interpenetration  of  the  opposition  of  commodity  and 
money,  of  purchase  and  sale,  in  the  twofold  forms  of  exchange  is  Marx's  application  of  this  Hegelian  law.  The 
operation  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  finds  its  expression  in  the  circularity  of  motions  contained  in  c-m-c 
and,  in  particular,  as  it  is  the  refluxing  act  of  a  single  subject,  m-c-m. 
Finally  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  was  the  primary  law  in  operation  of  capital  as  a 
systematic  interrelation  of  production  and  circulation  for  value's  self-expansion.  This  does  not,  of  course,  rule 
out  the  operation  of  the  other  laws  of  dialectics  in  each  of  these  processes,  but  as  now  the  sublated 
nomological  expressions  of  the  active  determinations  and  relations  as  a  systematic  whole. 
278 5.  Lenin,  Trotsky,  and  the  "Algebra  of  Revolution" 
Trotsky  defined  dialectics  as  the  logic  of  motion,  development,  and  evolution.  In  his  view, 
the  abstract  laws  and  formulas  of  Hegelian  Logic  expressed  the  view  that  everything 
becomes  the  way  it  is  as  a  result  of  law-like  development.  '  These  abstract  formulas  being 
the  general  laws  and  ontological  forms  inherent  to  any  process  of  motion  and  change.  It  is 
this  very  foundational  area  of  dialectical  method  that  I  have  attempted  to  elucidate  as  a  core 
constituent  of  the  thesis. 
There  is  here,  in  the  analysis  of  this  evolutionary  process,  an  interesting  distinction  between 
Trotsky  and  Lenin  that  can  be  drawn  out  between  their  respective  views  on  the  laws  of 
dialectics,  and  on  what  they  consider  to  be  the  essence  and  core  of  the  nature  of  dialectics 
itself.  The  character  of  this  apparent  difference  between  Trotsky  and  Lenin  can  be 
characterised  in  the  following  manner  and  form. 
For  Trotsky,  the  transformation  of  quantity  into  quality  was  the  fundamental  law  of 
dialectics,  in  that  it  outlined  the  essential  form  for  all  evolutionary  change  and 
development.  "'  Though  Trotsky  poses  the  dialectical  transitions  of  quality  and  quantity  as 
the  expression  of  the  movement  of  qualitative  change  and  transition,  he  also  makes  the  point 
that  this  logical  kernel  of  evolutionary  development  of  "the  transition  of  quality  into 
quantity  and  the  reverse  presupposes  the  transition  of  one  quality  into  another.  """ 
Lenin,  on  the  other  hand,  considered  that  the  unity  and  struggle  contained  in  the 
interpenetration  of  opposites  was  the  most  important  law  of  dialectics;  this  doctrine  of  the 
"I  L.  Trotsky.  Trotsky's  Notebooks.  193  -  1935.  C.  U.  P.  (1986.  )  P.  96. 
`6  "It  must  be  recognised  that  the  fundamental  law  of  dialectics  is  the  conversion  of  quantity  into 
quality,  for  it  gives  [us]  the  general  formula  of  all  evolutionary  processes  -  of  nature  as  well  as  society.  "  L. 
Trotsky.  Trotsky's  Notebooks.  1933  -  1935.  C.  U.  P.  (1986.  )  P.  88.  See  also  P.  90. 
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279 unity  of  opposites  is  regarded  by  hirn  as  the  essence  and  core  of  dialectics 
. 
24'  The  difference 
between  them  lies  in  the  following  relation.  Lenin  views  the  transition  of  quantity  into 
quality  and  vice  versa  as  itself  an  example,  one  that  is  ultimately  subordinate  to,  the  unity 
and  interpenetration  of  opposites.  "' 
However,  the  law  of  the  dialectical  transitions  of  quality  and  quantity  and  vice  versa  is,  and 
here  Trotsky  is  undoubtedly  correct,  absolutely  indispensable  and  the  central  law  in 
operation  for  the  analysing  of  the  contradictions  and  evolutionary  ruptures  and 
transformations  that  pertain  and  inform  all  natural,  social,  and  cognitive  processes  and  their 
interrelations.  Without  this  law  playing  a  fundamental  role,  no  coherent  analysis  of  the 
leaps,  ruptures,  and  transformations  would  be  able  to  be  cognitively  appropriated. 
Nevertheless,  as  the  transition  of  one  quality  into  another  not  only  presupposes,  as  Trotsky 
notes,  the  transition  of  one  quality  into  another;  then  Lenin's  emphasis  on  polar  opposition 
would  also  appear  to  have  real  validity  in  this  area,  as  the  process  favoured  by  Trotsky,  is 
interpreted  here  by  Lenin  as  only  a  specific  expression  of  the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of 
opposites.  In  this  particular  case,  according  to  Lenin,  the  law  is  manifested  through  the 
dialectical  opposition  of  the  categories  of  quality  and  quantity. 
Again,  like  Trotsky's  nomological  preference,  there  is  undoubtedly  a  large  measure  of  truth 
in  this  that  is  undeniable,  but  there  is  also  the  danger  of  reducing  and  collapsing  dialectics 
into  the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites.  This  would,  like  Trotsky's  emphasis,  be 
tantamount  to  an  error  in  my  view,  especially  when  this  specific  law,  though  absolutely 
fundamental  and  essential  to  dialectics,  is  at  the  same  time,  and  like  Trotsky's  preference, 
still  part  of  a  wider  nomological  process. 
11  See  V.  1.  Lenin.  Collected  Works.  Volume  38.  P.  222.  "In  brief,  dialectics  can  be  defined  as  the 
doctrine  of  the  unity  of  opposites.  This  embodies  the  essence  of  dialectics,  but  it  requires  explanations  and 
development.  "  V.  I.  Lenin.  Collected  Works.  Volume  38.  Progress  Publishers.  (1972.  )  P.  223. 
""  V.  I.  Lenin.  Collected  Works.  Volume  38.  Progress  Publishers.  (1972.  )  P.  222.  Points  9  and  16. 
Point  9:  "9)  not  only  the  unity  of  opposites,  but  the  transitions  of  every  determination,  quality,  feature,  side, 
property  into  every  other  [into  its  opposite?  ]"  -  Point  16:  "16)  the  transition  of  quantity  into  quality  and  vice 
versa  ((15  and  16  are  examples  of  9))" 
280 A  process  that  is  contained  within  the  systematic  expression  of  all  three  laws  of  dialectical 
motion,  and  which  are  consequently  expressed  in  the  manifestation  of  evolutionary  change 
through  contradiction.  To  their  credit,  what  Lenin  and  Trotsky  are  both  attempting  to  grasp 
is  what  they  regard  as  the  essence  of  evolutionary  and  revolutionary  change  from  the 
perspective  of  dialectics;  in  that  sense  both  highlight  differing  but  fundamentally  important 
aspects  of  this  process  of  evolutionary  and  revolutionary  transformation  inherent  within  all 
processes  of  change. 
One  could,  however,  dispute  that  the  attempt  to  posit  the  essence  of  dialectics,  in  the  form  of 
the  primacy  of  one  of  its  nomological  forms,  is  not  necessarily  the  best  way  to  proceed  in 
analysing  the  interrelation  of  the  evolving  totality  into  a  new  qualitative  form  of  expression. 
Certainly,  it  would  be  unacceptable,  without  thoroughly  and  critically  analysing  the 
interrelation  and  development  of  the  laws  of  dialectics  as  a  totality,  before  a  coherent 
argument  could  be  put  forward  as  to  the  primacy  or  otherwise,  of  any  specific  form  of 
expression  of  the  laws  of  dialectics  in  the  process  of  decline  and  transition  into  a  new 
systematic  form  of  activity.  250 
The  real  question  regarding  this  characterised  distinction  between  Lenin  and  Trotsky  is  the 
following  one;  is  this  transition  of  one  quality  into  another  quality  the  same  thing  as  the 
expression  of  the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites?  Does  the  transition  of  one  quality 
into  another  rest  solely  on  the  law  of  the  unity  and  struggle  of  the  interpenetration  of 
opposites  as  Lenin  would  logically  have  to  maintain,  given  his  preference  in  nomological 
primacy?  The  answer  to  this,  in  my  view,  is  both  a  yes  and  a  no. 
11  As  to  whether  Lenin  and  Trotsky  had  definitively  carried  out  this  work  seems  doubtful  from  the 
evidence  we  have  at  our  disposal.  This  did  not,  however,  stop  both  from  highlighting  two  differing  but 
fundamentally  key  areas  of  importance  in  a  brief  but  illuminating  manner.  The  question  is  why  pose  the 
relationship  here  in  terms  of  a  nomological  and  ontological  priority  of  any  specific  form  of  expression  of  the 
laws  of  dialectics? 
281 One  could  argue  though,  against  the  differing  positions  of  both  Lenin  and  Trotsky,  that  in 
order  to  grasp  the  full  picture  of  systematic  evolutionary  change,  it  is  not  only,  as  in 
Trotsky,  that  quantitative  alterations  to  quality  lead  to  the  transformation  into  a  new  quality. 
Nor,  as  in  Lenin,  that  it  is  the  interpenetration  of  opposites  that  is  presupposed  as  the  force 
and  law  in  operation  behind  the  transition  of  one  quality  into  another.  Both  are,  in  a  sense, 
right,  and  at  the  same  time  wrong. 
My  preference  is  to  attempt  to  analyse  the  process  of  evolutionary  change  as  the  combined 
account  of  the  systematic  movement  of  the  laws  of  dialectic,  but  to  view  their  nomological 
connections  in  a  form  that  is  different  from  Hegel's  idealist  analysis  of  the  laws  of  motion  of 
a  systematic  whole.  This  requires  attempting  to  understand  those  interacting  laws,  and  how 
they  operate  in  different  forms  and  relations,  in  the  process  of  evolutionary  transition.  That 
is,  in  the  form  of  the  decline  of  one  systematic  form  and  its  transition  to  another  systematic 
form. 
In  my  analysis  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  also  plays  a  vital  role  in  this  process 
of  the  development  of  a  new  qualitative  transformation.  This  form  of  the  dialectic  of 
negativity  also  lies  behind  the  presupposition  of  the  transition  of  one  quality  into  another 
quality.  Nevertheless,  in  order  to  do  so,  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation,  as  we  shall 
see,  requires  a  twofold  interpretation  of  the  operation  and  expression  of  the  law;  one  that  is 
not  reflected  in  the  logical  evolution  into  a  systematic  idealist  totality  in  Hegel. 
Lenin,  however,  also  makes  a  further  distinction  within  his  emphasis  on  the  importance  of 
the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites;  a  distinction,  that  is  itself  both  useful  for  the 
present  discussion,  and  derived  from  Engels  view  of  dialectics  as  a  form  of  absolute  change. 
The  distinction  is  of  that  between  the  relative  and  the  absolute  expression  of  the  forms  of 
operation  of  the  dialectical  law  of  the  interpenetration  of  opposites. 
282 "The  unity  (coincidence,  identity,  equal  action)  of  opposites  is  conditional, 
temporary,  transitory,  relative.  The  struggle  of  mutually  exclusive  opposites  is 
absolute,  just  as  development  and  motion  are  absolute.  ""' 
This  formulation  of  Lenin's  is  precisely  the  core  of  what  needs  to  be  systematically 
developed  in  order  to  begin  to  answer  this  important  question  of  laws  of  transition.  Engels 
criticisms  of  Hegel's  idealist  system  are  also  pertinent  here  to  the  beginnings  of  an 
understanding  of  this  complex  process.  The  question  then  becomes  what  are  the  processes 
here  that  lie  behind  the  relative  becoming  absolute,  and  at  the  same  time  positing  a  new 
form  of  the  relative? 
Dialectics  is  about  the  laws  of  motion  of  an  evolving  contradiction.  The  movement  of  these 
laws  of  dialectical  contradiction  provides  the  ontological  foundations  for  the  ongoing 
activity  of  a  specific  and  systematic  subject.  What  is  more  problematic  is  how  the  dialectical 
laws  operate  in  the  process  of  decline  and  transition  into  a  new  systematic  form;  this  is  the 
nub  of  the  theoretical  dilemma,  inherited  from  dialectics. 
Hegel's  blunting  of  the  dialectical  method,  and  hence  the  nature  of  contradiction  itself  in  the 
interests  of  an  idealist  system,  cannot  resolve  or  contradict  the  very  nature  of  dialectical 
change  itself.  Engels  expresses  this  contradiction  in  Hegel's  dialectical  thought  process  in 
the  following  form. 
"Thus  the  Hegelian  proposition  turns  into  its  opposite  through  Hegelian  dialectics 
itself,  All  that  is  real  in  the  sphere  of  human  history  becomes  irrational  in  the  process 
of  time,  is  therefore  irrational  by  its  very  destination,  is  tainted  beforehand  with 
irrationality;  and  everything  which  is  rational  in  the  minds  of  men  is  destined  to 
"  V.  I.  Lenin.  Collected  Works.  Notes  on  dialectics.  Volume  38.  Progress  Publishers.  (1972.  )  P.  360. 
Lenin  also  makes  the  point  that  this  dynamic  of  mutually  excluding  opposites  and  their  reciprocal  relation 
"furnishes  the  key  to  the  "self-movement"  of  everything  existing;  it  alone  furnishes  the  key  to  the  "leaps,  "  to 
the  "break  in  continuity,  "  to  the  "transformation  into  the  opposite,  "  to  the  destruction  of  the  old  and  the 
emergence  of  the  new.  "  (Ibid.  )  P.  360. 
283 become  real,  however  much  it  may  contradict  existing  apparent  reality.  In 
accordance  with  all  the  rules  of  the  Hegelian  method  of  thought,  the  proposition  of 
the  rationality  of  everything  which  is  real  resolves  itself  into  the  other  proposition: 
All  that  exists  deserves  to  perish.  "" 
The  difficulty  in  analysing  the  laws  of  motion  of  evolutionary  change  is  highlighted  by  the 
fact  that  the  process  of  decline,  transition  and  supersession  to  a  new  form,  is  more 
dialectically  complex  than  the  analysis  of  the  operation  of  the  laws  of  dialectics  when  they 
are  applied  to  the  systematic  operation  of  a  determinate  subject.  This  process  is,  and  has  to 
be  in  my  view,  necessarily  reflected  in  the  more  complex  interrelation  of  the  laws  of 
dialectics  that  pertain  to  the  decline  and  supersession  of  a  systematic  whole.  " 
Before  investigating  this  further,  let  us  see  how  Hegel  describes  the  process  of  the 
transformation  of  quantity  into  quality.  There  are,  for  Hegel,  two  possible  outcomes  in  the 
quantitative  process  inherent  in  measure.  Alteration  in  this  process  can  effect  the 
quantitative  aspect  of  measure  in  either  of  two  ways.  The  quantitative  aspect  of  the 
dialectical  relation  may  be  altered  without  it  effecting  a  change  in  the  quality  of  measure,  or 
the  changes  in  the  quantitative  relations  alter  the  quality  of  measure  itself. 
"A  quantitative  change  takes  place,  apparently  without  any  further  significance:  but 
there  is  something  lurking  behind,  and  a  seemingly  innocent  change  of  quantity  acts 
as  a  kind  of  snare,  to  catch  hold  of  the  quality  .... 
If  the  quantity  present  in  measure 
exceeds  a  certain  limit,  the  quality  corresponding  to  it  is  also  put  in  abeyance.  This 
however  is  not  a  negation  of  quality  altogether,  but  only  of  this  definite  quality,  the 
place  of  which  is  at  once  occupied  by  another.  This  process  of  measure,  which 
252  F.  Engels.  Ludwig  Feuerbach  and  the  end  of  classical  German  philosophy.  Marx  and  Engels. 
Selected  Works.  Volume  2.  Lawrence  and  Wishart.  (1950.  )  P.  327  -328. 
"  The  only  person  who  has  done  any  serious  work  on  this  central  theoretical  question  of  dialectics  is 
H.  H.  Ticktin.  In  particular  see  his  articles  in  Critique,  numbers  16,17,26,  and  30-31. 
284 appears  alternately  as  a  mere  change  in  quantity,  and  then  as  a  sudden  revulsion  of 
quantity  into  quality,  may  be  envisaged  under  the  figure  of  a  nodal  (Imotted)  line.  "254 
This  is  why  Trotsky  posits  that  this  process  contains  a  presupposition,  the  transformation  of 
one  quality  into  another  quality.  The  question  is  what  processes  are  involved  that  lead  to  this 
quantitative  change  that  posits  a  new  form  of  quality?  There  could  be  no  new  emergent  and 
determinate  quality,  in  my  view,  without  the  operation  of  the  law  of  negation  of  negation 
also  being  integrated  into  this  process. 
This  dialectical  law  is  also  inherent  in  all  evolutionary  change,  and,  as  such,  it  necessarily 
has  to  be  integrated  into  the  account  of  the  process,  in  order  to  more  Mly  express  the 
quantitative  and  qualitative  break  and  transition  from  one  form  of  the  relative  unity  of 
opposites,  and  the  positing  of  a  potentially  higher  form  of  a  new  relative  unity  of  opposites. 
The  process  of  decline  and  transition  requires  to  be  analysed,  to  borrow  a  proposition  from 
Engels,  in  "accordance  with  all  the  rules  of  the  Hegelian  method  of  thought.  "  The 
theoretical  problem  is  in  understanding  the  nature  of  the  development  of  the  contradictions 
that  both  posit  a  certain  form  of  substantial  activity  at  one  moment  in  time,  and  at  the  same 
time  also  posit  its  ultimately  ongoing  inability  to  continue  to  resolve  that  contradiction;  the 
dialectical  nature  of  this  process  leads  to  the  potentiality  for  the  contradiction  to  now  resolve 
itself  in  a  higher  and  opposite  form. 
A  new  form  that  is  already  contained  within,  and  whose  very  conditions  of  existence  are 
developed  by,  the  old  form;  this  is  the  crux  of  the  theoretical  problem  in  dialectics 
bequeathed  by  the  work  of  Hegel,  Marx,  Engels,  Lenin,  and  Trotsky.  To  pose  the  question 
and  solution  to  the  problem  in  another  manner  we  need  to  consider  the  following. 
"  G.  W.  F.  Hegel.  Logic.  O.  U.  P.  (1975.  )  Paragraph  108z.  P.  159,  and  Paragraph  109z.  P.  160 
respectively. 
285 The  resolution  of  the  contradictions  contained  in  any  systematic  dialectical  form  is  resolved 
through  how  the  subject  both  posits  and  resolves  its  contradiction,  that  is,  through  the 
operation  of  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation.  By  doing  so,  it  affirms  itself  as  the 
autonomous  subject  of  the  whole  process;  this  is  how  it  dialectically  operates  as  a 
determinate  and  specific  form  and  systematic  mode. 
This  would  be  an  example  of  the  unity  of  a  relative  form  of  opposites,  to  pose  it  in  Engels 
and  Lenin's  terminology.  This  is  one  form  of  the  expression  of  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the 
negation  as  applied  to  a  systematic  whole. 
To  take  an  example  from  Marx's  critique  of  value  and  capital  to  illustrate  this,  here  we  find 
the  following  dynamic.  Marx's  analysis  of  capital,  in  the  first  few  chapters  of  volume  one,  is 
the  attempt  to  develop  the  conceptual  understanding  of  the  dynamics  that  underpin  the 
subject  of  value  as  a  systematic  whole.  What  Marx  outlines  is  the  concept  of  value  and 
capital.  In  that  sense,  value  both  posits  its  contradiction  or  negation,  and  at  the  same  time 
overcomes  it  or  negates  it,  by  doing  so  it  affirms  itself  as  the  determinate  subject  of  the 
process. 
Capital,  in  its  classical  form,  the  form  conceptualised  by  Marx  in  volume  one  of  Capital,  is  a 
system  based  on  value  that  both  posits  and  resolves  its  contradiction  by  pumping  out  surplus 
value  from  the  direct  producers.  The  system  can  do  this  in  its  developing  and  mature  forms 
of  expression.  Commodity  and  money,  production  and  circulation  manifest  themselves  as  a 
dialectical  unity  of  opposites,  and  capital  as  the  subject  of  the  process  that  takes  these 
twofold  forms,  can  operate  in  its  laws  of  motion  without  the  system  and  its  laws  being 
fundamentally  challenged. 
Here  the  dialectical  expansion  takes  a  spiral  form,  where  the  development  of  the  forces  and 
relations  of  production,  not  without  generating  their  own  forms  of  tensions,  bitter  struggles, 
and  episodic  setbacks,  nevertheless,  continues  to  develop  and  extend  the  material  conditions 
286 for  value  in  its  characteristic  activity  and  principle  of  change  and  alteration  to  operate  in  its 
own  determinate  forms  of  the  dialectical  laws  of  motion. 
The  laws  of  motion  of  the  system  do  this  through  the  umbrella  of  the  law  of  the  negation  of 
the  negation.  The  expression  of  this  law,  that  integrates  all  the  determinate  parts  of  the 
process  into  a  systematic  whole,  is  not  however  fixed  or  static  in  its  nature.  Neither  is  it  also 
the  product  of  the  movement  of  the  ideal  category  either. 
As  dialectics  is  change  that  is  inherently  absolute  in  its  nature,  then  nothing  can  ultimately 
stand  in  the  way  of  the  unfolding  of  the  contradictions  within  any  determinate  form  of 
substantial  and  systematic  activity.  Hegel's  idealist  balancing  of  the  contradictions 
contained  in  the  concepts  cannot  prevent,  the  real  contradictory  movements  that  affect  all 
forms  of  material  and  substantial  polar  interpenetration,  from  developing  and  changing  their 
nature.  .% 
The  dialectical  contradictions  in  its  material  conditions  of  activity  are  themselves  changed 
and  transformed  by  the  very  nature  of  the  systematic  activity  itself.  The  systematic 
nomological  activity  of  the  determinate  forms  of  the  subject  increasingly  finds  it 
problematic  to  posit  and  resolve  the  real  material  and  social  contradictions  within  its 
activity. 
The  material  poles  of  the  contradiction,  unlike  their  idealist  forms  of  expression,  do  not 
remain  in  the  same  symmetry  or  determinate  form  of  relation;  as  a  conceptual  unity  of 
opposites  that  is  automatically  resolved  through  the  negation  of  the  negation.  The  material 
poles  of  the  contradiction  are  in  a  process  of  constantly  evolving  and  changing,  there  is  then, 
also  an  inherent  asymmetry  in  their  material  relations  and  operation;  no  amount  of  idealist 
balancing  of  the  concepts  can  therefore  halt  this  changing  relationship  of  the  material  poles 
of  the  contradiction. 
287 Like  the  distinction  between  the  relative  and  absolute  nature  of  change,  the  symmetry  of  the 
poles  are  relative  and  transitory,  their  asymmetry  is  absolute.  This  entails  that  the  polar 
relation  itself  is  constantly  in  an  evolving  process  of  being,  as  Trotsky  would  correctly  posit 
it,  subject  to  quantitative  and  therefore  qualitative  alterations. 
These  quantitative  material  changes  within  the  polar  opposition  characteristic  of  its  activity, 
are  changes  that  threaten  the  very  qualitative  nature  of  that  systematic  polar  opposition.  The 
polar  forms,  through  acting  upon  each  other  to  resolve  the  contradiction  of  the  subject  are 
thus  subject  to  alteration,  in  both  a  quantitative  and  qualitative  fashion. 
These  quantitative  alterations  must  then  impact  on  the  qualitative  nature  of  the  negation  of 
the  negation  that  characteristically  resolves  them  as  a  systematic  unity.  However,  it  could 
also  be  argued  that  the  negation  of  the  negation  is  the  dynamic  that  leads  to  these 
quantitative  shifts  in  the  alteration  of  the  poles  that  posits  a  potentially  new  qualitative 
nature  of  the  subject. 
As  dialectical  laws  outline  the  movement  of  the  positing  and  resolving  of  the  contradiction 
inherent  to  a  determinate  and  systematic  subject,  it  necessarily  already  contains  within  the 
operation  of  the  systematic  movement  of  the  laws  of  its  fundamental  contradictions,  the 
seeds  of  its  own  destruction. 
To  briefly  return  to  the  example  of  Marx's  critique  of  value;  it  was  by  showing  the 
contradictions  within  the  determinate  forms  of  expression  of  value  and  capital  that  Marx 
was  able  to  do  not  only  one,  but  two  things. 
He  not  only  showed  how  value  as  abstract  labour  sublates  concrete  labour  and  its  product  in 
order  to  pose  its  own  systematic  activity,  at  the  same  time  he  showed  how  the  systematic 
positing  and  resolving  of  this  contradiction  also  posited  the  ongoing  material  dynamic  for  its 
further  development;  dynamics  that  are  expressed  in  its  own  specific  and  determinate  forms 
of  decline  and  supersession. 
288 As  the  forces  and  relations  of  production  historically  develop,  then  the  inverse  of  this 
systematic  positing  and  resolving  of  the  contradictions  begins  to  manifest  itself,  that  is, 
value  as  capital  finds  it  increasingly  problematic  to  posit  and  resolve  its  contradiction  of 
creating  value  and  surplus  value.  Here,  not  only  is  the  spiral  form  of  development  of  its 
arising  and  mature  forms  curtailed,  but  the  ability  to  continue  to  negate  its  own  specific  and 
determinate  forms  of  opposition  is  increasingly  undermined,  by  the  very  conditions  posited 
by  the  system's  own  development  of  the  forces  and  relations  of  production. 
This  process  is  manifested  in  the  decline  of  the  substance  of  value,  abstract  labour  and  the 
money  form,  and  a  growing  crisis  in  the  ability  of  the  system  to  maintain  the  rate  of  profit. 
This  is  the  phenomenal  reflection  of  the  changes  within  the  organic  composition  of  capital 
in  the  production  process,  with  the  quantitative  emphasis  of  capital  shifting  to  the 
development  of  the  forces  of  production  at  the  expense  of  the  living  labour  employed  in  the 
production  process. 
This  inherent  bias  or  asymmetry,  generated  by  this  shift  in  the  quantitative  relation  of  the 
polar  opposites  of  constant  and  variable  capital  in  the  production  process,  is  manifested  in 
the  tendency  of  the  rate  of  profit  to  fall  or  decline.  That  is,  capital  can  no  longer  operate  in 
its  classical  form,  and  value  finds  it  increasingly  more  problematic  to  characteristically  act 
as  value.  Capital,  from  being  a  systematic  unity  of  production  and  circulation  for  value 
accumulation  is  driven  to  take  on  the  increasingly  parasitic  and  ideal  form  of  finance  capital. 
The  system  of  accumulation  becomes  increasingly  prone  to  more  periodic  and  longer 
expressions  of  the  slumps  brought  on  by  overproduction  and  underconsumption,  where 
commodity  production  and  its  realisation  in  money,  fail  to  mutually  interpenetrate  rather 
than,  as  before,  displaying  a  vitality  and  unity  of  a  systematic  process.  This  is  manifested  in 
conjunction  with  the  growing  inability  of  capital  to  halt  the  above  tendency  of  the  rate  of 
profit  to  decline. 
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pull  apart  or  become  mutually  exclusive,  rather  than  mutually  reciprocal.  This  is  reflected  in 
the  increasing  antagonism  of  the  polar  oppositions  in  their  entire  characteristic  forms  and 
relations.  Those  of  concrete  and  abstract  labour,  of  use  and  exchange  value,  of  production 
and  circulation,  and  ultimately  in  the  social  relation  between  capital  and  commodified 
labour  power. 
The  result  of  this  process  is  the  decline  of  the  laws  of  motion  pertaining  to  the  specific  and 
substantial  nature  of  this  systematic  activity.  The  polar  opposition  of  the  contradiction  is,  in 
its  old  characteristic  principle  of  change  and  alteration  in  decline,  and  a  new  form  of  polar 
opposition,  a  new  principle  of  change  and  alteration  is  evolving  and  arising  from  within  it. 
The  problem  is  though,  to  understand  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  shift  within  these  evolving 
twofold  forms  of  polar  opposition  that  develop  within  the  driving  contradiction  pertaining  to 
the  determinate  forms  of  a  systematic  totality. 
This  evolutionary  shift  is  qualitatively  different  from  the  polar  interpenetration  pertaining  to 
the  nomological  activity  of  a  systematic  whole,  in  that  the  new  qualitative  forms  of  the 
polarity  only  emerges  as  the  result  of,  not  only  as  Trotsky  correctly  points  out,  the  dialectic 
of  quality  and  quantity,  nor  solely,  in  Lenin's  postulation,  of  the  growing  struggle  of 
mutually  exclusive  opposites,  it  also  requires  something  more.  It  requires  the  integration  of 
the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  into  this  process  of  qualitative  and  quantitative 
transformation. 
What  we  have  here  is  an  evolving  process,  one  that  ultimately  manifests  itself  in  the  inverse 
expression  of  all  the  Hegelian  laws  of  dialectics.  One  that  will,  for  an  adequate  and  fuller 
explanation  of  the  process,  fundamentally  require  the  systematic  integration  of  all  the  laws 
of  Hegelian  dialectics.  This  is  due  to  the  unfolding  of  the  following  dynamic  that  is  reflected 
in  the  nomological  forms  of  the  principle  of  change  and  alteration  of  the  subject. 
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in  the  material  and  social  conditions  that  manifest  themselves  in  the  qualitative  and 
quantitative  aspects  of  the  very  nature  of  the  subject  itself.  What  we  in  fact  have  is  a  conflict 
between  two  differing  forms  of  polar  opposites,  one  that  was  formally  dominant  but  now 
declining,  and  one  that  is  emerging  in,  its  proto-forms  of  expression,  from  the  real  material 
changes  in  its  conditions  of  existence. 
Both  these  irreconcilable  and  asymmetric  polar  expressions  of  the  contrary  forms  of  the 
laws  of  motion  of  dialectics  are,  however,  still  fundamentally  interrelated  as  they  are  the 
manifestation  of  the  further  evolution  of  the  primary  and  essential  contradictions 
characteristic  of  the  subject  in  its  further  evolutionary  change,  expressed  in  the  form  of  a 
transition  from  one  social  form  of  nomological  activity  into  another  nomological  form  of 
social  activity. 
This  is  a  more  complex  form  of  dialectical  opposition  and  interpenetration  of  opposites.  The 
polar  opposites  are  themselves  in  the  process  of  doubling  in  form,  though  still  asymmetric  in 
their  contradictory  forms  of  expression.  These  contradictions,  of  what  are  ultimately 
mutually  exclusive  and  irreconcilable  opposites,  are  themselves  uneven  and  combined  in 
their  qualitative  and  quantitative  forms  of  development.  It  is  the  unfolding  of  this  dynamic 
that  leads  to  the  absolute  struggle  of  polar  opposites,  reflected  in  the  increasing 
contradictions  within  the  old  polar  opposition.  All  these  forms  of  expression  are 
symptomatic  of  a  system  in  decline. 
In  the  process  of  this  evolutionary  change  and  transition,  the  laws  of  dialectics  manifest  a 
tendency  to  invert  into  the  opposite  forms  of  their  systematic  expression.  This  movement 
towards  the  opposite  and  inverse  form  of  motion,  encapsulated  in  the  contradiction  between 
the  law  of  value  and  the  law  of  planning,  first  manifests  itself  in  the  decline  of  the  old 
characteristic  forms  of  active  motion,  and  the  positing  of  the  arising  out  of  it,  its  potentially 
contrary  form  of  motion.  This  it  does,  for  Marx,  through  the  further  development  of  the 
material  poles  of  the  contradiction. 
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The  relative  unity  of  opposites  become  increasingly  mutually  exclusive  rather  than 
reciprocal,  and  finally,  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  no  longer  resolves  these  other 
forms  of  dialectical  laws  in  the  systematic  manner  that  formerly  posited  the  totality  of  the 
relations  characteristic  to  the  laws  of  motion  and  activity  of  the  determinate  dialectical 
forms  of  the  subject. 
It  is  the  systematic  operation  that  is  undermining  itself;  as  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the 
negation  is  the  form  that  is  ftindamental  for  the  construction  and  operation  that  coheres  the 
laws  of  motion  of  the  system  as  a  whole,  it  must  manifest  itself  as  a  key  aspect  of  the 
process  of,  not  only  decline,  but  also  transition  to  a  new  form. 
The  result  is  a  terminal  crisis  and  inability  for  the  laws  to  continue  to  operate  in  positing  and 
resolving  the  particular  activity  of  the  systematic  subject.  This  development  posits  the 
conditions  for  the  necessity  of  an  absolute  struggle  of  these  mutually  exclusive  opposites 
that  are  no  longer,  as  in  the  classical  or  mature  form,  mutually  reciprocal. 
That  evolutionary  leap  is  itself,  with  all  its  quantitative  and  qualitative  changes,  only  fully 
resolved  when  the  new  form  negates  its  old  form,  and  at  the  same  time  posits  a  new  set  of 
conditions  whereby  it  can  now  develop  its  own  specific  and  systematic  form  of  the  negation 
of  the  negation.  It  is  through  this  process  that  the  law  of  the  transformation  of  quantity  into 
quality  congeals  into  a  new  form  of  existence,  a  new  qualitative  form  of  dialectical 
interrelation  and  interpenetration  of  opposites  that  has  its  own  systematic  form  activity  and 
specific  characteristic  determination. 
This  process  also  entails  that  for  the  new  relative  form  of  the  law  of  the  interpenetration  of 
opposites  to  successfully  emerge,  there  also  has  to  be  another  form  of  the  determinate 
expression  of  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation;  that  is,  in  the  process  of  superseding 
the  old  oppositional  form  and  its  replacement  with  the  actualisation  of  its  more  evolved 
292 potentiality.  This  is  the  second  form  of  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  that  operates 
in  the  process  of  transition,  of  decline  and  supersession. 
This  manifests  itself  in  a  new  form  of  qualitative  measure,  a  new  form  of  the 
interpenetration  of  opposites,  and  a  new  form  of  the  negation  of  the  negation.  The 
expression  of  the  law  of  the  negation  of  the  negation  is  then  fundamental  for  the  analysis  of 
the  process  of  the  decline  and  transition  to  a  new  and  higher  systematic  form  of  the 
historically  evolved  subject. 
This  process  only  culminates  when  the  dialectical  laws,  taken  as  a  whole,  congeal  into  a 
new  systematic  form.  A  new  form  that  has  grown  within  the  central  contradiction  of  the  old, 
and  whose  conditions  of  existence  have  been  posited  and  developed  within  the  old  form. 
These  are  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  dialectical  processes  whereby  evolutionary  leaps 
can  begin  to  assert  themselves  in  an  absolute  rather  than  relative  sense. 
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